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PRIMARY AGENCIES 
 
State:   Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) 
Federal:   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
International:  World Health Organization (WHO) 
 
 
SUPPORT AGENCIES 
 
State:   Arizona Division of Emergency Management (ADEM) 
   Office of Attorney General 
   Governor’s Office 
   State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers 
   Department of Agriculture 
   Department of Corrections 
   Department of Economic Security 
   Department of Administration 
   
County:   Health Departments 
  County Hospitals 
   Emergency Management Departments 
   Medical Examiners 
   
Local:   Metropolitan Medical Response Systems 
   Incorporated Community Governments 
  City Emergency Managers 
 
Federal:   Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
   U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) 
   Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) 
  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
  Indian Health Service (IHS) 
   Veterans Administration (VA) Medical Centers 
   U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
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Private:    Local Medical Facilities 
  Arizona Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
Arizona Health Care and Hospital Association 
  Arizona Funeral Directors Association 
   Arizona Chapter of American College of Emergency Physicians 
   Arizona Medical Association 
  Arizona Infectious Disease Society 
   Arizona Osteopathic Medical Association 
   Arizona Chapter of the Emergency Department Nurses Association 
  Arizona Nurses Association 
   Association of Practitioners of Infection Control 
 
 
Volunteer:  American Red Cross 
  Critical Incident Stress Debriefing – Arizona Chapter 
   Arizona Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (AzVOAD) 
   Salvation Army 
   University of Arizona (medical/nursing/pharmacist/public health students) 
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1.0 Executive Summary 
It is likely that another influenza pandemic will occur sometime in the future.  Arizona needs to be prepared for such an event.  
To lessen the impact of an influenza pandemic, the State of Arizona has created this Influenza Pandemic Response Plan to 
promote an effective response throughout the pandemic.  The plan was originally crafted in 2000, through a coordinated effort 
of the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS), Arizona Division of Emergency Management (ADEM), local health 
departments and other partners and stakeholders.  It is also an annex to the Arizona State Emergency Response and Recovery 
Plan (SERRP).  
 
The United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) has incorporated the World Health Organization 
(WHO) Pandemic Planning Periods and Phases into its 
influenza pandemic response plan.  These periods represent 
different levels of impact on society, based on the progression 
of a novel influenza virus and its potential to cause a 
pandemic; therefore, pandemic preparedness requires 
determining the appropriate capabilities, roles, and 
responsibilities needed to respond to the different periods.   In 
keeping with the national model, the Arizona Influenza 
Pandemic Response Plan identifies responsible parties and 
prescribes necessary actions, based on the WHO/HHS 
pandemic periods.    
 
While a pandemic response is primarily a public health response, many agencies, organizations, and private institutions will 
need to work in a coordinated and collaborative manner to ensure an effective overall response in Arizona:  
• ADHS is the lead agency for preparedness and response to an influenza pandemic in Arizona.   
• Local health departments (including county and tribal health departments) are the critical local response entities and 
should be the center of gravity for community level planning.  
• Emergency management and homeland security agencies will be important for ensuring overall coordination of 
government resources.   
• First responder agencies have important manpower and logistical resources that will be necessary for ensuring the 
safety of individuals and communities.   
• Hospitals and health care institutions will be the frontline of a pandemic and are essential planning partners at the 
local and state level.   
• Volunteer agencies are always important partners in emergency response activities. 
These entities are addressed in this plan, and are encouraged to develop their own influenza pandemic response plans that 
coordinate with the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan.     
 
The heart of the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan is the Response Activity Supplements.  The Response Activity 
Supplements address the concepts listed below.  These Supplements are subject-area specific and provide very detailed 
planning and response activities.  The Response Activity Supplements are subject to change and will be updated with changes 
in planning assumptions, response capacities, or information on potential pandemic strains and subsequent disease. 
Surveillance and Epidemiology -Arizona’s influenza surveillance system, which monitors influenza activity in 
the state, will provide the surveillance data needed to guide response efforts during a pandemic.   
Laboratory Diagnostics - The capability of identifying pandemic influenza viruses depends not only on rapid 
detection and characterization but also on strong partnerships between clinical and public health laboratories. 
Health Care Coordination and Surge Capacity - The health care system in Arizona will experience significant 
strains on its resources during a pandemic; preparedness for which includes surge capacity and mortuary issues. 
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Infection Control - The ability to limit transmission of the influenza virus already exists in the health care 
settings – the appropriate and thorough application of infection control measures.   
Clinical Guidelines - Early identification and appropriate medical intervention are essential for patients who 
present with suspect pandemic influenza symptoms. 
Vaccine and Antiviral Distribution and Use - During a pandemic, vaccines and antivirals may or not be 
effective or  available, will likely be in short supply and will have to be allocated on a priority basis.   
Community and Travel-Related Disease Control - Public health interventions, such as quarantine and social 
distancing, will be necessary during a pandemic to slow the transmission of disease in the community. 
Public Health Communications - Response officials will need to provide accurate and timely coordinated 
messages to the public leading up to, and during, a pandemic; 
an informed public is an asset to the overall response. 
Workforce Support - Response agencies and organizations 
need to ensure the safety and well being of response personnel 
to ensure and sustained and effective response 
Influenza Pandemic Information Management - Information 
management is the central nervous system of a complex 
response system, and a pandemic presents many needs for 
capturing, analyzing and sharing information. 
Guidance for County and Tribal Health Departments - This 
guidance is designed to help spotlight important planning and 
response activities that are necessary at the local health 
department level. 
 
Arizona has many facets: an international border, numerous Indian Nations, diverse and rich cultures, a rural vs. urban health 
care divide, a collaborative emergency response structure, and both a strong sense of community and rugged individualism.  
Understanding and appropriately addressing these facets will allow Arizona to be as prepared as possible for the unthinkable. 
 
2.0    Introduction and Background 
Influenza pandemics struck three times in the 20th century causing varying degrees of increased illness and death over annual 
influenza outbreaks.  Of particular note is the 1918 Pandemic, oft referred to as the Spanish Flu, where upwards of 50 million 
people died around the world and untold number of illnesses along with catastrophic disruption to society as a whole.  It is 
likely that another influenza pandemic will occur sometime in the future.  The State of Arizona needs to be prepared for such 
an event.   
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “An influenza pandemic (or global pandemic) occurs when a new 
influenza virus subtype appears, against which no one is immune.”  In past pandemics, influenza viruses have spread 
worldwide within months, and are expected to spread even more quickly given modern travel patterns.  There may be as little 
as one to six months warning before outbreaks begin in the United States.  Outbreaks are expected to occur simultaneously, 
preventing shifts in resources that commonly occur in other natural disasters.  An influenza pandemic is considered to be a 
high-probability event, and some experts consider it to be inevitable. 
  
In Arizona, an influenza pandemic would result in numerous persons ill with influenza.  The number of persons hospitalized 
would exceed the capacity of these institutions.  Additionally, the number of deaths due to influenza like illness (ILI) would 
rise above regular influenza season rates.  The Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan was developed to promote an 
effective and coordinated response, from the interpandemic period through the end of the pandemic period. 
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To prepare for the next pandemic, public health officials from around the world have initiated the planning process. The 
development of Arizona’s plan is a coordinated effort and is based on the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Pandemic Influenza Plan, November 2005 http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/  and the Pandemic Influenza Incident Annex 
to the State Emergency Response and Recovery Plan (SERRP). 
 
2.1 Organization of the Plan 
This plan is an Annex to the Arizona Department of Health Services Emergency Response Plan. The response activities will be 
carried out in collaboration with the Arizona Division of Emergency Management and local health departments and other local, 
state and federal agencies and organizations. 
 
International and national pandemic planning is divided into four periods and a total of six phases that range from the absence 
of a new virus subtype to resolution of the pandemic.  The periods are: 
• Interpandemic (Phases 1 and 2) 
• Pandemic Alert (Phase 3, 4 and 5) 
• Pandemic (Phase 6) 
• Postpandemic 
 
See Appendix B for definitions of the phases within the periods listed. 
 
The Arizona plan follows the WHO phase guidelines and the national HHS model of prescribing necessary activities and 
identifying responsible parties by the first three periods containing six phases.  The main plan provides a general overview of 
the ADHS response followed by 13 subject specific supplements. 
 
3.0      Situation and Assumptions 
The development of the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan 
is based on the following assumptions: 
• An influenza pandemic is likely to occur sometime in the 
future. 
• A new virus subtype will likely emerge in a country other 
than the United States, although a novel strain could first 
emerge in the United States. 
• Although there may be isolated pockets, the pandemic 
could affect all geographic areas of the state. 
• When the pandemic occurs, vaccines and medicines will 
be in short supply and will have to be allocated on a 
priority basis. 
• The federal government has assumed responsibility for devising a liability program for vaccine manufacturers and 
persons administering the vaccine. 
• Arizona’s temporary residents, winter visitors, migrant workers and tourists will create a potential vaccination target 
population of nearly double that of the permanent resident population. 
• The emergency response element will require the substantial interaction of state and local agencies in addition to the 
local health departments. 
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• Response to the demand for services will require non-standard approaches, including: 
o Discharge of all but critically ill hospital patients 
o Expansion of hospital capacity by using all available space and equipment on the hospital campus 
o Adjust patient-to-hospital staff ratio 
o Recruitment of volunteers who can provide custodial services under the general supervision of health and 
medical workers 
o Relaxation of practitioner licensure requirements as deemed appropriate 
o Utilization of general purpose and special needs shelters as temporary health facilities. 
o Expansion of mortuary services capacity 
• The federal government has assumed responsibility for developing “generic” guidelines and information templates, 
including fact sheets, triage and treatment of influenza patient protocols, and guidelines for the distribution and use 
of antiviral agents that can be modified at the state and local level.  Until these are developed and available, the state 
has the responsibility to develop such guidelines for its citizens. 
• Secondary bacterial infections following influenza illness may stress antibiotic supplies. 
 
 
4.0. Concept of Operations 
The Pandemic Flu response strategy involves the following elements: 
• Federal guidance and direction 
• Local support 
• Public Health Incident Management System (PHIMS) 
• Statewide Emergency Response 
• Liability 
• Tribal Activities 
• Border Activities 
• Special Populations  
• Executive and Regional Planning Committees 
• Response Activity Supplements 
1. Surveillance and Epidemiology 
2. Laboratory Diagnostics 
3. Health Care Coordination and Surge Capacity 
4. Infection Control 
5. Clinical Guidelines 
6. Vaccine Distribution and Use 
7. Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use 
8. Community Disease Control and Prevention 
9. Managing Travel-Related Risk of Disease Transmission 
10. Public Health Communications 
11. Workforce Support: Psychosocial Considerations and Information Needs 
12. Influenza Pandemic Information Management 
13. Guidance for County and Tribal Health Departments 
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4.1  Federal Guidance and Direction 
As the pandemic develops, the World Health Organization (WHO) will notify the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and other national health agencies on the progress of the pandemic.  CDC will communicate with ADHS and other state 
and territorial health departments about pandemic stages, information about the virus (laboratory findings), vaccine 
availability, recommendations for prioritizing vaccine and antivirals/antibiotics, national response coordination and other 
recommended strategies for pandemic detection, control and response. ADHS serves as the main conduit for communications 
with the CDC for all statewide parties. 
 
4.2 Local Support 
There is integration between local and state emergency management structure.  The primary response is at the local level with 
coordination and support from ADHS.  Local health departments (LHDs) (including county and tribal health departments) will 
carry out the components of the pandemic flu response in their communities.  Each county is expected to have its own 
pandemic flu plan that is consistent with the Department’s plan.  Necessary local health department actions are detailed in the 
Response Activity Supplements.  Examples of local health departments’ activities include: conducting flu surveillance in their 
jurisdictions; distributing and administering flu vaccine, if available; and responding to all crises in their jurisdiction, such as 
health care facility surge capacity, public inquiry and media requests, etc. 
 
ADHS will provide support to the local health departments if their resources are exceeded.  Additionally, ADHS will provide 
regular updates on pandemic status and response activities to the local health departments, through conference calls, Secure 
Integrated Response Electronic Notification (SIREN) (see Supplement 12) postings, health alerts and other avenues. 
 
4.3 Public Health Incident Management System (PHIMS) 
The ADHS incident management structure used in the Department is the “Public Health Incident Management System,” or 
PHIMS, as described in the ADHS Public Health Emergency Response Plan. Please refer to Appendix C – PHIMS 
Description.  This structure is compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and is in place but inactivated 
during normal day-to-day operations.  In the event of an emergency or when activities become overwhelming, the Director, 
will assign an Incident Commander within Public Health Services to coordinate the Department’s activities and report to the 
command staff.  The command staff and the Incident Commander work together to keep the Agency Administrator (Director) 
well informed.  It is also essential to coordinate with the local health departments and other agencies. 
 
The PHIMS command staff will devise the overall structure and responsibilities of “command and control” operations.  The 
command staff will oversee planning, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts. 
 
4.4 Statewide Emergency Response 
If the Governor declares a State of Emergency, the State’s emergency management structure is put into place (refer to the State 
Emergency Response and Recovery Plan (SERRP)) www.dem.state.az.us/preparedness/SERRP/SERRP_Layout_Index.html  
According to the Pandemic Influenza Incident Annex of the SERRP, the ADHS is listed as the primary agency and will provide 
the Incident Commander to oversee all of the statewide activities.  ADEM will operate the State Emergency Operations Center 
(SEOC) and provide other logistical support.  ADHS and ADEM will work together, in conjunction with local health 
departments, local emergency management, and other partners and stakeholders.  The responsibilities of agencies will increase 
with each successive stage of the pandemic. 
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In addition to the SERRP, which is designed to provide support to the State’s counties and cities, each State agency has written 
a Business Continuity Plan (BCP).  The goal of the BCP is to assist each state agency to prepare for, mitigate, respond to and 
recover from an emergency event capable of either causing significant injuries to employees or the public or disrupting normal 
business operations and damaging the environment.  The BCP strategic planning process began several years ago and as of 
2006 has entered into a third phase of planning.  This level emphasizes that each agency identify its critical business functions 
and identify or establish interdependency among agencies to support the resumption of these functions. The highly infectious 
characteristics of an influenza pandemic represent an incident that could limit the available workforce and have a substantial 
effect on these services.  
 
4.5 Liability 
There are several state references to the liability of volunteers in the event of a state of war emergency or a state of emergency. 
(for Federal, see Authorities in Appendix D) 
 
Under ARS § 26-310 Use of Professional Skills, during a state of war emergency or state of emergency, any person holding 
any license, certificate, or other permit issued by any state evidencing the meeting of qualifications of such state for 
professional skills may render aid involving such skill to meet the emergency as fully as if such license had been issued in this 
state. 
Under ARS § 23-901.06 Volunteer Workers, In addition to persons defined as employees under section 23-901, volunteer 
workers of a county, city, town, or other political subdivision of the state may be deemed to be employees and entitled to the 
benefits provided by this chapter upon the passage of a resolution or ordinance by the political subdivision defining the nature 
and type of volunteer work and workers to be entitled to such benefits. The basis for computing compensation benefits and 
premium payments shall be four hundred dollars per month. 
Under ARS § 26-314, Immunity of state, political subdivisions and officers, agents and emergency workers; limitation rules,  
The Department, (ADHS) or any other state agency, will not be liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance, or 
the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function or duty by an emergency worker, engaging in emergency 
management activities or performing emergency functions.  This state and its departments, agencies, boards and commissions 
and all other political subdivisions that supervise or control emergency workers engaging in emergency activities or emergency 
functions are responsible for providing for liability coverage, including legal defense, of an emergency worker if necessary.  
Coverage provided if the emergency worker is acting within the course and scope of assigned duties and is engaged in an 
authorized activity, except for actions of willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith. 
 
4.6 Tribal Activities 
For several years, preparedness activities and coordination have taken place among ADHS, the Arizona tribes, Indian Health 
Service, county health departments and the Intertribal Council of Arizona (ITCA).  This includes writing response plans, 
attending training opportunities and furthering the development of mass vaccination strategies and resources.  Due to the varied 
nature of public health services for the 21 different Indian Nations in Arizona (e.g., tribal health agency-only, IHS-only, tribal 
agency-IHS combination), this plan does not provide specific response actions at the tribal level.  ADHS is completing an 
additional supplement (Supplement 13) which provides general guidance for both county and tribal health agencies to assist 
these entities in the creation of their respective plans. 
 
The Indian Health Service (IHS) Area Offices are in the process of completing their influenza pandemic response plans.  In 
turn, each Service Area will develop a plan for their respective facility.   
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4.7 Border Activities 
In the event of a Binational public health emergency, the ADHS Office of Border Health (OBH) serves as the conduit for 
communication and coordination with the Sonoran state health department.  The OBH shares disease surveillance information 
with the Secretaria de Salud de Sonora (Sonoran State Health Department), specifically with the State Epidemiologists, as well 
as with local border health authorities via secure email, telephone, and/or fax. 
    
The OBH is instrumental in coordinating Binational emergency preparedness and response planning with the Arizona border 
county Health Departments, the Tohono O’odham Nation, Indian Health Services, and the Sonora State and municipal health 
departments in the Arizona-Sonora border region.  The OBH is currently conducting 
SIREN training with the State and local health department personnel in Sonora to 
improve Bi-national disease surveillance, communication and emergency preparedness 
and planning coordinating efforts through increased utilization of SIREN.  OBH is also 
coordinating planning with U.S. Border Patrol. 
 
4.8 Special Populations 
In April of 2005, ADHS completed a study that covered demographics and effective 
risk communication needs of special populations in Arizona  
(http://www.azdhs.gov/phs/edc/edrp/es/pdf/adhsspecialpopstudy.pdf).  Special 
populations include those persons who are physically disabled, mentally impaired, the 
elderly, those that live in rural communities or whose primary language is not English.  
Commonly used methods of risk communication may not reach or have little impact 
among these persons and therefore more creative measures are needed.  Accurate 
translation of risk communication materials and use of community agencies and 
spokespersons to provide key messages were among those approaches identified that 
would be effective to communicate to various special needs populations. 
  
4.9 Executive and Arizona Regional Coordinating Committees 
The State Epidemiologist and the Chief of Public Health Preparedness are the ADHS co-chairs of the ADHS Executive 
Pandemic Planning Committee.  This committee is comprised of members from the following Bureaus: Epidemiology and 
Disease Control, State Laboratory, Emergency Preparedness and Response (BEPR), and Public Information. BEPR will ensure 
that the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan is maintained, reviewed, and revised annually. 
 
The Arizona Regional Coordinating Committee planning meetings are coordinated with the Public Health Region meetings.  
There are four regions and the meetings are held quarterly.  Participants in the region meetings include public health, 
emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management and local hospitals.   
 
4.10 Response Activity Supplements 
The heart of the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan is the Response Activity Supplements.  The following gives 
general information about concepts and activities in the Response Activity Supplements, which are attached to this plan 
following the Appendices.  These Supplements are subject-area specific and provide very detailed planning and response 
activities.  The activities listed are subject to change and will be updated with changes in planning assumptions, response 
capacities, or information on potential pandemic strains and subsequent disease. 
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4.10a Supplement 1:  Surveillance and Epidemiology 
Arizona’s influenza surveillance system, which monitors influenza activity in the state, will provide the surveillance data 
needed to guide response efforts during a pandemic.  Supplement 1 provides a summary of influenza surveillance activities 
conducted during normal influenza seasons as well as proposed enhancements to surveillance that would be implemented in the 
event of a pandemic. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Virologic surveillance during interpandemic influenza season 
 Disease surveillance during interpandemic influenza season 
Surveillance for novel strains of influenza during the Pandemic Alert Period 
 Veterinary Surveillance 
 Preparedness planning for virologic and disease surveillance during a pandemic 
 Management of patients infected with novel strains of influenza and their contacts 
Pandemic Enhanced surveillance 
 Scaled-back surveillance 
 
4.10b Supplement 2:  Laboratory Diagnostics 
The public health laboratory is a critical component of the overall public health response to an influenza pandemic.  The 
capability of differentiating common influenza from pandemic influenza depends upon the rapid detection and characterization 
that is available only at public health laboratories.  Supplement 2 identifies the role of clinical and hospital laboratories and the 
State Public Health Laboratory as well as recommended activities. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Laboratory support for seasonal influenza surveillance 
 Laboratory testing for novel influenza subtypes 
 Laboratory planning to support the response to an influenza pandemic 
Pandemic Laboratory support for disease surveillance 
 Laboratory support for clinicians 
 Biocontainment procedures 
 Occupational health issues for laboratory workers 
 
4.10c Supplement 3:  Health Care Coordination and Surge Capacity 
The health care system in Arizona will experience significant strains on its resources during a pandemic.  Supplement 3 
describes the planning and actions necessary for the provision of care in hospitals and other health care settings including surge 
capacity and mortuary issues. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Provision of care in hospitals 
 Provision of care in non-hospital settings 
Pandemic Activating the facility’s influenza pandemic response plan 
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4.10d Supplement 4:  Infection Control 
The ability to limit transmission of the influenza virus in health care settings will rely heavily on the appropriate and thorough 
application of infection control measures.  Supplement 4 provides guidance to health care and public health partners on the 
basic principles of infection control including personal protective equipment for limiting the spread of pandemic influenza. 
 
Primary Information and Recommendations: 
Basic infection control principles for preventing the spread of pandemic influenza in health care settings 
Management of infectious patients 
Infection control practices for health care personnel 
Occupational health issues 
Reducing exposure of persons at risk for complications of pandemic influenza 
Health Care setting specific guidance 
Care of pandemic influenza patients in the home 
Care of pandemic influenza patients at alternative sites 
Infection control in schools and workplaces 
Infection control in community settings 
 
4.10e Supplement 5:  Clinical Guidelines 
The role of clinical guidelines magnifies itself during a pandemic from its use during a normal influenza season but involves 
the same components.  Early identification and appropriate medical intervention are essential.  Supplement 5 focuses on the 
initial screening, assessment and management of patients who present from the community with fever and/or respiratory 
symptoms during the pandemic periods. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Criteria for evaluation of patients with possible novel influenza 
 Initial management of patients who meet the criteria for novel influenza 
 Management of patients who test positive for novel influenza 
 Management of patients who test positive for seasonal influenza 
 Management of patients who test negative for novel influenza 
Pandemic Criteria for patients with possible pandemic influenza 
 Initial management of patients who meet the criteria for pandemic influenza 
 Clinical management of pandemic influenza patients 
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4.10f Supplement 6:  Vaccine Distribution and Use 
Before an influenza vaccine that is effective against the circulating pandemic virus strain is made available, criteria for its use 
must be established based upon scientific information as well as projections of available supply.  Supplement 6 provides 
actions and recommendations to state and local partners and other stakeholders on planning for the different elements of a 
pandemic vaccination program. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Vaccination against seasonal influenza virus strains 
 Preparedness planning for vaccination against a pandemic influenza virus 
Pandemic Before vaccine is available 
 When vaccine becomes available 
 
 
4.10g Supplement 7:  Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use 
Appropriate use of antivirals during an influenza pandemic may reduce morbidity and mortality and diminish the 
overwhelming demands that will be placed on the health care system.  Supplement 7 provides recommendations to state  
and local partners and to health care providers in Arizona on the distribution and use of antiviral drugs for treatment and 
prophylaxis during an influenza pandemic.  
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Use of antivirals in management of cases of novel influenza 
 Preparedness planning for use of antivirals during a pandemic 
Pandemi5c When pandemic influenza cases are reported abroad, or sporadic pandemic 
influenza cases are reported in the United States without evidence of spread 
 When there is limited transmission of pandemic influenza in the United States 
 When there is widespread transmission of pandemic influenza in the United States 
 
 
4.10h Supplement 8:  Community Disease Control and Prevention 
For the purposes of this response plan, “Isolation” refers to the separation of an individual with influenza from non-infected 
individuals. “Quarantine” refers to the separation of an individual or individuals exposed to influenza from non-infected and 
non-exposed individuals. As the phases of an influenza pandemic progress, use of quarantine to suspend transmission may 
have limited success and broader community containment measures may be utilized. Supplement 8  
defines and lists strategies and activities for implementation of community containment measures to be used during a 
pandemic.  Supplement 8 also contains legal preparedness templates. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Community preparedness for implementation of pandemic influenza containment 
measures 
 Containment of small clusters of infection with novel strains of influenza 
Pandemic Containment measures for individuals 
 Community-based containment measures 
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4.10i Supplement 9:  Managing Travel-Related Risk of Disease Transmission 
In a world of modern air travel and a relatively short incubation period of the influenza virus disease spread will likely be rapid 
during an influenza pandemic. Supplement 9 details travel-related containment strategies and activities to be used during 
different phases of an influenza pandemic. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Preparedness for implementation of travel-related containment measures 
 Health information for travelers 
 Evaluation of travel-related cases of infection with novel strains of influenza 
 Preventing the importation of infected birds and animals 
Pandemic Travel-related containment measures 
 De-escalation of travel-related control measures 
 
 
4.10j Supplement 10:  Public Health Communications 
Solid tools and approaches of proven risk communication methods are an essential component to education and action by all 
affected during an influenza pandemic.  The overarching goal of the Communications Strategy is to provide timely, accurate 
and pertinent information to the public and other stakeholders.  Supplement 10 covers education and information dissemination 
to the general public, health care providers, response agencies and organizations, community leaders, and other groups of 
individuals. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Assessing communication capacity and needs 
 Conducting collaborative planning 
 Developing and testing standard state and local procedures for disseminating 
information 
 Developing, testing and disseminating locally tailored Interpandemic messages and 
materials 
Pandemic Activating emergency communications plans 
 Refining and delivering messages 
 Providing timely, accurate information 
 Providing coordinated communications leadership across jurisdictional tiers (e.g. 
local, regional, state, national) 
 Promptly addressing rumors, misperceptions, stigmatization and unrealistic 
expectations about the capacity of public and private health providers 
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4.10k Supplement 11:  Workforce Support: Psychosocial 
Considerations and Information Needs 
The response to an influenza pandemic will pose substantial physical, personal, social and emotional challenges to health care 
providers, public health officials and other essential service workers.  Supplement 11 addresses the psychological and social 
(“psychosocial”) needs of the occupational groups that will participate in the Arizona response to an influenza pandemic. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Institutionalizing psychosocial support systems 
 Preparing workforce support materials 
 Developing workforce resilience programs 
Pandemic Delivering psychosocial support services 
 Providing information to responders 
 Implementing workforce resilience programs 
 
 
4.10l Supplement 12:  Influenza Pandemic Information Management 
Public Health Informatics is the systemic study of information in the public health system.  Specifically, how it is captured, 
retrieved and used in making decisions as well as the tools and methods used to manage this information and support decisions.  
Supplement 12 describes the role and activities for informatics systems that support surveillance, vaccine and pharmaceutical 
delivery, emergency response and communications needs during an influenza pandemic. 
 
Period Primary Actions 
Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Enhance and continue use of electronic surveillance systems 
 Maintain public information on AZ 211 
 Conduct inventory of all equipment and information gathering/tracking systems 
 Test alerting and communications systems 
 Prepare for Health Emergency Operations Center operations 
Pandemic Use of event-specific collaborative communication portals 
 Activate identified volunteers 
 Maintain communication of Health Emergency Operations Center with State 
Emergency Operations Center 
 Continue use of Health Alert Network notifications and communications 
 
 
4.10m Supplement 13: Guidance for County and Tribal Health Departments 
Supplement 13 is a guidance document designed to assist county and tribal health departments in detailing the local health 
responsibilities during an influenza pandemic in accordance with the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan. 
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4.11 Ethical Considerations 
In a situation such as an influenza pandemic, there will likely be a 
shortage of medical personnel and resources such as vaccines, antivirals 
and hospital bed space.  Under these conditions, ethical considerations 
become apparent as decisions regarding which persons receive the scarce 
resources must be made.  In addition, enforcing isolation and quarantine 
measures and anticipating the amount of risk medical personnel are 
willing to take, are issues that also involve ethical components such as 
civil liberties and professional codes of conduct. 
 
Processes and policies for these and other areas should be carefully 
considered and fairly implemented.  Close collaboration with community 
leaders and the Department’s legal council in developing these 
approaches is essential.  Public education programs covering the rationale 
for such decisions can improve their effectiveness. 
 
5.0  Organizational Roles and Responsibilities 
 
5.1 State Government 
 
State Board of Pharmacy 
• Provide guidance regarding proper certification and utilization of pharmacists in an emergency response (ex. mass 
vaccination clinics) 
 
 Arizona Department of Economic Security 
• CPS program-assist with the placement of orphans in foster care 
 
5.2 Local Government 
County Emergency Management 
• Operate the County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) 
• Maintain contact with the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 
 
County Health Departments 
• Recruit sentinel sites and other reporting sources as appropriate to the pandemic phase/level 
• Ensure timely and consistent reporting from sentinel sites and other reporting sources 
• Provide county surveillance information to state surveillance personnel; maintain regular communications with state 
surveillance personnel 
• Conduct additional primary surveillance as needed 
• Set-up and administer mass vaccination sites 
• Implement Isolation and Quarantine as needed 
 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) 
• Administer vaccine to first responder and law enforcement communities 
• Assist in providing PPE to first responder and law enforcement personnel 
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5.3 Federal Government 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
• Provide on-going surveillance updates and guidance 
• Provide criteria for influenza vaccine and antiviral use 
• Provide local assistance as requested 
• Consult with vaccine and antiviral manufacturers on availability 
• Investigate alternative resources (manufacturers) of vaccine and antivirals 
 
Indian Health Service (IHS) 
  
IHS Area Offices 
• Work with ADHS, tribes and counties in influenza pandemic response planning 
• Supply framework and oversight for Service Units in developing their influenza pandemic response plans 
• Provide behavioral health support  to service unit patients and hospital staff as needed 
• Translation of patient and visitor information (if needed) for service units 
• Provide training to service units to enable them to develop their own programs 
• Consult with tribes to provide guidance, oversight, and implementation of quarantine on tribal lands 
 
IHS Service Units 
• Prepare their individual influenza pandemic response plans that address the following criteria: 
o Hospital Surveillance 
o Communications 
o Triage, clinical evaluation and admission procedures 
o Triggers for surge capacity 
o Prioritization of vaccine administration 
o Education and training for hospital personnel 
o How the facility will participate in the community plan for distribution of vaccine or antiviral drugs 
o Security 
o Mortuary Issues 
o Occupational Health Issues 
 
 Food and Drug Administration 
• Oversee the safety and viability of vaccines and pharmaceuticals  
 
 
5.4 Private Organizations/Volunteer Organizations 
• Supply resources and volunteers for mass dispensing sites 
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6.0     Appendices 
A. List of Acronyms 
B. World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Phases 2005 
C. PHIMS Description & Organizational Chart 
D.    Legal Authorities 
 
7.0 Response Activity Supplements 
1. Surveillance and Epidemiology 
2.  Laboratory Diagnostics 
3.  Health Care Coordination and Surge Capacity 
4.   Infection Control 
5.   Clinical Guidelines 
6.   Vaccine Distribution and Use 
7.   Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use 
8.   Community Disease Control and Prevention 
9.  Managing Travel-Related Risk of Disease Transmission 
10.  Public Health Communications 
11.  Workforce Support: Psychosocial Considerations and Information Needs 
12.  Influenza Pandemic Information Management 
13.  Guidance for County and Tribal Health Departments 
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APPENDIX A 
List Of Acronyms 
AAC – Arizona Administrative Code 
ADEM – Arizona Division of Emergency Management 
ADES – Arizona Department of Economic Security 
ADHS – Arizona Department of Health Services 
AEFI – Adverse Events Following Immunization 
AH1, AH3, AH5, AH7 – Types of Influenza A Virus (H=Hemagglutinin) 
AIPO – Arizona Immunization Program Office 
AOMA – Arizona Osteopathic Medical Association 
APHIS – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
ARMA – Arizona Medical Association 
ARC – American Red Cross 
ARS – Arizona Revised Statutes 
ASIIS – Arizona State Immunization Information System 
ASL – Arizona State Public Health Laboratory 
AZ211 – Arizona 2-1-1 Online 
AzVOAD – Arizona Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters 
AzVOL – Arizona Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory 
BCP – Business Continuity Plan 
BEPR – Bureau of Emergency Preparedness and Response 
BSL – Laboratory Biosafety Level 
CBER – Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
CBRNE – Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive 
CDC – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CEOC – County Emergency Operations Center 
CHC – Community Health Center 
CHD – County Health Department 
CIR – Community Information and Referral 
CISA – Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment 
CISM – Critical Incident Stress Management 
CSTE – Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
DBHS – Division of Behavioral Health Services 
DMAT – Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 
DMORT – Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams 
DOD – Department of Defense 
EAP - Employee Assistance Program 
EDC - Epidemiology and Disease Control 
EDR – Electronic Death Registration 
EIP – Emerging Infections Program 
ELR – Electronic Laboratory Reporting 
EMSCOM – Emergency Medical Systems Communications 
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency 
EPI-X – Epidemic Information Exchange 
ESAR-VHP – Emergency System for the Advanced Reporting of Volunteer Health Professionals 
EMS – Emergency Medical Services 
EWIDS – Early Warning Infectious Disease Surveillance 
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FDA – Food and Drug Administration 
H5-N1 – Avian Influenza A 
HAN – Health Alert Network 
HAZMAT – Hazardous Materials 
HEICS – Hospital Emergency Incident Command System 
HHS – U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HPAI – Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
IDES- Infectious Disease Epidemiology Section 
HEOC – Health Emergency Operations Center 
HI – Hemagglutination Inhibition 
ICS – Incident Command System 
IDES – Infectious Disease Epidemiology Section 
ILI – Influenza Like Illness 
IHS – Indian Health Service 
IND – Investigational New Drug 
IRB – Institutional Review Board 
ITCA – Intertribal Council of Arizona 
ITS – Information Technology Services 
JENC – Joint Emergency News Center 
JIC – Joint Information Center 
JTF-CS – Joint Task Force Civil Support 
KAB – Knowledge, Attitude and Beliefs 
LHD – Local Health Department 
LIMS – Laboratory Information Management System 
LITS – Laboratory Information Tracking System 
MAM – MEDSIS Arbovirus Module 
MEDSIS – Medical Electronic Disease Surveillance Intelligence System 
MMRS – Metropolitan Medical Response System 
NCHS – National Center for Health Statistics 
NDMS – National Disaster Medical System 
NIMS – National Incident Management System 
NMRT – National Medical Response Team 
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NNDSS – National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System 
NRDMS – National Retail Data Monitoring System 
NREVSS – National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance 
NRP – National Response Plan 
NVPO – National Vaccine Program Office 
NVSN – New Vaccine Surveillance Network 
OEP – Office of Emergency Preparedness 
OIDS – Office of Infectious Disease Services 
OTC – Over the Counter 
PHILS – Public Health Information System 
PHIMS – Public Health Incident Management System 
PIO- Public Information Officer 
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment 
Q & A – Question and Answer(s) 
RACES – Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service  
RBHA – Regional Behavioral Health Authority 
RRT – Rapid Response Team 
RT - PCR – Real Time - Polymerase Chain Reaction 
SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
SEOC – State Emergency Operations Center 
SERRP – State Emergency Response and Recovery Plan 
SIREN – Secure Integrated Response Electronic Notification 
SNS – Strategic National Stockpile 
UA – University of Arizona 
USDA – United States Department of Agriculture 
USNORTHCOM – United States Northern Command 
USPS – United States Public Health Service 
VA – Veterans Administration 
VACMAN – Vaccine Management System 
VAERS – Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System 
VAPPC – Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization Policy Committee 
VFC – Vaccines For Children Program 
VS – Veterinary Services 
WHO – World Health Organization 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
New  World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Phases – May 2005 
Interpandemic Period –  
Phase 1 
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans.  An influenza virus subtype that has caused human 
infection may be present in animals.  If present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is considered to be 
low. 
Phase 2 
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans.  However, a circulating animal influenza virus 
subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease. 
Pandemic Alert Period –  
Phase 3 
Human infections with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread or at most rare instances of spread to a close 
contact. 
Phase 4 
Small cluster(s) with human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not 
well adapted to humans. 
Phase 5 
Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better 
adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk) 
Pandemic period - 
Phase 6 
Pandemic phase increased and sustained transmission in general population. 
Postpandemic period – 
Return to interpandemic period 
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APPENDIX C 
PHIMS Organization 
The Public Health Incident Management System (PHIMS) is the Department’s Incident Management System.  It is an 
organizational framework within which the Department responds to an emergency that is consistent with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).  During an emergency, Department resources such as personnel and supplies as well as 
activities, may need to be mobilized across programs.  The PHIMS response utilizes a structure that fosters communications 
between the tactical (front line responders) and through a chain-of-command.  This structure is NIMS compliant. 
PHIMS Staff 
(See the Influenza Pandemic PHIMS Response Organizational Chart located after this introduction as a visual example) 
The Agency Administrator consists of the Department Director or their designee who oversees the response.  A Public Policy 
Advisory Group may be assembled as needed and is comprised of selected Department Response Sector Leaders (Division 
Directors, Bureau and Office Chiefs) to assist the Agency Administrator in developing public policy recommendations.  The 
Agency Administrator then assigns an Incident Commander who is responsible for managing the Department’s response 
activities by coordinating the Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration sections.  In addition, this individual 
develops the Public Health Incident Action Plan (IAP) in conjunction with the Planning Section 
The Incident Commander is supported by a command staff that is represented by the State Epidemiologist, Information Officer, 
Liaison Officer, Safety Officer and a Chief for each of the Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration 
sections. 
 
The PHIMS Command Staff is comprised of an Information Officer, Liaison Officer and a Safety Officer.  The 
Information Officer develops material, has it reviewed internally and releases it to the media.  The Liaison Officer maintains 
relations between the Department and outside agencies and the Safety Officer oversees the safety of the response. 
The PHIMS General Staff includes Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administrative responsibilities. These 
responsibilities remain with the Incident Commander (IC) until they are assigned to other individuals. When the Operations, 
Planning, Logistics or Finance/Administrative responsibilities are established as separate functions under the IC, they are 
managed by a section chief and can be supported by other functional units (Group Supervisors and Unit Leads) 
 The Operations Staff is responsible for carrying out the response activities described in the Incident Action Plan 
(IAP).  The Operations Section Chief coordinates Operation Section activities and has primary responsibility for 
receiving and implementing the IAP.  The Operations Section Chief reports to the Incident Commander and 
determines the required resources and organizational structure within the Operations Section.  Here are some 
examples of activities that the Operations Section might be involved in: 
 Conduct human case surveillance and characterize an outbreak 
 Conduct human case follow-up 
 Disseminate data (cases, geographical distribution) 
 Handle public, media and health care provider inquiries 
 Develop messages covering clinical information and prevention 
 Oversee funding to counties for activities 
 Make regular updates to local health departments 
 Identify need and broker vaccine/antivirals 
 Provide Behavioral Health Services to ADHS staff 
 Determine needs of Arizona hospitals 
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 The Planning Staff is responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination and use of information about the 
development of the incident and status of resources.  This section’s responsibilities also include creation of the 
Incident Action Plan (IAP) which defines the response activities and resource utilizations for a specified time period. 
 Development of IAP 
 Compilation of PHIMS Updates/Briefs into the weekly/daily Situation Report 
 Reports to the Governor’s Office 
 The Logistics Staff is responsible for providing additional facilities, services, and materials for the incident response.  
 Additional equipment for HEOC, Communications, Call Center, etc. 
 Facilities  
 Personnel (above and beyond routine need) 
 The Finance and Administration Staff is responsible for all financial, administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the 
incident. 
 Procurement of items/services 
 Maintenance of contracts 
The modular organization of PHIMS allows responders to scale their efforts and apply the parts of the PHIMS structure that 
best meet the demands of the incident.  For example, many incidents will never require the activation of Planning, Logistics, or 
Finance/Administration Sections, while others, such as influenza pandemic, will require some or all of them to be established. 
 
Communications occurs across groups, but also comes directly to one’s supervisor and subsequently to the Section Chiefs and 
Command Staff.  The Section Chiefs and Command Staff meet as needed to use information to make decisions.  Information 
from these meetings and regular updates are incorporated into Situation Reports that are disseminated by e-mail to the entire 
response network to keep everyone up to date and anticipate future issues. 
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APPENDIX D 
Legal Authorities 
 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
STATUTE AGENCY AUTHORITY 
U.S. Public Law 93-288 Federal Government • Provides authority to respond to 
emergencies and provide assistance to 
protect public health; implemented by 
Federal Emergency Management Act 
USC Title 42-264 Federal Government • Provides the U.S. Surgeon General the 
authority to apprehend and examine 
any individual(s) reasonably believed 
to be infected with a communicable 
disease for purposes of preventing the 
introduction, transmission, or spread of 
such communicable disease only: 
1. if the person(s) is moving or about 
to move from state to state. 
2. if the person, upon examination, is 
found to be infected, he may be 
detained for such time and in such 
manner as may be reasonably 
necessary. 
USC Title 42-139 Sec. 
14503 
Federal Government • Liability protection for volunteers – No 
volunteer of a non-profit organization 
or governmental entity shall be liable 
for harm caused by an act of omission 
of the volunteer on behalf of the 
organization or entity. 
ARS § 36-782 Governor • In consultation with the Director of 
ADHS, may issue an enhanced 
surveillance advisory. 
ARS § 35-192 Governor • Allows Governor to declare a state of 
emergency. 
ARS § 26-303 Governor • Gives Governor authority over state 
agencies and the right to exercise police 
power. 
• Allows Governor to delegate authority 
to adjutant general. 
ARS § 26-310 Division of Emergency Management • Allows any person holding any license, 
certificate, or other permit issued by 
any other state to render aid to meet the 
emergency as fully as if such license 
had been issued in this state. 
ARS § 26-311 Division of Emergency Management • Protects state employees, volunteers, 
and employees from other states 
against liability claims while 
performing duty’s during a state of 
emergency. 
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STATUTE AGENCY AUTHORITY 
ARS § 36-136 Arizona Department of Health Services • Powers and duties of the Director 
ARS § 782 Arizona Department of Health Services • Defines an Enhanced Surveillance 
Advisory 
ARS § 36-787(A)(6) Arizona Department of Health Services • Establishes in conjunction with 
applicable licensing boards a process 
for temporary waiver of the 
professional licensure requirements to 
address the state of emergency or state 
of war emergency. 
ARS § 787(A) (7) Arizona Department of Health Services • Grants temporary waivers of health 
care institution licensure requirements 
to address the state of emergency or 
state of war emergency. 
ARS § 788 Arizona Department of Health 
Services/County Health Departments 
• Describes the authorities for isolation 
and quarantine during a state of 
emergency or state of war emergency. 
ARS § 789 Arizona Department of Health 
Services/County Health Departments 
• Due process for isolation and 
quarantine. 
AAC R9-6-204 Arizona Department of Health Services • Allows for collection of patient specific 
information for positive laboratory 
reports of influenza 
ARS § 36-624 County Health Departments • Allows county health departments to 
adopt quarantine and sanitary measures 
to prevent the spread of the disease. 
ARS § 36-627 County Health Departments • Allows county health departments to 
assume control of hospitals and other 
places where infectious or contagious 
disease exists. 
• Allows county health department to 
provide temporary hospitals or places 
of reception for persons with infectious 
or contagious diseases. 
ARS § 36-628 County Health Departments • Allows county health departments to 
employ physicians and others they 
deem necessary to provide care for 
persons afflicted with contagious or 
infectious diseases. 
ARS § 26-311 Local Governments • Allows mayors or chairmen of the 
board of supervisors to declare a local 
emergency 
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I.  Rationale 
Pandemic influenza surveillance includes surveillance for influenza viruses (laboratory surveillance) and surveillance for 
influenza-associated illness and deaths (disease surveillance). 
 
The goals of laboratory surveillance for pandemic influenza are to: 
• Rapidly detect the introduction and early cases of a pandemic influenza virus in the United States, and the 
specific introduction into Arizona. 
•  Track the virus’ introduction into local areas. 
• Monitor changes in the pandemic virus, including development of antiviral resistance. 
 
The goals of disease surveillance are to: 
• Serve as an early warning system to detect increases in influenza-like illness (ILI) in the community. 
• Monitor the pandemic’s impact on health (e.g., by tracking outpatient visits, hospitalizations, and deaths). 
• Track trends in influenza disease activity and identify populations that are severely affected. 
 
Surveillance data can help decision-makers identify effective control strategies and re-evaluate recommended priority groups 
for vaccination and antiviral therapy. Data from surveillance can also facilitate efforts to mathematically model disease spread 
during a pandemic. The existing methods of influenza surveillance provide a framework to detect and monitor pandemic 
influenza. 
 
II. Overview 
This supplement provides a summary of influenza surveillance activities conducted during normal influenza seasons as well as 
proposed enhancements to surveillance that would be implemented in the event of a pandemic.   While primary investigations 
of influenza are conducted by local health departments, the Arizona Department of Health Services’ Infectious Disease 
Epidemiology Section coordinates human influenza surveillance throughout the state.  
 
Veterinary surveillance is conducted through the Arizona Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (AzVDL) in coordination with the 
Arizona Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) Program.  These agencies work together to conduct influenza surveillance in 
domestic animals. USDA also monitors wild avian populations for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and other 
diseases of concern through the APHIS Wildlife Services program.  Veterinary surveillance is discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix 8: Avian Influenza Surveillance. 
 
III. World health organization (who) pandemic phases 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a global influenza preparedness plan, which defines phases of a 
pandemic, outlines the role of WHO, and makes recommendations for national measures before and during a pandemic. The 
WHO phases are used in this document to divide response actions by phases of pandemic activity.  WHO pandemic phases are: 
 
1. Interpandemic period (routine influenza surveillance)  
Phase 1: No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has 
caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is 
considered to be low.  
Phase 2: No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza 
virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease.  
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2. Pandemic alert period  
Phase 3: Human infection(s) with a new subtype but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of 
spread to a close contact.  
Phase 4: Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting 
that the virus is not well adapted to humans.  
Phase 5: Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming 
increasingly better adapted to humans but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).  
3. Pandemic period  
 Phase 6: Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general population.  
 
 
IV.  Routine (interpandemic) influenza surveillance (WHO phases 1 and 2) 
ADHS maintains and coordinates a statewide influenza surveillance system that identifies circulating influenza viruses and 
monitors influenza activity. While the majority of influenza surveillance is conducted October through May each year, recent 
enhancements to influenza surveillance include performing virologic testing and gathering influenza-like illness reporting from 
selected sites year round.   The state surveillance system is comprised of the following components: 
• Influenza-like illness sentinel provider network 
• Positive laboratory reports for influenza from laboratories throughout the state 
• Subtyping data for selected influenza isolates 
• Influenza-associated mortality data from county/state vital records offices 
• Influenza-associated pediatric mortality 
• Data from county health department influenza surveillance activities, including school and selected worksite 
absenteeism rates 
 
These components provide data that results in an overall state-level assessment of influenza activity.  Components are 
described in greater detail in Appendix 1: Components of the Arizona Influenza Surveillance System. 
 
A.  Laboratory Surveillance for Influenza 
Public health goals for surveillance of influenza viruses are twofold:  to identify and characterize circulating strains to inform 
annual vaccine formulation, and to identify and characterize strains with pandemic 
potential.  
 
The Arizona State Public Health Laboratory (ASL) provides testing of influenza 
specimens submitted by providers throughout the state year-round.  The ASL 
performs preliminary typing, forwards isolates with unusual results to CDC for 
identification of novel viruses, and provides specimens routinely to CDC for 
antigenic characterization.  The ASL has the capacity for polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) testing for identification of influenza A H1, H3, H5, and H7, and will expand 
testing capacity as information, protocols, and reagents are provided by the CDC.    
 
In preparation for a pandemic, the ASL will be responsible for coordinating the 
detection of the pandemic strain by testing and forwarding specimens to the CDC 
laboratory, as appropriate.  Recommendations for testing patients during a 
pandemic will likely come from the CDC, and patients for whom testing is 
recommended would likely be a subset of all patients with suspected influenza.  
 
The ASL provides influenza specimen collection kits to county health departments 
and tests specimens that are submitted. Upon request, the county health department 
may provide collection kits to health care providers and facilitate transport of the 
specimens to the State Laboratory for testing and subtyping.  Clinical and reference 
laboratories may also send a select number of isolates for subtyping.  
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IDES receives ASL information through the state laboratory’s electronic laboratory database (LITS).  The information sharing 
procedures between IDES, ASL and clinical laboratories will change with implementation of the Department’s Medical 
Electronic Disease Surveillance Intelligence System (MEDSIS) http://www.azdhs.gov/phs/edc/edrp/es/ 
electronicdiseasesurveillanceprogram.htm, Electronic Laboratory Reporting (ELR), and Laboratory Information Management 
System (LIMS).  The implementation of the new systems will facilitate rapid, accurate, electronic sharing of information and 
improved data management. During 2006, the largest commercial laboratories in Arizona and the ASL will be transmitting 
laboratory information electronically to MEDSIS.  State and county health departments will be able to monitor positive tests 
and cultures in near realtime.  
  
The ASL is part of a national system of U.S.-based collaborating laboratories of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global 
Influenza Surveillance Network and the National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) (see 
Supplement 2 – Laboratory trends and compare seasonal differences, rather than to record all influenza tests performed in the 
United States.   These laboratories provide information to describe influenza surveillance on a national level.   The ASL and 
one other Arizona clinical laboratory report regularly to the NREVSS. 
 
All positive influenza tests have been reportable to ADHS by laboratories since October 2004, including influenza cultures, 
DFA/IFAs, PCR, and rapid tests.  This component of the state surveillance system provides useful information on the burden of 
confirmed influenza each week (disease surveillance) and also helps to determine the type of influenza circulating.  This 
system is discussed in more detail in the Disease Surveillance section below.   
 
B.  Disease Surveillance for Influenza 
Disease surveillance provides valuable information on the burden of disease in a community and seasonal trends.  Data on 
outpatient visits for ILI, hospitalizations, and deaths allow public health to monitor regional disease trends.  As mentioned 
previously, influenza surveillance has traditionally been conducted from October through May, though in recent years various 
components of influenza surveillance have been expanded to year-round. This enhancement is an important part of surveillance 
for novel strains of influenza.  
 
Nationally, four different types of disease surveillance are used to describe influenza activity:  outpatient surveillance (Sentinel 
Provider Network), hospital surveillance [Emerging Infections Program (EIP) influenza project and New Vaccine Surveillance 
Network (NVSN)], mortality surveillance [122 Cities Mortality Reporting System and National Notifiable Disease 
Surveillance System (NNDSS)], and weekly state-level assessments of influenza activity.   These components are described in 
greater detail in Appendix 2: Components of the National Influenza Surveillance System.  
 
The statewide influenza disease surveillance system is coordinated and maintained through the ADHS Infectious Disease 
Epidemiology Section.  The Arizona surveillance system is similar to the national surveillance system and reports data to the 
national system.  The system’s components are:  
• Influenza-like illness sentinel provider network 
• Positive laboratory reports for influenza from laboratories throughout the state 
• Subtyping data for selected influenza isolates 
• Influenza-associated mortality data from county/state vital records offices 
• Influenza-associated pediatric mortality 
• Data from county health department influenza surveillance activities, including school and selected worksite 
absenteeism rates 
These components are described in further detail in Appendix 1: Components of the Arizona Influenza Surveillance System.  
Each week, these components are all considered when assessing the statewide influenza activity, which is submitted to CDC 
and communicated to local partners.  Activity is characterized as “widespread”, “regional”, “local”, “sporadic” or “no activity”. 
 
Disease surveillance activities can be divided into the following six categories: Outpatient (ILI) Surveillance, Hospitalization 
Surveillance, Mortality Surveillance, Laboratory Surveillance, Syndromic Surveillance, and Surveillance Communications.  
Below are influenza activities, by category, conducted during a normal influenza season: 
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Outpatient (ILI) Surveillance 
• Recruiting influenza-like illness (ILI) sentinel reporting sites (county health departments or the providers report to the 
U.S. Influenza Sentinel Provider Surveillance System via internet or fax; ADHS accesses this information online) 
o At least one regularly reporting surveillance site per 250,000 persons population is recommended, or at least 
one site for smaller counties. 
o 61 sites were enrolled for the 2005-2006 season, from 12 counties.   
• Ensuring ILI sentinel reporting sites are reporting to the state surveillance system on a regular basis 
• Collecting county health department-level influenza surveillance information (cases and/or ILI outbreaks) from 
schools, long-term care facilities, or other institutions.  Some counties also monitor school absenteeism regularly 
throughout the influenza season.   
• Collaborating with local health departments to respond to special situations and follow CDC requests (e.g. 
investigation of pediatric influenza-associated deaths). 
 
Hospitalization Surveillance 
• Conducting informal calls to major hospitals and hospital laboratories throughout the state, as needed, or in 
conjunction with the local health departments   
• Working with local health departments to monitor activity levels or unusual events from infection control 
practitioners, infectious disease doctors, medical examiners or other relevant groups, as warranted by the influenza 
season.    
 
Mortality Surveillance 
• Ensuring receipt of data regarding influenza-associated mortality from county and ADHS vital records offices, 
analyzing data 
• Ensuring that IDES is receiving reports of 
influenza-associated pediatric morbidity from 
local health departments 
 
Laboratory Surveillance 
• Promoting testing of suspect influenza patients 
at ILI sentinel reporting sites 
o Sentinel providers may send selected 
specimens for testing at no charge for 
shipping or testing. 
o Additional kits are sent to providers 
upon specimen receipt. 
• Contacting local health departments on a 
monthly basis to assess influenza specimen 
collection kit needs; ensuring that kits are sent in 
a timely manner. 
• Ensuring that ASL is producing adequate influenza testing media and preparing sufficient influenza testing kits for the 
influenza season. 
• Ensuring reporting of positive influenza results by laboratories. 
• Entering and analyzing laboratory data. 
 
Syndromic Surveillance 
Currently, the syndromic surveillance systems are not fully validated as reliable sources of information regarding the 
identification and tracking of an outbreak.  The sources listed below are monitored and will continue to be assessed in the 
context of other information available during interpandemic influenza seasons.   
• BioSense:  A CDC system that includes ICD-9-coded outpatient visits at DOD ambulatory-care centers and 
Department of Veterans Affairs outpatient clinics and private clinical laboratory test requests.  
http://www.cdc.gov/phin/component-initiatives/biosense/index.html  
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• Realtime Outbreak Detection System’s National Retail Data Monitor (NRDM):  A system coordinated by the 
University of Pittsburgh used to monitors sales of over-the-counter (OTC) health care products of enrolled pharmacies 
in order to identify disease outbreaks as early as possible.  http://rods.health.pitt.edu/NRDM.htm    
• Some county health departments also work with their local hospitals to conduct syndromic surveillance within the 
emergency departments.  
 
Surveillance Communications 
• Monitoring of national and/or global influenza activity through CDC reports or conference calls. 
• Conducting weekly conference calls with all local health departments to discuss influenza activity and associated 
issues in their jurisdictions. 
• Posting weekly influenza activity reports on the departmental website throughout the influenza season, at 
http://www.azdhs.gov/phs/oids/epi/flu/index.htm. 
• Distributing communications from ADHS, CDC and WHO to partners via HAN and EpiAZ (weekly outbreak 
newsletter) to public health and health care practitioners across the state. 
• Distributing other information to internal and external partners as needed. 
 
As mentioned above, the development of the Department’s Medical Electronic Disease Surveillance Intelligence System 
(MEDSIS) and the integration of the Electronic Laboratory Reporting (ELR) component will enhance surveillance practices 
and capacity in several ways.  Laboratories using the ELR will be able to provide more timely data, including certain clinical 
laboratories that are be able to transmit laboratory data automatically from their systems.  More information about MEDSIS 
and ELR can be found in Supplement 12 – Informatics.       
 
 
V.  Pandemic preparedness surveillance planning  
CDC recommends that pandemic surveillance enhancements be developed during the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert 
Periods (WHO Phases 1-5) so that baseline data for interpreting information gathered during the pandemic will be available 
and staff will have experience and familiarity with new methodologies.  ADHS is currently working on improvements to 
existing influenza surveillance infrastructure. 
 
A. Outpatient (ILI) Surveillance 
As mentioned previously, ADHS provides weekly assessments of the overall level of influenza activity during the influenza 
season (categories are: no activity, sporadic, local, regional, widespread) in the state. These assessments are used to compare 
the extent of influenza activity from state to state, and are the only state-level influenza surveillance data that CDC makes 
publicly available during the regular (interpandemic) influenza season. The state influenza activity assessments are used to 
generate the influenza activity map (see www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/usmap.htm). During a pandemic, CDC will recommend that 
these assessments be made year-round, rather than only October through May. 
 
CDC is exploring options for enhancing or supplementing ILI outpatient surveillance at the national, regional, and state levels, 
given that health care providers might not be able to report ILI in a timely manner when overwhelmed with patients during an 
emergency. Existing electronic data sources that might increase the geographic completeness, frequency of reporting, and 
sustainability of ILI data are being considered and include: 1) the BioSense http://www.cdc.gov/phin/component-
initiatives/biosense/index.html, and 2) existing emergency department “chief complaint” monitoring systems used by several 
states. CDC is also working with state and local partners to evaluate expanding and enhancing the Sentinel Provider Network.   
 
As development of MEDSIS continues, additional components will be added that may be relevant for influenza surveillance.  
Future enhancements may incorporate outpatient, hospitalization, or syndromic surveillance components such as reporting of 
hospitalized influenza cases, hospital emergency department data such as chief complaint or discharge summary, or hospital 
admissions for influenza.  MEDSIS or its platform (the Secure Integrated Response Electronic Notification (SIREN) system) 
may also contain the flexibility to quickly accommodate other electronic surveillance needs at various pandemic phases.  See 
Supplement 12 – Informatics for more details on these systems.    
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ADHS is working to implement the following enhancements to influenza surveillance in preparation for a pandemic: 
• Recruiting additional regularly-reporting sentinel sites for year-round ILI surveillance  
• Ensuring adequate representation and consistent reporting of ILI from sentinel sites.  (County health departments are 
responsible for helping to recruit sites and follow-up with non-reporting sites) 
• Developing a protocol for investigating institutional outbreaks and working with local health departments to 
implement this protocol.  Investigations would include information on epidemiology, vaccination history of cases and 
staff, and specimen collection 
 
B.  Laboratory Surveillance 
Please refer to Supplement 2 – Laboratory Diagnostics, for state plans to enhance 
laboratory-testing capacity in the event of a pandemic.  
 
Nationally, CDC is currently working with state and local partners to evaluate the 
utility and feasibility of reporting patient-level data (including zip code and/or 
county of residence) through an electronic mechanism other than the Public Health 
Laboratory Information System (PHLIS). Such a system would allow daily (rather 
than weekly) reporting during a pandemic and analysis of virus spread at the 
county or health district level. During a pandemic—as the burden of disease 
increases and state and local health departments face multiple, competing 
demands—it might be necessary to adjust surveillance strategies and reassess the 
need for frequent (or daily) reporting.  
 
ADHS is working to implement the following enhancements related to influenza 
virologic surveillance in preparation for a pandemic: 
• Exploring options for increasing specimen collection from sentinel sites, 
outbreaks, unusual cases, and geographical areas not currently 
represented in specimens received. 
• Developing sampling scheme for laboratory surveillance during 
pandemic. 
• Assessing ability to transport specimens to the state laboratory quickly; exploring the feasibility and need for courier 
service or other transport options.  
• ADHS is implementing electronic laboratory reporting integrated within MEDSIS (Arizona’s NEDSS) from the two 
largest commercial clinical laboratories in the state.  These two commercial laboratories contribute over 80% of 
positive laboratory reports in Arizona.  Other large volume hospital laboratories will also be targeted for electronic 
transmission of laboratory result data.  A web entry form will be available for low volume laboratories to report to 
ELR/MEDSIS.   
• The State Public Health Laboratory is implementing a new laboratory information system (StarLIMS) that will 
transmit result data to MEDSIS automatically. 
 
C.  Hospitalization Surveillance 
 
In Arizona, current hospitalization surveillance is limited to data provided by the Hospital Discharge Database, which is not 
timely enough for early detection of pandemic flu but may help with longer term monitoring of the impact of a pandemic in 
Arizona.  Active hospital surveillance may be implemented in conjunction with county health departments for hospitalizations 
or emergency department visits. At the national level, surveillance for hospitalizations associated with influenza is limited to 
the collection of data on pediatric hospitalizations in 12 large metropolitan areas (Emerging Infections Program (EIP) influenza 
project).  In January 2006, the EIP influenza project will be expanded to include laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated 
hospitalizations of adults as well as children.  The ADHS Office of Border Health is working with CDC to implement this 
pediatric hospitalization surveillance protocol in Tucson hospitals, but Arizona is otherwise not included in this program. 
Plan 
    
 
8 AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06)  Supplement 1:  Surveillance and Epidemiology  
 
CDC is exploring options for expanding hospitalization surveillance to obtain data from all age groups in all parts of the 
country and obtaining more detailed information from a small number of sites. Options under review include working with the 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) to make laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalizations 
nationally notifiable; obtaining timely hospital discharge data to estimate 
the number of influenza-associated hospitalizations across the country; 
adding a hospitalization surveillance component to BioSense 
(http://www.cdc.gov/phin/component-initiatives/biosense/index.html ); 
developing protocols for active population-based hospitalization 
surveillance, and developing protocols for reporting the number of 
influenza-associated hospitalizations. Please refer to the national plan at 
www.pandemicflu.gov for further detail on national enhancements to 
influenza surveillance. 
 
ADHS is working to implement the following enhancements to influenza 
hospitalization surveillance in preparation for a pandemic: 
• Incorporating regular analysis of the ADHS Hospital Discharge 
Database into existing influenza surveillance 
 
In addition, ADHS is exploring the following additional hospital-related surveillance activities: 
• Drafting emergency measures to initiate reporting of hospitalized cases of influenza in the event of a pandemic. 
• Creating case definitions and reporting forms for reporting hospitalized influenza cases. 
• Identifying sites for active surveillance and guidelines for when to initiate active surveillance. 
•  Working with CDC to facilitate data provisioning to BioSense from large hospital systems to enhance influenza 
surveillance (such as hospital admissions data, etc.) and provide situational awareness. 
http://www.cdc.gov/phin/component-initiatives/biosense/index.html 
 
D.  Mortality Surveillance  
The collection of mortality data can also help health departments monitor the severity of a pandemic and determine the 
population and areas most affected.  In Arizona, mortality surveillance is accomplished through data collected by state and 
county vital records offices, as well as reports of pediatric deaths due to laboratory-confirmed influenza.    
 
At a national level, timely data on influenza deaths is provided by two sources: reports of pediatric deaths due to laboratory-
confirmed influenza (nationally notifiable as of October 2004), and the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System, which provides 
weekly reports of the total number of death certificates that list P&I as a cause of death and the total number of death 
certificates filed (Table 1). Although the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) also collects mortality data, these data 
are not available until 2-3 years after each influenza season. 
 
During a pandemic, state and local policy-makers and public health officials will likely ask health departments to provide 
mortality data to guide decision-making on control and response measures. To help ensure uniform data collection across 
jurisdictions, CDC will provide case definitions and reporting procedures. CDC is also investigating the feasibility of obtaining 
mortality data through the Electronic Death Registration (EDR) Project (http://www.naphsis.org/projects/index.asp?bid=374) 
and the validity of estimating national mortality based on data from the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System. State-specific 
mortality cannot be estimated from data provided by the 122 Cities system. 
 
ADHS is working to implement the following enhancements to influenza mortality surveillance in preparation for a pandemic: 
• Investigating methods to obtain timely influenza mortality data from county and/or state vital statistics; establish 
routine surveillance to identify influenza-associated deaths 
• Establishing forms and algorithms to monitor influenza in the event of a pandemic. 
• Incorporating regular analysis of the ADHS Vital Statistics’ Death Database into existing influenza surveillance 
• Estimating Arizona morbidity and mortality resulting from potential flu pandemics using Flu-Surge. 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/flusurge.htm 
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E.  Syndromic Surveillance 
Because syndromic surveillance is a relatively new area, these systems are still under development and validation of these 
methods is needed to reduce false signals and increase sensitivity. 
 
ADHS is working to implement the following enhancements to surveillance for influenza-like illness in preparation for a 
pandemic: 
• Incorporate the use of nontraditional surveillance sources (e.g. over-the-counter pharmaceutical sales, BioSense) into 
routine surveillance. http://www.cdc.gov/phin/component-initiatives/biosense/index.html  
• As the capacity for electronic transfer of data improves at both public health and hospitals, additional capabilities for 
receiving hospital data may be incorporated into MEDSIS.  
• ADHS is working with the Real-time Outbreak Detection System’s National Retail Drug Monitoring System in 
recruitment of additional retailers of OTC medication to increase coverage of rural areas in the State. 
http://rods.health.pitt.edu/NRDM.htm.   
• ADHS is working with the Arizona School Nurse Consortium and the 
Department’s Child Health Indicator Program to develop weekly reports of 
school nurse visits including ILI that will be uploaded from 300 schools in 
Arizona. 
 
 
F.  Surveillance Communications 
ADHS is working to implement the following enhancements to influenza surveillance 
communications in preparation for a pandemic: 
• Establishing and maintaining contacts with influenza and immunization 
coordinators in neighboring states 
• Increasing the reach of the Arizona Health Alert Network into the health care 
provider community 
• Providing regular updates of influenza activity in Immunications, Prevention 
Bulletin, The Arizona Partnership for Immunizations (TAPI) Newsletter, and 
other regular communication venues 
 
 
VI. Pandemic Surveillance (WHO PHASES 3-6) 
A.  Pandemic Alert Surveillance for Novel Strains of Influenza (WHO Phases 3-5) 
 
1. Monitoring for novel strains of influenza 
During the Pandemic Alert Period, ADHS will provide CDC’s enhanced surveillance recommendations for identification 
of patients at increased risk for infection with a novel virus to providers, laboratories, county health departments, and other 
partners. Novel influenza strains include avian influenza viruses that can infect humans, other animal influenza viruses 
(such as swine influenza viruses) that can infect humans, or new or re-emergent human influenza strains that cause cases 
or clusters of human disease. The specific recommendations will depend on the epidemiology of the virus and the clinical 
characteristics of the human cases as they are known at the time, and will most likely focus on severely ill, hospitalized, or 
ambulatory patients who meet certain epidemiologic and clinical criteria. (For example, since February 2004, CDC has 
recommended enhanced surveillance to identify patients potentially infected with avian influenza A (H5N1). The current 
recommendations are summarized in Appendix 4: Interim Recommendations: Enhanced US Surveillance and Diagnostic 
Evaluation to Identify Cases of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1). 
 
Local Health Departments, in conjunction with ADHS, are responsible for investigating initial reports of potential human 
influenza infections due to a novel influenza strain in the state.  Once a novel strain detected abroad exhibits sustained 
human-to-human transmission (WHO Phase 6), recommendations for further intensified laboratory and disease 
surveillance will likely be issued.  
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2. Reporting novel strains of influenza 
County health departments should immediately inform ADHS of any suspected human infection with an 
avian/animal/novel human strain of influenza.  Clinical algorithms for managing patients with possible novel influenza 
infection are provided in Appendix 4: Interim Recommendations: Enhanced US Surveillance and Diagnostic Evaluation to 
Identify Cases of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1).  
 
ADHS would immediately report to CDC any influenza cases that: 
• Test positive for a novel influenza subtype, or 
• Meet the enhanced surveillance case definition in effect at that time, and 
• Cannot be subtyped in the state public health laboratory because appropriate reagents or biocontainment equipment is 
not available (see Supplement 2 – Laboratory Diagnostics). 
 
ADHS would call the CDC 24- hour Emergency Response Hotline (770-488-7100) to report a suspected case of infection 
with avian influenza A (H5N1) or any other novel influenza virus. Following the initial telephone report, ADHS 
Epidemiology staff and/or county health department staff should conduct case interviews using a CDC case screening and 
report form and monitor contacts of all suspected cases. Per CDC, the completed form should be faxed to CDC at 888-
232-1322 with a cover sheet that says: “ATTN: Influenza case reporting.” (The case screening and report form used to 
report suspected cases of human infection with influenza A (H5N1) is provided in Appendix 5: CDC Human Influenza A 
(H5) Case Screening and Report Form .) If infection with a novel influenza virus is confirmed, ADHS may request CDC 
assistance with a case investigation to identify the source of infection and determine the course of illness.  
 
Specific surveillance activities during the Pandemic Alert phase 
include the following: 
 
a. Phase 3: Human infection(s) with a new subtype but no human-to-
human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.  
 
Activities:  
Interpandemic surveillance operations will continue, and the 
following will be implemented (if not already occurring):  
 
Outpatient (ILI) Surveillance 
• Request that providers screen patients with influenza or ILI for 
specific epidemiological factors related to the new subtype (e.g. travel to affected areas)    
• Work with local health departments to ensure timely and comprehensive reporting of ILI from sentinel sites.   
• Monitor surveillance reports and communications from CDC and WHO and enact recommendations.   
• Notify ILI surveillance partners to be prepared to send reports 
 
Laboratory Surveillance 
• Ensure that representative and unusual viral isolates are sent to CDC for appropriate testing   
• Ensure that any influenza A viruses that cannot be subtyped are reported to CDC immediately and isolates are sent as 
appropriate. 
• Ensure timely reporting of influenza from laboratories.   
• Ensure data entry and analysis of reports of influenza cases 
 
Syndromic Surveillance 
• Monitor syndromic surveillance data sources, including local health department data, Biosense, and RODS, to detect 
unusual patterns of ILI activity. 
• Increased syndromic surveillance activity will be monitored and evaluated by local health departments. 
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Surveillance Communications  
• Maintain regular internal communication between State Laboratory and IDES regarding epidemiological and 
laboratory surveillance.   
• Distribute epidemiologic reports of influenza activity updates to surveillance partners and stakeholders and hold 
regular conference calls with county health department partners. 
• Obtain CDC guidelines/statements and distribute to partners. 
 
The local health departments’ rapid response teams (RRT) will investigate suspected cases of influenza with a novel subtype, 
including completing investigations forms, obtaining specimens for testing, and monitoring close contacts for influenza-like 
illness.  Upon request, the ADHS RRTs may also assist in this process. 
 
b. Phase 4: Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus 
is not well adapted to humans.  
 
Activities:  
Surveillance operations listed above will continue, and the following will be implemented: 
 
Outpatient (ILI) Surveillance 
• Request that sentinel providers activate ILI surveillance system, if not already operating.   
• Screen travelers arriving from influenza-affected areas for ILI.   
• Enhance surveillance, including obtaining demographic data on clusters, ill travelers, or unusual cases.   
• Investigate any influenza cases, outbreaks, or increases in ILI. 
• Consider instituting active surveillance including evaluating school and workforce absenteeism at selected sites. 
• Analyze data from laboratory reporting, outbreaks, clusters, travelers, hospitals and other health care facilities to 
identify population groups at greatest risk and inform possible prioritization of vaccine or antivirals (see Supplement 6 
– Vaccine Distribution and Supplement 7 – Antiviral Distribution)  
 
Hospitalization Surveillance  
• Consider instituting active surveillance.  Work with county health departments to contact hospitals, emergency 
departments, clinics, and labs that test for influenza. 
• Depending upon frequency and location of influenza activity, ADHS may consider enacting an emergency measure to 
make influenza-associated hospitalizations reportable to the county health departments (Appendix 6: Arizona Draft 
Emergency Measure for Pandemic Influenza) 
 
Mortality Surveillance 
• Consider instituting active surveillance (e.g. number of deaths due to respiratory illness among hospitalized patients; 
influenza-like illnesses seen by the medical examiners).  
 
Laboratory Surveillance 
• Request that surveillance partners (local health departments, sentinel providers, clinical laboratories) increase 
specimen collection; alert state laboratory to expect an increased number of specimens. Increase influenza laboratory 
testing for persons with compatible clinical syndromes at emergency departments or among hospitalized cases. 
• Assess need to change types of laboratory testing performed to adhere to CDC guidance regarding safety concerns in 
working with the novel virus.     
 
c. Phase 5: Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly 
better adapted to humans but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).  
 
    
 
12 AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06)  Supplement 1:  Surveillance and Epidemiology  
 
Activities:  
Surveillance operations listed above will continue, but will likely be coordinated under the Surveillance Group in the ADHS 
PHIMS structure (as PHIMS will be activated).  Communications and analysis of surveillance data will likely occur with 
greater frequency.   
 
B. Pandemic Influenza Surveillance (WHO Phase 6) 
If a pandemic is suspected, ADHS will closely monitor data from CDC 
regarding the first cases of a pandemic influenza virus in the United States as 
well as tracking disease spread.  To be able to detect the first cases of the 
virus in Arizona, ADHS will notify local health departments and providers in 
addition to increasing laboratory surveillance.  More intense testing will be 
necessary during the early stages of a pandemic, when detecting the 
introduction of the virus into a state or community is the primary goal.  Once 
the virus has been identified throughout the state, testing levels may be 
decreased depending on resource availability. Specific surveillance activities 
for this pandemic phase follow:  
 
a. Phase 6: Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general 
population.  
 
Activities for the early part of Phase 6: Surveillance activities described 
above will continue to the extent possible, in addition to the following activities: 
 
Outpatient (ILI) Surveillance 
• Continue to monitor data received, and use data to establish or reassess vaccine and anti-viral priority groups. 
• Analyze morbidity and mortality data to establish population- and geographic area-specific rates. 
 
Laboratory Surveillance 
• Focus laboratory surveillance on detecting antigenic drift variants or re-assortment viruses.  
 
Mortality Surveillance 
• Medical examiner reporting of influenza-related deaths will be requested during the pandemic period under A.R.S.  
§ 36-782 to 786 (Appendix 7: Declaration of Enhanced Surveillance Advisory). 
• Mortality data will be monitored in conjunction with existing surveillance data to evaluate the range and severity  
of the pandemic. 
 
Additional sources of surveillance data may be evaluated to determine the effectiveness of pandemic influenza interventions 
and resource allocation needs.  These may include partnering with emergency preparedness staff to identify health care 
resource demands (e.g. number of patients on ventilators, EMT runs, etc.).  In addition, surveillance programs may be asked to 
monitor vaccine and anti-viral effectiveness. 
 
Activities for later in Phase 6: Scaled-back surveillance 
Surveillance will likely be overwhelmed during a pandemic, and personnel will need to be diverted to higher-priority activities.  
While enhanced surveillance will be conducted during the introduction, initial spread, and first waves of a pandemic, over time, 
as more persons are exposed, the pandemic strain is likely to become a routinely circulating influenza A subtype. When that 
happens, the activities of both the ADHS and national influenza surveillance systems will revert to the frequency and intensity 
typically seen during interpandemic influenza seasons. The return to interpandemic surveillance will occur as soon as feasible, 
and the change will be communicated to all surveillance partners. 
 
 
 
Appendices: 
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Appendix 1 
Components of the Arizona Influenza Surveillance System 
 
TABLE 1. COMPONENTS OF THE ARIZONA INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM  
Source Surveillance type Description 
ADHS State Laboratory  Virologic surveillance  
 
The ADHS State Laboratory performs 
influenza culture and polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) on respiratory submissions.  
Subtyping is performed on isolates and PCR 
performed at ADHS can identify influenza A 
H1, H3, H5 and H7 subtypes, and influenza B. 
Unusual or untypable specimens are 
forwarded to CDC for further testing. 
ADHS State Laboratory 
Phoenix Childrens Hospital  Virologic surveillance  
The State Laboratory and one other Arizona 
clinical laboratory are part of the National 
Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance 
System (NREVSS) and report weekly to CDC 
the number of influenza tests performed and 
the number of positive results by type.  
All laboratories Virologic surveillance 
All positive laboratory tests for influenza are 
reportable to the state health department by 
law.  Selected specimens are forwarded from 
clinical labs to the State Lab for typing. 
Influenza-like Illness (ILI) Sentinel 
Provider Network Outpatient surveillance  
Health Care providers around the state 
monitor outpatient visits for ILI (fever >100°F 
AND sore throat and/or cough). Specimens 
from a small subset of patients are submitted 
to the State Laboratory for influenza virus 
testing.  Approximately 60 sites are enrolled 
each year.  
122 Cities Mortality  
Reporting System  Mortality surveillance  
Phoenix and Tucson vital records offices 
transmit weekly data to CDC on the total 
number of death certificates filed and the 
number with pneumonia and/or influenza 
listed as a cause of death.  
Influenza-associated pediatric 
mortality  Mortality surveillance  
Reported laboratory-confirmed influenza-
related deaths among children <18 years are 
investigated and reported to CDC.  
Statewide summary report State-level assessments 
ADHS reports to CDC on a weekly basis the 
overall level of influenza activity as none, 
sporadic, local, regional, or widespread.  
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Appendix 2 
Components of the National Influenza Surveillance System 
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Appendix 3 
Types of Influenza Surveillance 
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Appendix 4 
Interim Recommendations: Enhanced US Surveillance and  
Diagnostic Evaluation to Identify Cases of Human Infection  
with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) 
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Appendix 5 
CDC Human Influenza A (H5) Case Screening and Report Form 
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Appendix 6 
Arizona Draft Pandemic Emergency Measure 
 
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 200X-XX 
(Emergency Measures for Pandemic Influenza) 
 
WHEREAS, the Director of the Department of Health Services, pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-136 (G) may define and prescribe 
emergency measures for detecting, reporting, preventing, and controlling communicable or infectious diseases or conditions if 
the Director has reasonable cause to believe that a serious threat to public health and welfare exists; and 
 
WHEREAS, there is a need to adopt control measures for pandemic influenza as an emergency measure under the authority of 
A.R.S. § 36-136(G), as established by the following: 
 
1. Pandemic Influenza represents a serious threat to public health.  Pandemic influenza is a recently recognized, 
contagious febrile respiratory illness associated with infection by a novel influenza virus known as Influenza A 
(H5N1).  Pandemic influenza manifestations are often severe, including death, and severe illnesses often occur in 
previously healthy persons, including health care workers.   
2. While Pandemic influenza can be highly contagious, its overall rate of spread is slow enough that it can often be 
contained with early recognition and aggressive implantation of control measures.  The key to controlling 
pandemic influenza is prompt detection of cases and their contacts, followed by rapid implementation of control 
measures. 
3. Effective surveillance for pandemic influenza is challenging because the early signs and symptoms of Influenza A 
(H5N1) are not specific enough to reliably distinguish pandemic influenza from other common respiratory 
illnesses.  Thus, risk of exposure is key to considering the likelihood of a pandemic influenza diagnosis, and 
pandemic influenza surveillance efforts need to be determined by the presence of known Influenza A (H5N1) 
transmission in the world. 
4. In February 2004, the World Health Organization adopted guidelines for the global surveillance of influenza A 
(H5/N1).  These emergency measures are needed to implement the WHO guidelines for the detection and control 
of pandemic influenza. 
5. The current rules for communicable diseases, in 9 A.A.C. 6 do not include provisions related to suspect cases of 
pandemic influenza.  These emergency measures are needed to ensure the sharing of patient confidential 
information related to this non-reportable disease by health care providers, and health care institutions and to 
ensure that health care providers and health care institutions implement appropriate control measures for 
pandemic influenza. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, I Susan Gerard, by virtue of the authority vested in me as the Director of the Arizona Department of 
Health Services, do hereby Order the following emergency measures to be adopted for detecting, reporting, preventing, and 
controlling pandemic influenza in Arizona: 
 
A. Reporting Requirements and Control Measures in the Absence of Known Person-to-Person Transmission 
of Pandemic Influenza Worldwide 
1. A health care provider1 or administrator of a health care institution2 shall: 
a. Ensure that each patient hospitalized for influenza like illness is screened for the following that might 
indicate a higher index of suspicion of Influenza a (H5N1) infection: 
i. In the 10 days before illness onset, travel to or close contact3 with another ill individual who recently 
traveled to a geographical area with known Influenza A (H5N1) activity. 
b. Immediately report to the local health agency by telephone or equally expeditious means each positive 
Influenza A (H5N1) test result; and 
c. Include the following information in each report made under subsection (A)(1)(b):  
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i. The patient’s name, address, telephone number, date of birth, race or ethnicity, gender, and occupation; 
ii. The disease, date of onset, date of diagnosis, date of laboratory confirmation (if applicable) and test 
results; and 
iii. The name, address, and telephone number of the person or agency making the report. 
 
 
1 “Health Care provider” means a physician, physician assistant, registered nurse practitioner, or dentist. 
2 “Health Care institution” has the same meaning as in A.R.S. § 36-401. 
 
2. A local health agency shall: 
a. Conduct an epidemiologic investigation of each patient reported under subsection (A)(1)(b); and  
b. Forward each report received under subsection (A)(1)(b) to the Department along with the 
communicable disease reports forwarded each week under R9-6-203 (B), including for each report a 
description of what action was initiated by the local health agency. 
 
B. Reporting Requirements and Control Measures in the Presence of Person to Person Transmission of 
Pandemic Influenza 
1. In addition to complying with the reporting requirements and control measures described in 
subsection (A), a health care provider or administrator of a health care institution shall: 
a. Ensure that each patient presenting to an outpatient clinic with influenza like illness is 
screened for the following pandemic influenza risk factors: 
i. Travel within 10 days of illness onset to a foreign or domestic location with documented or 
suspected recent local transmission of Influenza A (H5N1) infection, or 
ii. Close contact with 10 days of illness onset with an individual with known or suspected 
pandemic influenza; 
 
 I have executed this Order on this day 
 
_______________________________________ , 200X 
having authority to do so under Arizona Law 
 
 
 
 
 
DIRECTOR 
 
 
 
ON this _________ day of _______________, 200X,  
Susan Gerard, Director of the Arizona Department of  
Health Services, signed and acknowledged this document 
in my presence. 
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Appendix 7 
Declaration of Enhanced Surveillance Advisory 
 
In Development.
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Appendix 8 
Arizona Avian Influenza Surveillance Information 
 
A.  USDA and Arizona Department of Agriculture (ADA) preparedness for Avian Influenza in Poultry.  
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has established an 
interagency working group to address highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) preparedness and response issues. The group 
includes representatives from several federal agencies and international animal- and public-health organizations.  
 
1.  Surveillance 
Currently, the Arizona Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (AzVDL) has the capability to conduct testing for both avian 
influenza (AI) and exotic Newcastle disease (END).  The Arizona Department of Agriculture provides funding for 
necropsies on poultry at the AzVDL, when the owner cannot pay.  This funding is through a cooperative agreement 
between ADA and USDA for surveillance for AI and END1.  All fighting and exhibition birds that are confiscated are 
tested for AI and END. 
  
If specimens from a chicken tested positive for either of these agents at the AzVDL, specimens are required to be 
forwarded to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) for confirmation. 
 
2.  Response 
If an HPAI outbreak should occur in the United States, APHIS has the Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) management 
infrastructure required to conduct an emergency response program. The response would take place at the local level in 
accordance with the National Animal Health Emergency Management System's guidelines for highly contagious 
disease2.  The Arizona Department of Agriculture (ADA) assisted in the development of the Foreign Animal Disease 
Incident Annex to the State Emergency Response and Recovery Plan3.  ADA has the primary role of responsibility in 
the annex. 
 
3.  Protection of Outbreak Response Workers 
APHIS has collaborated with CDC to draft recommendations to help prevent the transmission of HPAI to animal-
disease outbreak-response workers4.  APHIS' Veterinary Services (VS) program is developing a policy to ensure the 
protection of personnel involved in HPAI control and eradication activities.  Upon detection of HPAI (such as H5N1) 
in poultry, APHIS would quickly notify the CDC to initiate their involvement, in coordination with State and local 
health departments, in efforts to minimize disease transmission from birds to humans.  Upon detections of a low 
pathogenic AI outbreak in poultry in Arizona, the ADHS may have to contact USDA and the Arizona Department of 
Agriculture (AzDA) to initiate public health involvement in the same efforts to minimize disease transmission from 
birds to humans, in consultation with the CDC.   
 
4. Food Safety 
An outbreak in the United States could raise public health concerns about food safety. Without following proper food 
handling, hygiene, and normal cooking practices, HPAI (H5N1) virus can survive on contaminated raw poultry meat, 
on contaminated surfaces of eggs, and within the albumen and yolk of eggs. However, it is important to note that there 
is no evidence that people have been infected by HPAI (H5N1) through the consumption of eggs, egg products, or 
well-cooked poultry meat.  The Word Health Organization has developed a guidance document for concerns related to 
food safety and avian influenza5. 
 
B.  Surveillance for HPAI in Wild Birds 
At this time, there is no enhanced surveillance for detection of avian influenza in wild birds in Arizona.  Only poultry 
submitted to the AzVDL with symptoms and/or lesions associated with avian influenza are being tested for the disease.  
Examples of enhanced surveillance ongoing in Alaska include sampling of live-captured, apparently healthy wild birds to 
detect the presence of HPAI or antibodies to the virus.   In July 2005, President Bush's Homeland Security Council's Policy and 
Coordination Committee (PCC) requested the USDA and DOI to organize an interagency working group with the objective of 
developing a plan for early detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) introduction into North American wild birds. 
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The interagency effort to detect HPAI in wild birds is being divided into two phases.  The initial phase will address early 
detection activities in Alaska, and in particular, coastal areas that have the most potential for contact among Asian and North 
American birds.  The second phase will address subsequent HPAI detection activities in the four major North American 
flyways. 
 
The working group is currently evaluating five potential strategies for the detection of HPAI in wild birds.  The working group 
is currently developing each of these strategies and comparing their respective advantages and disadvantages before providing 
their recommendation to the PCC.   
 
References: 
 
1)  Per conversation with Dr. John Hunt, Director of Animal Services Division, Arizona Department of Agriculture:  
cooperative agreement with USDA for surveillance for avian influenza and exotic Newcastle disease in poultry 
 
2)  Safeguarding the United States From Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI): USDA Actions, Plans, and Capabilities 
for Addressing the Bird Flu Threat www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet_faq_notice/fs_ahhpaiplan.html 
 
3) Foreign Animal Disease Incident Annex, State Emergency Response and Recovery Plan 
www.dem.state.az.us/preparedness/SERRP/Plan_Start_Index.html.   
Also available on SIREN, Public Health Preparedness Portal, Response Plans, ADEM plans 
 
4) OSHA-NIOSH Issues Exchange Group document, Avian Influenza, Protecting Poultry Workers at Risk, posted on the 
OSHA Web site as a Safety and Health Information Bulletin on December 13, 2004. 
www.osha.gov/dts/shib/shib121304.pdf 
 
5)  Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza outbreaks in poultry and in humans: Food safety implications, Department of 
Food Safety, Zoonoses, and Foodborne Diseases, World Health Organization 
www.who.int/foodsafety/micro/avian/en/index.html 
 
Other guidelines: 
The U.S. Geological Survey also has provided “Interim Guidelines for the Protection of Persons Handling Wild Birds with 
Reference to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza” at: 
www.nwhc.usgs.gov/publications/wildlife_health_bulletins/WHB_05_03.jsp
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Summary of State Responsibilities 
 
Interpandemic and Pandemic Periods 
• Assess and monitor readiness to meet communications needs in preparation for an influenza pandemic, including regular 
review and update of communications plans. 
• Plan and coordinate emergency communication activities with private industry, education, and nonprofit partners (e.g., 
American Red Cross chapters).  
• Identify and train lead subject-specific spokespersons.  
• Provide public health communications staff with training on risk communications for use during an influenza pandemic.  
• Develop and maintain up-to-date communications contacts.  
• Participate in tabletop exercises and other collaborative preparations to assess readiness.  
• Address rumors and false reports regarding pandemic influenza threats.  
• Confirm any contingency contracts needed for communications resources during a pandemic.  
 
Pandemic Period  
• Contact key community partners and implement frequent 
update briefings.  
• As appropriate, implement and maintain community 
resources, such as hotlines and websites to respond to local 
questions from the public and professional groups.  
• Tailor communications services and key messages to specific 
local audiences; utilize statewide special populations study 
information to target specific hard to reach populations.  
• In coordination with epidemiologic and medical personnel, 
obtain and track information daily on the numbers and 
location of newly hospitalized cases, newly quarantined 
persons, and hospitals with pandemic influenza cases.  Use 
these reports to determine priorities among community 
outreach and education efforts, and to prepare for updates to 
media organizations in coordination with federal partners.  
• Coordinate pandemic influenza media messages to ensure 
consistency with Federal government messages and local/county messages 
• Coordinate communications activities with federal and local communications staff, including regional or local 
communications centers as appropriate.  
• Promptly respond to rumors and inaccurate information to minimize concern, social disruption, and stigmatization.  
• Coordinate state information with federal agencies for inclusion in communications for international information exchange 
and communication strategies  
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I.  Rationale 
Strategic communications activities based on scientifically derived risk communications principles are an integral part of a 
comprehensive public health response before, during, and after an influenza pandemic.  Effective communication guides the 
public, the news media, health care providers, and other groups in responding appropriately to outbreak situations and 
complying with public health measures.   
The goals of this plan are to: 
• Describe the integral role of communications in preparing for, implementing, and evaluating public health actions to 
protect health and prevent pandemic influenza-associated morbidity and mortality.  
• Provide state health officials, community health care professionals and communications specialists with guidance to 
assist them in developing and implementing communication plans that support an effective public health response and 
help minimize anxiety, fear, and stigmatization.  
• Provide the basis for a well-coordinated and consistent communications strategy across jurisdictions, based on a 
common adherence to established risk communication principles.  
 
This plan emphasizes the following strategies to help state and local communications professionals collaborate with each other, 
CDC, and other organizations to accomplish these goals: 
• Provide timely, accurate, consistent, and appropriate information about pandemic influenza public health 
interventions.  
• Emphasize the rationale and importance of adherence to public health measures that some people may consider 
intrusive (e.g., quarantine).   
• Help set realistic expectations of public health and health care systems.  
• Promptly address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions.  
• Minimize stigmatization that may occur during a pandemic.  
• Adapt materials, utilizing information for the Arizona Special Populations Study, for special needs populations (e.g., 
non-English speaking populations, difficult-to-reach communities, and persons living in institutional settings) receive 
appropriate information.  
• Acknowledge the anxiety, distress, and grief that people experience during long-term, major public health events such 
as pandemics.  
 
II.  Overview 
Communications preparedness for an influenza pandemic, as outlined in this plan, follows seven key risk communications 
concepts.  
• When health risks are uncertain, as likely will be the case during an influenza pandemic, people need information 
about what is known and unknown, as well as interim guidance to formulate decisions to help protect their health and 
the health of others.  
• Coordination of message development and release of information among federal, state, and local health officials is 
critical to help avoid confusion that can undermine public trust, raise fear and anxiety, and impede response measures.  
• Guidance to community members about how to protect themselves and their family members and colleagues is an 
essential component of crisis management.  
• Information provided to the public should be technically correct and succinct without seeming patronizing.  
• Information presented during an influenza pandemic should minimize speculation and avoid over-interpretation of 
data, overly confident assessments of investigations and control measures.  
• An influenza pandemic will generate immediate, intense, and sustained demand for information from the public, 
health care providers, policy makers, and news media.  Health care workers and public health staff are likely to be 
involved in media relations and public health communications.  
• Timely and transparent dissemination of accurate, science-based information about pandemic influenza and the 
progress of the response can build public trust and confidence.  
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During the Interpandemic Period, national, state, and local health communications professionals will focus on preparedness 
planning and on building flexible, sustainable communications networks and media relationships.  During the Pandemic 
Period, they will focus on coordinated health communications to support public health interventions designed to help limit 
influenza-associated morbidity and mortality. 
 
III.  Actions for the InterPandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
During the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods, health communications 
professionals will work together to develop and maintain communications preparedness 
and to keep the public and other target groups updated about risks as the threat of a 
pandemic evolves.  Actions fall into four major categories: 
• Assessing communications capacity and needs statewide 
• Conducting collaborative planning  
• Developing and testing standard procedures for disseminating information  
• Developing, testing, and disseminating messages and materials tailored to 
Arizona audiences. 
 
A.  Assessing communications capacity and needs 
A first step in effective risk communications preparedness is to conduct an assessment of 
communications strengths and challenges.   
 
1.  Capacity  
• As part of overall pandemic influenza preparedness planning, ADHS has developed a risk communications plan (see 
Appendix 4).  
• Ensure adequate human and fiscal resources will be available for all phases of a pandemic.   
• Prepare for resource contingencies (e.g., surge capacity) by developing and regularly updating backup plans and 
procedures, identifying community resources, and training extra staff for emergency communications responsibilities.  
• Ensure ongoing communications proficiency among all staff engaged in pandemic influenza response, especially 
given personnel changes, reorganization, or other variables. 
 
2.  Needs 
• Review and update risk communications plans at least annually to ensure that they remain practical and evidence-
based.  Plans have been shared in advance with stakeholders. 
• ADHS has identified communications professionals and media spokespersons. ADHS will, as needed, provide media 
training and instruction in crisis and risk communication.  Encourage familiarity with professional counterparts from 
local/regional jurisdictions or communities to facilitate collaboration.  
• Familiarize key officials with available communications resources and gaps; apprise policy and key decision-makers 
of plans to deploy staff and resources during an influenza pandemic.    
• ADHS is preparing basic communications resources in advance, and is planning to update them during a 
pandemic, utilizing sample templates in Appendices 2 and 3, fact sheets, and other communications tools and those 
available through the www.pandemicflu.gov and www.cdc.gov websites, as well other resources. 
• ADHS will identify common communications opportunities and challenges with neighboring states, particularly with 
regard to reaching people in high-priority risk groups; this plan will consider novel opportunities to pool 
communications resources.  
• ADHS will continuously monitor the effectiveness of risk communication activities, adjusting as necessary to achieve 
public health communications objectives.  
• ADHS will continuously maintain communications with Governor’s office and all state agencies and update 
www.az211.gov with preparedness information. 
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B.   Conducting collaborative planning 
 
Communications professionals in the public and private sectors need to ensure strong and well-integrated working relationships 
that will help sustain communications resources as a pandemic evolves.  Interaction with all partners is vital to surveillance and 
other essential information exchange and to building collaborative and consistent messaging strategy.  The following are 
critical elements of Arizona’s response:  
• Where and when appropriate, ADHS will coordinate training and other preparedness activities that include options for 
backing up key communications personnel in the event of their personal illness or emergency.   
• ADHS will coordinate with partner agencies to prepare for appropriate public, health care provider, policy, and media 
responses to outbreaks of pandemic influenza.  ADHS is prepared to address the following topics as a pandemic alert 
draws near:  
o Basic health protection information the public and other target audiences will need  
o Responsiveness, capabilities, and limitations of the public health system  
o Roles and responsibilities of diverse pandemic response stakeholders 
o Resources to help people cope with escalating fear, anxiety, grief, and other emotions (see Supplement 11).  
o How public health procedures and actions may change during different pandemic phases and why unusual 
steps may be needed to protect public health. 
• ADHS and other response agencies will consider when and how to use federal assistance when available.  For 
instance, background information and frequent updates for communications and other health care professionals will be 
available on the www.pandemicflu.gov website and through other official mechanisms.   
• Response agencies need to identify and engage 
credible local resources as partners.  For example, 
local chapters of nonprofit health organizations may 
assist with urgent communications to community 
groups.  
• Affirm mechanisms with news media representatives 
to optimize effective working relationships during 
pandemic phases.  
• ADHS will ensure that communications 
professionals have opportunities to participate with 
other public health and emergency staff in tabletop 
exercises and drills to help identify and resolve 
potential problems in the Interpandemic and 
Pandemic Alert periods. 
 
C. Developing and testing standard state and local procedures for disseminating information 
 
Although there will be much that is unpredictable about an influenza pandemic, communication processes can and should be 
formalized.  Standard, yet flexible procedures for disseminating information support consistency, efficiency, and coordination, 
and improve prospects for effective feedback in both internal and external communications.  
 
State and local communication plans will identify dissemination procedures and channels for forwarding communications from 
partner agencies to ensure that partners and stakeholders at all levels remain informed but protected from unnecessary 
messaging.  As an influenza pandemic unfolds, ADHS will then relate essential information to response agencies and partners 
through SIREN and the Health Alert Network (see supplement 12) and to the public through www.az211.gov and 
www.azdhs.gov, as well as through county/local agencies and media communications. The following activities will be used to 
ensure effective state and local information dissemination during an influenza pandemic:  
• Establishing expedited procedures for reviewing and approving pandemic influenza-related messages and materials.  
• Establishing protocols for frequently updated information, including daily disease activity reports.  These may include 
morbidity and mortality figures, geographic location of cases, demographics of infected populations, and the number 
of persons hospitalized. This is done on a weekly basis every influenza season in Arizona, as well as during declared 
outbreaks (e.g., West Nile and pertussis).  
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• Establish and maintain a website with current information through www.azdhs.gov and www.az211.gov.  
• Arizona will utilize established local, state and federal hotlines, such as the CDC-INFO telephone line (1-800-CDC-
INFO; 1-800-232-4636), dissemination of public information.  However, during an influenza pandemic, state will also 
tailor additional information for Arizona through www.azdhs.gov and www.az211.gov. 
• Prepare contingency plans to manage increased media demands.  Arizona’s media relations specialists from all state 
agencies will form a Joint Emergency News Center (JENC) or Joint Information Center (JIC), through the Arizona 
Division of Emergency Management (ADEM); this will ensure the coordination of messages with the Governor’s 
office to prepare for media requests and facilitate media needs. A schedule for regularly scheduled press briefings will 
be determined by the Governor’s office and the ADEM JIC. 
• Develop ongoing coordination procedures with state agencies and organizations to conserve resources and avoid 
duplication in such areas as developing and pre-testing messages, and in training media spokespersons. 
  
D.  Developing, testing, and disseminating locally tailored Interpandemic messages and materials 
   
The Interpandemic period is the ideal time to identify and learn about target audiences and raise awareness and knowledge of 
pandemic influenza.  Doing so, however, may prove challenging.  For instance, in the absence of pandemic influenza, it may be 
difficult to generate media and public interest in pandemic influenza.  In addition, the need to inform and educate the public, 
health care professionals, policy-makers, and others about the threat of a pandemic must be balanced against the possibility that 
a pandemic may not occur for many years and may or may not be severe.  Risk communication strategies such as dilemma-
sharing and acknowledging uncertainty can help establish appropriate and balanced messages. 
   
It is also appropriate during the Interpandemic Period to prepare communications materials for use during the Pandemic Alert 
and Pandemic Periods.  Advance message development helps to ensure that the target audience’s questions and concerns are 
addressed and that messages are credible and understandable. Answers to the most likely questions can be provided by way of 
press releases and fact sheets, using “place-holders” for specific details to be inserted later. Reviewing and clearing these 
materials with the Governor’s office, ADEM and state agency 
PIOs that will participate in the JIC, in advance can help 
identify potential areas of disagreement and allow time to 
work through controversies outside the stressful environment 
of an emergency response. Formative research can help 
inform development of appropriately tailored messages. (See 
Appendices 1 and 2 for additional information about message 
development.)  
 
Communications efforts should also take into account 
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs (KABs) that suggest how 
audiences understand and react to certain messages.  
Concerns will vary by group or subgroup but will likely 
include personal safety, family and pet safety, and interruption of routine life activities.  State and local communications 
professionals will identify methods to assess the unique KABs of target audiences in their populations and communities.  Such 
activities can help identify potential barriers to compliance with response measures, and inform message development to build 
support and trust.   
 
Stigmatization and discrimination (e.g., being shunned as a perceived source of contagion) can be especially difficult and 
potentially dangerous during an infectious disease outbreak. Identify possible scenarios when stigmatization may occur.  Plan 
steps to address and resolve such problems quickly and repeatedly if needed.  Consider messages for general audiences, high-
risk groups, and difficult-to-reach populations.  (For additional information, see Supplement 11, which includes information on 
psychosocial factors and issues.) 
 
Basic human needs for self-protection and protection of loved ones can have both positive and negative impacts on public 
health efforts.  Stress, worry, and fear will be present to varying degrees throughout a pandemic.  Communications 
professionals will work ahead of time with others—including mental health experts from Arizona’s Behavioral Health 
community —to assess the effect of message content on public anxiety, anticipate other possible stressful situations, and plan 
appropriate countermeasures.   
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Additional considerations for developing and disseminating messages and materials about pandemic influenza include the 
following: 
• Assess existing organizational resources for communications, including materials and messages to meet concerns and 
information needs of target audiences and identify current and potential information gaps.  
• Maintain current, accessible, and secure communications contact lists and databases.  Maintain lists electronically and 
updated hard copy monthly in case of electricity interruption.   
• Develop a portfolio of communications information sources, including material on topics such as clinical and 
laboratory diagnostics, infection control practices, isolation and quarantine procedures, stigmatization management, 
travel control authority, and legal issues related to the pandemic. The state will utilize information at 
www.pandemicflu.gov and other resources during a pandemic and adapt these materials for Arizona use.  
• Work with local subject-matter experts to adapt key national messages about topics such as basic medical treatments, 
prioritization recommendations for high-risk groups, use of antiviral medications, and access to care.  HHS will 
provide communications materials (e.g., fact sheets, question-and-answer documents, and message maps) for states 
and localities to use and adapt.   
• Work with local subject-matter experts to adapt communications components of education courses and materials in 
multiple formats for professional audiences. Consult the www.pandemicflu.gov and www.cdc.gov/flu/ websites for 
information about specific materials and training opportunities.   
• Develop a specific, consistent plan to identify and address rumors and misinformation promptly.  Test the plan before 
a pandemic occurs and modify as needed to ensure it works.  
• Utilize the Arizona Special Populations Study and other resources to identify preferred channels for target audiences.  
• Ensure the availability of communications products in multiple languages, based on the demographics of the 
jurisdiction. State will provide all materials in Spanish via its Spanish version of its website and for other languages 
will adapt materials available via the www.pandemicflu.gov and www.cdc.gov/flu/ websites.   
• Begin disseminating messages and materials to increase the knowledge and understanding of the public, health care 
professionals, policy-makers, media, and others about unique aspects of pandemic influenza that distinguish it from 
seasonal influenza, and generally what to expect during different phases of an influenza pandemic.  
• Provide coordinated information on ways to access help (e.g., www.az211.gov, local/county hotlines, helplines) and 
self-help (e.g., psychological resources, and stress and anxiety management). 
  
 
V.  Actions for the Pandemic Period 
Communications professionals from response agencies in Arizona will focus on 
providing timely, accurate information in especially challenging conditions, 
coordinating communications leadership across all tiers of jurisdiction (e.g., local, 
state, regional, and national), and promptly addressing rumors, misperceptions, 
stigmatization, and any unrealistic expectations about public and private health 
provider response capacity. 
 
A.  Activating emergency communications plans 
 
According to A.R.S. 36-787, ADHS is the lead agencies for crafting public 
information strategies and messages during a declared public health emergency.  Once a public health emergency is declared 
and state PHIMS (see Primary Plan - Appendix A) is activated, communications demands will increase. This will raise the 
need to communicate health risk to local populations (for example, if a human case of avian influenza is reported in Arizona). 
As communications demands escalate, state and local health departments will activate emergency communications plans and 
system, including local and state hotlines and www.az211.gov. 
 
B. Refining and delivering messages 
Arizona will follow these steps ensuring the delivery of proper messages: 
• Provide regular updates and offer opportunities to address questions (e.g., in partnership with news media, in public 
forums, and in printed or electronic messages).  
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• Distribute practical information, such as travelers’ advisories, infection control measures, and information about 
potential priority distribution of antiviral medications and first-generation vaccines. Be prepared to immediately 
address questions related to initial case(s) and to provide guidance to the public about disease susceptibility, diagnosis, 
and management, as well as other topics.  
• Reinforce and verify ways to help people protect themselves, their families, and others, including self-care 
information for psychological well-being.  
• Address rumors and misinformation promptly and persistently.  
• Take steps to minimize stigmatization. 
  
C.  Providing timely, accurate information 
  
Depending on health, economic, and overall societal effects, such 
as the extent of influenza-related illness and death, 
communications professionals will reassess and adjust as 
necessary to emerging needs and expectations of public and 
professional audiences.  Areas meriting particular attention 
include: 
• Community subject-matter experts and spokespersons. It 
may be important to consider additional recruitment and 
training.  
• Effectiveness of procedures for keeping communications 
lists, materials, and databases current and accurate. Plans 
for having these lists available in alternate formats if 
electricity fails.  
• Open and accessible channels for advice to the public, including ongoing functioning of hotlines in collaboration with 
the CDC-INFO telephone line.  In addition to providing ready access to inquiries and concerns, state and local 
hotlines can help communications professionals assess community awareness and behaviors and adapt 
communications strategies. 
   
D.  Providing coordinated communications leadership across jurisdictional tiers (e.g., local, regional, state, and 
national) 
 
Communications officials at ADHS will work with communications officials from state agencies, county, tribal, city, and 
federal agencies as well as from other response partners, including health care and volunteer organizations, as necessary.  This 
coordination will occur through the ADEM Joint Information Center. 
 
E.   Promptly addressing rumors, misperceptions, stigmatization, and unrealistic expectations about the capacity of 
public and private health providers 
 
After the initial stages of a pandemic, news media coverage may become more mixed, with both positive and critical coverage. 
Hero stories may emerge, while “what ifs” and negative images may start to compete for the public attention. As the media 
proceeds into in-depth analysis of what happened and why, these elements become important to an effective response: 
• Monitor news media reports and public inquiries to identify emerging issues, rumors, and misperceptions and respond 
accordingly.  
• Conduct “desk-side briefings” and editorial roundtables with news media decision-makers.  
• Proactively address groups that voice overly critical, unrealistic expectations.  
• Establish trust with marginalized groups subject to or experiencing stigmatization and cite specific media outlets for 
inaccurate, misleading, or misguided reporting that may serve to encourage stigmatization.  
• Maintain scheduled access to pandemic subject-matter experts to balance the media’s needs with other subject-matter 
expert priorities.     
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Appendix 1 
Background Information for Developing Communications Messages about Pandemic Influenza 
 
The language, timing, and detail of key messages will depend on a number of factors, including demographics and group 
psychological profiles of intended audiences, available or preferred media, and urgency.  However, the following points may 
help communications professionals adapt appropriate health messages related to an influenza pandemic: 
 
By definition, pandemic influenza will result from a new influenza A subtype against which humans have limited or no natural 
immunity. Pandemic influenza virus infection therefore is likely to cause serious, possibly life-threatening disease in greater 
numbers, even among previously healthy persons, than occurs during seasonal interpandemic influenza outbreaks.  
• Global influenza pandemics are unpredictable events, presenting challenges for communication.   
• Global and domestic surveillance, coupled with laboratory testing, are vital to identifying new influenza A subtypes 
virus strains with pandemic potential.   
• The threat of a pandemic may be heightened when a highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus spreads widely among 
birds and infects other animals, including humans.  The strains can mutate or adapt and give rise to a strain that 
spreads easily from person to person in a sustained manner, causing a pandemic.  
• Illness and death may be much higher during a pandemic than during annual seasonal community influenza outbreaks; 
pandemics can also occur in waves over several months.  
• It could take many months to develop an effective pandemic influenza vaccine and immunize substantial numbers of 
people. Antiviral medications for treatment or prevention of pandemic influenza could have an important interim role, 
but may also be in short supply.  Consequently, practical and common sense measures, such as frequent hand 
washing, covering your mouth and nose while sneezing or coughing, and staying home from work or school if you are 
ill with influenza-like illness, may be important to help prevent the spread of pandemic influenza.  
• Although travel restrictions and isolation and quarantine procedures may limit or slow the spread of pandemic 
influenza in its earliest stages, these measures are likely to be much less effective once the pandemic is widespread. 
Alternative population containment measures (e.g., cancellation of public events) may be necessary.  
• Arizona is preparing for pandemic influenza by:  
o Developing a coordinated state strategy to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic in conjunction 
with federal and local partners 
o Participating in a pandemic influenza table-top exercise within the first six months of 2006   
o Already embarking on a campaign to immunize elderly adults for pneumonia, often a secondary infection to 
influenza that can cause fatalities in the high risk elderly population 
o Educating health care workers about pandemic influenza diagnosis, case management, and infection control 
practices  
o Refining pandemic influenza surveillance systems  
o Developing guidelines for minimizing transmission opportunities in different settings  
o Working with federal agencies as they are expanding supplies of antiviral medications in the Strategic 
National Stockpile and establishing guidelines for their use  
o Developing candidate vaccines and establishing plans for the rapid development, testing, production, and 
distribution of vaccines that may target specific pandemic influenza strains  
o Developing materials that county and local agencies can adapt as guidance for use during an influenza 
pandemic.   
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Appendix 2 
Sample Materials 
 
ADHS will utilize materials provided and adapted from HHS which will provide communications materials for states and 
localities throughout all pandemic phases.  Many of these resources will made available at appropriate times on the 
www.azdhs.gov/pandemic flu and www.pandemicflu.gov websites. Others will be disseminated by using the Health Alert 
Network (HAN), Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X), and other resources for health professionals.  Current links to 
available materials: 
 
Avian Influenza Fact Sheet 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm  
 
Guidance to Travelers 
http://www.cdc.gov/travel/other/avian_flu_ah5n1_031605.htm 
 
Interim Guidance for U.S.  Citizens Living Abroad 
http://www.cdc.gov/travel/other/avian_flu_ig_americans_abroad_032405.htm  
 
Sample CDC News Conference Transcript 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/transcripts/t040127.htm 
 
Managing Anxiety in Times of Crisis 
http://mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/cmhs/managinganxiety/default.asp  
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Appendix 3 
Additional Resources 
 
HHS and its agencies will make resources available to state and local health professionals to assist with their communications 
responsibilities during Interpandemic, Pandemic Alert, and Pandemic Periods.  Because information may change frequently, 
check the www.pandemicflu.gov and www.cdc.gov/flu/ websites for up-to-date materials.  Communications professionals in 
states and local areas will be able to localize and download most resources, including posters, brochures, fact sheets, media 
kits, webcasts, and archived satellite broadcasts.  Much of the material will also be available through e-mail or mail orders.  
Material will include color and black and white versions for health care and public health professionals and for public 
audiences, as well as specific versions for low-literacy populations.  As appropriate and feasible, materials will be provided in a 
variety of languages. 
 
Other resources 
National Vaccine Program Office Pandemic Influenza Website 
http://www.HHS.gov/nvpo/pandemics/  
 
WHO Pandemic Influenza Website 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/ 
 
MMWR Guide for Influenza  
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/mguide_flu.html  
 
Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/epix/epix.html  
 
Health Alert Network (HAN) 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/documentsapp/HAN/han.asp; http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/han  
 
Centers for Public Health Preparedness  
www.asph.org/acphp 
This website provides locating information and links to the 40 centers involved in this network.  The centers form a unique 
partnership that includes accredited schools of public health, dentistry schools, medical schools, veterinary schools, and state 
and local health departments.  Together, the partners provide a countrywide defense system through the preparation of front-
line public health workers and first responders.   
Vaccine-Specific Sites and Resources  
Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS) website at http://vaers.hhs.gov/ or call 1-800-822-7967   
 
Surveillance Sites  
CDC Influenza Surveillance Data 
EISS: European Influenza Surveillance Scheme  
EuroGROG: International Influenza Surveillance  
World Health Organization (WHO): Flunet  
 
Outbreak Sites  
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services, U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA)  
APHIS coordinates efforts to prepare for and respond to outbreaks of exotic animal diseases, including highly pathogenic avian 
influenza.  Results of surveillance for influenza A viruses in avian species in the United States are reported each year by the 
National Veterinary Services Laboratories in the Proceedings of the U.S.  Animal Health Association Annual Meeting. 
World Health Organization Disease Outbreak Site   The World Health Organization (WHO): disease outbreaks  
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Research Sites 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/dmid/influenza/pandemic.htm 
 
USDA Agricultural Research Service 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS), USDA  
 
The ARS' Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory publishes information on avian influenza research and contacts for further 
information.   
 
Manufacture and Licensing of Influenza Vaccine  
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), FDA  
CBER plays a critical role in the manufacture and licensing of influenza vaccine.   
 
WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_5/en/index.html  
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Appendix 4 
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Introduction   
 
About Crises 
Crises can occur at any time.  They can quickly result in widespread public confusion or anxiety, shut down a laboratory or 
office, harm a relationship with a partner or damage the agency’s reputation.  Crises can diminish public confidence in the 
Arizona Department of Health Service’s (the Department) advice and disrupt the Department’s ability to perform its public 
health mission.  
 
Fortunately, with effective decision-making and communications – especially media communications – crises can be managed 
and resolved.  Key personnel can be notified and crisis teams activated effectively.  Rumors can be detected and dealt with.  
And the public can be given useful information in a timely manner.  Sometimes crises can be anticipated and avoided 
altogether. 
 
Purpose of Plan 
This crisis communication plan describes the crisis policies and procedures carried out by the Public Information Office (PIO) 
from pre-crisis monitoring to crisis occurrence and resolution.   
 
The PIO goal during crises is to support the Department’s public health mission and to protect its reputation.  The PIO plays an 
essential role in resolving crises by serving as a source of credible and useful information to the media, by influencing the 
content and flow of information, and by directing the media’s attention to what the Department and other agencies are doing, 
and what the public should be doing to resolve the problem. 
 
The PIO’s specific objectives are to: 
• Lead the state wide Health PIO/risk communications task force for crisis communications. 
• Follow events and trends in order to anticipate crises and prevent them when possible. 
• Respond to crises effectively (e.g., accurate verification, timely notifications, rapid assembly of crisis teams, effective 
response to rumors, etc.). 
• Convene a joint information center (JIC) with public information representation from the governor’s office, agency 
personnel, federal, state, local, tribal and county public health officials including Arizona Division of Emergency 
Management and the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security.  
• Provide timely, accurate and helpful information to the public, the media, the governor’s office, agency personnel, 
federal, state, local, tribal and county public health officials, first responders, media and other audiences during crises. 
What is a Crisis? 
For purposes of this plan, a crisis is any event that triggers a level of public interest and media inquiry that requires the 
Department’s PIO to significantly increase its efforts or resources in order to accomplish a reasonable media response.  Crises 
include, but are not limited to, bioterrorism, disease outbreaks or epidemics, natural disasters, fires, issues of water, power, and 
computer outages, breakdowns in communications, vaccination shortages, or other emergencies in which a public health threat 
is either real or perceived. 
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Types of Crises 
Potential crises include the following: 
 
• Bioterrorism event 
• Suspected 
• Declared 
• Chemical terrorist event 
• Radiological event 
• National/multi-state disease outbreak, epidemic, investigation or environmental crisis 
• Food-borne 
• Airborne  
• Water-borne 
• Vector-borne 
• Potential to spread internationally  
• Unknown infectious agent 
• Chemical 
• Natural disasters 
• Toxic materials 
• International disease outbreak or epidemic investigation or large scale environmental disaster 
• Unknown infectious agent with potential to spread to the United States 
• Known infectious agent with potential to spread to the United States 
• Large scale environmental crises 
• War related 
 
• Department disaster (Phoenix, Tucson or Flagstaff offices) 
• Laboratory incident with laboratory worker 
• Laboratory incident with release of material in community 
• Death of employee/contractor/visitor while on premises 
• Hostage event with/by employee/contractor on premises 
• Bomb threat 
• Explosion/fire–destruction of property 
• Violent death of an employee/contractor or visitor on premises 
 
• Department Leadership/Management/Employee Relations Crisis Issues 
• Unexpected resignation of Director or other hi-profile employee 
• Accusation of misconduct involving conflict of interest, human subjects, or research animals 
• Accusation of personal misconduct 
• Lawsuit filed against Department/leadership 
• Sexual misconduct charges 
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Crisis Lifecycle 
 
 
Understanding the patterns of crisis can help Department teams anticipate problems and respond effectively.  These 
considerations are offered for background purposes. 
 
 
Initial Phase 
The initial phase of a crisis is characterized by confusion and intense media interest.  Information is usually incomplete and the 
facts dispersed.  It’s important to recognize that information from media, other health offices or other agencies might not be 
accurate.  The Department’s role is to learn the facts about what happened, to determine what local and/or national health 
agencies are doing about the problem and to verify the true magnitude of the event as quickly as possible.  
 
When a crisis is verified, the initial Department media contact notifies key executives of the event and the Director of 
Communications or Public Information Officer activates the Crisis Communication Plan.   
 
One of the best ways to limit public anxiety in a crisis is to provide useful information about the nature of the problem and 
what the public can do about it.  During the initial phase of an event, the Department seeks to establish itself as a credible 
source of information.  Even when there is little information to offer, the Department can communicate how the agency is 
investigating the event and when more information will be available.  At the very least, messages should demonstrate that the 
Department is addressing the issues head on – that its approach is reasonable and empathetic.   
 
While pressure to release information prematurely may be intense, appropriate leaders in the incident chain of command must 
approve the release of any information.  
 
Crisis Maintenance 
As the crisis evolves, the Department should anticipate sustained media interest.  Unexpected developments, rumors or 
misinformation, and media scrutiny may place further demands on the Department.  Health care professionals and others not 
associated with the Department may comment publicly on the issue, and possibly contradict or misinterpret the Department’s 
messages.  The Department may be criticized over its handling of the situation. 
 
Maintaining coordination with the Department’s Incident Commander within the PHIMS structure and other agencies is 
essential.  Processes for tracking media inquiries and Department activities become increasingly important as the workload 
increases.  Department personnel will keep a log of people they talk with, responses to media request, issues raised and actions 
taken during crises.  This stage may involve ADHS conducting activities from the Health Emergency Operations Center and 
coordinating with the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), local Joint Information Centers (JICs) and the State JIC.  
 
The crisis maintenance phase includes an ongoing assessment of the media requests and information needs and the allocation 
of resources to be sustainable throughout the duration of the event.    
 
Resolution 
Once the crisis is resolved, the Department may need to respond to media inquiry or scrutiny about how the event was handled.  
The Department may have an opportunity to reinforce public health messages while the issue is still current.  A public 
education campaign or updates to existing information may be necessary.  When the crisis is over, the Department evaluates its 
performance, documents lessons learned and determines specific actions to improve crisis systems, communications, and the 
overall crisis plan. 
 
Recovery 
Once the crisis is resolved, the public, and specifically the affected public will be in a phase of recovery.  During this period it 
will remain necessary to respond to information and media requests, especially about the Department’s work to help the public 
recover from the crisis.  
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Public Health Incident Management System (PHIMS) 
 
Depending on the circumstances, a public health incident management system (PHIMS) will be activated.   PHIMS is an 
operational system is an operational structure based common terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, 
unified command structure, action planning, manageable span-of-control, pre-designated facilities, and comprehensive resource 
management. It may become necessary for the public health agency to become the Incident Commander. 
 
In consultation with the Division of Emergency Management, the Department may request activation of the State Emergency 
Response and Recovery Plan (SERRP), which will lead immediately to the involvement of multiple agencies in emergency 
response operations under a Unified Command system operating out of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).  
 
Outbreak Scenario With Multiple-Agency Involvement 
In the case of an outbreak or epidemic situation that taxes local public health resources, other state and/or federal agencies may 
contribute to the emergency response.  As soon as multiple agencies are involved, two entities are established, the Joint 
Information Center (JIC) and the Unified Command (UC). 
 
Joint Information Center (JIC) 
The JIC1 is a physical location, usually at a local level, where public affairs officers from participating agencies come together 
to ensure the coordination and release of accurate and consistent information that is disseminated quickly to the media and the 
public.  The JIC may be established at the headquarters of the local Emergency Operations Center or at an offsite location near 
the incident. The local health officer appoints one or more public health representatives to the JIC.  Representatives may 
include the public affairs officer, a health educator, and/or a mental health representative.  If operating at the JIC is not feasible, 
all organizations are encouraged to conduct their information activities in cooperation with the JIC. Or if the physical 
establishment of a JIC is not feasible, a “virtual” JIC may be formed via teleconference and electronic mail operations.  
 
The primary functions of the on-scene JIC are to: 
• Provide response information to individuals, families, and business and industry directly or indirectly 
affected by the emergency. 
• Establish phone lines for public and press inquiries. 
• Monitor news coverage to ensure that accurate information is being disseminated. 
• Take action to correct misunderstandings, misinformation, and incorrect information concerning emergency 
response and mitigation operations that appear in the news media. 
• Ensure that non-English-speaking, hard to reach, and differently-abled populations receive accurate and 
timely information about emergency response and mitigation operations through appropriate news media and 
through established community resources. 
• Use a broad range of resources to disseminate information to those affected by the disaster and the general 
public, including the utilization of the emergency alert system, www.az211.gov, broadcast fax, the Internet, 
print, radio, and broadcast news media. 
• Maintain contact with and gather information from federal, state, local, and voluntary organizations taking 
part in emergency response operations. 
• Manage news conferences and press operations for disaster area tours by state and FEMA officials and 
others. 
• Provide public affairs support and advice to the State Coordinating Officer, if one is involved in the 
emergency response. 
• Credential press personnel when necessary to control access to sensitive areas. 
• Coordinate with logistics staff to provide basic facilities to assist the news media in disseminating 
information to the public and to credential media representatives. 
                                                 
1 The term JIC normally refers to the local Joint Information Center. JENC, or Joint Emergency News Center, is the state version of the same concept, 
providing a state-based center of operations for media oversight. The term JIC is generally the more preferred use of acronym and may sometimes be used at 
the state level as well. 
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Unified Command (UC)  
Unified Command is a concept of operations used when there are multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions such as local, 
county, state and possibly federal.  Command is accomplished by consensus.  The state may establish a physical UC center (the 
State Emergency Operations Center, for example) and/or may periodically convene key decision makers to accomplish unified 
command.  A state-level Joint Information Center (JIC) is usually formed to support the local JICs and to ensure a unified state 
response, and is operated out of the State EOC.  In an event, the ADHS Communications Director or PIO should report, as 
assigned, to the State EOC but be continue to operate within the Health PHIMS structure as well.  The state health officer 
and/or a designee participate(s) in unified command activities and may consult with core working group members, such as the 
PIO, as necessary.  
 
According to A.R.S. 36-787, ADHS is the lead agencies for crafting public information strategies and messages during a 
declared public health emergency.  ADHS will work within the existing system to coordinate public health messages.  The 
ADHS PIO is the lead PIO within the Health EOC but reports to the Arizona Division of Emergency Management SEOC lead 
PIO or Governor appointed lead PIO within the State EOC and State JIC and acts as the primary jurisdiction spokesperson for 
the Department, in accordance with ADHS communication plans and protocols. All state agencies must coordinate the release 
of information through ADEM and the State and local JICs prior to release. 
EXAMPLE OF AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CHART 
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 Crisis Team Organization______________________________________________________________________ 
 
PHIMS Response Structure 
The Public Health Incident Management System (PHIMS) is the Department’s Incident Management System.  In other 
words, it is an organizational framework within which the Department responds to an emergency.  During an emergency, 
Department resources such as personnel and supplies as well as activities, may need to be mobilized across programs.  The 
PHIMS response utilizes a structure that fosters communications between the tactical (front line responders) and through a 
chain-of-command.  
PHIMS Staff 
(See the PHIMS Response Organizational Chart located after this introduction as a visual example) 
The Agency Administrator consists of the Department Director or their designee who oversees the response.  A Public Policy 
Advisory Group may be assembled as needed and is comprised of selected Department Response Sector Leaders (Division 
Directors, Bureau and Office Chiefs) to assist the Agency Administrator in developing public policy recommendations.  The 
Agency Administrator then assigns an Incident Commander who is responsible for managing the Department’s response 
activities by coordinating the Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration sections.  In addition, this individual 
develops the Public Health Incident Action Plan (IAP) in conjunction with the Planning Section 
The Incident Commander is supported by a command staff that is represented by the State Epidemiologist, Information Officer, 
Liaison Officer, Safety Officer and a Chief for each of the Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration 
sections. 
 
The PHIMS Command Staff is comprised of an Information Officer, Liaison Officer and a Safety Officer.  The 
Information Officer develops material, has it reviewed internally and releases it to the media.  The Liaison Officer maintains 
relations between the Department and outside agencies and the Safety Officer oversees the safety of the response. 
The PHIMS General Staff includes Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administrative responsibilities. These 
responsibilities remain with the Incident Manager (IM) until they are assigned to other individuals. When the Operations, 
Planning, Logistics or Finance/Administrative responsibilities are established as separate functions under the IM, they are 
managed by a section chief and can be supported by other functional units (Group Supervisors and Unit Leads) 
 The Operations Staff is responsible for carrying out the response activities described in the Incident Action Plan 
(IAP).  The Operations Section Chief coordinates Operation Section activities and has primary responsibility for 
receiving and implementing the IAP.  The Operations Section Chief reports to the Incident Manager and determines 
the required resources and organizational structure within the Operations Section.  Here are some examples of 
activities that the Operations Section might be involved in: 
 Conduct human case surveillance and characterize an outbreak 
 Conduct human case follow-up 
 Conduct animal surveillance and characterize an outbreak 
 Disseminate data (cases, geographical distribution) 
 Handle public, media and health care provider inquiries 
 Develop messages covering clinical information and prevention 
 Oversee funding to counties for activities 
 Make regular updates to local health departments 
 Identify need and broker vaccine 
 Provide Behavioral Health Services to ADHS staff 
 Determine needs and research resources of Arizona hospitals 
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  The Planning Staff is responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination and use of information about the 
development of the incident and status of resources.  This section’s responsibilities also include creation of the 
Incident Action Plan (IAP – See attached example), which defines the response activities and resource utilizations for 
a specified time period. 
 Development of IAP 
 Compilation of PHIMS Updates/Briefs into the weekly/daily Situation Report 
 The Logistics Staff is responsible for providing additional facilities, services, and materials for the incident response.  
 Additional equipment for HEOC, Communications, Call Center, etc. 
 Facilities  
 Personnel (above and beyond routine need) 
 The Finance and Administrative Staff is responsible for all financial, administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the 
incident. 
 Procurement of items 
 Maintenance of contracts 
The modular organization of PHIMS allows responders to scale their efforts and apply the parts of the PHIMS structure that 
best meet the demands of the incident. In other words, there are no hard and fast rules for when or how to expand the PHIMS 
organization. Many incidents will never require the activation of Planning, Logistics, or Finance/Administration Sections, 
while others will require some or all of them to be established. 
 
Communications occurs across groups, but also comes directly to one’s supervisor and subsequently to the Section Chiefs and 
Command Staff.  The Section Chiefs and Command Staff meet as needed to use information to make decisions.  Information 
from these meetings and regular updates are incorporated into Situation Reports (see attached example) that are disseminated 
by e-mail to the entire response network to keep everyone up to date and anticipate future issues.  
Crisis Team Assignments 
 
Media Response PIO Activities 
• Manages all media relations related to crisis. 
• Assists with all aspects of procedures involved with a State or local Joint Information Center, if established. Follows PIO 
guidelines as outlined by State Emergency Management Division. 
• Appoints spokespersons for Department. 
• Identifies Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) for the Department. 
• Attends SME meetings/conference calls. 
• Develops messages and supporting materials for SMEs. 
• Manages SME interface with media. 
• Utilizes key messages, message templates and develops and disseminates messages. 
• Manages development of all materials for internal and external audiences. 
• Utilizing PHIMS approval process for dissemination of information and protocol established by State or local JIC, 
manages approvals of messages and materials. 
• Provides media with approved information/materials. 
• Coordinates personnel to handle media logistics, (e.g., logistics/facilities set-up, logging media requests). 
• Provides strategic direction for timing and content of media releases and media conferences or briefings. 
• Trains and prepares spokespersons for media interfaces. 
• Anticipates media’s questions and tests spokespersons media responses. 
• Determines need for off-site referrals to other agency experts.  
• Gathers ongoing data about the crisis. 
• Monitors media. 
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Crisis Response Checklists 
 
9-Step Crisis Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Crisis         
Occurs 
9. Monitor events  
8. Conduct public 
education  
PIO 
9-Step Crisis Map 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Verify situation 
7. Conduct post-
crisis evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Crisis 
ends 
 
2. Conduct 
notifications  
 
 
6. Conduct media 
relations in 
accordance with 
PHIMS structure and 
established protocols 
of State or local JIC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Conduct 
assessment  
(Activate crisis plan) 
5. Prepare 
information and 
obtain approvals 
 
4. Organize 
assignments 
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 Step #1.  Verify situation 
The initial PIO contacted is responsible for verifying the situation.  Recognize that information from Department offices, health 
care professionals or media may not be complete or accurate, and what may seem like a crisis to one source may not be to 
others. 
 Get the facts. 
 Obtain information from additional sources to put the event in perspective. 
 Ascertain where the information originated and determine its credibility.   
¾ Did the information come from a federal source such as FBI, CDC, HHS or Epi-Aid?   
¾ Did the information come from a local channel such as DEM, DPS, the Governor’s Office, a hospital, or a county 
health official?   
¾ Is this a rumor such as an email chain? 
 Review and critically judge all information. 
 Determine whether the information is consistent with other sources. 
 Determine whether the characterization of the event is plausible. 
 Clarify information through public health staff and managers. 
 Attempt to verify the magnitude of the event. 
 Begin to identify staffing and resource needs to meet the expected media interest. 
 Determine who should be notified of this potential crisis. 
  
Step #2.  Conduct notifications 
 
Mandatory Notification and Coordination 
 Department Director 
 Deputy Directors 
 Assistant Directors 
 PHIMS Incident Commander 
 Governor’s Office  
 Office of Legal Counsel 
 County PIOs 
 Local Health Liaison (notify ALHOA and counties) 
 Border Health Liaison (notify Border communities) 
 Tribal Health Liaison (notify ITCA, IHS and tribes) 
 
Secondary Notification and Coordination (depending on the event) 
 Arizona Division of Emergency Management PIO 
 Arizona Department of Public Safety PIO 
 FBI 
 CDC  
 Arizona Dept. of Environmental Quality PIO 
 Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 
 Local fire department 
 Arizona Medical Association 
 Arizona Hospital and Health care Association 
 American Red Cross 
 Others as needed 
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 Step #3.  Conduct assessment (activate crisis plan) 
Throughout the event, the PIO will continue to gather information and try to determine the severity of the situation and the 
potential impact on PIO operations, resources and staffing.  Based on the initial assessment, and with approval of the 
Department Director, the Director of Communications activates the Department Crisis Communication Plan. 
 
Results 
 Determine the agency/office/individual in charge of managing the crisis.  Ensure direct and frequent contact with the office 
in charge. 
 Continue to gather and check the facts.  What happened?  What was done to prevent this situation from happening?  What 
can be done to prevent it from getting worse? 
 Determine what Department is doing to end this crisis.  Is there an investigation?  Who’s involved in the investigation? 
 Determine what other agencies/organizations are doing to solve this crisis. 
 Determine who is being affected by this crisis.  What are their perceptions?  What do they want and need to know? 
 Determine what the public should be doing. 
 Activate media monitoring. 
 Activate Internet monitoring. 
 Determine what’s being said about the event.  Is the information accurate?  
 Determine consistency of information across sources. 
 
Crisis Assessment Tool (developed by CDC) 
Use the questions below to assess the “crisis level.”  The assessment helps Department determine the staffing and resources 
needed to respond to the situation.  It also helps differentiate events when there is more than one crisis going on at a time. 
 
Level A Crisis – A true public health emergency with expected casualties.  A 24-hour operation may be necessary.  (First three 
boxes checked.) 
 
Level B Crisis – An intense crisis, but not a public health emergency for public information.  PIO may need to extend its hours 
of operation.  (First box not checked, second or third boxes checked and the majority of the others checked.) 
 
Level C Crisis – A media frenzy.  (Boxes 1 and 3 not checked, second box checked and a majority of the others checked.) 
 
Level D Crisis – A limited crisis.  (Less than 50 percent of the boxes checked and the first four boxes not checked.) 
 Is this a legitimate public health emergency requiring widespread public education to prevent further illnesses or deaths 
(e.g., multi-state e-coli outbreak or BT-event)? 
 Is this the “first,” “worst” or “biggest” of its kind? 
 Are deaths expected above endemic levels? 
 Is the event occurring in a metropolitan area (with likelihood of high media interest)? 
 Is the event national or international? 
 Does the event involve children or special populations? 
 Does the event involve a consumer product, service or industry? 
 Does the event involve any sensitive international trade or political relations? 
 Is this event within the scope of the Department’s responsibility? 
 Was the Department’s responsible for this event occurring? 
 Is the event possibly man-made, deliberate or intentional? 
 Is the situation getting worse?   
 Could the event become more serious (e.g., a novel influenza virus)? 
 Is media interest significant? 
 Is this a legitimate public health concern? 
 Are there potential long-term health effects related to this event?  Does the event involve a criminal investigation? 
 Is the state or city health department at the epicenter of the event not well equipped or trained to manage a media response 
of this magnitude? 
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Step #4.  Organize assignments 
The Incident Manager, in consultation with the Department Director, coordinates the PHIMS Response Structure. 
 
Ongoing organizational issues 
 What do investigators say about the potential for the crisis getting worse?   
 Could events result in more intense public/media interest? 
 What rumors or points of conflict have been identified?   
 How should the Department respond to these issues?  Is our response working? 
 Should the Department continue to be a source of information for the media about this crisis or should some issues be 
more appropriately addressed by other government entities? 
 Are the teams operating with more or less equal intensity?  How could we improve efficiency?  Would reassignments 
help? 
 Should the IM and PIO determine a time for daily updates to media (e.g., set a time for a media update via web and 
broadcast fax) or cancel the regular updates? 
 Are hourly/daily/weekly SME briefings appropriate to reduce the demand for one-on-one interviews with SMEs? 
 What is the PHIMS Response Group learning from the public and media that could be useful to Department outbreak 
investigators and policy managers?  
 Are partner organizations concerned about their own reputations?   
 Which partners are or should be involved in this crisis? 
 How do partners want to get involved in the Department’s response? 
 Have mandatory and secondary notifications been made? 
 Have the key partners been updated?  When? 
 
Step #5.  Prepare information and obtain approvals 
This function includes all message development and materials development activities, the approval process and coordination of 
information bureaus, offices and programs of the Department. General public and health care provider information must be 
made immediately available via fact sheets, FAQs, Vaccine Information Sheets, and other relevant materials. Information 
should be updated on at least a daily basis to the ADHS Web site.  
 
Message development 
 Who are our audiences?  Who’s been affected by this event?  Who’s upset or concerned?  
 Who needs to be alerted to this situation? 
 What hard to reach populations will be affected by this event?  
 What are audiences’ perceptions and information needs? 
 What do media want to know? 
 How should the Department show empathy? 
 What are the facts?  What happened?   
 What is our policy on this issue?  
 What is the Department doing about this issue?  How are we solving the problem? 
 What did the Department do to prevent this from happening? 
 What other agencies or third parties are involved?  What are they saying? 
 What should the public be doing? 
 What public information is available? 
 When will more information be available?  
 
Information should be presented in an audience appropriate format (i.e., general public, health care providers, legislators, 
senior citizens). Scientific and technical jargon should be avoided.  
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 Public Health Information Line (PHIL) 
The Public Information Office and The Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response are responsible for 
coordinating the scripting and activation of the State Public Health hotline. The bi-lingual, 24/7 menu-driven State Public 
Health Hotline is administered through the Dept. of Administration. Metro Phoenix 602.364.4500, statewide 800.314.9243. For 
detailed procedures on how to change the information on the recorded line, see Appendix G. 
 
Information approval process 
At all times, the Department Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Director of Public Health or their designees will approve 
all information for public use. Or, in a crisis approval will happen as per the PHIMS Command Structure. It is critical that all 
parties involved in the approval process understand the need for timeliness and responsiveness in disseminating information to 
the public. For specific approval process and confidentiality guidelines for press releases, Web updates or other communication 
materials, contact your Office Chief or Bureau Chief. See The Crisis Communication Action Plan (Appendix A) for additional 
information. All information posted on the ADHS Web site must be approval by the Incident Manager and the ADHS Director 
of Communications. 
 
Step #6.  Conduct media relations 
General media relations guidelines remain in effect during crisis events.  Please see Appendix B. Below are additional 
considerations. 
 
Identified Spokespersons 
Following is a list of Department approved spokesperson positions, in addition to the Public Information Office. The Incident 
Commander, the Director, or their designee may identify other spokespersons during the course of the event. 
 Director Susan Gerard 
 Deputy Director Rose Conner 
 Communications Director Michael Murphy 
 Assistant Director, Public Health, Niki O’Keeffe 
 Public Information Officer for Public Health, Mary Ehlert 
 Deputy Assistant Director, Public Health, Jeanette Shea-Ramirez 
 Deputy Assistant Director, Public Health, Will Humble 
 State Epidemiologist David Engelthaler 
 Chief Medical Officer Dr. Karen Lewis 
 Chief, Office of Bioterrorism and Epidemic Preparedness and Response, Jane Wixted 
 Chief, State Lab, Victor Waddell 
 Bureau Chief, Epidemiology and Disease Control, Ashraff Lasee 
 Infectious disease specialist physician, Dr. Peter Kelly 
 Spanish language spokespersons, Dr. Karen Lewis, Michael Murphy 
 
Media questions to anticipate 
 What happened? 
 Who’s in charge?  
 What are you doing for the people who got hurt? 
 Is the situation under control? 
 What can we expect? 
 How did this happen?  
 Why wasn’t this prevented from happening? 
 What else can go wrong? 
 When did you begin working on this (were notified of this, determined this)? 
 What does this data/information/results mean? 
 What bad things aren’t you telling us?  
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 When talking to the media … 
 Express empathy; acknowledge victims and/or their concerns 
 Provide only approved information, do not speculate or interject personal opinion. 
 State the facts about the event. 
 Describe the data collection and investigation process. 
 Describe what the Department is doing about the crisis.   
 Explain what the public should be doing. 
 Describe how to obtain more information about the situation. 
 
Alternatives to “no comment” 
When the Department is not able to talk about an event, rather than saying “no comment” try to establish an open line of 
communications in response to media inquires. Possible responses: 
 "We’ve just learned about the situation and are trying to get more complete information now." 
 "All our efforts are directed at bringing the situation under control, so I cannot speculate about the cause of the incident." 
 ___________ is the agency with jurisdiction on that topic/the expert on that topic… I will have them call you. What is 
your deadline? We’re preparing a statement on that now it will be released time/in two hours and available via email/at a 
briefing to be held at time/in two hours, etc.  
Step #7.  Conduct post-crisis evaluation  
As soon as feasible following a crisis, the PHIMS Response Team will conduct a “hot wash” or after action evaluation of its 
response. The PIO’s role in the hot wash is to: 
 Compile and analyze comments and criticisms from Department employees, the public, health care providers, emergency 
response personnel, local health offices and other stakeholders. 
 Analyze and discuss media interviews done by Department personnel, SMEs, etc. and analyze media coverage. 
 Report results of comments and analysis to Department leadership. 
 Determine need for changes to the Department Crisis Communication Plan and need for  
 Determine need to improve policies and processes. 
 Institutionalize changes with appropriate training. 
 Revise crisis plan policies and procedures based on lessons learned. 
Step #8.  Conduct public education 
Once the crisis has subsided, PHIMS Response Team and the ADHS Public Information Office may need to carry out 
additional public education activities. 
 Should the Department be educating the public about public health issues related to this crisis?   
 What are the public’s perceptions and information needs related to this crisis?   
 Does the public understand the Department’s health messages on this issue?  Are they taking appropriate actions? 
 Should we also consider audiences that were not involved in the crisis for public education? 
 Should a public health message related to this crisis event be incorporated into other health communication activities (e.g., 
Public Health Week or National Infant Immunization Week)? 
 Should we use this event to highlight any related public health messages?  
 
Step #9.  Monitor events 
The PIO and the ERG should monitor events and exchange information on an ongoing basis during an emergency.  Checklist 
to include: 
 Media monitoring 
 Internet monitoring 
 Ongoing exchanges of information with county health departments, other agencies, state health departments 
 Ongoing communications with SMEs and Department partners  
 Monitoring of public opinion data and other Department research 
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 Logistics 
 
 
In the event of a serious infectious disease outbreak or epidemic, logistical response systems must be put in place quickly.  
County public health agencies need to identify sites that can serve as a joint information center (JIC) or a media center.  Such 
sites must be able to accommodate multiple phone lines and have ample electrical outlets for other communication equipment, 
including fax machines, computer modems, televisions (to monitor broadcast news reports), etc.  In addition, a system for 
immediate communication across agencies within the state should be established well in advance of an emergency.   
 
A standard PIO mobilization package (Tak Pack) is available with the following suggested contents: 
 
State owned equipment 
• State (or rental) vehicle  
• Cell phone with extra battery, charger and dc cable with cigarette lighter adapter 
• Laptop computer w/modem & portable printer 
• Digital camera with spare battery, memory card, card reader 
• Telephone credit card (optional) 
• State credit card for general expenses up to $1000 (film development, printing, etc.) 
• Media contact list 
 
Personally Owned Equipment 
• Clothes for the climate of the affected area 
• Medications 
• Cash/credit card for emergencies 
• Name and phone number of next of kin 
 
 
Local Communications and Response Networks 
Health agencies should determine in advance with whom they may need to communicate during a small- or large-scale 
infectious disease outbreak.  Contact lists (including cell phone, batch faxes, email lists, etc.) should be reviewed and updated 
at least monthly and should include the following: 
 
Need to include updated contact lists for all listed partners. 
• Media organizations  
• Local health agencies 
• Laboratories (state, county, environmental health, Department of Agriculture, university-based, and clinical labs in 
physician offices/hospitals) 
• Health care organizations (hospitals, health clinics, professional associations, etc.) 
• Mental health services 
• Schools and universities 
• Sources of antidotes, vaccines and other therapeutic agents 
• First responders (including local emergency medical response agencies) and public safety officials 
• State and local emergency management agencies 
• State emergency response commissions, local emergency planning commissions, and, if existing, National Guard 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civilian Response teams 
• State-based contacts to federal agencies that may provide additional support during emergency situations (e.g., 
National Domestic Preparedness Office, FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction program) 
 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 29 Supp. 10:  Public Health Communications 
 
 In general, it is best to establish working relationships with community partners before an emergency situation arises.  
Therefore, development of community education and response networks will necessitate the active involvement of local health 
agencies.  Community partners, such as schools and hospitals must first be identified.  Beyond simple contact lists, health 
agencies may wish to develop and maintain a partnership manual mapping community resources that are available during a 
crisis.  State and local health agencies can build ongoing relationships with partners through a series of periodic health 
education and other activities:  
• Involving partners in health department projects, when appropriate 
• Participating in partner activities, when appropriate 
• Distributing periodic educational alerts 
• Including partners in training programs.  Such programs might include laboratory workshops, seminars/workshops for 
teachers and other school staff (food service providers, nurses, etc.), risk communication training for select partners, 
invitations to participate in ongoing educational programs for health agency staff, etc. 
• Engaging in multi-agency simulation exercises 
 
Continuing Risk Communication Training for Health Department Staff 
Health department officials designated as spokespersons should take advantage of risk communication and emergency response 
training programs, and should assure that they have support personnel trained to work with the public and with the media 
during a crisis.  Among the organizations which periodically offer these kinds of training programs are the National Public 
Health Information Coalition, the National Laboratory Training Network (hosted by the Association of Public Health 
Laboratories and the CDC), the Public Health Training Network (hosted by the CDC), the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, state emergency management agencies, state emergency medical services agencies, and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. The Department is also providing media training to designated spokespersons herein.  
 
 
Event-Specific Guidelines 
National and multi-state disease outbreak investigation or environmental crisis (information provided by CDC) 
 CDC is a non-regulatory Federal agency that must be invited by a state health department or foreign ministry of health to 
participate in the disease investigation. 
 The state or local health department, unless otherwise designated, has the lead on the public health investigation.  
 When the investigation involves one state, the lead state health department “owns” the information and is the releasing 
authority to the media.  All media information provided by CDC is coordinated through the lead agency. 
 When multiple states or a nationwide disease outbreak is detected, lead media responsibility converts to CDC.  
 When the Federal Response Plan is activated following a significant natural disaster or man-made event, HHS/Public 
Health Service directs the public health and medical care services. 
 All information released by CDC should be coordinated with the states prior to release. 
Bioterrorism event 
If an infectious disease outbreak is threatened or initiated as part of announced terrorist activities, law enforcement agencies, 
e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would immediately assume command of federal criminal investigations.  A 
core-working group would be established at the level of the state health agency to coordinate surveillance and other public 
health support activities.  A JIC would be immediately established with public health representation as described above.  The 
state health officer or designee would take part in unified command activities as described above. 
 
During all disease outbreak investigations, do not speculate on the possibility of an outbreak being a bioterrorism event. A 
suspected bioterrorism event could be any disease outbreak in which one or more elements of the outbreak mirror aspects 
expected in a bioterrorism event.  Some of these elements include: a novel virus, an outbreak out of season, persons becoming 
ill who are normally not at high risk of being ill.    
 Do not speculate on the CDC or FBI's participation in an investigation.  Inform media that disease outbreak investigations 
routinely include questions about the possibility of an intentional act and that it is the Department’s policy not to speculate 
on this possibility during a disease outbreak investigation.  
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Chemical/Radiological terrorism event 
 Department and PHIMS Response Team personnel who become aware of a possible chemical/radiological terrorism event 
should notify the Office Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response  (after hours through on-call emergency list 
or answering service). 
 Ensure contact with appropriate agencies (i.e., Division of Emergency Mgmt., Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency, 
DPS, FBI, etc.) is made to determine chain of command in response. 
 
 
Continuity of Operations Checklists 
Emergencies that prevent access to ADHS main building at 150 N. 18th Ave., but leave mainframe intact 
 Operations plan for notifying PHIMS personnel about alternate work site, schedules and operations. (Re-locate to other 
ADHS building sites at TBD).  
 Temporary site for press operations (ADEM or Homeland Security). 
 Portable workstations and computers with Internet and e-mail access. 
 Media monitoring capability. 
 Ability to forward media calls to temporary site. 
 Credit cards for emergency purchases. 
 Support for travel approvals. 
 
Emergencies that prevent access to 150 N. 18th Ave and break mainframe access 
 Plan for maintaining communications with CDC, Counties, Hospitals, etc. 
 Satellite in physical proximity of Department command center operations. 
 Plan for secure phone lines, Internet and email access, cell phones, pagers, and workstations. 
 Agreements with other Department communication offices to use space at alternate campus for temporary PHIMS 
operations. 
 Media and Internet monitoring capabilities. 
 Credit cards for emergency purchases. 
 Support for travel approvals. 
 Press conference logistics capability. 
 
 
Plan Development and Maintenance 
 
All emergency response plans, including this one, should be reviewed and updated at least annually.  It may be helpful to 
assign the responsibility for coordinating this effort to one individual.  The revision process should include developing or 
updating any documents necessary to implement the plan (e.g., lists of local health department and media contacts). 
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I.    Rationale  
The response to an influenza pandemic will pose substantial physical, personal, social, and emotional challenges to health care 
providers, public health officials, and other emergency responders and essential service workers. Critical stress levels may 
reach varying degrees of severity among health care providers and emergency responders through the duration of the response 
as well as the recovery phases of a pandemic.  These critical stress levels may persist for more than a year. Experience with 
disaster relief efforts suggests that enhanced workforce support activities can help responders remain effective and proactive 
during emergencies. 
 
Medical and public health responders and their families will be at personal risk for as long as the pandemic continues in their 
community. Special planning is therefore needed to ensure that hospitals, public health agencies, first-responder organizations, 
and employers of essential service workers are prepared to help employees maximize personal resilience and professional 
performance. An essential part of this planning effort involves the creation of alliances with governmental, community-based 
organizations and nongovernmental organizations with expertise in and resources for psychosocial support services or training. 
 
 
II.    Overview 
The objective of supplement 11 is to ensure health care providers, public health officials, and other emergency responders and 
essential service workers reside in the safest and healthiest environment possible by addressing the psychological and social 
(“psychosocial”) needs of the occupational groups that will participate in the response to an influenza pandemic in Arizona.  
 
 
III. Concept of Operations 
During regular business operations, the Arizona Department of Health Services, Division of Behavioral Health Services 
(ADHS/DBHS) is a publicly funded behavioral health system that serves children, families and adults who are at or below the 
federal poverty level. 
 
However, as stated in the Arizona State Emergency Response and Recovery Plan (SERRP), during natural or human caused 
incidents that require state assistance, guidance and/or recovery funding ADHS/DBHS is the lead agency for the development 
and coordination of state behavioral health emergency/disaster response plans and services.  In addition, ADHS/DBHS will 
ensure coordination with other state, county, private and volunteer response agencies to prepare intra-agency emergency 
response plans that include checklists as well as procedural guides.   
 
ADHS/DBHS will assist the Arizona Division of Emergency Management (ADEM) in preparing a Presidential Major Disaster 
Declaration request to ensure that behavioral health services support is requested. 
 
The ADHS/DBHS will also manage and perform the following operational support functions during an emergency such as an 
influenza pandemic: 
• Assist in the preparation of an application for and attainment of federal grants (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), etc.) to fund immediate crisis counseling needs of the population and work 
force suffering from the pandemic emergency as well as grants to fund ongoing behavioral health and 
substance abuse service needs during the response and recovery phases. 
• Managing contracts with behavioral health service providers including reporting emergency behavioral 
health service provision, funding expenditure and reimbursement, and the outcome of service provision. 
• Managing emergency pandemic grants and funds including reporting emergency behavioral health service 
provision, funding acquisition and expenditure, and the outcome of service provision. 
• Overseeing the quality of care provided by behavioral health service providers directly, or through contracted 
regional behavioral health authorities. 
• Maintaining surveillance of behavioral health needs and efforts undertaken in order to adjust behavioral 
health service provision to meet the workforces demand 
• Provide guidance on development of appropriate behavioral health information messages to the ADHS 
communications team (see Supplement 10).  
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IV.    The Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Period  
Planning activities for the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods focus on the establishment of statewide psychosocial 
support services that will help workers manage emotional stress during the response to an influenza pandemic and resolve 
related personal, professional, and family issues. 
 
A.  Institutionalizing Statewide Psychosocial Support Systems 
   
ADHS will assist local health departments, hospitals and 
health care organizations in planning for the provisi
psychosocial support services that include the following 
activities: 
on of 
• Sharing of information and available tools 
and systems. 
• Encouraging the use of tools and techniques 
for supporting staff and their families during 
times of crisis.  
• As grant funding is available, offering Basic 
and Advanced Critical Incident Stress 
Management (CISM) training for State and 
local public health and behavioral health 
staff.  This training focuses on behavioral 
interventions to help employees cope with 
grief, stress, exhaustion, anger, and fear 
during an emergency.  
• Encouraging the local health departments to 
establish partnerships and participate in any RBHA outreach activities to the emergency responder 
community.  This purpose of this outreach is to inform these individuals on how to use as well as receive 
suggestions on how to improve the crisis response system. 
 
B.  Preparing Workforce Support Materials 
 
ADHS/DBHS is in the process of developing communication materials to assist Department employees and serve as a resource 
for the local health departments and other employers of health care providers, response workers and providers of essential 
services.  These materials will be prepared utilizing in-house knowledge as well as resources developed by other agencies and 
entities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, American Psychological Association, Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration and other behavioral health organizations for distribution during a pandemic. These 
materials shall be designed to do the following: 
• Educate and inform employees about emotional responses they might experience or observe in their 
colleagues and families (including children) during an influenza pandemic and techniques for coping with 
these emotions. 
• Educate employees about the importance of developing “family communication plans” so that family 
members can maintain contact during an emergency. 
• Describe workforce support services that will be available during an emergency, including confidential 
behavioral health services and employee assistance programs. 
• Answer questions about infection control practices to prevent the spread of influenza in the workplace (see 
Supplement 4)  
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C.  Developing Workforce Resilience Programs 
 
ADHS and local health departments need to establish their own workforce 
resilience programs that will help deployed workers to prepare for, cope with, 
and recover from the social and psychological challenges of emergency work.  
To prepare for implementation of workforce resilience programs to cope with 
the special challenges posed by an influenza pandemic, state and local 
response agencies should include the following components: 
• Plan for a long response (i.e., more than 1 year). 
• Identify pre-deployment briefing materials. 
• Augment employee assistance programs (EAP) with social 
support services for the families of deployed workers. 
• Provide program administrators and counselors with 
information on: 
o Cognitive, physiological, behavioral, and emotional 
symptoms that might be exhibited by patients and 
their families (especially children), including 
symptoms that might indicate severe mental 
disturbance. 
o Self-care in the field (i.e., actions to safeguard physical and emotional health and maintain a sense of 
control and self efficacy). 
o Cultural (e.g., professional, educational, geographic, ethnic) differences that can affect 
communication. 
o Potential impact of a pandemic on special populations (e.g., children, ethnic or cultural groups,  
the elderly). 
 
 
V.    The Pandemic Period 
Actions for the Pandemic Period focus on the delivery of statewide psychosocial support services to response workers, 
provision of occupational health information to health care providers, and implementation of workforce resilience programs. 
 
A.  Delivering Psychosocial Support Services 
 
Health care facilities, ADHS and local health departments - as well as companies and local governments that employ essential 
service providers need to make full use of  self-care and behavioral health interventions that can help response workers manage 
emotional stress, family issues and build coping skills and resilience. These approaches and tools can include: 
• Stress control/resilience teams in hospitals should observe recommended infection control precautions as 
well as assist and support employees and foster cohesion and morale by: 
o Monitoring employee health and well-being (in collaboration with occupational health clinics, if 
possible). 
o Staffing “rest and recuperation sites”.  
o Distributing informational materials.  
• Rest and recuperation sites. Sites can be stocked with healthy snacks and relaxation materials (e.g., 
music, relaxation tapes, movies), as well as pamphlets or notices about workforce support services. 
• Confidential telephone support lines staffed by behavioral health professionals. 
• Services for families. Services to families of employees who work in the field, work long hours, and/or 
remain in hospitals or other workplaces overnight might include: 
o Assistance with elder care and child care. 
o Help with other issues related to the care or well-being of children. 
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o Provision of cell phone or wireless communication devices to allow regular communication among 
family members. 
o Provision of information via websites or hotlines. 
o Access to expert advice and answers to questions about disease control measures and self care. 
• Information for commuters. Workers might need alternative transportation and scheduling (e.g., 
carpooling, employer provided private transportation, alternate work schedules during off-peak hours) to 
avoid exposure to large groups of potentially infected persons. 
• Services provided by community- and faith-based organizations. Activities of these organizations can 
provide relaxation and comfort during trying and stressful times. 
 
 
B.  Providing Information to Responders 
 
Health care providers, especially those who work in hospitals, are likely to be under extreme stress during a pandemic and will 
have special needs for open lines of communication with employers and access to up-to-date information. Health care facilities 
should ensure that employees have ongoing access to information on the following: 
• International, national, and local progress of the pandemic. 
• Work policies related to illness, sick pay, staff rotation, shift coverage, overtime pay, use of benefit time, 
transportation, and use of cell phones. 
• Family issues, especially the availability of child care. 
• Health care issues such as the availability of vaccines, antiviral drugs, and personal protective equipment 
(PPE); actions to address understaffing or depletion of PPE and medical supplies; infection control 
practices as conditions change; approaches to ensure patients’ adherence to medical and public health 
measures without causing undue anxiety or alarm; management of agitated or desperate persons; 
guidance on distinguishing between psychiatric disorders and common reactions to stress and trauma; 
management of those who fear they may be infected, but are not (so-called “worried well”); and 
guidance and psychosocial support for persons exposed to large numbers of influenza cases and deaths 
and to persons with unusual or disturbing disease symptoms. 
• Because health care workers might be called upon to fill in for sick colleagues and perform unfamiliar 
tasks, health care facilities and state and local public health agencies shall provide written instructions 
for “just-in-time” cross training on essential tasks. 
 
Other occupational groups that might participate in the response to pandemic influenza (including police, firefighters, and 
community outreach workers) shall have access to information and written materials available on the Department’s website and 
other appropriate Health Alerts that will help them anticipate behavioral reactions to public health measures such as movement 
restrictions (e.g., quarantine, isolation, closure of public events), especially if such actions are compounded by an economic 
crisis or abrupt loss of essential supplies and services. 
 
Stigmatization issues - Health care workers and other emergency responders shall be provided with information on what to do 
if they or their children or other family members experience stigmatization or discrimination because of their role in the 
pandemic influenza response. Hospital public affairs offices should be prepared to address these issues as well. 
 
C.  Implementing Workforce Resilience Programs 
 
During an influenza pandemic, state and local response agencies need to implement workforce resilience programs that meet 
the special needs of emergency workers - including those who continue to report to the same job location but whose 
assignments shift to respond to the pandemic.  Other personnel maintaining essential operations will also need attention. First-
responder or nongovernmental organizations that send employees or volunteers to assist patients in hospitals, non-hospital 
settings and at home should also establish similar programs.  
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State and local workforce resilience programs need to provide the 
following services: 
 
1. Predeployment/assignment 
• Conduct briefings and training on behavioral 
health, resilience, stress management issues, 
and coping skills. 
• Train supervisors in strategies for recognizing 
signs of stress and maintaining a supportive 
work environment. 
 
2.  During deployment/assignment 
• To support responders in the field: 
o Deploy several persons as a team 
and/or assign “buddies” to maintain 
frequent contact and provide mutual help in coping with daily stresses. 
o Frequently monitor the occupational safety, health, and psychological well-being of deployed staff. 
o Provide access to activities that help reduce stress (e.g., rest, hot showers, nutritious snacks, light 
exercise). 
o Provide behavioral health services, as requested. 
 
• For essential operations personnel: 
o Enlist stress control or resilience teams to monitor employees’ occupational safety, health, and 
psychological well being. 
o Establish rest and recuperation sites and encourage their use. 
o Provide behavioral health services, as requested. 
 
• For families of responders: 
o Provide a checklist of necessary personal affairs documents that need to be assembled prior to 
departure.  (e.g. benefits information, personal will, power of attorney) 
o Enlist employee assistance programs to provide family members with psychosocial support (e.g., 
family support groups, bereavement counseling, and courses on resilience, coping skills, and stress 
management). 
o Provide a suggestion box for input via e-mail or anonymous voice-mail with a toll-free number. 
o Continue to provide outreach to employees’ families to address ongoing psychological and social 
issues. 
 
• Throughout the response, policies on personnel health and safety should be reviewed and revised, as needed. 
 
3. Post-deployment/assignment 
• Interview employees and family members (including children) to assess lessons learned that might be applied 
to future emergency response efforts. 
• Provide ongoing access to post-emergency psychosocial support services for employees and their families 
(on-site or through partner organizations). 
• Conduct an ongoing evaluation of the after-effects of the pandemic on employees’ health, morale, and 
productivity. 
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I.  Rationale/Purpose 
Public Health Informatics refers the use of technology for improving access to and utilization of public health information. 
Public Health Informatics is the management of information in the public health system—how it is captured, retrieved, and 
used in making decisions.  In the area of public health emergency response, information management takes on new 
characteristics associated with real-time analysis instead of research driven analysis.  Similarly, public health emergency 
response informatics focuses on systems that support response related interventions and resource tracking.   
 
As part of the pandemic influenza response activities, information will be needed to address decision support for all phases of 
the event.  To this end, the need for near real-time communication flow will grow as the event progresses from Inter-Pandemic 
phases to the Pandemic phase. 
 
Areas of Information Need during all phases 
• Status of the Disease Event – this includes the ability to collect, compile, and analyze information from varied sources 
to determine the extent of the outbreak within geographic regions and the variance based on time.  This effort begins 
with monitoring to support early identification, and includes support for patient follow-up, and analysis of outbreak 
mitigation efforts including vaccine efficacy and adverse event reporting. 
• Status of Vaccination Progress – this includes the availability of pre-event vaccine and pre-event vaccination progress 
(dependent upon vaccine availability), and continued vaccine availability and vaccination progress on-going 
throughout the event.  These efforts include the need to identify the status, location, and resources of vaccination 
facilities; the amount, location, and delivery status of vaccine inventories; and the number of vaccinations having been 
given by risk or response group.    
• Status of Isolation and Quarantine Systems – this includes the collection and tracking of individuals and locations that 
have been established for isolation and quarantine.  Similarly, the tracking will include information on medical 
conditions and treatment associated with the outbreak.  Aggregate numbers will be needed to understand outbreak 
mitigation, while detail information will support individual patient treatment. 
• Status of Equipment and Resources – this includes identification and tracking of existing and recently acquired 
resources.  Resources include durable equipment, vaccine, prophylaxis, supplies (medical and other), and human 
resources (volunteers and staff at a variety of locations).  
• Status of Community Resources – this includes the tracking of health care and community resources.  This includes 
availability of hospital beds and ambulances, as well as the operational status and location of the Medical Reserve 
Corp, the Red Cross, and other community response agencies.  
 
Areas of Communications Needs 
• Direct Communications 
This type of communications involved direct person to person communication that can be performed through 
synchronous and asynchronous methods.  The need for redundancy of direct communications is imperative for 
maintenance of communications of response partners.  
• Collaborative Communications 
Collaborative communications are systems that support the group interchange of information.  These types of 
communications can be handled through synchronous and asynchronous methods. 
• Mass Distribution Communications 
This type of communications is usually associated with communications to the media, the public or special 
populations.  The mechanisms can vary, and are utilized to take strain off of response groups and systems. 
• Stakeholder and Responder Distribution Communications 
This type of communications is the utilization of direct communications for one-way distribution of information.  This 
communication need is usually associated with directed response or emergency information that is associated with 
activation or emergency updates.  This communication need is usually directed to specific public health and 
emergency response roles. 
• Data Collaboration Messaging 
This communication need is associated with establishing data or systems integration and interoperability.  This 
communication mechanism is usually established as part of planning efforts, but flexible implementation can allow for 
tailoring for specific emergency response efforts. 
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II.  Overview/Executive Summary 
Addressing the needs of Inter-Pandemic and Pandemic response will require the use of all Departmental systems.  Each of 
these systems will meet a critical information need, while together the information from many systems can be synthesized to 
provide stronger decision support.  Specifically, systems will be in place to support surveillance, vaccine and pharmaceutical 
delivery, emergency response, and communications needs.  Systems that will be utilized in these efforts are listed below: 
 
Surveillance (see also Supplement 1) 
• MEDSIS (Medical Electronic Disease Surveillance 
Intelligence System) – MEDSIS is a web-based 
application to electronically capture and analyze 
disease information from Arizona hospitals and clinical 
laboratories. MEDSIS is a statewide system hosted and 
supported by the ADHS for use by local health 
departments, and individuals and institutions 
responsible for reporting communicable diseases.  
Participating institutions will electronically transmit 
disease information to MEDSIS.  When completed, 
MEDSIS will be linked to numerous other data sources 
including other surveillance data sources. 
Kendall Reeves
• ELR (Electronic Laboratory Reporting) – ELR is a 
component of MEDSIS that is solely for the collection 
of reportable Laboratory orders and results used for 
disease surveillance.   This web-based system utilizes 
data messaging standards, and allows for web-based 
data entry if electronic data transfer is unavailable.  
• EWIDS (Early Warning Infectious Disease 
Surveillance) – This is additional functionality being 
developed in MEDSIS and SIREN to address 
surveillance needs along the Arizona Mexico border.  
Some of the EWIDS Functions include cross border 
notification, sharing of surveillance data, and 
collaboration on binational investigations.  
• LIMS (Laboratory Information Management System) – This is the State Laboratory Information Management System.  
The system that is currently under development will replace an existing system and allow for integration with other 
State Laboratories, and transmission of laboratory data via ELR to MEDSIS. 
• MAM (MEDSIS Arbovirus Module) – The Arbovirus Module was developed to collect both human and animal 
Arbovirus data to address the needs for tracking West Nile Virus.  While human data will move to the new MEDSIS 
system, animal data will remain in the Arbovirus module.  This module could be adapted to address sentinel animal 
testing.  
• CDC BioSense – BioSense provides visualization of syndromic surveillance data using in and out patients seen at 
Veterans Administration and Department of Defense facilities as well as laboratory orders from Laboratory 
Corporation of America.  County health department are able to access this system to identify sentinel alerts and 
unexpected data aberrations for follow up investigations.  CDC in conjunction with ADHS and Maricopa County 
Department of Public Health are working with large hospital systems to transmit additional patient specific emergency 
department and inpatient data to BioSense and MEDSIS. 
• NRDMS (National Retail Data Monitoring System) – The University of Pittsburgh’s RODS Laboratory provides 
visualization of daily aggregate sales of over-the-counter medication from large national retailers in Arizona.  Several 
states have used this system to identify early influenza activity based upon increasing sales of OTC cold and cough 
remedies.  County health departments may access to this system. 
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Emergency Response 
• ASIIS (Arizona State Immunization Information System) – ASIIS is a web-based application that represents the 
ADHS immunization registry.  The focus on the system is childhood vaccinations, based on reporting requirements.  
However, the system can collect and manage immunization information for all ages.   
• Volunteer Management/ESAR-VHP (Emergency System for the Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health 
Professionals) – Many county health departments currently have systems in place for volunteer management.  In 
addition, the Department of Health Services is pursuing a system to enroll health care provider volunteers.  This type 
of system will be important in managing availability, activation and deployment of volunteers in an emergency. 
• Outbreak Management – While there is currently no established system at the Department of Health Services, a 
module to MEDSIS has been discussed to address outbreak management and tracking needs.  The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention have a personal computer based application, OMS, which can be used for outbreak 
management. 
• Isolation and Quarantine Tracking – While there is currently no system in place to track patients, and their locations, 
related to isolation and quarantine needs, basic tracking can be performed using elements of the SIREN Portal 
Environment.  This feature will need to be developed, and collection of the system needs may require the development 
of another web-application. 
• EmSystem – The EmSystem is a web-based application for Hospitals, Urgent Care Centers, Emergency Medical 
Services, and Public Health to share information about hospital diversion status, public health events, and mass 
causality incidents.  The system is also used as a mechanism to query the hospitals about bed availability, surge 
capacity, and response needs. 
James Gatheney
 
Vaccine and Pharmaceutical delivery (see also Supplements 6 & 7) 
• Inventory Management and Tracking – While there is currently no system in place 
to perform this level of tracking, the Department of Health Services is currently 
pursuing this type of application.  This application will allow for tracking of 
equipment, office supplies, medical supplies, prophylaxis, and vaccine.  The 
purpose is to have a system to inventory existing items, enable emergency receipt 
of items, and manage distribution of items in an emergency. The Vaccine 
Management System (VACMAN) is a CDC application that is currently available 
for vaccine tracking, but will not meet all inventory management needs. 
• Flu-shot module – This web-based application is a proof-of-concept system for 
rapid collection of flu vaccination information.  This system would integrate with 
ASIIS, but be streamlined to meet emergency needs.  While the system was 
created for testing and exercising, it can be adapted to address a full-scale 
emergency. 
 
Communication 
• HAN Messaging (Health Alert Network Messaging) – HAN messaging is a web-based system to initiate the 
distribution of alerts.  The system can distribute information by email, phone, text-pager, or fax.  In addition, the 
system utilizes text-to-speech to read typed information over the phone.  This system is utilized for information 
dissemination to public health responders and stakeholders.  In addition, this system supports teleconference-bridging 
capability for conference call meetings. 
• SIREN (Secure Integrated Response Electronic Notification System) – SIREN is both a system’s architecture to 
support web-based applications (like MEDSIS, HAN messaging, etc.) it also supports the Public Health Preparedness 
Portal.  This portal supports secure areas for response tracking.  These secure portal spaces represent a virtual 
emergency operations center.  Similarly, the system supports an secure online collaborative portal for sharing of 
information between local health jurisdictions and across the Mexico border. 
• Az211 (Arizona 2-1-1 Online) – Az211 is a web-based data repository that includes information for the public about 
public services and other health and human services.  In addition, the system has an emergency response area that is 
utilized to post public emergency bulletins. (See also Supplement 10) 
 
(Additional information on these systems and their contacts is located in Appendix A) 
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Inter-pandemic activities will focus on surveillance activities other areas supported with exercise and training of the systems.  
The primary electronic surveillance system is called MEDSIS, which provides access to representatives from all public health 
jurisdictions.  Similarly, this system integrated with an electronic laboratory reporting component for collection of clinical 
laboratory observations and the State Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) utilizing data messaging standards.  
These data messaging mechanisms are also being utilized for connection of surveillance data sources. 
 
Other inter-pandemic activities will include the refinement of system protocols and system exercises/training.  This includes 
improvements on protocols for initiating Health Alert Network (HAN) Alerts and for the use of az211.com. Similarly, 
equipment and material caches will be managed and enhanced to support deployment and distribution needs.   
 
Pandemic Alert activities will still focus on surveillance efforts, but other systems will be activated and outfitted (configured) 
for the nature of the event.  Surveillance efforts may require the connection of additional data sources, and event specific 
collaboration portals are established.  Communications system for distribution of information to stakeholders and public will be 
activated, and direct communication systems including radio systems will be tested. 
 
Similarly, immunization registries will begin collecting information depending on the availability of vaccine, and vaccine 
distribution management will begin.  As the Pandemic Alert period escalates from phase 4 to phase 5, communications, 
emergency response, and vaccine/pharmaceutical tracking will expand, while surveillance efforts will be maintained. 
 
In the Pandemic period, activities will shift from the surveillance efforts to response efforts.  Emergency response efforts will 
be scaled up, and will include event specific collaborative portals, tracking of deployed resources and materials, and the 
tracking of volunteer resources.  Emphasis will change to the maintenance of surveillance efforts.  In addition, a strong 
emphasis will be placed on communication and the maintenance of communication channels, whether to the public or to 
responders/stakeholders. 
 
 
III.  Actions 
A.  Interpandemic 
  
Surveillance 
• Respiratory specimens submitted to the state laboratory are tested and isolates subtyped; a sample of reference isolates are 
also sent by clinical laboratories for subtyping (see Supplement 1).  The ADHS Infectious Disease Epidemiology Section 
(IDES) receives information through the state laboratory’s electronic laboratory database (LITS) or by communication 
with the laboratory.  The information sharing procedures between IDES, the state laboratory and clinical laboratories will 
change with the addition of MEDSIS, Electronic Laboratory Reporting (ELR), and Laboratory Information Management 
System (LIMS).     
• Schools, long-term care facilities, or other institutions report influenza or ILI outbreaks to state or local health departments 
(passive reporting).  Investigate electronic ways to receive this information more easily. 
• Enhancing influenza surveillance (works in progress): 
o Increase electronic submission of laboratory results from clinical and hospital laboratories. 
o Develop a protocol for investigating institutional outbreaks; work with local health departments to implement the 
protocol, and identify the necessary data collection tools. 
o Incorporate use of other alternative surveillance sources (e.g. over-the-counter pharmaceutical sales, BioSense) 
into routine surveillance. 
o Recruit additional Arizona pharmaceutical retailers for NRDMS to increase coverage in rural areas of the state. 
Collaborate with CDC in providing additional hospital data for BioSense and MEDSIS. 
o Provide additional training on CDC BioSense and suggest system enhancements   
o Continue development of Early Warning Infectious Disease Surveillance (EWIDS) functions in MEDSIS to 
address needs along the Arizona-Mexico border  
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Vaccine and Pharmaceutical Delivery 
• No activities 
 
Emergency Response 
• Management of equipment and materials caches that are owned by the 
Department of Health Services 
• Enhancing state-wide response and tracking (work in progress): 
o Improved systems for inventory and tracking of equipment and 
materials.  This will include inventory, receiving and 
distributing of materials. 
o Develop a system for tracking of patients in isolation & 
quarantine 
o Evaluate existing systems for outbreak management and 
evaluate a system module for MEDSIS 
o Purchase fixed and portable radio units for communication 
redundancy and clinic/warehousing coordination. 
 
Communications 
• HAN messaging sends information from the Office of Infectious Disease Services via SIREN or blast fax to key partners 
and stakeholders 
 
B. Pandemic Alert 
 
Surveillance 
• Investigate additional data sources including pharmaceutical data, hospital emergency department and community health 
center capacity (bed availability). 
• Explore animal surveillance using though adaptation of the MEDSIS Arbovirus Module (MAM). 
• Explore other feeds of surveillance data including hospital admissions data or discharge data. 
• Utilize data messaging standards to receive other syndromic surveillance data. 
• Consider instituting active surveillance (e.g. school absenteeism; number of patients on ventilators; number of deaths due 
to respiratory illness; contacting hospitals, emergency departments, clinics, labs that test for influenza; use of SARS self-
screening tools). 
 
Vaccine and Pharmaceutical Delivery 
• Conduct inventory of critical equipment, including, but not limited to, statewide availability of antiviral and antibiotic 
pharmaceuticals, refrigerated depots for vaccines, and transport for delivery of vaccines.  This can utilize developed 
systems or paper inventory. 
• Provide systems training update to ensure available trained staff on inventory and alerting systems. 
• Configure inventory tracking systems to the established protocols for distribution of vaccine, antibiotics, and antivirals. 
 
Emergency Response 
• Establish a plan for information sharing utilizing the Public Health Preparedness Portal.  Establish the secure portal space 
with activation of PHIMS. 
• Establish activation groups and alerting protocols specific for the event. 
• Prepare for EOC Activation 
• Prepare volunteer job posting and review available volunteers for necessary skill-sets. 
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Communications 
• Disseminate surveillance data to local health departments and providers using the public health preparedness portal. 
• Establish and maintain contacts with influenza and immunization coordinators in neighboring states. 
• Maintain information on AZ211 with accurate information on status of the event and State-wide readiness (see Supplement 
10). 
• Review message templates and ensure that audiences for messages have been established. 
• Test alerting systems and communications equipment.  Include testing of radio equipment. 
• Place Information Technology Response Staff on 24-hour stand-by. 
• Evaluate system maintenance and upgrade schedules to minimize planned downtime of systems. 
• ADHS will continue use of HAN messaging for distribution of information via SIREN and/or blast faxing. 
 
C.  Pandemic 
 
Surveillance 
• Surveillance systems will likely be overwhelmed.  Surveillance activities described above will continue to the extent 
possible while diverting personnel to the highest-priority activities (see Supplement 1). 
• Analyze morbidity and mortality data to establish age- and geographic area-specific rates. 
 
Vaccine and Pharmaceutical Delivery 
• Provide tracking information on the number and types of individuals receiving vaccinations. 
• Monitor VAERS data for evidence of adverse reactions to the influenza vaccine (see Supplement 6). Report findings 
routinely to the PHIMS Planning Section and to the CDC.   
 
Emergency Response 
• Monitor availability of antivirals  
• Distribute vaccine and/or antiviral agents as they become available; use Vaccine Management System (VACMAN) for 
inventory tracking or other developed systems (see Supplement 6). 
• Assess antiviral/antibiotic/vaccine needs, conduct necessary activities as prescribed in SNS protocol. 
• Activate identified volunteers.  Deploy volunteers as necessary and maintain their deployment status. 
• Request health care workers from other institutions. 
 
Communications 
• HEOC to be in contact with SEOC 
• Notify the Department Director, general counsel, legislative liaison, 
tribal liaison, local health liaison, border health liaison, Governor's 
Press Secretary, ADEM Public Affairs Director, Arizona Office of 
Homeland Security, county health department PIOs, and other 
stakeholders of Pandemic Period. 
• Continue information flow to local health departments and other 
stakeholders.  Utilize the Joint Information Center (JIC) at the State 
Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) to organize all public and 
media messages. 
• Maintain information on AZ211 with accurate information on status of the event and State-wide readiness (see Supplement 
10). 
• Convey local information back to the CDC and other States through EPI-X. 
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• Change system maintenance and upgrade schedules to minimize planned downtime of systems.  Move to a limited 
maintenance schedule, with notification of all planned downtime. 
• Increase system monitoring to 6 hour intervals. 
• ADHS will continue use of HAN messaging for distribution of information via SIREN and/or blast faxing. 
 
D.  Post Pandemic Period 
 
Surveillance 
• Surveillance will return to inter-pandemic activities to the extent possible.   
o Vaccine and Pharmaceutical Delivery 
• Provide finalized tracking information and inventory all equipment and remaining materials. 
• Initiate recovery of distributed equipment.  Perform equipment inventory with testing. 
 
Emergency Response 
• De-activate the Emergency Operation Center, and related information management systems. 
 
Communications 
• Communicate to the media and public that the pandemic is 
over 
• Notify the Department Director, general counsel, legislative 
liaison, tribal liaison, local health liaison, border health 
liaison, Governor's Press Secretary, ADEM Public Affairs 
Director, Arizona Office of Homeland Security, county 
health department PIOs, and other stakeholders that the 
pandemic is over. 
• Maintain information on AZ211 with accurate information 
on status of the event and State-wide readiness. 
• Convey local information back to the CDC and other States 
through EPI-X. 
• Return to normal system maintenance routines, and 
schedule any outstanding system upgrades. 
• Return system monitoring to regular intervals. 
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Appendix A 
Information Management Systems: Access Information 
 
Surveillance Systems 
• MEDSIS (Medical Electronic Disease Surveillance Intelligence System)  
Status: Operational, being rolled out to County Public Health 
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health, and reporting by health care providers  
System Contact: Ken Komatsu, MEDSIS Project Manager 
  
• ELR (Electronic Laboratory Reporting)  
Status: Operational, clinical laboratories being connected 
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health, and reporting by clinical laboratories  
System Contact: Ken Komatsu, MEDSIS Project Manager  
  
• EWIDS (Early Warning Infectious Disease Surveillance)  
Status: Proposed 
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health, and Border Partners  
System Contact: Ken Komatsu, MEDSIS Project Manager 
 
• LIMS (Laboratory Information Management System) 
Status: Operational, new system being developed. 
Access: Secure Intranet Application 
Users: Arizona Department of Health Services’ employees  
System Contact: William Slanta, Assistant Bureau Chief 
 
• MAM (MEDSIS Arbovirus Module)  
Status: Operational  
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: Ken Komatsu, MEDSIS Project Manager  
 
• CDC BioSense  
Status: Operational  
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: Ken Komatsu, MEDSIS Project Manager 
  
• NRDMS (National Retail Data Monitoring System)  
Status: Operational  
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: Ken Komatsu, MEDSIS Project Manager 
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Emergency Response 
• ASIIS (Arizona State Immunization Information System)  
Status: Operational  
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health and health care providers 
System Contact: Kimiko Gosney, ASIIS Project Lead 
  
• Volunteer Management/ESAR-VHP (Emergency System for the Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health 
Professionals)  
Status: Proposed  
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State Public Health 
System Contact: John Nelson, Health Alert Network Section Chief 
  
• Outbreak Management  
Status: Deployable  
Access: Desktop Application 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: Ken Komatsu, MEDSIS Project Manager 
 
• Isolation and Quarantine Tracking  
Status: Proposed  
Access: Secure Web-Based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: John Nelson, Health Alert Network Section Chief 
 
• EmSystem  
Status: Operational  
Access: Secure Web-Based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health and pre-hospital and hospital emergency departments 
System Contact: Paul Barbeau, Logistics Section Chief 
  
 
Vaccine and Pharmaceutical delivery (see also Supplements 6 & 7) 
• Inventory Management and Tracking  
Status: Proposed  
Access: Secure Web-Based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: John Nelson, Health Alert Network Section Chief 
 
• Vaccine Management System (VACMAN) 
Status: Deployable 
Access: Desktop Application with web-synchronization 
Users: Arizona Department of Health Services’ employees 
System Contact: Kathy Frederickson, Office Chief for Arizona Immunization Program Office 
 
• Flu-shot module  
Status: Proof-of-Concept  
Access: Secure Web-Based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: John Nelson, Health Alert Network Section Chief 
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Communication 
• HAN Messaging (Health Alert Network Messaging)  
Status: Operational, being rolled out to County Public Health 
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: John Nelson, Health Alert Network Section Chief  
  
• SIREN (Secure Integrated Response Electronic Notification System)  
Status: Operational  
Access: Secure Web-based System 
Users: State and Local Public Health 
System Contact: Paul Barbeau, Logistics Section Chief  
  
• Az211 (Arizona 2-1-1 Online)  
Status: Operational  
Access: Public Web-based System http://www.az211.gov  
Users: Public 
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I.  General Preparedness Guidance  
County and tribal health departments will be highly effected prior to and during an influenza pandemic.  This guidance is 
designed to help spotlight important planning and response activities that are necessary at the local health department level.   In 
January 2006, HHS released a state and local planning checklist (www.pandemicflu.gov).  While the HHS checklist is not 
reproduced here, is lists broad concepts that are important and may help counties and tribes in the development of their 
respective plans.   
 
All counties should have a jurisdiction-specific Influenza Pandemic Response Plan that is an extension of both their 
jurisdiction’s overall Emergency Response Plan and the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response plan.  It is necessary for each 
county, and each tribe, as appropriate, to fit into the existing state plan to more effectively coordinate overall resources in the 
state.  Therefore, ADHS has made it a requirement for each county to have a jurisdiction-level response plan that fits in with 
the state plan, as a condition of continuing to receive public health preparedness grant funds. 
 
Tribes in Arizona, and elsewhere in the Nation, have sovereign authority.  In order to achieve optimal state-wide coordination 
during a pandemic response, tribal health departments and other tribal-related entities (e.g., U.S. Indian Health Services), will 
need to work closely with neighboring county health departments and ADHS.  For purposes of this planning guide tribal and 
county health departments are both considered local health departments, as these entities are responsible for providing public 
health services at the local level.  There is no inference in this guide or elsewhere in the plan that equates counties with tribes. 
 
Under a declared public health emergency (A.R.S. 36-787), the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) becomes the 
primary coordinating agency in the state for all public health activities.  This declaration will likely occur in Arizona during the 
late stages of a Pandemic Alert Period or at the outset of a federally declared pandemic.  Under such a declaration the counties 
will be responsible for carrying out the local public health duties necessary to respond to the pandemic.  The goal and direction 
of these activities will be coordinated by ADHS; however, the operational plans to conduct these activities may vary from 
county to county, depending on the availability of local resources.  This guidance should help both counties and tribes in 
Arizona identify the key local public health activities that will likely be necessary during the different phases of pandemic 
activity.  
 
Incident Command 
As with other disasters and emergency plans, the response systems developed need to incorporate a NIMS compliant incident 
command system (ICS).  This requires training of management and staff in ICS.  As ADHS will likely be playing a 
coordination role throughout the pandemic response, all partner agencies should be familiar with the ADHS ICS system – 
Public Health Incident Management System (PHIMS).  PHIMS is described in detail in Appendix C to the Arizona Influenza 
Pandemic Response Plan.  Local health agencies that have not adopted an ICS should consider using PHIMS as a structure, 
therefore, better ensuring the ability of the local health agency and ADHS to appropriately coordinate during a pandemic 
response.  
 
Community Preparedness 
Local health agencies should ensure community level planning and preparedness occurs within their jurisdictions.  As with any 
disaster, a pandemic response will require the community and the government sectors working together.  Community sectors 
include: 
- businesses 
- schools, day care  
- long term care facilities 
- churches 
- volunteer organizations 
- health care 
- emergency responders 
- community leaders 
- private citizens and families 
- local media outlets 
 
Community preparedness activities include information sessions, training and education, resource assessments, community and 
individual planning (school, businesses, families, etc.), and community level exercises.  Community level preparedness 
requires knowledge of the demographic, geographic and cultural make-up of the community, in order to ensure all populations 
in a community are involved, or are, at a minimum, accounted for in the response plan.  See Supplement 8 for actual 
community preparedness planning guides (see also www.pandemicflu.gov for updated guides). 
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II.  Specific Activity Preparedness 
The following portion of the guidance details specific local health agency activities extracted from Supplements 1-12 of the 
Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan.  These activities are listed here, by category, as an outline of specific local actions 
that will need to be undertaken during the different phases of pandemic response, as part of an overall statewide response.  
Some actions will not pertain to all counties and tribes, and it is likely that each county and tribe will have additional activities 
that are not listed here.  This model is typical of all public health emergency responses, where certain actions need to be 
coordinated at a state level, but the necessities of local implementation require innovative and, sometimes, alternative 
approaches. 
 
A. Surveillance and Epidemiology 
Disease surveillance and epidemiological analysis are the key 
science-based components for all public health response activities.  
While ADHS will coordinate state-wide surveillance activities, the 
success of these actions will be rely heavily upon the participation 
and implementation at the local level.  County and tribal health 
departments are the primary agencies for conducting surveillance.  
The current surveillance systems during non-pandemic, seasonal 
influenza will be the basis for any surveillance activities during a 
pandemic (see Supplement 1) 
 
Interpandemic (Phase 1-2) Activities 
1. Ensure participation is ongoing influenza surveillance 
systems 
2. Continue to increase participation in sentinel surveillance 
for influenza-like illness 
3. Explore opportunities to conduct syndrome surveillance 
with local reporting sources (i.e., clinics, ambulance 
companies, schools, etc.) 
4. Maintain participation in the Arizona Health Alert 
Network, by receiving and re-distributing health alerts to 
appropriate community members 
5. Ensure the full implementation of MEDSIS in respective 
jurisdiction, both at the health department and health care 
system level 
6. Work with ADHS to develop and implement protocols for investigating institutional outbreaks 
7. Ensure the ability to collect deaths certificates related to infectious causes, especially influenza, in a timely 
manner 
 
Pandemic Alert (Phase 3) Activities 
8. Investigate initial reports of potential human influenza infections due to a novel influenza strain in 
respective jurisdiction utilizing local rapid response teams (RRT).  These response activities include 
completing investigations forms, obtaining specimens for testing, and monitoring close contacts for 
influenza-like illness 
9. Immediately inform ADHS of any suspected human infection with an avian/animal/novel human strain of 
influenza 
10. Ensure timely and comprehensive reporting of ILI from sentinel sites 
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11. Monitor syndromic surveillance data sources and evaluate increased activity, as appropriate 
12. Assist ADHS with distribution of epidemiologic reports of influenza activity updates to surveillance 
partners and stakeholders and participate in regular pandemic alert surveillance conference calls with 
ADHS 
 
Pandemic Alert (Phase 4) Activities 
13. Request health care providers to screen travelers arriving from influenza-affected areas for ILI 
14. Collect and analyze demographic data on clusters, ill travelers, or unusual cases 
15. In accordance with ADHS recommendations, initiate active surveillance for hospitalized cases.   
16. In accordance with ADHS recommendations, initiate active surveillance for influenza deaths 
 
Pandemic Alert (Phase 5) Activities 
17. Continue with previous phase activities, likely at increased levels 
18. Consider activating Public Health Incident Command System, to better coordinate activities within 
jurisdiction and with ADHS 
 
Pandemic (Phase 6) Activities 
19. Coordinate with ADHS to increase surveillance with health care providers at the early stages of a declared 
Pandemic, to detect introduction of virus into jurisdiction.  
20. Analyze morbidity and mortality data to establish population- and geographic area-specific rates 
21. Assist ADHS in ensuring medical examiner reporting of influenza-related deaths (see Supplement 1) 
22. Additional sources of surveillance data may be evaluated to determine the effectiveness of pandemic 
influenza interventions and resource allocation needs. 
23. Once the virus has been identified throughout the state, surveillance and testing levels may be decreased 
depending on resource availability 
24. The pandemic strain is likely to become a routinely circulating influenza A subtype. When that happens, 
the activities of both the counties, tribes, ADHS and national influenza surveillance systems will revert to 
the frequency and intensity typically seen during interpandemic influenza seasons 
 
 
B. Health Care Response Coordination 
Inter-Pandemic Activities 
While health care response during an emergency is 
primarily an partnership between private sector 
health care institutions, ADHS and county and 
tribal health departments need to work with these 
entities to ensure overall coordination. 
 
During the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert 
Periods, ADHS and county and tribal health 
departments, along with emergency management 
and first responder agencies work together with 
these health care entities through Arizona 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Public 
Health Region Committees, to develop 
preparedness plans including infectious disease 
referral systems and patient surge capacity plans 
(see Supplement 3). 
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Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Activities 
1. County and tribal health departments need to maintain active participation in their respective Arizona 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Public Health Region Committees 
2. Build close relationships with the hospital administrators in respective jurisdiction, to ensure closer 
coordination during emergencies. 
3. Identify multiple lines of redundancy for communication between local health department on health care 
institutions 
4. Ensure facilities have an influenza pandemic response plan as part of their overall facility emergency 
response plan 
 
Pandemic Response Activities 
5. Ensure health care partners receive latest guidance from ADHS or HHS during emergency 
6. Work to identify needed health care resources, depending on impact of pandemic on health care system 
 
 
C. Vaccine and Antiviral Delivery and Administration 
Vaccines and antivirals are public health and medical tools to prevent and respond to influenza outbreaks.  Their 
effectiveness during any given outbreak is not certain, especially during a pandemic due to a novel strain.  While it is 
important for local plans to include the use of these tools as potential interventions, they should not be the focus of an 
influenza pandemic response plan. Vaccines are to be used as a preventative measure, while antivirals will primarily be 
used as a treatment by health care providers, but may also be used as a prophylactic measure for response officials with 
the highest risks of exposure (see Supplements 6 and 7) 
 
Inter-Pandemic and Pandemic Alert Activities 
1. Develop and implement plans, systems and 
capacities to receive, distribute, and administer 
vaccine to population of jurisdiction  
2. Identify and train public health volunteer 
workforce to staff and administer mass 
vaccination clinics 
3. Identify strategies to deliver vaccine doses to 
health care and immunization providers within 
jurisdiction, as part of the overall vaccine 
response plan 
4. Develop a system to rapidly vaccinate staff 
within respective agencies, and their families. 
5. Identify strategies to effectively distribute 
antiviral medications to potential priority groups, including hospitals and clinics for patient treatment, and 
frontline health care providers, first responders and other priority workers for potential prophylactic 
measures.   
 
Pandemic (Pre-Vaccine Availability) Activities 
6. Mobilize response partners, and prepare to activate plans for distributing and administering vaccines and 
antivirals, as necessary 
7. Activate plans and systems to receive, distribute and administer pre-pandemic stockpiled vaccines and 
antivirals, to designated groups, upon delivery by ADHS 
8. Review modifications, if any, to recommendations on vaccinating priority groups. 
9. Accelerate training in vaccination and vaccine monitoring for public health staff and for partners 
responsible for vaccinating priority groups. 
10. Work with other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to ensure effective public 
health communications. 
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Pandemic (Post-Vaccine Availability) Activities 
11. Activate plans and systems to distribute and administer vaccines to designated groups, upon delivery from 
ADHS. 
12. Phase in vaccination of the rest of the population after priority groups have been vaccinated. 
 
 
D. Community Disease Control 
Community Disease Control measures are those measures that are taken to limit or slow the spread of illness in a 
community.  These can be enacted on an individual basis (i.e., quarantine of a contact of a case), on a large group of 
individuals (e.g., the quarantine of plane passengers that arrive with an case), or at the community level (e.g., 
declaration of “Stay Home Days”  to keep citizens at home and creating social distance between all members of the 
community.  These measures will be best enacted at the local level as they may only be necessary or effective in 
certain communities.  County and tribal health departments should consult with ADHS prior to taking such actions. 
 
Inter-Pandemic and Pandemic Alert Activities 
1. Identify and engage traditional partners (e.g., public heath and health care workers) and non-traditional 
community partners (e.g., transportation workers) and invite them to participate in preparedness planning 
and in pandemic influenza containment exercises and drills 
2. Provide information to the public on the definitions of and the potential need for individual, small group, 
and community containment measures, to improve a wider understanding and acceptance during a 
pandemic 
3. Identify potential isolation and quarantine facilities  
4. Establish procedures, in conjunction with ADHS, for medical evaluation and isolation of quarantined 
persons who exhibit signs of influenza-like illness (ILI)  
5. Develop tools and mechanisms to prevent stigmatization and provide mental health services to persons in 
isolation or quarantine, as well as to family members of affected persons and other community members 
6. Establish procedures for delivering medical care, food, and services to persons in isolation or quarantine. 
These efforts should take into account the special needs of children and persons with disabilities.  
7. Develop protocols for monitoring and enforcing quarantine measures 
8. Ensure legal authorities and procedures exist for various levels of movement restrictions  
 
Pandemic Alert Period Activities 
9. When a case with a novel strain that has been 
identified that matches a strain with potential to 
cause a pandemic, use quarantine authority to 
separate known exposed contacts of cases, to help 
limit spread within community.  Quarantine of 
contacts should be implemented only when there is a 
high probability that the ill patient is infected with a 
novel influenza strain that may be transmitted to 
others 
10. Monitor contacts who are quarantined at least once a 
day—by phone or in person—to assess symptoms 
and address any needs 
 
Pandemic Period Activities 
11. Early in Pandemic period use quarantine authority to separate known exposed contacts of cases, to help 
limit spread within community.  Quarantine of contacts should be implemented only when there is a high 
probability that the ill patient is infected with a novel influenza strain that may be transmitted to others 
12. Monitor contacts who are quarantined at least once a day—by phone or in person—to assess symptoms 
and address any needs 
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As disease progresses within the community, use of quarantine will likely have little value, except in closed 
settings. Local health authority should be ready to enact community-wide containment measures (as detailed 
in Supplement 8) 
 
13. Promote community containment strategies, as appropriate, and in consultation with ADHS.  These 
measures may include: 
a. Promotion of community-wide infection control measures (e.g., respiratory hygiene/cough 
etiquette)  
b. Declare “Stay Home Days”  
c. Don’t discourage “self-isolation” 
d. Closure of office buildings, shopping malls, schools, and public transportation  
14. Identify strategies to determine impact of containment measures on both disease and society.  Use this 
information to better focus containment measures. 
15. Stand down measures as quickly as possible without risk of prolonging pandemic  
 
 
E. Addressing Travel-Related Risk 
Travel-related risk in regards to pandemic planning primarily refers to health affects associated with air travel, or any 
international travel (e.g., border crossings).  Measures used to address travel-related risks include many of the 
community disease control measures found in Supplement 8.  As with community containment, travel-related 
containment if often best addressed at the local level, although many situations will naturally involve ADHS and the 
federal government, due to federal quarantine authority and international travel laws.  Affected county and tribal 
health departments are encouraged to work with ADHS while preparing for and enacting containment measure that 
address travel-related risk.  
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Inter-Pandemic Period Activities 
1. Ensure readiness to implement travel-related 
disease containment measures 
2. Engage appropriate community partners and 
develop and exercise appropriate plans 
 
Pandemic Alert Period Activities 
3. Assist ADHS in providing public health 
information to travelers who visit countries 
where avian or animal influenza strains that 
can infect humans (e.g., avian influenza A 
[H5N1]) or human strains with pandemic 
potential have been reported. 
4. Evaluate and manage arriving ill passengers 
who might be infected with avian or animal influenza strains or human strains with pandemic potential. 
 
Pandemic Period Activities 
5. Continue to provide public health information to travelers, in coordination with ADHS 
6. In coordination with ADHS and CDC, initiate enhanced disease surveillance at ports of entry 
7. Evaluate and implement quarantine, as necessary, on exposed passengers or other individuals related to 
travel 
8. Evaluate the need to implement or terminate travel-related containment measures as the pandemic evolves. 
 
 
F. Public Information 
During the Interpandemic Period, communications professionals from local health departments will need to work 
closely with ADHS communications team and other response agencies to focus on preparedness planning and on 
building flexible, sustainable communications networks and media relationships.  During the Pandemic Period, they 
will focus on coordinated health communications to support public health interventions designed to help limit 
influenza-associated morbidity and mortality.  According to A.R.S. 36-787, ADHS is the lead agency for crafting 
public information strategies and messages during a declared public health emergency.  While ADHS will take the 
coordination role, local health departments may be best placed to ensure the unified messages reach Arizona residents 
at the community level (see Supplement 10). 
 
Inter-Pandemic Period Activities 
1. Assess and monitor readiness to meet communications needs in preparation for an influenza pandemic, 
including regular review and update of communications plans. 
2. Participate in regional and state-wide emergency communication activities with ADHS, other response 
agencies, private industry, education, and nonprofit partners (e.g., American Red Cross chapters). 
3. Identify and train lead subject-specific spokespersons.  
4. Provide public health communications staff with training on risk communications for use during an 
influenza pandemic.  
5. Develop and maintain up-to-date communications contacts.  
6. Participate in tabletop exercises and other collaborative preparations to assess readiness.  
7. Confirm any contingency contracts needed for communications resources during a pandemic. 
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Pandemic Alert Period Activities 
8. Begin disseminating messages and materials to increase the 
knowledge and understanding of the public, health care 
professionals, policy-makers, media, and others about unique 
aspects of pandemic influenza that distinguish it from seasonal 
influenza, and generally what to expect during different phases of an 
influenza pandemic. 
9. Address rumors and false reports regarding pandemic influenza 
threats.  
 
Pandemic Period Activities 
10. Contact key community partners and implement frequent update 
briefings.  
11. As appropriate, implement and maintain community resources, such 
as hotlines and websites to respond to local questions from the 
public and professional groups. 
12. Tailor communications services and key messages to specific local 
audiences; utilize statewide special populations study information to target specific hard to reach 
populations. 
13. In coordination with epidemiologic and medical personnel, obtain and track information daily on the 
numbers and location of newly hospitalized cases, newly quarantined persons, and hospitals with 
pandemic influenza cases.  Use these reports to determine priorities among community outreach and 
education efforts, and to prepare for updates to media organizations in coordination with federal partners. 
14. Coordinate all pandemic influenza media messages with ADHS to ensure consistency with statewide and 
national messages  
15. Promptly respond to rumors and inaccurate information to minimize concern, social disruption, and 
stigmatization.  
 
 
G. Workforce Support – Psychosocial Needs 
All response agencies, including county and tribal health departments need to ensure that their response personnel 
reside in the safest and healthiest environment possible by addressing the psychological and social (“psychosocial”) 
needs of these employees (see Supplement 11). 
 
Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Activities 
1. Encouraging the use of tools and techniques for supporting staff and their families during times of crisis 
2. Establish partnerships and participate in any Regional Behavioral Health Agency (RBHA) outreach 
activities to the pandemic responder community.  This purpose of this outreach is to inform these 
individuals on how to use as well as receive suggestions on how to improve the crisis response system 
3. Provide psychosocial communication information developed by ADHS to employees.  Such information 
will: 
• Educate and inform employees about emotional responses they might experience or observe in their 
colleagues and families (including children) during an influenza pandemic and techniques for 
coping with these emotions. 
• Educate employees about the importance of developing “family communication plans” so that 
family members can maintain contact during an emergency. 
• Describe workforce support services that will be available during an emergency, including 
confidential behavioral health services and employee assistance programs. 
4. Establish workforce resilience programs that will help deployed workers to prepare for, cope with, and 
recover from the social and psychological challenges of emergency work 
 
Pandemic Activities 
5.  Make full use of  self-care and behavioral health interventions that can help response workers manage 
emotional stress, family issues and build coping skills and resilience (including providing child and family 
care, use of stress-control teams, establishing rest and recuperation sites – see Supplement 11 for more 
information) 
6. Ensure that employees have ongoing access to 
information, including  the progression of the 
pandemic, business and personnel issues (e.g., 
overtime pay, work hours, etc.),  and health care 
issues 
7. Implement workforce resilience programs that 
meet the special needs of emergency workers - 
including those who continue to report to the 
same job location but whose assignments shift 
to respond to the pandemic (see Supplement 11 
for more information). 
 
 
H. Information Management 
For pandemic planning and response public health information management (informatics) focuses on technology 
systems that support response related interventions and resource tracking.  Like ADHS, county and tribal health 
departments have been developing and improving information management systems for emergency response for the 
past several years.  Supplement 12 lists and describes all the statewide information management systems that will be 
used during a pandemic.  County and tribal health departments should continue to participate in the development, 
testing, deployment, and use of these systems to ensure their overall effectiveness. 
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I.  Rationale 
The goals of diagnostic testing during a pandemic are to: 
• Identify the earliest U.S. cases of pandemic influenza (whether the pandemic begins in the United States or 
elsewhere). 
• Support disease surveillance to monitor the pandemic’s geographic spread and impact of interventions. 
• Facilitate clinical treatment by distinguishing patients with influenza from those with other respiratory illnesses. 
• Monitor circulating viruses for antiviral resistance. 
 
During the earliest stages of a pandemic, public health, hospital, and clinical laboratories might receive a large and potentially 
overwhelming volume of clinical specimens.  Pre-pandemic planning is therefore essential to ensure timeliness of diagnostic 
testing and the availability of diagnostic supplies and reagents, address staffing issues, and disseminate protocols for safe 
handling and shipping of specimens. Once a pandemic is underway, the need for laboratory confirmation of clinical diagnoses 
may decrease as the virus becomes widespread. 
Diagnostic testing for pandemic influenza virus may involve a range of laboratory assays (see Box 1. and Appendix 1.) 
 
II.  Overview 
The public health laboratory is a critical component of the overall public 
health response to pandemic influenza.  The capability of differentiating 
common influenza from pandemic influenza depends upon the rapid 
detection and characterization that is available at the Arizona State Public 
Health Laboratory (ASL) and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC).  
• The ASL contributes to national laboratory-based surveillance 
efforts.   
• Only through laboratory testing can the signs and symptoms of 
influenza-like illness be attributed to a definitive pathogen.  
• Only by identifying the pathogen can appropriate treatment and 
control measures be taken to limit/prevent the spread of the 
disease.  
• Once the ASL detects and characterizes a newly emerging influenza strain, for example, the highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (H5) in the U.S., a sound epidemiologic approach to monitor and respond to the infectious agent can begin.   
 
The ASL plays a key role in laboratory preparedness and response efforts.  Federal funding has been used by the ASL not only 
to enhance biological /chemical terrorism preparedness and response activities but also to improve diagnostic capabilities and 
capacities for responding to all hazards including pandemic influenza. Specifically the ASL:  
• Provides accurate and rapid state-of-the-art testing for detection and identification of newly emergent subtypes of 
influenza such as H5N1. 
• Leads laboratory-based surveillance efforts within each state and contribute to national surveillance efforts as 
members of a network of World Health Organization collaborating laboratories.  
• Provides viral samples to the CDC for further characterization throughout the pandemic period and contribute to the 
selection of future vaccine strains.  
 
The ASL not only contributes to the detection and identification of influenza, but must also work closely with a network of 
clinical and physicians office laboratories to support and coordinate diagnostic testing for influenza by: 
• Providing education, training, and guidance on use and interpretation of rapid hand-held influenza tests. 
• Maintaining a close working relationship with veterinary diagnostic labs to monitor influenza activity within animal 
populations that may impact human populations. 
• Assisting in the development of pandemic preparedness and response plans within states. 
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III. The interpandemic and pandemic alert periods 
Global and US surveillance 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has a worldwide network of surveillance laboratories providing information on 
Influenza.  In the United States they work in cooperation with the CDC.  The ASL is a participant in the WHO surveillance 
network (see Box 2.) 
 
Routine Surveillance Activities 
• Once a weekly basis of information about the number of influenza isolates is detected, their sub-types, patient ages, 
and geographical location are sent to the CDC. 
• A random sample of influenza isolates are selected and submitted to the CDC three times during each influenza 
season. These samples are selected to represent early, middle, and late season isolates. 
 
A. Roles and Responsibilities 
Clinical and Hospital Laboratories 
• Work with the ASL to address laboratory surge capacity issues. 
• Train personnel in the management of respiratory specimens during an influenza pandemic. 
• Refer specimens from patients with suspected novel influenza to the ASL. 
• Institute surveillance for influenza-like illness among laboratory personnel working with influenza virus. 
Arizona State Public Health Laboratory 
• Performs diagnostic testing. 
• Supports surveillance activities 
o Seasonal influenza. 
o Detect novel influenza subtypes. 
• Participates in pandemic influenza planning and exercises. 
• Institutes surveillance for influenza-like illness among laboratory personnel. 
• Develops/reviews pandemic response plans and checklists. 
• Educates clinical laboratorians on the safety and handling of specimens suspected to contain novel influenza 
viruses (see Appendicies 3 and 4). 
 
B. Laboratory testing 
 
Clinical Laboratories 
• Test clinical samples by rapid identification methods or viral culture. 
• Forward specimens containing suspect novel viruses to the ASL (see  page S2-8 for contact information). 
 
Arizona State Public Health Laboratory (ASL) 
• All Influenza specimens received by the ASL are tested by Real Time RT-PCR with primer/probe sets for 
Influenza A (group), Influenza A subtypes H1, H3, H5, and H7, and Influenza B (group).   
• PCR positive specimens are inoculated into cell culture for virus isolation 
• Hemagglutination Inhibition (HI) testing is done to determine influenza A subtype or influenza B subtype. 
• Refers specimens to the CDC if a patient meets the requirements for infection with a novel influenza virus and 
tests positive for Influenza A Virus. 
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C. Laboratory safety - Biocontainment 
  
During the Pandemic Alert Period, specimens from suspected cases of human infection with novel influenza viruses 
should be sent to the ASL for testing.  The following guidelines should be used for handling and testing of samples 
suspected to contain a novel influenza virus. 
• Commercial antigen detection testing – conduct all assays in a Bio-Safety cabinet under BSL-II conditions.  
• RT-PCR – conduct all assays in a Bio-Safety cabinet under BSL-II conditions. 
• Virus Isolation - all assays must be conducted under BSL-III with enhancements. 
(see Appendix 4 for additional laboratory BioSafety Guidelines). 
 
D. Surge capacity planning 
 
1. Staffing and Training 
• Cross-train personnel in the use of testing protocols and reporting through existing surveillance systems. 
• Establish back-up plans for hiring temporary laboratory staff. 
 
2. Supplies and Equipment 
• Establish inventory system to determine current level of diagnostic supplies, including personal protective 
equipment. 
• Determine mechanism to monitor consumption of supplies during the pandemic. 
• Assess anticipated equipment and supply needs. 
 
E. Partnerships 
 
The ASL should build partnerships with the private clinical laboratories and provide them with updated information and 
training in influenza diagnostics. 
 
 
IV.  The pandemic period 
A. Roles and Responsibilities 
 
Public health, hospital and clinical laboratories will 
continue to support surveillance for pandemic influenza 
through the same mechanisms that support laboratory-based 
surveillance for seasonal influenza.   
 
Clinical Laboratories 
• Perform diagnostic testing for influenza. 
• Scale up to manage increased numbers of requests 
for influenza testing. 
• Support surveillance activities – refer selected specimens from possible pandemic influenza patients to the ASL. 
• Maintain other diagnostic services. 
 
Arizona State Public Health Laboratory (ASL) 
• Maintain surveillance activities. 
• Scale up to manage increased numbers of requests for influenza testing. 
• Work with federal partners to supply health care providers and clinical laboratories with guidelines on all aspects 
of specimen management and diagnostic testing. 
• Work with federal partners to monitor the pandemic virus and conduct special studies with CDC related to 
vaccine development or other aspects of emergency response. 
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• Maintain reference testing for influenza. 
• Continue education of clinicians & laboratorians. 
• Share data/information in “real-time”. 
• Maintain other diagnostic services. 
 
 B. Laboratory support for health care providers 
 
 Arizona State Public Health Laboratory (ASL) 
• Provide clinical laboratories with guidelines for safe handling, processing, and rapid diagnostic testing of clinical 
specimens from patients who meet the case definition for pandemic influenza (see Appendices 4 and 5). 
• Provide rapid communication of test results. 
• Provide guidance on the use of commercially available rapid diagnostic tests for the detection of Influenza A 
(see Appendix 6). 
• Provide guidance on the specimens to refer to the State Public Health Laboratory. 
 
 
C. Laboratory safety - biocontainment 
• Commercial antigen detection testing – conduct all assays in a Bio-Safety cabinet under BSL-II conditions.  
• RT-PCR – conduct all assays in a Bio-Safety cabinet under BSL-II conditions. 
• Virus Isolation - all assays must be conducted under Bio-Safety Level III with enhancements.  (see Appendix 4). 
 
D. Occupational health issues for laboratory workers 
 
To protect the health of laboratory workers during a pandemic, laboratories should maintain the safety practices used 
during the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods. 
• Conduct laboratory procedures under appropriate biocontainment conditions. 
• Encourage routine vaccination of laboratory employees exposed to specimens with respiratory infections.   
(see Appendix 7). 
 
E.  Use of diagnostic assays during an influenza pandemic 
 
1. Rapid Diagnostic Tests 
 
Rapid diagnostic tests based on antigen detection are 
commercially available for influenza.  Laboratories in outpatient 
settings and hospitals can use these tests to detect viruses in 30 
minutes.  Some tests can detect Influenza A viruses, including 
avian strains.  Testing is not capable of distinguishing between 
the subtypes of influenza. 
(see Appendix 6). 
 
2. RT-PCR Subtyping 
Influenza specimens may be typed and subtyped using RT-PCR.  
This method does not require the growth or isolation of virus. 
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3. Virus Isolation 
 
This method requires growth of virus in cell culture.  Identification of the virus is usually confirmed through the use of 
IFA staining or hemagglutination inhibition (HAI), or RT-PCR to monitor circulating seasonal strains.  If clinical or 
epidemiological data suggests that the human case of influenza might be due to infection with avian influenza, the 
virus should not be cultured except under BSL-3 conditions with enhancements.  Laboratories that lack BSL-3 
enhanced facilities should contact their State Public Health 
Laboratory and arrange to forward the specimen to the CDC 
for isolation and characterization.  
 
Immunofluorescence Antibody Staining 
IFA staining following virus isolation may be used by some 
laboratories to identify influenza types (A & B) and 
Influenza A subtypes using a panel of specific antisera.   
 
4. Serologic Tests 
 
Tests based on the detection of antibodies in the patient’s 
sera can be used retrospectively to confirm influenza 
detection.  Acute and convalescent (paired) sera are used to 
detect rising antibody titers in patient’s sera.  The testing 
cannot be used to subtype species of Influenza A Virus.  
This method is of limited value in the monitoring of an 
ongoing influenza pandemic.   
 
 
V. Appendices 
 
Reference Testing Guidelines 
 
The ASL and other local laboratories may conduct initial testing on patient specimens for influenza A or potential highly 
pathogenic strains, if laboratory capacity is available. Due to the spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) in poultry in Asia, 
laboratories should be on the alert for avian and human H5 viruses. Procedures for diagnosis of human cases of influenza A 
(H5N1) are provided in Appendix 2. Influenza A viruses other than currently circulating H1 and H3 subtypes should also be 
considered as potentially pandemic if detected in humans. (See Appendix 3). 
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Box 1. Use of diagnostic assays during an influenza pandemic 
 
Public health and clinical laboratories will use different types of diagnostic tests for influenza at different stages of a 
pandemic. Each of the tests discussed below is described in detail in Appendix 1. 
 
Virus Isolation 
Virus isolation—growing the viral strain in cell culture—is the “gold standard” for influenza diagnostics because it 
confirms that the virus is infectious. During a pandemic, virus isolation followed by antigenic and genetic (sequencing) 
analysis will be used to characterize the earliest pandemic isolates, as well as to monitor their evolution during the 
pandemic. Laboratories that participate in the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network, such as ASL, typically use 
virus isolation followed by hemagglutination inhibition (HAI), IFA staining, or RT-PCR to monitor circulating seasonal 
strains of influenza. If clinical and epidemiologic data suggest that a human case of influenza might be due to infection with 
avian influenza A (H5N1) or another highly pathogenic avian influenza strain (see Box 3), the virus should not be cultured 
except under BSL-3 conditions with enhancements. Laboratories that lack BSL-3 enhanced facilities may either perform 
RT-PCR subtyping using BSL-2 containment procedures or send the specimen to CDC for isolation and characterization. 
 
Immunofluorescence Antibody Staining 
IFA staining following virus isolation can be used to identify influenza types (A, B) and influenza A HA subtypes using a 
panel of specific antisera. In some cases, IFA can be used for direct testing of cells pelleted from original clinical samples. 
CDC’s Influenza Branch produces and distributes a reagent kit to WHO collaborating laboratories that includes monoclonal 
antibodies for typing and subtyping currently circulating influenza viruses by IFA. Many laboratories use commercially 
available reagents to type influenza viruses by direct immunofluorescence tests (DFA). 
Box 1. Use of diagnostic assays during an influenza pandemic – cont. 
 
RT-PCR Subtyping 
Influenza specimens may also be typed and subtyped using RT-PCR, which does not require in vitro growth or isolation of 
virus. ASL scientists have received training from CDC on using RT-PCR subtyping to identify human and avian HA 
subtypes of public health concern. APHL members can access protocols and sequences of primers and probes that can be 
used for typing and subtyping on the APHL website. 
 
Serologic Tests 
Tests based on detection of antibodies in patient sera—e.g., enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), HAI, and 
microneutralization assay—can be used to retrospectively confirm influenza infection. Although microneutralization assay 
is the most comprehensive test for detection in humans of antibodies to avian influenza viruses, it is currently not available 
at ASL. 
 
Rapid Diagnostic Tests 
Several rapid diagnostic test kits based on antigen detection are commercially available for influenza. Laboratories in 
outpatient settings and hospitals can use these tests to detect influenza viruses within 30 minutes. Some tests can detect 
influenza A viruses (including avian strains); others can detect influenza A and B viruses without distinguishing 
between them, and some can distinguish between influenza A and B viruses. The type of specimens used in these tests (i.e., 
nasal wash/aspirate, nasopharyngeal swabs, or nasal swab or throat swab) may also vary. Like RT-PCR, rapid diagnostic 
tests do not require in vitro growth or isolation of virus. During a pandemic, rapid diagnostic tests will be 
widely used to distinguish influenza A from other respiratory illnesses. See Appendix 6 for additional information. 
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Box 2. Laboratory support for seasonal influenza surveillance 
 
 
U.S. Collaborating Laboratories of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network 
All state public health laboratories, including ASL, as well as about 25 tertiary-care hospital and academic center 
laboratories, participate as U.S. collaborating laboratories in the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network, which 
collects worldwide data on circulating strains of influenza viruses. These data are used to develop recommendations for the 
formulation of each year’s influenza vaccines, as well as to detect new human influenza viruses that might have pandemic 
potential. CDC’s Influenza Laboratory serves as the WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and 
Control of Influenza, along with the WHO Collaborating Centers for Reference and Research on Influenza in Australia, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom. The U.S.-based WHO collaborating laboratories provide CDC with weekly reports of 
laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A and B viruses, by age group. These laboratories typically use virus isolation 
followed by antigenic testing with IFA staining or HAI—or by molecular testing with RT-PCR—to identify known 
subtypes of human influenza viruses. If unusual subtypes are detected, or if the specimens cannot be subtyped using 
available techniques, the specimens are sent to CDC for further testing. 
 
 
NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories 
The National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS; http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/revb/nrevss/) 
includes more than 90 laboratories throughout the country, including many hospital laboratories, some state public health 
laboratories, and a few private commercial laboratories. About 40 of the NERVSS laboratories are also WHO collaborating 
laboratories.  Like the WHO collaborating laboratories, NREVSS laboratories provide CDC with weekly reports of 
laboratory confirmed cases of influenza A and B viruses. These laboratories typically test respiratory specimens with 
commercially available rapid diagnostic tests. Several NREVSS laboratories also perform virus isolation followed by rapid 
diagnostic tests or antigenic typing by IFA. If untypable viruses or unusual subtypes are detected, the specimens are sent to 
the state public health laboratory or to CDC for further testing. 
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Box 3. Avian influenza strains with high and low pathogenicity 
 
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) classifies avian influenza viruses as low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 
viruses or highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, based on characteristics of a virus’ hemagglutinin cleavagesite 
or its virulence in birds, as determined by laboratory testing. LPAI strains are endemic in wild birds worldwide and are 
responsible for most avian influenza outbreaks in poultry. LPAI strains with H5 and H7 subtypes sometimes evolve into 
highly pathogenic forms. HPAI strains are extremely contagious and cause severe illness and high mortality rates in poultry. 
 
LPAI strains include:  
•H5N2, the cause of poultry outbreaks in New York, Maine, and California in 2002 
•H7N2, the cause of poultry outbreaks in Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey in 2004  
 
HPAI strains include: 
•H5N1, the cause of major poultry outbreaks in Southeast Asia 
•H7N7, the cause of a 2003 outbreak in the Netherlands 
•H7N3, the cause of a 2004 outbreak in British Columbia 
•H5N2, the cause of a 2004 outbreak in poultry in Texas 
 
The 2004 outbreak in Texas was the first HPAI outbreak in the United States since a previous outbreak of H5N2 in1983-84 
in the northeastern United States. The 1983-84 disease control effort involved the destruction of approximately 17 million 
birds and cost more than $70 million. 
 
Although avian influenza A viruses do not usually infect humans, several instances of human infections of avian influenza 
have been reported since 1997. Cases of avian influenza infection in humans are apparently caused by contact with infected 
poultry or with surfaces contaminated with avian influenza viruses. 
 
LPAI strains associated with human infection include: 
•H9N2, which caused three cases of influenza-like illness in Hong Kong between 1999 and 2003, and other casesin China in 
1998 and 1999 
•H7N2, which was detected by serology in one person involved in the culling of sick chickens during the responseto a 
poultry outbreak in Virginia in 2002, and was isolated from a New York resident in 2003 (unknown source of the infection)  
 
HPAI viruses associated with human infection include:  
•H5N1, which caused 51 deaths in Southeast Asia between January 2004 and April 2005•H7N7, which caused the death of 
a veterinarian as well as 83 cases of mild human disease (including conjunctivitis) during the 2003 poultry outbreak in the 
Netherlands. 
•H7N3, which caused 2 cases of very mild human disease (conjunctivitis, headache) in persons culling sick poultry in 
British Columbia in 2004   
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Appendix 1 
Influenza diagnostic assays 
 
Among the several types of assays used to detect influenza, rapid antigen tests, reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction 
(RT-PCR), viral isolation, immunofluorescence assays (IFA), and serology are the most commonly used. The sensitivity and 
specificity of any test for influenza will vary by the laboratory that performs the test, the type of test used, and the type of 
specimen tested. A chart that lists influenza diagnostic procedures and commercially available rapid diagnostic tests follows 
more detailed descriptions provided below. 
 
Virus Isolation 
Biocontainment level: Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods – BSL-3 with enhancements; Pandemic Period –BSL-2 
 
Virus isolation is a highly sensitive and very useful technique when the clinical specimens are of good quality and have been 
collected in a timely manner (optimally within 3 days of the start of illness). Isolation of a virus in cell culture along with the 
subsequent identification of the virus by immunologic or genetic techniques are standard methods for virus diagnosis. Virus 
isolation amplifies the amount of virus from the original specimen, making a sufficient quantity of virus available for further 
antigenic and genetic characterization and for drug-susceptibility testing if required. Virus isolation is considered the 
“goldstandard” for diagnosis of influenza virus infections.  
 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses are BSL-3 agents. During the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods, 
laboratories should attempt to culture HPAI viruses—as well as other influenza viruses with pandemic potential—only under 
BSL-3 conditions with enhancements in order to optimally reduce the risk of a novel influenza virus subtype spreading to 
persons or animals. During the Pandemic Period, biocontainment of BSL-2 is appropriate to prevent laboratory-acquired 
infection and the virus will already be widespread.  
 
In recent years, the use of cell lines has surpassed the use of embryonated eggs for culturing of influenza viruses, although only 
viruses grown in embryonated eggs are used as seed viruses for vaccine production. Because standard isolation procedures 
require several days to yield results, they should be used in combination with the spin-amplification shell-vial method. The 
results of these assays can be obtained in 24–72 hours, compared to an average of 4.5 days using standard culture techniques. 
Spin-amplification should not be performed using 24-well plates because of increased risk of cross-contamination. The most 
effective combination of cell lines recommended for public health laboratories is primary rhesus monkey for standard culture, 
along with Madin Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) in shell vial. 1 The use of these two cell lines in combination has 
demonstrated maximum sensitivity over time for recovery of evolving influenza strains. Some clinical laboratories have 
recently reported good isolation rates  using commercially available cell-line mixed-cell combinations; however, data are 
lacking on the performance of these mixed cells with new subtypes of Influenza A viruses. 
 
1The shell-vial technique is described in: Manual of Clinical Virology, 3rd edition. Steven Specter, Richard Hodinka, and Stephen Young, eds. ASM Press, 
2000. 
 
Appropriate clinical specimens for virus isolation include nasal washes, nasopharyngeal aspirates, nasopharyngeal and throat 
swabs, tracheal aspirates, and bronchoalveolar lavage. Ideally, specimens should be collected within 72 hours of the onset of 
illness. Viral culture isolates are used to provide specific information regarding circulating influenza subtypes and strains. This 
information is needed to compare current circulating influenza strains with vaccine strains, to guide decisions on influenza 
treatment and chemoprophylaxis, and to select vaccine strains for the coming year. Virus isolates also are needed to monitor 
the emergence of antiviral resistance and of novel influenza A subtypes that might pose a pandemic threat. During outbreaks of 
influenza-like illness, viral culture may help identify other causes of illness when influenza is not the etiology (except when 
using MDCK cells or the MDCK shell-vial technique). 
 
Immunofluorescence Assays 
Biocontainment level: BSL-2 when performed directy on clinical specimens; if used on cultures for earlier detection of 
virus, biocontainment recommendations for viral culture apply  
Direct (DFA) or indirect (IFA) immunofluorescence antibody staining of virus-infected cells is a rapid and sensitive method 
for diagnosis of influenza and other viral infections. DFA and IFA can also be used to type and subtype influenza viruses using 
commercially available monoclonal antibodies specific for the influenza virus HA. The sensitivity of these methods is greatly 
influenced by the quality of the isolate, the specificity of the reagents used, and the experience of the person(s) performing, 
reading, and interpreting the test.  
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Although IFA can be used to stain smears of clinical specimens directly, when rapid diagnosis is needed it is preferable to first 
increase the amount of virus through growth in cell culture. For HPAI isolates, attempts to culture the virus should be made 
only under BSL-3 conditions with enhancements. 
 
 
Reverse-Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR)  
Biocontainment level: BSL-2  
PCR can be used for rapid detection and subtyping of influenza viruses in respiratory specimens. Because the influenza 
genome consists of single-stranded RNA, a complementary DNA (cDNA) copy of the viral RNA must be synthesized using 
the reverse-transcriptase (RT) enzyme prior to the PCR reaction.  
 
APHL member laboratories can obtain CDC protocols and sequences of primers and probes for rapid RT-PCR detection of 
human and avian HA subtypes of current concern at the APHL website (ASL is an APHL member laboratory and has these 
capabilities)  . These protocols use real-time RT-PCR methods with fluorescent-labeled primers that allow automatic, semi-
quantitative estimation of the input template. The RT-PCR results are analyzed and archived electronically, without the need 
for gel electrophoresis and photographic recording. A large number of samples may be analyzed at the same time, reducing the 
risk of carry-over contamination. As with all PCR assays, interpretation of real-time RT-PCR tests must account for the 
possibility of false-negative and false-positive results. False-negative results can arise from poor sample collection or 
degradation of the viral RNA during shipping or storage. Application of appropriate assay controls that identify poor-quality 
samples (e.g., an extraction control and, if possible, an inhibition control) can help avoid most false-negative results. 2 
 
The most common cause of false-positive results is contamination with previously amplified DNA. The use of real-time RT-
PCR helps mitigate this problem by operating as a contained system. A more difficult problem is the cross-contamination that 
can occur between specimens during collection, shipping, and aliquoting in the laboratory. Use of multiple negative control 
samples in each assay and a well-designed plan for confirmatory testing can help ensure that laboratory contamination is 
detected and that negative specimens are not inappropriately identified as influenza-positive. 
 
Specimens that test positive for a novel subtype of influenza virus should be forwarded to CDC for confirmatory testing. (Due 
to the possibility of contamination, it is important to provide original clinical material.) All laboratory results should be 
interpreted in the context of the clinical and epidemiologic information available on the patient. 
 
 
Rapid Diagnostic Tests  
Biocontainment level: BSL-2  
Commercial rapid diagnostic tests can be used in outpatient settings to detect influenza viruses within 30 minutes. These rapid 
tests differ in the types of influenza viruses they can detect and in their ability to distinguish among influenza types. Different 
tests can 1) detect influenza A viruses only (including avian strains); 2) detect both influenza A and B viruses, without 
distinguishing between them; or 3) detect both influenza A and B viruses and distinguish between them. 
 
The types of specimens acceptable for use (i.e., nasal wash/aspirate, nasopharyngeal swab, or nasal swab and throat swab) also 
vary by test. The specificity and, in particular, the sensitivity of rapid tests are lower than for viral culture and vary by test and 
specimen tested. The majority of rapid tests are >70% sensitive and >90% specific. Thus, as many as 30% of samples that 
would be positive for influenza by viral culture may give a negative rapid test result with these assays.  
When interpreting results of a rapid influenza test, physicians should consider the level of influenza activity in the community. 
When influenza prevalence is low, positive rapid test results should be independently confirmed by culture or RT-PCR. When 
influenza is known to be circulating, clinicians should consider confirming negative tests with viral culture or other means 
because of the lower sensitivity of the rapid tests. Package inserts and the laboratory performing the test should be consulted 
for more details regarding use of rapid diagnostic tests. Additional information on diagnostic testing is provided at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/labdiagnosis.htm . Detailed information on the use of rapid diagnostics tests is provided 
in Appendix 6. 
 
2 CDC is working with the private sector to provide inactivated RNA virus for use as RT-PCR controls for influenza A (H5) testing in LRN laboratories. CDC 
is working with USDA to resolve any permit issues that might affect the ability of LRN members to use these controls. 
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Serologic Tests3 
 
Hemagglutination Inhibition (HAI) 
Biocontainment level: BSL-2  
Serologic testing can be used to identify recent infections with influenza viruses. It can be used when the direct identification 
of influenza viruses is not feasible or possible (e.g., because clinical specimens for virus isolation cannot be obtained, cases are 
identified after shedding of virus has stopped, or the laboratory does not have the resources or staff to perform virus isolation).  
 
Since most human sera contain antibodies to influenza viruses, serologic diagnosis requires demonstration of a four-fold or 
greater rise in antibody titer using paired acute and convalescent serum samples. HAI is the preferred diagnostic test for 
determining antibody rises. In general, acute-phase sera should be collected within one week of illness onset, and convalescent 
sera should be collected 2–3 weeks later.  
 
There are two exceptions in which the collection of single serum samples can be helpful in the diagnosis of influenza. In 
investigations of outbreaks due to novel viruses, testing of single serum samples has been used to identify antibody to the novel 
virus. In other outbreak investigations, antibody test results from single specimens collected from persons in the convalescent 
phase of illness have been compared with results either from age-matched persons in the acute phase of illness or from non-ill 
controls. In such situations, the geometric mean titers between the two groups to a single influenza virus type or subtype can be 
compared. In general, these approaches are not optimal, and paired sera should be collected whenever possible. 
 
Because HAI titers of antibodies in humans infected with avian influenza viruses are usually very low or even undetectable, 
more sensitive serologic tests, such as microneutralization, may be needed. 
 
Microneutralization Assay 
Biocontainment level: Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods – BSL-3 with enhancements; Pandemic Period –BSL-2  
The virus neutralization test is a highly sensitive and specific assay for detecting virus-specific antibody in animals and 
humans. The neutralization test is performed in two steps: 1) a virus-antibody reaction step, in which the virus is mixed with 
antibody reagents, and 2) an inoculation step, in which the mixture is inoculated into a host system (e.g. cell 
cultures,embryonated eggs, or animals). The absence of infectivity constitutes a positive neutralization reaction and indicates 
the presence of virus-specific antibodies in human or animal sera.  The virus neutralization test gives the most precise answer 
to the question of whether or not a person has antibodies that can neutralize the infectivity of a given virus strain. The 
neutralization test has several additional advantages for detecting antibody to influenza virus. First, the assay primarily detects 
antibodies to the influenza virus HA and thus can identify functional, strain-specific antibodies in animal and human serum. 
Second, since infectious virus is used, the assay can be developed quickly upon recognition of a novel virus and before suitable 
purified viral proteins become available for use in other assays.  
 
3Enzyme-linked immunoassay (EIA) is not included on this list because of non-specificity issues. Complement fixation is not included because it is currently out 
of use. 
 
The microneutralization test is a sensitive and specific assay for detecting virus-specific antibody to avian influenza A 
(H5N1)in human serum and potentially for detecting antibody to other avian subtypes. Microneutralization can detect H5-
specificantibody in human serum at titers that cannot be detected by HAI. Because antibody to avian influenza subtypes is 
presumably low or absent in most human populations, single serum samples can be used to screen for the prevalence of 
antibody to avian viruses. However, if infection of humans with avian viruses is suspected, the testing of paired acute and 
convalescent sera in the microneutralization test would provide a more definitive answer regarding the occurrence of infection. 
Conventional neutralization tests for influenza viruses based on the inhibition of cytopathogenic effect (CPE)-formation in 
MDCK cell cultures are laborious and rather slow, but in combination with rapid culture assay principles the neutralization test 
can yield results within 2 days. For HPAI viruses, neutralization tests should be performed at BSL-3 enhanced conditions. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Interim CDC recommendations: enhanced U.S. surveillance and diagnostic evaluation to identify cases of human 
infection with avian influenza a (H5N1) 
 
NOTE: This guidance pertains to the avian influenza A (H5N1) situation in October 2005. CDC will provide updated guidance 
for avian influenza A (H5N1) and for new situations, as needed, through the Health Alert Network (HAN). 
 
Enhanced surveillance efforts by state and local health departments, hospitals, and clinicians are needed to identify patients at 
increased risk for influenza A (H5N1). Interim recommendations include the following:  
 
Testing for avian influenza A (H5N1) is indicated for hospitalized patients with: 
 
• Radiographically confirmed pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), or other severe respiratory 
illness for which an alternative diagnosis has not been established, and 
• History of travel within 10 days of symptom onset to a country with documented avian influenza A (H5N1) infections 
in poultry and/or humans. (For a regularly updated listing of H5N1-affected countries, see the OIE website at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm and the WHO website at http://www.who.int/en/ ).  
 
or 
 
Testing for avian influenza A (H5N1) should be considered on a case-by-case basis in consultation with state and local health 
departments for hospitalized or ambulatory patients with: 
 
• Documented temperature of >100.4°F (>38°C), and 
• One or more of the following: cough, sore throat, or shortness of breath, and 
• History of close contact either with poultry (e.g., visited a poultry farm, a household raising poultry, or a bird market) 
in an H5N1-affected country, or with a known or suspected human case of influenza A (H5N1) within 10 days prior to 
onset of symptoms. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Reference testing guidelines for potential pandemic strains of influenza 
 
State and local laboratories may conduct initial testing on patient specimens for influenza A or potential highly pathogenic 
strains, if laboratory capacity is available. Due to the spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) in poultry in Asia, laboratories 
should be on the alert for avian and human H5 viruses. Procedures for diagnosis of human cases of influenza A (H5N1) are 
provided in Appendix 2. Influenza A viruses other than currently circulating H1 and H3 subtypes should also be considered as 
potentially pandemic if detected in humans.  
 
• ASL should send specimens to CDC if:  
• A sample tested by ASL is positive for H5 or another novel subtype; 
 
Note:  A laboratory should test for influenza A (H5) only if it is able to do so by PCR or has a BSL-3-enhanced facility for 
influenza A(H5) viral culture.  
 
or 
 
• A sample from a patient who meets the clinical and epidemiologic criteria for possible infection with a potentially 
pandemic virus is positive for influenza A by RT-PCR or rapid antigen detection,* is negative for influenza A(H1) 
and A(H3), and the referring jurisdiction is not equipped to test for specific strains; 
or 
 
• The referring jurisdiction is not equipped to test samples for novel influenza viruses by RT-PCR and is requesting 
testing at CDC.  
 
Shipping procedures for potential pandemic strains of influenza are provided in Appendix 5. 
 
 
*Because the sensitivity of commercially available rapid diagnostic tests for influenza may not always be optimal, CDC will 
also accept specimens taken from persons who meet the clinical and epidemiological criteria even if they test negative by 
influenza rapid diagnostic testing—if PCR assays are not available at the state laboratory. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Laboratory biosafety guidelines for handling and processing specimens or isolates of novel influenza strains 
 
Key Messages 
 
• Commercial antigen detection testing for influenza may be conducted under BSL-2 containment conditions if a Class 
II biological safety cabinet is used.  
• Clinical specimens from suspected novel influenza cases may be tested by RT-PCR using standard BSL-2 work 
practices in a Class II biological safety cabinet for initial processing of patient specimens. 
• If a specimen is confirmed positive for influenza A (H5N1) by RT-PCR, additional testing should be performed only 
under BSL-3 conditions with enhancements. CDC’s Influenza Branch should be informed immediately by contacting 
the CDC Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) at 770-488-7100.  
• A detailed description of recommended facilities, practices, and protective equipment for the various laboratory 
biosafety levels can be found in the CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 
(BMBL)manual at www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm 
• BSL-3 with enhancements and Animal Biosafety Level 3 include:  all BSL-3 practices, procedures, and facilities, plus 
the use of negative-pressure, HEPA-filtered respirators or positive air-purifying respirators, and clothing change and 
personal showering protocols.  Additional practices and/or restrictions may be added as conditions of USDA-APHIS 
permits.  Registration of personnel and facilities with the Select Agent Program is required for work with highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, which are classified as agricultural select agents. 
• ASL will test clinical specimens from suspected novel influenza cases by RT-PCR using standard BSL-2 work 
practices in a Class II biological safety cabinet. Commercial rapid antigen detection testing may also be conducted 
under BSL-2 biocontainment conditions.  
• Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5) and A (H7) viruses are classified as select agents. USDA regulations 
require that these viruses (as well as exotic low pathogenic avian influenza viruses) be handled under BSL-3 
laboratory containment conditions, with enhancements (i.e., controlled-access double-door entry with change room 
and shower, use of respirators, decontamination of all wastes, and showering of all personnel). Laboratories that work 
with these viruses must be certified by USDA.  
• Laboratories should not perform virus isolation on respiratory specimens from patients who may be infected with an 
avian influenza virus unless stringent BSL-3 enhanced containment conditions can be met and diagnostic work can be 
kept separate from studies with other human influenza A viruses (i.e., H1 or H3). Therefore, respiratory virus cultures 
should not be performed in most clinical laboratories. Cultures for patients suspected of having influenza A 
(H5N1)infection should be sent only to state laboratories with appropriate BSL-3 with enhancement containment 
facilities or to CDC. 
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Appendix 5 
 
1/4/06 Guidelines for collecting and shipping specimens for influenza diagnostics 
 
Key Messages 
• Appropriate specimens for influenza testing vary by type of test. 
• Before collecting specimens, review the infection control precautions are described in  
Supplement 3.   
 
I. Respiratory specimens 4 
 
Eight types of respiratory specimens may be collected for viral and/or bacterial diagnostics: 
1) nasopharyngeal wash/aspirates, 2) nasopharyngeal swabs, 3) oropharyngeal swabs, 4) broncheoalveolar lavage, 5) 
trachealaspirate, 6) pleural fluid tap, 7) sputum, and 8) autopsy specimens. Nasopharyngeal wash/aspirates are the specimen of 
choice for detection of most respiratory viruses and are the preferred specimen type for children aged <2 years.  
Respiratory specimens for detection of most respiratory pathogens, and influenza in particular, are optimally collected within 
the first 3 days of the onset of illness. Before collecting specimens, review the infection control precautions in Supplement 4. 
 
A. Collecting specimens from the upper respiratory tract 
  
1.Nasopharyngeal wash/aspirate 
• Have the patient sit with head tilted slightly backward.  
• Instill 1 ml–1.5 ml of nonbacteriostatic saline (pH 7.0) into one nostril. Flush a plastic catheter or tubing with 2 ml–
3ml of saline. Insert the tubing into the nostril parallel to the palate. Aspirate nasopharyngeal secretions. Repeat this 
procedure for the other nostril. •Collect the specimens in sterile vials. Label each specimen container with the 
patient’s ID number and the date collected.  
• If shipping domestically, use cold packs to keep the sample at 4°C. If shipping internationally, pack in dry ice (see 
shipping instructions below). 
• 2.Nasopharyngeal or oropharyngeal swabs 
• Use only sterile dacron or rayon swabs with plastic shafts. Do not use calcium alginate swabs or swabs with wooden 
sticks, as they may contain substances that inactivate some viruses and inhibit PCR testing. 
• To obtain a nasopharyngeal swab, insert a swab into the nostril parallel to the palate. Leave the swab in place for a 
few seconds to absorb secretions. Swab both nostrils.  
• To obtain an oropharyngeal swab, swab the posterior pharynx and tonsillar areas, avoiding the tongue.  
• Place the swabs immediately into sterile vials containing 2 ml of viral transport media. Break the applicator sticks off 
near the tip to permit tightening of the cap. Label each specimen container with the patient’s ID number and the date 
the sample was collected. 
• If shipping domestically, use cold packs to keep the sample at 4°C. If shipping internationally, pack in dry ice (see 
shipping instructions below). 
 
4All types of respiratory specimens may used in RT-PCR tests. Fresh-frozen unfixed tissue specimens may also be submitted 
for RT-PCR. 
 
B. Collecting specimens from the lower respiratory tract 
 
1. Broncheoalveolar lavage, tracheal aspirate, or pleural fluid tap  
• During bronchoalveolar lavage or tracheal aspirate, use a double-tube system to maximum shielding 
fromoropharyngeal secretions.  
• Centrifuge half of the specimen, and fix the cell pellet in formalin. Place the remaining unspun fluid in sterile vials 
with external caps and internal O-ring seals. If there is no internal O-ring seal, then seal tightly with the available cap 
and secure with Parafilm®. Label each specimen container with the patient’s ID number and the date the sample was 
collected. 
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• If shipping domestically, use cold packs to keep the sample at 4°C. If shipping internationally, ship fixed cells at room 
temperature and unfixed cells frozen (see shipping instructions below). 
 
2.Sputum 
• Educate the patient about the difference between sputum and oral secretions. 
• Have the patient rinse the mouth with water and then expectorate deep cough sputum directly into a sterile screw-cap 
sputum collection cup or sterile dry container.  
• If shipping domestically, use cold packs to keep the sample at 4°C. If shipping internationally, pack in dry ice (see 
shipping instructions below). 
 
II. Blood components 
 
Both acute and convalescent serum specimens should be collected for antibody testing. Collect convalescent serum specimens 
2–4 weeks after the onset of illness. To collect serum for antibody testing: 
• Collect 5 ml–10 ml of whole blood in a serum separator tube. Allow the blood to clot, centrifuge briefly, and collect 
all resulting sera in vials with external caps and internal O-ring seals. If there is no internal O-ring seal, then seal 
tightly with the available cap and secure with Parafilm®.  
• The minimum amount of serum preferred for each test is 200 microliters, which can easily be obtained from 5 ml of 
whole blood. A minimum of 1 cc of whole blood is needed for testing of pediatric patients. If possible, collect 1 cc in 
an EDTA tube and in a clotting tube. If only 1cc can be obtained, use a clotting tube.  
• Label each specimen container with the patient’s ID number and the date the specimen was collected.  
• If unfrozen and transported domestically, ship with cold packs to keep the sample at 4°C. If frozen or transported 
internationally, ship on dry ice. 
 
III.  Autopsy specimens 
 
CDC can perform immunohistochemical (IHC) staining for influenza A (H5) viruses on autopsy specimens. Viral antigens 
maybe focal and sparsely distributed in patients with influenza, and are most frequently detected in respiratory epithelium of 
large airways. Larger airways (particularly primary and segmental bronchi) have the highest yield for detection of influenza 
viruses by IHC staining. Collection of the appropriate tissues ensures the best chance of detecting the virus by (IHC) stains. 
• If influenza is suspected, a minimum total of 8 blocks or fixed-tissue specimens representing samples from each of the 
following sites should be obtained and submitted for evaluation:  
• Central (hilar) lung with segmental bronchi 
• Right and left primary bronchi 
• Trachea (proximal and distal)•Representative pulmonary parenchyma from right and left lung 
 
In addition, representative tissues from major organs should be submitted for evaluation. In particular, for patients with 
suspected myocarditis or encephalitis, specimens should include myocardium (right and left ventricle) and CNS (cerebral 
cortex, basal ganglia, pons, medulla, and cerebellum). Specimens should be included from any other organ showing significant 
gross or microscopic pathology.  Specimens may be submitted as: 
• Fixed, unprocessed tissue in 10% neutral buffered formalin, or 
• Tissue blocks containing formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded specimens, or 
• Unstained sections cut at 3 microns placed on charged glass slides (10 slides per specimen)  
• Specimens should be sent at room temperature (NOT FROZEN). 
• Fresh-frozen unfixed tissue specimens may be submitted for RT-PCR.  
• Include a copy of the autopsy report (preliminary, or final if available), and a cover letter outlining a brief clinical 
history and the submitter’s full name, title, complete mailing address, phone, and fax numbers, in the event that CDC 
pathologists require further information. Referring pathologists may direct specific questions to CDC pathologists. 
The contact number for the Infectious Disease Pathology Activity is 404-639-3133, or the pathologists can be 
contacted 24hours a day, 7 days a week through the CDC Emergency Response Hotline at 770-488-7100.  
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IV. Shipping instructions 
 
• Local health departments, pathologists, or medical examiners should call ASL, who will coordinate with CDC before 
sending specimens for influenza A reference testing. CDC Hotline staff will notify a member of the Influenza Branch 
who will contact ADHS to answer questions and provide guidance. In some cases, the ASL may arrange for a clinical 
laboratory to send samples directly to CDC.  
• Specimens should be sent by Priority Overnight Shipping for receipt within 24 hours. Samples (such as fresh-frozen 
autopsy samples for RT-PCR or other clinical materials) may be frozen at –70 if the package cannot be shipped within 
a specified time (e.g., if the specimen is collected on a Friday but cannot be shipped until Monday).  
• When sending clinical specimens, include the specimen inventory sheet (see below), include the assigned CDC case 
ID number, and note “Influenza surveillance” on all materials and specimens sent. 
• Include the CDC case ID number on all materials forwarded to CDC. Protocols for standard interstate shipment of 
etiologic agents should be followed, and are available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/shipregs.htm . All 
shipments must comply with current DOT/IATA shipping regulations. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Rapid diagnostic testing for influenza 
 
The following information in this appendix is designed to assist clinicians and clinical laboratory directors in the use of rapid 
diagnostic tests during interpandemic influenza seasons. During an influenza pandemic, one or more of these tests may be 
sensitive and specific enough to be used by clinicians to supplement clinical diagnoses of pandemic influenza. However, 
clinicians should be reminded that a negative test result might not rule out pandemic influenza and should not affect patient 
management or infection control decisions.  
 
 
I. Information for clinicians 
 
A. Background 
  
Rapid diagnostic tests for influenza can help in the diagnosis and management of patients who present with signs and 
symptoms compatible with influenza. They also are useful for helping to determine whether institutional outbreaks of 
respiratory disease might be due to influenza. In general, rapid diagnostic testing for influenza should be done when the results 
will affect a clinical decision.  
Rapid diagnostic testing can provide results within 30 minutes. 
 
B. Reliability and interpretation of rapid test results 
 
The reliability of rapid diagnostic tests depends largely on the conditions under which they are used. Understanding some basic 
considerations can minimize being misled by false-positive or false-negative results. 
 
Median sensitivities of rapid diagnostic tests are generally ~70%–75% when compared with viral culture, but median 
specificities of rapid diagnostic tests for influenza are approximately 90%–95%. False-positive (and true negative) results are 
more likely to occur when disease prevalence in the community is low, which is generally at the beginning and end of the 
influenza season. False-negative (and true positive) results are more likely to occur when disease prevalence is high in the 
community, which is typically at the height of the influenza season.  
 
C. Minimizing the occurrence of false results 
 
• Use rapid diagnostic tests that have high sensitivity and specificity.  
• Collect specimens as early in the illness as possible (within 4–5 days of symptom onset). 
• Follow the manufacturer’s instructions, including those for handling of specimens. 
• Consider sending specimens for viral culture when: 
• Community prevalence of influenza is low and the rapid diagnostic test result is positive, or 
• Disease prevalence is high but the rapid diagnostic test result is negative.  
• (Contact your ADHS or your county health department for information about influenza activity.) 
 
D. For further information 
 
Information about influenza is available at www.azdhs.gov/flu or the CDC influenza website (www.cdc.gov/flu) or from the 
CDC FluInformation Line (800-CDC-INFO [English and Spanish]; 800-243-7889 [TTY]). 
 
For more information about influenza diagnostics, contact: 
Arizona State Public Health Laboratory: 
250 North 17th Avenue 
Phoenix, AZ 85007 
Attn: Virology 
  (602) 542-6134 
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Additional resources: 
• Association of Public Health Laboratories: http://www.aphl.org/Public_Health_Labs/index.cfm 
• Weekly U.S. influenza activity reports: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm 
• CDC Clinician Outreach and Communication Activity: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/coca/index.asp 
• CDC website: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/labdiagnosis.htm 
 
 
II. Information for clinical laboratory directors 
 
A. Background 
 
Rapid diagnostic tests for influenza are screening tests for influenza virus infection; they can provide results within 30minutes. 
The use of commercial influenza rapid diagnostic tests by laboratories and clinics has increased substantially in recent years. 
At least ten rapid influenza tests have been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (see Appendix 1). 
 
Rapid tests differ in some important respects. Some can identify influenza A and B viruses and distinguish between them; some 
can identify influenza A and B viruses but cannot distinguish between them. Some tests are waived from requirements under 
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA). Most tests can be used with a variety of specimen types, 
but sensitivity and specificity can vary with specimen type. FDA approval is based upon specific specimen types. Rapid tests 
vary in terms of sensitivity and specificity when compared with viral culture. Product insert information and research 
publications indicate that median sensitivities are approximately 70%–75% and median specificities are approximately 90%–
95%. 
Specimens to be used with rapid tests generally should be collected as close as possible to the start of symptoms and usually no 
more than 4–5 days later in adults. In very young children, influenza viruses can be shed for longer periods; therefore, in some 
instances, testing for a few days after this period may still be useful. Test sensitivity will be greatest in children, who generally 
have higher viral titers, if the specimen is obtained during the first 2 days of illness, and if the clinician or laboratory has more 
experience performing the test. The quality of the specimen tested also is critical for test sensitivity. 
 
 
B. Accuracy depends on disease prevalence 
  
The positive and negative predictive values of rapid tests vary considerably depending on the prevalence of influenza in the 
community. False-positive (and true negative) influenza test results are more likely to occur when disease prevalence is low, 
which is generally at the beginning and end of the influenza season. False-negative (and true positive) influenza test results are 
more likely to occur when disease prevalence is high, which is typically at the height of the influenza season. 
 
1.Clinical considerations when influenza prevalence is low  
When disease prevalence is low, the positive-predictive value (PPV) is low and false-positive test results are more likely. By 
contrast, the negative-predictive value (NPV) is high when disease prevalence is low, and negative results are more likely tobe 
truly negative (see Graphs 1 and 2). 
 
If flu prevalence is… and specificity is… then PPV is…       false-positive rate is… 
VERY LOW (2.5%)     POOR (80%)  V POOR (6%–12%)       V. HIGH (88%–94%) 
VERY LOW (2.5%)   GOOD (98%)      POOR (39%–56%)        HIGH (44%–61%) 
MODERATE (20%)       POOR (80%)                POOR (38%–56%)        HIGH (44%–62%) 
MODERATE (20%)        GOOD (98%)                GOOD (86%–93%)       LOW (7%–14%) 
 
Interpretation of positive results should take into account the clinical characteristics of the case-patient. If an important clinical 
decision is affected by the test result, the rapid test result should be confirmed by another test, such as viral culture or PCR. 
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2. Clinical considerations when influenza prevalence is high 
When disease prevalence is relatively high, the NPV is low and false-negative test results are more likely. By contrast, when 
disease prevalence is high, the PPV is high and positive results are more likely to be true (see Graph 2). 
 
If flu prevalence is…  and sensitivity is…     then NPV is…        false-negative rate is. 
MODERATE (20%)    POOR (50%)        MODERATE (86%–89%)   MODERATE (11%–14%)  
MODERATE (20%)       HIGH (90%)         V. GOOD (97%–99%)         V. LOW (2%–3%)        
HIGH (40%)                 POOR (50%)        MODERATE (70%–75%)  MODERATE (25%–30%) 
 HIGH (40%)                   HIGH (90%)         V. GOOD (93%–94%)        LOW (6%–7%) 
 
Interpretation of negative results should take into account the clinical characteristics of the case-patient. If an important clinical 
decision is affected by the test result, the rapid test result should be confirmed by another test, such as viral culture or PCR. 
 
C. Selecting tests 
 
Selection of a test should take into consideration several factors, such as the types of specimens that are considered optimal for 
that test. Also, tests with high sensitivity and specificity will provide better positive and negative predictive values.  
Information about test characteristics is provided in product inserts and scientific articles and by the manufacturer. 
 
D. Changes in recommended procedures can affect test results 
 
Modification by the user can affect test performances and increase false-positive and/or false-negative rates. Such 
modifications include using specimens for which the test is not optimized or using swabs that did not come with the rapid test 
kit (unless recommended).  
 
E. When are rapid diagnostic tests beneficial?  
 
Use of rapid diagnostic tests are beneficial in these situations: 
• To test cases during an outbreak of acute respiratory disease to determine if influenza is the cause, or 
• To test selected patients during the influenza season, or  
• In the fall or winter, to test selected patients presenting with respiratory illnesses compatible with influenza to help 
establish whether influenza is present in a specific population and to guide health care providers in diagnosing and 
treating respiratory illnesses. 
  
In general, the exclusive use of rapid tests does not address the public health need for obtaining viral isolates so that influenza 
virus strain subtyping and characterization can be conducted to monitor antigenic and genetic changes. 
 
During an influenza pandemic, some rapid diagnostic tests may be able to detect the pandemic strain with adequate 
sensitivityand specificity. Rapid tests can be used by physicians to supplement clinical diagnoses of pandemic influenza.  
 
Physicians should be reminded that a negative test result might not rule out influenza and should not affect patient management 
or infection control decisions.  
 
F. For further information 
 
Information on influenza diagnostics is provided on the CDC website at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/labdiagnosis.htm . 
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Appendix 7 
 
Guidelines for medical surveillance of laboratory research personnel working with novel strains of influenza, including 
avian strains and other strains with pandemic potential  
 
Key Messages 
• Laboratory workers should receive training on the appropriate biosafety level for the type of work being performed.  
• Before working with avian influenza A viruses, including highly pathogenic strains, laboratory workers should have a 
baseline serum sample obtained and stored for future reference.  
• Workers in laboratories that contain avian influenza A viruses should report any fever or lower respiratory symptoms 
to their supervisors.  Workers should be evaluated for possible exposures, and the clinical features and course of the 
illness should be closely monitored. 
• Laboratory workers who are believed to have had a laboratory exposure to an avian influenza A virus or other highly 
pathogenic strain should be evaluated, counseled about the risk of transmission to others, and monitored for fever or 
lower respiratory symptoms as well as for any of the following: sore throat, rhinorrhea, chills, rigors, myalgia, 
headache, diarrhea.  
• ADHS and/or county health departments should be notified promptly of laboratory exposures and illnesses in exposed 
laboratory workers. Medical surveillance of laboratory personnel can help to ensure that workers who are at risk of 
occupational exposure to avian influenza viruses or other novel animal or human influenza strains and who develop 
symptoms of illness receive appropriate medical evaluation and treatment, both for the benefit of their health and to 
prevent further transmission.  
 
I. Prerequisites for working with novel avian or human influenza viruses 
 
A. Baseline serum samples 
 
Before working with novel avian or human influenza viruses, laboratory workers should have a baseline serum sample 
obtained and stored for future reference.  
 
B. Influenza vaccine 
 
Laboratories should offer the current inactivated influenza vaccine to laboratory personnel. Its use is especially encouraged for 
personnel working with avian viruses in BSL-3 enhanced laboratory conditions and for those who may be exposed to these 
viruses in the field. Immunization might reduce the chance of illness from exposure to human influenza viruses currently 
circulating in the community that could lead to confusion in monitoring for avian influenza A infection. Vaccines against novel 
influenza A viruses (e.g., H5N1) are undergoing clinical trials and might be available in the future. 
 
C. Oseltamivir prophylaxis 
 
• It is not necessary to require oseltamivir for laboratory research personnel working with highly pathogenic influenza 
strains, but encourage it for those doing animal experiments only for the time they are working with animals and 
especially while working with ferrets. 
• When considering oseltamivir prophylaxis, be sure to evaluate appropriate candidates for contraindications, answer 
their questions, review adverse effects, and explain the benefits.  
• Maintain a log of persons on oseltamivir, persons evaluated and not on oseltamivir, doses dispensed, and adverse 
effects. 
• Periodically evaluate and update oseltamivir policies and procedures. 
 
D. Post-exposure prophylaxis 
 
Conditions for use of oseltamivir for post-exposure prophylaxis include a known or suspected laboratory exposure to live avian 
influenza virus, including highly pathogenic strains, for a person not on oseltamivir. Appropriate health care personnel should 
be available to evaluate immediately and dispense oseltamivir if the exposure occurs during working hours. If exposure occurs 
after working hours, an exposed laboratory person should present to the Emergency Department and, after evaluation, 
communicate with ADHS or CDC for recommendations. 
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II.  Management of influenza-like illness in personnel with possible exposure to novel avian 
or human influenza viruses 
 
A. General procedures 
• Maintain a daily sign-in/out sheet to record name, date, time in/out, use of oseltamivir, and brief description of job 
tasks. This record will facilitate retrospective documentation if an illness occurs. 
• Workers should report any influenza-like illness and any potential laboratory exposures to the supervisor (see also 
Supplement 4). 
 
B. Evaluation and treatment 
 
1. During regular working hours  
• The affected employee should notify the supervisor. The supervisor should immediately contact the appropriate health 
care personnel and facility contacts (e.g., occupational health, infection control, or designee).  
• Upon arrival at the designated clinic, the employee should be placed in a private room for isolation where a health 
care provider can provide consultation and evaluation. 
• The health care provider should obtain a respiratory specimen (e.g. nasopharyngeal swab or aspirate) for viral culture. 
A rapid antigen test5 with the ability to differentiate between influenza A and B should be used for initial diagnosis, 
followed by virus isolation.  
 
5If laboratory capacity is available; RT-PCR should be used to rule out the suspected pathogen. 
 
• Based on: 1) the rapid test result (if influenza A positive), 2) the status of oseltamivir prophylaxis, and 3) the clinical 
evaluation, the health care provider should determine whether the patient will return to work, be sent home, or be sent 
to an infectious disease consultant. 
 
2. During working hours when the employee calls from home 
• The employee should notify the supervisor. The supervisor should discuss the situation with the appropriate health 
care personnel and determine where and by whom the employee will be evaluated and specimens for viral culture will 
be obtained. 
• The employee may come to an on-site clinic for evaluation or may elect to see a personal physician. If the employee 
chooses to see a personal physician, the on-site clinician should discuss with the personal physician the likelihood of 
alaboratory-acquired infection. The personal physician should be asked to collect specimens for antigen detection and 
viral culture. 
• An employee who is not sick enough to be admitted to a hospital should remain at home under the care of a personal 
physician, pending results from the viral culture. If influenza A (H3N2) or A (H1N1) is identified, the employee 
should be advised and can resume normal activities as soon as symptoms subside. 
• If avian influenza A (e.g., H5, H7, H9) is identified, the family and other contacts should be monitored for illness.6 
• Local public health officials should be notified about any confirmed avian influenza infections. 
 
3. After working hours 
• The employee should notify the supervisor. The supervisor should inform other persons as the situation dictates. 
• If the employee is acutely ill with symptoms consistent with influenza, the employee and/or supervisor should contact 
the appropriate health care provider for instructions. The health care provider should conduct the initial evaluation and 
patient management.  
• The supervisor should immediately ask the health care provider to collect specimens for rapid testing and viral culture. 
• The employee should follow the advice of the health care provider with regard to further evaluation/treatment. 
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Appendix 8 
 
Contact Information and Resources 
 
Contact Information 
Arizona State Public Health Laboratory 
250 North 17th Avenue 
Phoenix, AZ 85007 
Attn: Virology 
(602) 542-6134 
 
After-hours emergency contact: 
Laboratory Manager’s cell – (602) 283-6277 
 
Influenza:  Resources 
 
ADHS homepage for influenza 
http://www.azdhs.gov/flu
 
ADHS homepage for influenza pandemic preparedness 
http://www.azdhs.gov/pandemicflu   
 
CDC home page for influenza 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm
 
U.S. web site for pandemic flu & U.S. Pandemic Flu Plan and Preparedness Planning 
http://pandemicflu.gov/
 
W.H.O. home page for influenza (including avian influenza) 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/en/  
  
Promed (Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, International Society for Infectious)  
http://www.promedmail.org
 
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/oivd/tips/rapidflu.html
 
 
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), 4th ed 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm
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 I.   Rationale 
Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS), county and tribal health departments, hospitals, other healthcare 
facilities, healthcare providers, emergency responders, law enforcement and many others in the community must prepare 
and respond closely together if a local epidemic is to be detected and managed in a timely and effective manner.  Planning 
is a key factor in preparation for the State’s response to a pandemic.  Lessons learned from past influenza pandemics 
demonstrate that planning must take into account staffing, hospital surge capacities and capabilities, mass prophylaxis 
and/or vaccination, and disposition of remains. 
 
During a pandemic, there will be an increased burden affecting the entire healthcare system.  Facilities must be able to 
respond to day-to-day emergencies and care of their patients.  Additional planning is therefore needed to increase the 
ability of healthcare professionals and first responders to function during a greater demand of their services related to a 
pandemic when there is fewer staff to continue essential services. 
 
II. Overview 
Two key strategies compose the Arizona plan to respond to an influenza pandemic.  The aim of these strategies is to  
minimize the morbidity and mortality associated with the event. One strategy is containment which refers to preventing 
transmission and spread of the disease by implementing border control measures, isolation of the sick, quarantine of 
contacts (see Supplement 8), judicious use of antiviral medications (see Supplement 7) and maintenance of essential public 
health services.  If there is an explosive spread within the general population, containment may not be possible. The 
strategy will then shift to an emphasis on the maintenance of essential public health and healthcare services.  
 
The objectives of this supplement are to: 
1. Ensure adequate surveillance is in place to detect a novel influenza virus 
2.  Limit the spread of influenza through early containment measures to increase the amount of time available to 
implement preparedness measures. 
3. Limit morbidity and mortality during an influenza pandemic. 
4. Provide the public, health care workers, the media and other public health service providers with timely, factual and 
readily available information at all pandemic stages 
5. Address the stress on the healthcare system through early identification and use of additional resources. 
 
 
III.  Actions for the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
 
A.  Planning for Provisional Care in Hospitals 
 
1.  Planning Process 
 
The planning process for interpandemic and pandemic alert periods is a complicated process that involves all available public 
health and health care assets.  Arizona healthcare facilities must be capable of rapidly expanding services (surge capacities and 
capabilities) to meet interpandemic and pandemic influenza patient and public health needs.  ADHS/BEPR is charged with 
developing  a state healthcare coordination plan and assisting in the development of regional and county plans. There are other 
response plans in place that contain relevant information and should be used whenever possible.  Arizona Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Public Health Region Committees should assist in the development of pandemic response plans 
within their jurisdiction.  The planning process should include: 
1. Pre-existing plans and  papers from technical experts, procedures from WHO, HHS, and CDC, other State and local 
guidance should all be included in healthcare pandemic response plans. 
2. In accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP), all agencies should be using the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and should have plans to establish an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) using the 
Incident Command System (ICS) structure. 
3. Hospital planning is vital to the success of combating an influenza pandemic.  Surge capacity and capability should be 
planned for and should consider other hospital, region, county, state and other community based organizations. 
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 2.  Planning Elements 
 
a.  Hospital Surveillance 
 
Expanding influenza surveillance and epidemiological capacity at the local level is an important component of pandemic 
preparedness.  Local disease surveillance and on-site laboratory testing are an essential first step in preparedness and is 
important in helping ADHS to react quickly.  Hospital surveillance procedures are outlined in Supplement 1.  Laboratory 
procedures are located in Supplement 2. 
 
b.  Hospital Communications 
 
The role of the news media will be critical during a pandemic, 
however, healthcare information releases by hospitals, regions, 
and counties must be carefully coordinated with the ADHS to 
ensure the most accurate and consistent messages are provided 
and to prevent conflicting information.  The communication 
procedures for all levels or public health response during a 
pandemic are summarized in Supplement 10. 
1. Communications must be coordinated during pandemic 
operations so all elements of the public health response 
network operate as a single entity. 
2. Hospital, regional and county internal communications 
are an integral component to keep Administration and 
Public Information Officers informed as to the entity’s 
ability to meet the demands of the pandemic and still 
provide critical health care services to the community. 
 
c.  Education and Training 
 
Each hospital should develop an education and training plan that addresses the needs of staff, patients, family members and 
visitors. 
 
Staff Education: 
 Identify educational resources for clinicians, including federally sponsored teleconferences, state and local health 
department programs, web-based training materials, and locally prepared presentations. 
 General topics for staff education should include: 
• Prevention and control of influenza 
• Implications of pandemic influenza 
• Benefits of annual influenza vaccination 
• Role of antivirals 
• Infection control strategies 
      Education of patients, family members, and visitors 
•  Identify language-specific and reading-level appropriate materials 
• Develop a plan for distributing information to all persons who enter the hospital. Identify staff to answer 
questions about procedures for preventing influenza transmission. 
 
d.  Triage, Clinical Evaluation and admission procedures 
 
During the peak of a pandemic, hospital emergency departments, outpatient clinics and healthcare provider offices might be 
overwhelmed with patients seeking care.  Triage should be conducted to: 1) identify persons who might have pandemic 
influenza, 2) separate them from others to reduce the risk of disease transmission, and 3) identify the type of care they require 
(i.e., home care or hospitalization). These procedures are outlined in Supplement 5, Clinical Guidelines. 
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 e.  Facility Access 
 
Uncertainty, anxiety and ongoing stress will affect all segments of the population, which will place additional burdens on the 
health care system as well as individual and community recovery.  Service demand will be heavy as treatment facilities seek to 
triage and treat those affected, those who believe they are infected and "normal" non-influenza patient loads.  Hospitals must 
therefore restrict access, and if needed implement a lockdown to prevent unwanted infected people from entering the facility. 
 
1. Visitors should be limited to reduce the likelihood of pandemic influenza transmission among visitors, patients, and 
healthcare workers.  
2. Visitors should receive infection control training from hospital infection control departments (e.g., brochures, video) 
and comply with infection control measures.  
3. Symptomatic persons exposed to pandemic influenza patients should be excluded from visitation of patients that do 
not have the influenza. 
4. Transportation of the patients within the facility does not need to be restricted. Patient transportation requirements are 
listed in Supplement 4, Infection Control.  Disinfection of the transportation equipment as well as other potentially 
exposed surfaces and equipment must take place.  
5. Transportation outside of the facility may also be considered.  Additional precautions and disinfection will be 
necessary if the person is undergoing mechanical ventilation.  
 
f. Occupational Health 
 
Employee health programs should institute a strategy to monitor the health of staff 
and patients who are potentially exposed to the pandemic influenza strain.  
Employee health programs should: 
 
1. Develop an active education of all staff in hygiene precautions.  This 
includes proper hand washing procedures and techniques for donning 
gloves, P95 mask, gown and eyewear.  
2. Develop a plan to identify staff that may have acquired immunity to the 
pandemic influenza virus and might be deployed to high exposure areas. 
3. Prepare for dislocation of hospital workforce due to illness, death and 
absenteeism.     The hospital will be affected at all levels from, key 
administrative positions to essential service providers, including clerical 
and support staff.  Collateral organizational structures, backups and 
workarounds must be in place prior to the pandemic.  
4. Educate staff regarding the impact of a pandemic on the hospital and how it could influence their decision to continue 
to work in a potentially high risk environment. 
5. Ensure time off policies and procedures and consider staffing needs during periods of clinical crisis. 
6. Have mental health and faith-based resources identified as part of the hospital team to assist caregivers in the high 
stress environment during a pandemic. 
7. Implement procedures to screen staff for possible onset of symptoms. 
8. Anticipate the potential need to isolate staff working in high exposure areas such as the emergency department 
between shifts.  
9. Ensure hospital workers and their immediate families receive prophylaxis and/or vaccination as appropriate.  
 
g. Use and Administration of Vaccines and Antiviral Drugs. 
 
Vaccines and antiviral drugs will be in short supply early in a pandemic.  Prudent use will include holding the vaccines and 
antiviral drugs to ensure availability when they are required.  Information on vaccines is located in Supplement 6.  Procedures 
for antiviral medications can be found in Supplement 7. 
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 h. Surge Capacity  
 
The purpose of ADHS and Regional Hospital Surge Capacity and Capability Plans are to provide a framework for utilizing 
regional resources and capabilities to deliver hospital based care to the victims during a bioterrorism attack or pandemic. The 
secondary purpose of this plan to provide a framework that provides for the uninterrupted delivery of essential healthcare to the 
counties, tribal reservations and communities served by the hospitals in the region. These essential services include, but are not 
limited to trauma, surgical, critical care, cardiac, obstetric, pediatric and neonatal services. 
 
Surge capacities and capabilities are developed at ADHS/BEPR and Region levels.  Hospitals must develop their own surge 
capability and capacity plans.  These plans should consider both on and off campus surge requirements.  For additional 
information on surge capacity and capability hospitals should contact ADHS/BEPR. 
 
i. Security 
 
Healthcare facilities should plan for additional security.  This may be required given the increased demand for services and the 
possibility of long wait times for care, and because triage or treatment decisions may lead to people not receiving the level of 
care they think they require. 
 
j. Mortuary Issues 
 
To prepare for the possibility of mass fatalities during an influenza pandemic, hospitals should do the following: 
• Assess current capacity for refrigeration of deceased persons. 
• Discuss mass fatality plans with local and state health officials and medical examiners. 
• Work with local health officials and medical examiners to identify temporary morgue sites. 
• Determine the scope and volume of supplies (e.g. body bags) needed to handle an increased number of deceased 
persons. 
 
In-hospital post-mortem care is another issue that must be addressed and planned for during a pandemic.  
• Health care workers must follow standard precautions when caring for a patient with pandemic influenza who is 
deceased.  
• Full personal protective equipment (PPE) must be worn if the patient died during the infectious period (i.e. within 
7 days after resolution of fever in adults and 21 days after the onset of symptoms in children).  
• Transfer to the mortuary or funeral home should occur as soon as possible after death.  
• If the family wishes to view the body, they may be allowed to do so. If the patient died during the infectious 
period, the family should wear gloves and a gown.  
 
  
B. Planning for Provision of Care in Non-Hospital Settings 
 
Staff attrition will most likely force the closure of primary healthcare practices, smaller practices first, then larger practices, 
shifting demand for services to hospital emergency departments.  This process will disrupt normal patient services, leave most 
primary healthcare assets abandoned, and create great pressures on hospital emergency departments.  Understaffed skilled 
nursing facilities will face in-house outbreaks of influenza among fragile patients.  Home healthcare services will be critically 
challenged, leaving thousands of vulnerable clients stranded without services.  Some of these clients will manage with the help 
of family, friends, or neighbors, but others who require skilled nursing services may succumb to chronic illnesses or infection.  
With the elimination of primary healthcare practices, and nursing home degradation it will be necessary to develop outpatient 
call in lines and websites to ease the burden on emergency departments.  See also Supplement 8 and Supplement 10. 
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 1. Non-hospital Healthcare Facilities 
 
In a pandemic, those presenting with influenza-like-illness to hospital emergency departments should ideally be directed away 
from these facilities for diagnosis and triage wherever possible.  The intent is to reduce the transmission of influenza within 
facilities, an important consideration because they are 
closed settings with high-risk populations.  Also, hospitals 
will become overwhelmed with the additional demands 
brought on by a pandemic and patients should seek the 
appropriate level of care.  Community health centers and 
urgent care centers will be a critical resource for many 
patients.  In addition, separate sites for those presenting 
with symptoms or signs of influenza should be established 
away from primary care, emergency departments and 
hospitals.  These alternative (“non-traditional”) sites could 
be schools, gymnasiums, or other sites identified by 
ADHS for use during the pandemic.  See Appendix 1 - the 
Hospital Surge Capacity and Capability Planning Guide. 
 
 
2. Alternative care sites 
 
State, regional, and hospital plans include the ability to increase beds and services through surge capacity and capabilities.  
Alternate care sites may be located on campus (ideally) or off campus.  See the Hospital Surge Capacity and Capability 
Planning Guide for more information. 
 
 
IV.  Actions for the Pandemic Period 
 
A.  Activating the facility’s pandemic influenza response plan 
 
Following the initial detection of pandemic influenza anywhere in the world, ADHS will communicate the level of pandemic 
influenza response plan activation.  See Table 1 for hospital triggers based upon pandemic influenza periods. 
 
1. Pandemic Influenza Reported Outside the United States 
 
If cases of pandemic influenza have been reported outside the United States, the main steps will be to: 
• Establish contact with key public health, healthcare, and community partners. 
• Implement hospital surveillance for pandemic influenza, including detection of patients admitted for other reasons 
who might be infected with the pandemic strain of influenza virus. 
• Implement a system for early detection and antiviral treatment of healthcare workers who might be infected with the 
pandemic strain of influenza virus. 
• Reinforce infection control measures to prevent the spread of influenza (see Supplement 4). 
• Accelerate the training of staff, in accordance with the facility’s pandemic influenza education and training plan. 
 
 2. Pandemic influenza reported in the United States 
 
If cases of pandemic influenza have been reported in the United States, additional steps for healthcare facilities will be to: 
• Identify when pandemic influenza cases begin in the community. (See Supplement 1) 
• Identify, isolate, and treat all patients with potential pandemic influenza. See also Supplements 4, 5, and 8. 
• Implement activities to increase capacity, supplement staff shortages, and provide supplies and equipment. 
• Maintain close communication within and among healthcare facilities and with ADHS and local health departments. 
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Table 1.  Hospital Pandemic Influenza Triggers 
Pandemic Influenza Level Suggested Actions 
 
Inter-Pandemic Period 
 
 
 
• Conduct planning 
• Conduct education/training 
• Conduct hospital surveillance for influenza 
• (Supplement 1) 
 
Pandemic Alert Period 
• Increase preparation; refine local plan 
• Conduct hospital surveillance for influenza 
• (Supplement 1) 
 
 
Pandemic Period 
 
Pandemic influenza outside the United States 
 
 
• Establish contact with key public health, healthcare, 
and community partners. 
• Implement hospital surveillance for pandemic 
influenza (Supplement 1) in incoming patients and 
previously admitted patients. 
• Implement a system for early detection and treatment 
of healthcare personnel who might be infected with 
the pandemic strain of influenza. 
• Reinforce infection control procedures to prevent the 
spread of influenza     (Supplement 4). 
• Accelerate staff training in accordance with the 
facility’s pandemic influenza education and training 
plan. 
 
Pandemic Period 
 
Pandemic influenza in the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above, plus: 
• Implement activities to increase capacity, supplement 
staff, and provide supplies and equipment. 
• Maintain close contact with and among healthcare 
facilities and with state and local health departments. 
• Post signs for respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette. 
• Maintain high index of suspicion that patients 
presenting with influenzalike illness could be infected 
with pandemic strain. 
• If pandemic strain is detected in local patient, 
community transmission can be assumed and hospital 
would move to next level of response. 
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Table 1.  Hospital Pandemic Influenza Triggers – cont. 
 
 
Pandemic Period  
 
Pandemic influenza in the local area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above, plus; 
Emergency department (ED) 
• Establish segregated waiting areas for persons with 
symptoms of influenza. 
• Implement phone triage to discourage unnecessary 
ED/outpatient department visits. 
• Enforce respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette. 
Access controls 
• Limit number of visitors to those essential for patient 
support. 
• Screen all visitors at point of entry to facility for signs 
and symptoms of influenza. 
• Limit points of entry to facility; assign clinical staff to 
entry screening. 
Hospital admissions 
• Defer elective admissions and procedures until local 
epidemic wanes. 
• Discharge patients as soon as possible. 
• Cohort patients admitted with influenza. 
• Monitor for nosocomial transmission. 
Staffing practices 
• Consider furlough or reassignment of pregnant staff 
and other staff at high risk for complications of 
influenza. 
• Consider re-assigning non-essential staff to support 
critical hospital services or placing them on 
administrative leave; cohort staff caring for influenza 
patients. 
• Consider assigning staff recovering from influenza to 
care for influenza patients. 
• Implement system for detecting and reporting signs 
and symptoms of influenza in staff reporting for duty. 
• Provide staff with antiviral prophylaxis, according to 
HHS recommendations (See Supplement 7). 
 
               AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 8 Supp. 3:  Health Care Coordination & Surge Capacity  
 
  
Table 1.  Hospital Pandemic Influenza Triggers – cont. 
 
 
Pandemic Period  
 
Nosocomial transmission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Widespread transmission in community and hospital; 
patient admissions at surge capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• As above, plus, if nosocomial transmission is limited 
to only a small number of units in the facility: 
• Close units where there has been nosocomial 
transmission. 
• Cohort staff and patients. 
• Restrict new admissions (except for other pandemic 
influenza patients) to affected units. 
• Restrict visitors to the affected units to those who are 
essential for patient care and support. 
• See also Supplement 4. 
 
 
As above plus: 
• Redirect personnel resources to support patient care 
(e.g., administrative clinical staff, clinical staff 
working in departments that have been closed [e.g., 
physical/occupational therapy, cardiac 
catheterization]). 
• Recruit community volunteers (e.g., retired nurses 
and physicians, clinical staff working in outpatient 
settings). 
• Consider placing on administrative leave all non-
essential personnel who cannot be reassigned to 
support critical hospital services. 
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 Appendix 1 
Hospital Surge Capacity and Capability Planning Guide 
 
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES 
HOSPITAL SURGE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY PLANNING GUIDE 
(Developed and maintained by the Bureau of Emergency Preparedness and Response) 
 
I. GENERAL 
 
A. Purpose: The purpose of the Hospital Surge Capability and Capacity Plan is to provide a framework for applying 
federal, state, regional, and local resources and capabilities to deliver hospital based care during a large scale public health 
emergency.  A public health emergency may consist of victims from a chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, high 
yield explosive (CBRNE) event as well as a man made, natural disaster, or pandemic event.  The Arizona Department of 
Health Services (ADHS) will notify hospitals of any condition or situation requiring their potential or immediate response 
to a public health emergency. 
 
(1) Medical surge describes the ability to provide adequate medical evaluation and care during events that exceed the 
limits of the normal medical infrastructure of an effected community. 
 
(2) Capacity is the ability to evaluate and care for a markedly increased volume of patients that exceeds normal operating 
requirements. 
 
(3) Capability refers to the ability to manage patients requiring unusual or very specialized medical evaluation and care. 
 
B. Scope:   This document is intended to provide guidance for coordination of hospital response to public health emergencies 
that occur within the State of Arizona. 
 
C. Direction and Control: 
 
(1) Incident Command:  ADHS will use the Incident Command System (ICS) as outlined in the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and directed by the National Response Plan (NRP) to work with other agencies and 
organizations in a coordinated manner based on the size and scope of the public health emergency. 
 
(2) Hospitals:  Hospitals in Arizona will use the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) during a 
public health emergency. 
 
(3) Local Health Jurisdictions:  ADHS will support local jurisdictions and regions through the Health Emergency 
Operations Center (HEOC). 
 
(4) Emergency Management:  ADHS will coordinate with the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and local 
jurisdiction EOCs. 
 
D.  Activation and System Response: 
 
ADHS will alert hospital emergency departments, community health centers, tribal health centers, and ambulance 
companies of events according to the following 6 categories:   
MCI (Burn, Explosion, Chemical, Radiation, Trauma or Biological) 
•  Law Enforcement 
•  Evacuation 
•  Natural Disaster 
•  NDMS 
• Amber Alert 
Information regarding activation and system response will be communicated via the EMSystem.  ADHS may refer hospital 
personnel on the EMSystem to the Secure Integrated Response Electronic Notification (SIREN) for further detailed 
information. 
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 In addition, event information will be sent through the Health Alert Network (HAN) to hospital administration and 
emergency departments, infection control practitioners, physicians, nurse practitioners, community and tribal health 
centers, local health departments and other agencies via fax, e-mail and conference calls. 
 
II. SIX TIER SYSTEM 
 
The Arizona plan for regional hospital surge capacity is shown in Table 1 and is consistent with the Department of Health and 
Human Services 6 tier plan. 
 
A. Tier 1:  Hospital patient load has increased due to a local public health emergency or an influx of patients from another 
county, region, or state.  A Tier 1 event may not overwhelm a hospital or hospital system.  Hospital administration 
activates the hospital over-capacity plan. 
 
B. Tier 2:  A public health emergency occurs within Arizona or one of the surrounding states that requires more emergency 
department or inpatient hospital beds, or both, than available through a Tier 1 response.  The Governor of Arizona declares 
a state of emergency.  Hospital administration expands the number of emergency department or inpatient beds, or both, 
through the opening of centers on the hospital campus.  Hospitals activate mutual aid agreements.  Intra-region and ADHS 
coordination may be required. 
 
C. Tier 3:  A Tier 3 response to a major public health emergency event requires coordination and all available resources 
within the region as well as ADHS coordination of hospital and healthcare facility assets.  The Governor of Arizona 
declares a state of emergency.  A public health emergency that requires a Tier 3 response may instantaneously severely 
damage local infrastructure as the result of a natural disaster, or terrorist event.  The public health emergency also may be 
slow building such as a bioterrorism event or a pandemic that may come in several waves.  A public health emergency that 
requires a Tier 3 response ay be comprised of several Tier 2 events that together stress the regional healthcare system 
requiring Tier 3 planning to be implemented.  Healthcare facilities and systems must be prepared to implement drastic 
measures to save and preserve life.  A public health emergency requiring a Tier 3 response may impact on all the counties 
in a region. 
 
D. Tier 4:  A Tier 4 response is the consequence of a catastrophic event that totally overwhelms the local and region’s ability 
to respond.  ADHS provides intrastate coordination of hospital and healthcare facility assets.  The Governor of Arizona 
declares a state of emergency.   Additional federal aid or assistance from other states may or may not be available or 
required.  In most cases hospitals should not rely on external assistance for a minimum of 72 hours.  The victims of a 
public health emergency that requires a Tier 4 response, especially one of sudden onset, will fall into one of four categories 
in decreasing order of severity: (1) those immediately killed, (2) those destined to die regardless of any care received, (3) 
those whose survival depends on timely and appropriate medical care, (4) and those who will live even without medical 
attention.  A community response network considers off campus center sufficiency of care compared to hospital standard 
of care for diagnosis, treatment, and transfer policy and procedures. 
 
E. Tier 5:  A Tier 5 response is the process by which Arizona and other states assist one another and coordinate management 
and response activities during times of crisis. The Governor of Arizona declares a state of emergency.   Response efforts 
include all state agencies that oversee emergency management, public health, and public safety emergency preparedness 
and response. Collaborative efforts between Arizona and other states promote system-wide consistency in response 
strategies and ensure optimal utilization of available health and medical resources.  The basis for an effective regional 
response is an open exchange of information, incident management coordination, and mutual aid support.   The 
community response network considers off campus center sufficiency of care compared to hospital standard of care for 
diagnosis, treatment, and transfer policy and procedures. 
 
F.  Tier 6:  A Tier 6 response is a federally declared emergency or an Incident of National Significance under Emergency 
Support Function #8 of the National Response Plan (NRP).  The federal government may also authorize aid under the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The federal response is coordinated with Arizona’s 
response by the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) may also be 
mobilized to provide increased medical support.  During a pandemic the NDMS most likely will not be available because 
the teams consist of medical personnel from other states also involved in the pandemic.  The community response network 
considers off campus center sufficiency of care compared to hospital standard of care for diagnosis, treatment, and transfer 
policy and procedures. 
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Table 1.  Hospital Surge Capacity and Capability Plan (HSCCP) Tier system 
Mass Casualty/Fatality Incident 
Event Size Increased Large Scale Surge Capacity 
Extreme Surge 
Capacity 
Far above Surge 
Capacity Catastrophic Incident 
Arizona Governor Declaration of State of Emergency Presidential Declaration of State of Emergency.  
Conditions 
Localized 
incident 
resulting in 
patient load 
increase. 
Local hospitals 
activate mutual aid 
agreements.  Intra-
region and ADHS 
coordination may be 
required. 
Intra-region 
coordination 
required as mutual 
aid provided by other 
resources within the 
region.  ADHS 
coordination 
required to integrate 
hospital and 
healthcare assets with 
other response 
disciplines. 
Intrastate 
coordination and 
mutual aid provided 
by other regions in 
Arizona with ADHS 
coordination of 
hospital and 
healthcare assets. 
Interstate 
coordination and 
mutual aid 
provided by other 
states to support 
Arizona. 
Overwhelmed situation 
with federal assistance 
required. 
Surge Level Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5 Tier 6 
Resources 
Activation of 
hospital(s)  
over 
capacity 
plan(s). 
Activation of litter 
use to establish on-
campus centers. 
Coordination of 
tactical mutual aid 
between jurisdictions 
within the region.  All 
medical resources 
brought to areas of 
greatest need. State 
assets may be 
required by on-
campus centers.   
Full range of State 
health and medical 
resources are 
brought to bear.  
State assets 
required by off-
campus centers. 
Off campus center 
overflow.  Assets 
from other states 
required by off-
campus centers. 
Off campus center 
overflow.  DMAT, 
DMORT, NDMS 
support required. 
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 G. Conditions for Implementation: 
 
This plan will be implemented in response to a public health emergency resulting from terrorist action, natural disaster, or 
man-made catastrophe within the State of Arizona. 
 
H. Agencies that may be Assisting: 
 
(1) The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a section within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response Division, Operations Branch, and has the responsibility for 
managing and coordinating the Federal medical and mortuary affairs response to major emergencies and Federally 
declared disasters. 
 (a) Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) a group of medical and support personnel designed to provide 
emergency medical care during a disaster or other unusual event. Up to 3 DMATS can be deployed within 24 
hours to a disaster site. To supplement the standard DMATs, there are highly specialized DMATs that deal with 
specific medical conditions such as crush injury, burn, and mental health emergencies. 
 (b) The National Medical Response Team (NMRT) is a specialized response force designed to provide medical care 
following CBRNE incidents. This unit is capable of providing mass casualty decontamination, medical triage, 
primary and secondary care to stabilize victims for transport to tertiary care facilities in a HAZMAT environment.  
There are four NMRT's tasked to support the NDMS. 
 (c) Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT) are composed of funeral directors, medical examiners, 
coroners, pathologists, forensic anthropologists, medical records technicians and transcribers, finger print 
specialists, forensic odontologists, dental assistants, x-ray technicians, mental health specialists, computer 
professionals, administrative support staff, and security and investigative personnel to provide victim 
identification and mortuary services.  There is only one WMD DMORT that can process contaminated remains. 
(2) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) may provide response teams and laboratory support to the affected 
region. 
(3) The American Red Cross (ARC) and/or the Salvation Army, while not providing for healthcare, does provide for mass 
care assistance and support, when a disaster event exceeds the resources and capacity of state and local responders. 
(4) Department of Defense (DOD) has several units that may assist civilian authorities under the National Response Plan 
(NRP).  DOD medical assistance must be requested through the Principal Federal Agency charged with disaster relief 
subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense. 
(a)  Under the NRP, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers are required to provide disaster relief during a declared 
emergency or an incident of National Significance. 
 (b)  As directed by the President or the Secretary of defense, the United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) provides military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management 
operations. 
i. Natural Disaster Relief 
ii. Military assistance to civilian disaster organizations 
iii. Oil and hazardous substances incident and emergencies 
iv. Public health emergencies 
v. Technological and manmade disaster relief 
vi. CBRNE support including DOD’s incident management assistance for CBRNE events. 
 (c)  Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) plans and integrates DOD support to the designated Lead Federal 
Agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations.  When directed by the Commander of 
USNORTHCOM, JTF-CS will deploy to the incident site, establish command and control of designated DOD 
forces, and provide military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary 
critical life support. 
(5) Other Agencies as directed by the Federal Government under the activation of the NRP. 
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 I.   Hospital Assumptions: 
 
(1) The combined expertise and capabilities of government at all levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental 
organizations may be required to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a public health emergency. 
(2) Adequate staff may or may not be available at the hospital and local levels for providing healthcare during public 
health emergency in the State of Arizona. 
(3) The Governor, the Arizona State Public Health Officer, and ADHS staff will manage public health and medical 
support requirements. 
(4) Surge capacity may require a temporary redirection of personnel and financial resources from other programs. 
(5) In most cases, outside federal support will not begin to arrive into the public health emergency zone to assist hospitals 
for a minimum 72 hours into the incident. 
(6) Casualties may or may not be contaminated by a CBRNE or hazardous material. 
(7) The incident could involve CBRNE or other hazardous materials. 
(8) Biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may or may not be infectious (transmitted from human-to-human).   
If the pathogen (such as Bacillus anthraces) is not transmitted from human-to-human then the event will not spread 
and become an epidemic.   If the pathogenic event is an infectious biological agent such as smallpox (variola virus) 
then it may become an epidemic or even a pandemic.  
(a) The infectious disease outbreak may or may not be a natural event. 
(b) There may or may not be an outbreak even if the disease is spread person-to-person. 
(c) The first set of cases will be in one place (the origin of the exposure), however the secondary infection will spread 
will be to family members, workers, other people of casual (unknown contact), etc. of those contacting the 
primary set of cases.  The cases will become non-localized to place, however, time (incubation period) should be 
somewhat consistent (number of days after the initial exposure to the primary individuals). 
 (d) There is a chance of the outbreak becoming an epidemic even proceeding to pandemic level. 
 (9)  Hospitals normally request patient remains be retrieved by local funeral homes; however, the local funeral homes may 
or may not accept the remains.  Hospitals may or may not have to store remains until the Arizona Mass Fatality 
Response Plan can be implemented or the local Medical Examiner can find cold storage. 
 
III. MISSION: 
 
A. Planning Factors: 
 
(1) Planning factors for support of the hospital efforts following an ADHS declared public health emergency must 
consider available commercial resources as well as local and state assets. 
(2) Availability of assets and facilities at, or close to hospitals during the public health emergency.  These planning 
factors should include: 
 (a) Transportation, to include commercial, federal, state, county, city, and tribal systems may be needed for, 
evacuation, patient movement, and rapid transport of vital medical supplies from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) airhead, or other logistics support centers. 
 (b) Security measures required to protect the hospital and to deliver medical supplies. 
 (c) Capabilities of the county or region and other privately owned agencies to expand response or increase in Tier 
response as the situation dictates. 
 
 
IV. EXECUTION: 
 
ADHS may receive a request for assistance from federal, state, county, and local agencies.  The request may be for assistance 
within Arizona, to assist a neighboring state, or to augment federal support to another state, tribal government or U.S. 
Territory.  ADHS will issue alerts, notices and bulletins to hospitals, local health departments, and other healthcare providers as 
required by the situation. 
 
Key tasks that hospital administration will need to address through Tier 1 through Tier 6 depending on the public health 
emergency and impact on the hospital community are listed below. 
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 A. Key Tasks: Planning and Coordination: 
 
 (1)  Activate HEICS and open the hospital command center.  
 (2)  Implement surveillance procedures as determined by the local health department and ADHS. 
 (3)  Use mutual aid agreements with other hospitals and health care agencies for additional medical supplies and 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, personnel, and transfer arrangements. 
 (4)  Arrange for delivery of essential goods and services, specifically, regular and disposable linen, hospital beds, 
additional food for patients and staff, portable negative air machines and HEPA filters, potable water and water 
purification equipment, and diesel fuel for the emergency generator. 
 (5)  Implement policy and procedures for patient registration and tracking, and routing and maintenance of medical 
record documentation when receiving a large influx of patients.  
 (6)  Coordinate with school nurses and school-based clinics, long term care facilities, home health agencies, mental 
health facilities, and urgent care centers. 
 (7)  Identify special patient population requirements and advise local health departments of available equipment and 
shortages. The special patient population includes elderly, pediatric, pregnant women, physically disabled, and 
behavioral health patients. 
(8)  Manage safe disposal of increased volume of medical waste. 
(9)  Manage unsolicited donated items. 
(10)   Increase hospital morgue capacity with alternate storage locations; coordinate fatality management with the local 
Medical Examiner with legal jurisdiction 
(11)  Coordinate communications between the hospital Public Information Officer (PIO) and the Joint Information Center 
(JIC). 
 (12)  Initiate recovery plan for financial and medical records, information systems, and restoration of supply inventory, 
including tracking of all expenditures caused by the event. 
(13)   Initiate plan for clean up, salvage, garbage and waste disposal, equipment and physical plant restoration. 
 
B. Key Tasks: Communication systems 
 
(1)   Implement procedures for receiving and distributing notifications, alerts, and activations from state and local 
agencies. 
  (a)  EMSystem 
  (b)  Health Alert Network (HAN) including the Secure Integrated Response Electronic Notification (SIREN) 
 (2)  Use redundant communication systems according to established procedures if    landlines, fax machines, cellular 
phones, and paging systems are inoperable. 
 (a)  Emergency Medical Systems Communications (EMSCOM) 
 (b)  800 MHz radio system 
 (c)  RACES 
 (d)  Satellite telephones 
 (e)  Satellite intranet 
 (f)  Telemedicine network 
(3)  Use automated system for group notification of a potential disaster 
(4)  Establish a long term waiting area for patients’ families with access to information and counseling services. 
(5)  Obtain translators and deaf interpreters. 
(6)  Manage increased volume of telephone calls to hospital switchboard; confirm procedures for release of information 
and referral to external agencies. 
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 C. Key Tasks: Security  
 
(1)  Determine need for total lockdown of hospital and notification of local law enforcement. 
(2)  Establish communication with individuals immediately outside established perimeter if hospital is in total lockdown. 
(3)  Provide staff access to hospital during lockdown separate from emergency department and decontamination activity 
(4)   Establish control of access and egress if lockdown not indicated by the event. 
(5)   Confirm control of internal access to the emergency department, inpatient areas and support departments within 
hospital. 
(6)   Confirm control of access to outdoor air intakes and mechanical rooms. 
(7)   Provide onsite capability to produce photo identification for all staff including physicians and supplemental personnel. 
(8)   Verify need to augment hospital security, especially if local law enforcement unavailable, and obtain additional 
security personnel if needed. 
(9)   Establish crowd control on hospital campus. 
(10) Establish routing of traffic to triage and decontamination areas. 
 
D.  Key Tasks: Personnel 
 
(1)   Determine current staffing capability and additional requirements for increased volume and acuity of patients.  
Additional staffing needs may be for a short duration for a CBRNE event and long term up to two months or more 
during a pandemic event. 
(2)  Provide credentialing and supervision of clinicians not normally working in the hospital (physicians, registered nurses, 
pharmacists, respiratory therapists). 
(3)   Use agreements with educational institutions to obtain personnel, both faculty and   students. 
(4)  Manage unsolicited offers of help from undocumented clinicians. 
(5)  Implement the preparedness plan for families of staff. 
(6)   Provide housing and feeding of staff unable to leave the hospital. 
(7)   Develop a staffing plan to afford staff time off to allow a return to normal family routine if staff over worked for long 
periods. 
 
E.  Key Tasks: Decontamination and use of personal protective equipment  
 
(1) Decontamination 
(a)  Authorize implementation of decontamination procedures. 
(b)  Maintain patient privacy during decontamination process. 
(c)  Provide sufficient space for processing and triage of patients. 
(d)  Provide security for patients and staff during decontamination process. 
(e)  Monitor procedures according to the hospital decontamination plan. 
(f)  Monitor hot and cold water supply, especially for special population patients. 
(g)  Establish emergency power and lighting at the decontamination site if required. 
(h)  Provide radiation monitors at the decontamination site. 
(i)  Establish and monitor effluent (runoff) collection procedures. 
(j)  Track contaminated and decontaminated patients through the process. 
(k)   Establish procedures for collection of personal effects and clothing according to law enforcement requirements if 
the public health emergency is determined to be a crime scene. 
(l)   Establish procedures for managing law enforcement weapons during the decontamination process. 
(m)  Provide decontamination procedures for special population patients, specifically, pediatric, pregnant, elderly, 
chronically ill, and disabled patients. 
 (n)  Provide decontamination procedures for animals and pets.  Local Animal Control, Humane Society, and animal 
shelter assistance may be required for animal restraint and or decontamination assistance. 
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(2) Determine PPE requirements: 
(a)  Initiate hospital policy and procedures for use of PPE (Level C, N95 and surgical masks), storage, and preventive 
maintenance. 
(b)  Obtain access to documentation of training and fit testing during an event. 
 
F.  Key Tasks:  Pharmaceutical: 
 
(1)   Conduct inventory of medications of choice and alternate medications to obtain a minimum supply for 3 days 
prophylaxis for designated employees and their families.  Report inventory and shortages in medications and 
administration supplies to the local health department. 
(2)   Implement dispensing of prophylaxis and vaccination procedures as indicated by the event to staff and their families. 
(3)  Receive and distribute medications and administration supplies from other sources, including the Strategic National 
Stockpile. 
 (4)  Initiate protocols for dispensing of drugs to asymptomatic and symptomatic patients as well as prophylaxis to patient 
family members. 
 
G.  Key Tasks: Hospital laboratory: 
 
(1)  Comply with special protocols and packaging for sampling CBRNE as directed by the   State Laboratory. 
(2)  Alert the Arizona State Laboratory if samples are being sent and method of transportation. 
(3)  Manage clinical specimens if laboratory is contaminated or overwhelmed by a large influx of patients.  
 
H.  Key Tasks:  Patient Transfer 
 
(1)  Implement patient triage, transfer, and discharge procedures to create open beds. 
(2)   Implement arrangements to transport patients to other healthcare facilities and initiate tracking procedures. 
(3)   Distribute instructions for home care specific to the agent or event during a public health emergency in case large 
numbers of patients are unable to be admitted due to resource limitations. 
 (4)  Initiate plan for processing prescriptions for discharged patients. 
 (5)  Implement procedures to evacuate the hospital in a disaster. 
 (6)  Plan for medical evacuation of patients to out of state locations. 
 (7)  Plan for receiving patients that have been sent to hospitals out of region or out of Arizona. 
 
  
I.  Key Tasks:  Alternate Care Site 
 
(1)  Work with county, region, and state agencies to open an off campus center, obtaining: medical, nursing, and ancillary 
staff, security personnel, medical record  and patient tracking systems, equipment and supplies, medical waste pickup, 
pharmaceuticals and facility maintenance. 
 (2)  Prepare to receive patients arriving at the center, possibly by alternate methods of transportation (busses, vans, etc.)   
Confirm location for ease of transferring patients. 
(3)  Communicate with other hospitals and first responders regarding patient transfers once security is in place at each 
facility. 
 (4)  Implement plan to incorporate DMATs and DMORTS into system of hospital and off campus centers in coordination 
with county, region, and ADHS. 
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I.  Rationale  
The primary strategies for preventing pandemic influenza are the same as those for seasonal influenza: vaccination, early 
detection and treatment with antiviral medications (as discussed elsewhere in this plan), and the use of infection control 
measures to prevent transmission during patient care. However, when a pandemic begins, a vaccine may not yet be widely 
available, and the supply of antiviral drugs may be limited. The ability to limit transmission in health care settings will, 
therefore, rely heavily on the appropriate and thorough application of infection control measures. While it is commonly 
accepted that influenza transmission requires close contact—via exposure to large droplets (droplet transmission), direct 
contact (contact transmission), or near-range exposure to aerosols (airborne transmission)—the relative clinical importance of 
each of these modes of transmission is not known. 
  
II.  Overview 
Supplement 4 provides guidance to health care and public health 
partners on basic principles of infection control for limiting the 
spread of pandemic influenza. These principles (summarized in 
Box 1) are common to the prevention of other infectious agents 
spread by respiratory droplets. Supplement 4 also includes 
guidance on the selection and use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE); hand hygiene and safe work practices; 
cleaning and disinfection of environmental surfaces; handling of 
laboratory specimens; and post-mortem care. The guidance also 
covers infection control practices related to the management of 
infectious patients, the protection of persons at high-risk for 
severe influenza or its complications, and issues concerning 
occupational health.  
Supplement 4 also provides guidance on how to adapt infection control practices in specific health care settings, including 
hospitals, nursing homes and other long-term care facilities, pre-hospital care (emergency medical services [EMS]), medical 
offices and other ambulatory care settings, and during the provision of professional home health care services. The section on 
hospital care covers detection of entering patients who may be infected with pandemic influenza; implementation of source-
control measures to limit virus dissemination from respiratory secretions; hospitalization of pandemic influenza patients; and 
detection and control of nosocomial transmission.  
In addition, Supplement 4 includes guidance on infection control procedures for pandemic influenza patients in the home or in 
alternative care sites that may be established if local hospital capacity is overwhelmed by a pandemic. Finally, it includes 
recommendations on infection control in schools, workplaces, and community settings.  
Supplement 4 does not address the use of vaccines and antivirals in the control of influenza transmission in health care settings 
and the community. These issues are addressed in Supplements 6 and 7, respectively.  
1 
Eye protection is recommended when working with conjunctivitis-inducing avian influenza viruses  
 
III.  Recommendations for Infection Control In Health care Settings 
The recommendations for infection control described below are generally applicable throughout the different pandemic phases. In some 
cases, as indicated, recommendations may be modified as the situation progresses from limited cases to widespread community illness. 
A. Basic infection control principles for preventing the spread of pandemic influenza in health care settings 
  
The following infection control principles apply in any setting where persons with pandemic influenza might seek and receive 
health care services (e.g. hospitals, emergency departments, out-patient facilities, residential care facilities, homes). Details of 
how these principles may be applied in each health care setting follow.  
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Limit contact between infected and non-infected persons
2 
 
• Isolate infected persons (i.e., confine patients to a defined area as appropriate for the health care setting). 
• Limit contact between nonessential personnel and other persons (e.g., social visitors) and patients who are ill 
with pandemic influenza. 
• Promote spatial separation in common areas (i.e., sit or stand as far away as possible—at least 3 feet—from 
potentially infectious persons) to limit contact between symptomatic and non-symptomatic persons. 
  
Protect persons caring for influenza patients in health care settings from contact with the pandemic influenza virus.  
Persons who must be in contact should:  
• Wear a surgical or procedure mask3 for close contact with infectious patients.  
• Use contact and airborne precautions, including the use of N95 respirators, when appropriate (e.g., during 
aerosol generating procedures).  
• Wear gloves (gown if necessary) for contact with respiratory secretions.  
• Perform hand hygiene after contact with infectious patients. 
  
Contain infectious respiratory secretions:  
• Instruct persons who have “flu-like” symptoms (see below) to use respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (See 
Box 2).  
• Promote use of masks4 by symptomatic persons in common areas (e.g., waiting rooms in physician offices or 
emergency departments) or when being transported (e.g., in emergency vehicles).  
 
Symptoms of influenza include fever, headache, myalgia, prostration, coryza, sore throat, and cough. Otitis media, nausea, 
and vomiting are also commonly reported among children. Typical influenza (or “flu-like”) symptoms, such as fever, may not 
always be present in elderly patients, young children, patients in long-term care facilities, or persons with underlying chronic 
illnesses  
 
2 
During the early stages of a pandemic, laboratory-confirmation of influenza infection is recommended when possible.  
3 
Surgical masks come in two basic types: one type is affixed to the head with two ties, conforms to the face with the aid of a flexible adjustment for the nose 
bridge, and may be flat/pleated or duck-billed in shape; the second type of surgical mask is pre-molded, adheres to the head with a single elastic and has a 
flexible adjustment for the nose bridge. Procedure masks are flat/pleated and affix to the head with ear loops. All masks have some degree of fluid resistance 
but those approved as surgical masks must meet specified standards for protection from penetration of blood and body fluids.  
4 
Coughing persons may wear either a surgical or procedure mask. However, only procedure masks come in both adult and pediatric sizes.  
 
 
B. Management of infectious patients  
 
1. Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette  
Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette has been promoted as a strategy to 
contain respiratory viruses at the source and to limit their spread in 
areas where infectious patients might be awaiting medical care (e.g., 
physician offices, emergency departments). 
The impact of covering sneezes and coughs and/or placing a mask on a 
coughing patient on the containment of respiratory secretions or on the 
transmission of respiratory infections has not been systematically 
studied. In theory, however, any measure that limits the dispersal of 
respiratory droplets should reduce the opportunity for transmission. 
Masking may be difficult in some settings, e.g., pediatrics, in which 
case the emphasis will be on cough hygiene. 
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The elements of respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette include:  
• Education of health care facility staff, patients, and visitors on the importance of containing respiratory 
secretions to help prevent the transmission of influenza and other respiratory viruses  
• Posted signs in languages appropriate to the populations served with instructions to patients and 
accompanying family members or friends to immediately report symptoms of a respiratory infection as 
directed  
• Source control measures (e.g., covering the mouth/nose with a tissue when coughing and disposing of used 
tissues; using masks on the coughing person when they can be tolerated and are appropriate)  
• Hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions, and  
• Spatial separation, ideally >3 feet, of persons with respiratory infections in common waiting areas when 
possible.  
 
2. Droplet precautions and patient placement  
Patients with known or suspected pandemic influenza should be placed on droplet precautions for a minimum of 5 days from 
the onset of symptoms. Because children and immunocompromised patients may shed virus for longer periods, they may be 
placed on droplet precautions for the duration of their illness. Health care personnel should wear appropriate PPE. The 
placement of patients will vary depending on the health care setting (see setting-specific guidance).  If the pandemic virus is 
associated with diarrhea, contact precautions (i.e., gowns and gloves for all patient contact) should be added. CDC will update 
these recommendations if changes occur in the anticipated pattern of transmission (www.cdc.gov/flu).  
 
C. Infection control practices for health care personnel  
Infection control practices for pandemic influenza are the same as for other human influenza viruses and primarily involve the 
application of standard and droplet precautions (Box 1) during patient care in health care settings (e.g., hospitals, nursing 
homes, outpatient offices, emergency transport vehicles). This guidance also applies to health care personnel going into the 
homes of patients. During a pandemic, conditions that could affect infection control may include shortages of antiviral drugs, 
decreased efficacy of the vaccine, increased virulence of the influenza strain, shortages of single-patient rooms, and shortages 
of personal protective equipment. These issues may necessitate changes in the standard recommended infection control 
practices for influenza. CDC will provide updated infection control guidance as circumstances dictate. Additional guidance is 
provided for family members providing home care and for use in public settings (e.g., schools, workplace) where people with 
pandemic influenza may be encountered.  
 
1. Personal protective equipment  
a) PPE for standard and droplet precautions  
PPE is used to prevent direct contact with the pandemic influenza virus. 
PPE that may be used to provide care includes surgical or procedure masks, 
as recommended for droplet precautions, and gloves and gowns, as 
recommended for standard precautions (Box 1). Additional precautions may 
be indicated during the performance of aerosol-generating procedures (see 
below). Information on the selection and use of PPE is provided at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_isolation.html.  
Masks (surgical or procedure)  
• Wear a mask when entering a patient’s room. A mask 
should be worn once and then discarded. If pandemic influenza patients are cohorted in a common area or in 
several rooms on a nursing unit, and multiple patients must be visited over a short time, it may be practical to 
wear one mask for the duration of the activity; however, other PPE (e.g., gloves, gown) must be removed 
between patients and hand hygiene performed.  
• Change masks when they become moist.  
• Do not leave masks dangling around the neck.  
• Upon touching or discarding a used mask, perform hand hygiene. 
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Gloves  
• A single pair of patient care gloves should be worn for contact with blood and body fluids, including during 
hand contact with respiratory secretions (e.g., providing oral care, handling soiled tissues). Gloves made of 
latex, vinyl, nitrile, or other synthetic materials are appropriate for this purpose; if possible, latex-free gloves 
should be available for health care workers who have latex allergy.  
• Gloves should fit comfortably on the wearer’s hands.  
• Remove and dispose of gloves after use on a patient; do not wash gloves for subsequent reuse. 
• Perform hand hygiene after glove removal.  
• If gloves are in short supply (i.e., the demand during a pandemic could exceed the supply), priorities for 
glove use might need to be established. In this circumstance, reserve gloves for situations where there is a 
likelihood of extensive patient or environmental contact with blood or body fluids, including during 
suctioning.  
• Use other barriers (e.g., disposable paper towels, paper napkins) when there is only limited contact with a 
patient’s respiratory secretions (e.g., to handle used tissues). Hand hygiene should be strongly reinforced in 
this situation. 
  
Gowns  
• Wear an isolation gown, if soiling of personal clothes or uniform with a patient’s blood or body fluids, 
including respiratory secretions, is anticipated. Most patient interactions do not necessitate the use of 
gowns. However, procedures such as intubation and activities that involve holding the patient close (e.g., in 
pediatric settings) are examples of when a gown may be needed when caring for pandemic influenza patients.  
• A disposable gown made of synthetic fiber or a washable cloth gown may be used.  
• Ensure that gowns are of the appropriate size to fully cover the area to be protected.  
• Gowns should be worn only once and then placed in a waste or laundry receptacle, as appropriate, and hand 
hygiene performed. If gowns are in short supply (i.e., the demand during a pandemic could exceed the 
supply) priorities for their use may need to be established. In this circumstance, reinforcing the situations in 
which they are needed can reduce the volume used. Alternatively, other coverings (e.g., patient gowns) could 
be used. It is doubtful that disposable aprons would provide the desired protection in the circumstances where 
gowns are needed to prevent contact with influenza virus, therefore should be avoided. There are no data 
upon which to base a recommendation for reusing an isolation gown on the same patient. To avoid possible 
contamination, it is prudent to limit this practice. 
  
Goggles or face shield  
In general, wearing goggles or a face shield for routine contact with 
patients with pandemic influenza is not necessary. If sprays or splatter 
of infectious material is likely, goggles or a face shield should be worn 
as recommended for standard precautions. Additional information 
related to the use of eye protection for infection control can be found at 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/eye/eye-infectious.html.  
b) PPE for special circumstances  
• PPE for aerosol-generating procedures  
During procedures that may generate increased small-particle aerosols 
of respiratory secretions (e.g., endotracheal intubation, nebulizer 
treatment, bronchoscopy, suctioning), health care personnel should 
wear gloves, gown, face/eye protection, and a N95 respirator or other 
appropriate particulate respirator. Respirators should be used within the 
context of a respiratory protection program that includes fit-testing, 
medical clearance, and training. If possible, and when practical, use of 
an airborne isolation room may be considered when conducting 
aerosol-generating procedures.  
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• PPE for managing pandemic influenza with increased transmissibility  
The addition of airborne precautions, including respiratory protection (an N95 filtering face piece respirator or other 
appropriate particulate respirator), may be considered for strains of influenza exhibiting increased transmissibility, 
during initial stages of an outbreak of an emerging or novel strain of influenza, and as determined by other factors such 
as vaccination/immune status of personnel and availability of antivirals. As the epidemiologic characteristics of the 
pandemic virus are more clearly defined, CDC will provide updated infection control guidance, as needed.  
• Precautions for early stages of a pandemic  
Early in a pandemic, it may not be clear that a patient with severe respiratory illness has pandemic influenza. Therefore 
precautions consistent with all possible etiologies, including a newly emerging infectious agent, should be implemented. 
This may involve the combined use of airborne and contact precautions, in addition to standard precautions, until a 
diagnosis is established.  
c) Caring for patients with pandemic influenza  
Health care personnel should be particularly vigilant to avoid:  
• Touching their eyes, nose or mouth with contaminated hands (gloved or ungloved). Careful placement of PPE before 
patient contact will help avoid the need to make PPE adjustments and risk self-contamination during use. Careful 
removal of PPE is also important. (See also: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/ppe.html.)  
• Contaminating environmental surfaces that are not directly related to patient care (e.g., door knobs, light switches)  
 
2. Hand hygiene  
Hand hygiene is the single most important practice to reduce the transmission of 
infectious agents in health care settings and is an essential element of standard 
precautions. The term “hand hygiene” includes both hand washing with either plain 
or antimicrobial soap and water and use of alcohol-based products (gels, rinses, 
foams) containing an emollient that do not require the use of water.  
• If hands are visibly soiled or contaminated with respiratory secretions, wash 
hands with soap (either non-antimicrobial or antimicrobial) and water.  
• In the absence of visible soiling of hands, approved alcohol-based products 
for hand disinfection are preferred over antimicrobial or plain soap and 
water because of their superior microbiocidal activity, reduced drying of the 
skin, and convenience.  
• Always perform hand hygiene between patient contacts and after removing 
PPE.  
• Ensure that resources to facilitate handwashing (i.e., sinks with warm and 
cold running water, plain or antimicrobial soap, disposable paper towels) 
and hand disinfection (i.e., alcohol-based products) are readily accessible in 
areas in which patient care is provided.  For additional guidance on hand 
hygiene see http://www.cdc.gov/handhygiene/.  
 
3. Disposal of solid waste  
Standard precautions are recommended for disposal of solid waste (medical and non-medical) that might be contaminated with 
a pandemic influenza virus:  
• Contain and dispose of contaminated medical waste in accordance with facility-specific procedures and/or 
local or state regulations for handling and disposal of medical waste, including used needles and other sharps, 
and non-medical waste.  
• Discard as routine waste used patient-care supplies that are not likely to be contaminated (e.g., paper 
wrappers).  
• Wear disposable gloves when handling waste. Perform hand hygiene after removal of gloves.  
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4. Linen and laundry 
Standard precautions are recommended for linen and laundry that might be contaminated with respiratory secretions from 
patients with pandemic influenza:  
• Place soiled linen directly into a laundry bag in the patient’s room. Contain linen in a manner that prevents 
the linen bag from opening or bursting during transport and while in the soiled linen holding area.  
• Wear gloves and gown when directly handling soiled linen and laundry (e.g., bedding, towels, personal 
clothing) as per standard precautions. Do not shake or otherwise handle soiled linen and laundry in a manner 
that might create an opportunity for disease transmission or contamination of the environment.  
• Wear gloves for transporting bagged linen and laundry.  
• Perform hand hygiene after removing gloves that have been in contact with soiled linen and laundry.  
• Wash and dry linen according to routine standards and procedures 
(http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/guidelines/Enviro_guide_03.pdf).  
 
5. Dishes and eating utensils  
Standard precautions are recommended for handling dishes and eating utensils used by a patient with known or possible 
pandemic influenza:  
• Wash reusable dishes and utensils in a dishwasher with recommended water temperature 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/guidelines/Enviro_guide_03.pdf 
• Disposable dishes and utensils (e.g., used in an alternative care site set-up for large numbers of patients) 
should be discarded with other general waste. 
• Wear gloves when handling patient trays, dishes, and utensils.  
 
6. Patient-care equipment  
Follow standard practices for handling and reprocessing used patient-care equipment, including medical devices:  
• Wear gloves when handling and transporting used patient-care equipment. 
• Wipe heavily soiled equipment with an EPA-approved hospital disinfectant before removing it from the 
patient’s room. Follow current recommendations for cleaning and disinfection or sterilization of reusable 
patient-care equipment.  
• Wipe external surfaces of portable equipment for performing x-rays and other procedures in the patient’s 
room with an EPA-approved hospital disinfectant upon removal from the patient’s room.  
 
7. Environmental cleaning and disinfection  
Cleaning and disinfection of environmental surfaces are important components of routine infection control in health care 
facilities. Environmental cleaning and disinfection for pandemic influenza follow the same general principles used in health 
care settings.  
a) Cleaning and disinfection of patient-occupied rooms  
(See: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/guidelines/Enviro_guide_03.pdf) 
• Wear gloves in accordance with facility policies for environmental cleaning and wear a surgical or procedure mask in 
accordance with droplet precautions. Gowns are not necessary for routine cleaning of an influenza patient’s room.  
• Keep areas around the patient free of unnecessary supplies and equipment to facilitate daily cleaning.  
• Use any EPA-registered hospital detergent-disinfectant. Follow manufacturer’s recommendations for-use dilution 
(i.e., concentration), contact time, and care in handling.  
• Follow facility procedures for regular cleaning of patient-occupied rooms. Give special attention to frequently touched 
surfaces (e.g., bedrails, bedside and over-bed tables, TV controls, call buttons, telephones, lavatory surfaces including 
safety/pull-up bars, doorknobs, commodes, ventilator surfaces) in addition to floors and other horizontal surfaces.  
• Clean and disinfect spills of blood and body fluids in accordance with current recommendations for Isolation 
Precautions (http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_isolation.html ).  
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b) Cleaning and disinfection after patient discharge or transfer  
• Follow standard facility procedures for post-discharge cleaning of an isolation room.  
• Clean and disinfect all surfaces that were in contact with the patient or might have become contaminated during 
patient care. No special treatment is necessary for window curtains, ceilings, and walls unless there is evidence of 
visible soiling.  
• Do not spray (i.e., fog) occupied or unoccupied rooms with disinfectant. This is a potentially dangerous practice that 
has no proven disease control benefit.  
 
8. Postmortem care  
Follow standard facility practices for care of the deceased. Practices should include 
standard precautions for contact with blood and body fluids. 
9. Laboratory specimens and practices  
Follow standard facility and laboratory practices for the collection, handling, and 
processing of laboratory specimens. 
 
D. Occupational health issues 
Health care personnel are at risk for pandemic influenza through community and health 
care-related exposures. Once pandemic influenza has reached a community, health care 
facilities must implement systems to monitor for illness in the facility workforce and 
manage those who are symptomatic or ill.  
• Implement a system to educate personnel about occupational health issues 
related to pandemic influenza.  
• Screen all personnel for influenza-like symptoms before they come on duty. 
Symptomatic personnel should be sent home until they are physically ready to 
return to duty.  
• Health care personnel who have recovered from pandemic influenza, and 
should develop antibody against future infection with the same virus, and 
therefore should be prioritized for the care of patients with active pandemic influenza and its complications. These 
workers would also be well suited to care for patients who are at risk for serious complications from influenza (e.g., 
transplant patients and neonates).  
• Personnel who are at high risk for complications of pandemic influenza (e.g., pregnant women, immunocompromised 
persons) should be informed about their medical risk and offered an alternate work assignment, away from influenza-
patient care, or considered for administrative leave until pandemic influenza has abated in the community.  
 
E. Reducing exposure of persons at high risk for complications of influenza 
  
Persons who are well, but at high risk for influenza or its complications (e.g., persons with underlying diseases), should be 
instructed to avoid unnecessary contact with health care facilities caring for pandemic influenza patients (i.e., do not visit 
patients, postpone nonessential medical care).  
F. Health care setting-specific guidance 
 
All health care facilities should follow the infection control guidance above. The following guidance is intended to address 
setting-specific infection control issues that should also be considered. 
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1. Hospitals 
a) Detection of persons entering the facility who may have pandemic influenza  
• Post visual alerts (in appropriate languages) at the entrance to hospital outpatient facilities (e.g., emergency 
departments, outpatient clinics) instructing persons with respiratory symptoms (e.g., patients, persons who accompany 
them) to:  
o Inform reception and health care personnel when they first register for care, and  
o Practice respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette. Sample visual alerts are available at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/germstopper/materials.htm and http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/covercough.htm 
• Triage patients calling for medical appointments for influenza symptoms:  
o Discourage unnecessary visits to medical facilities.  
o Instruct symptomatic patients on infection control measures to limit transmission in the home and when 
traveling to necessary medical appointments.  
 
As the scope of the pandemic escalates locally, consider setting up a separate triage area for persons presenting with symptoms 
of respiratory infection. Because not every patient presenting with symptoms will have pandemic influenza, infection control 
measures will be important in preventing further spread.  
• During the peak of a pandemic, emergency departments and outpatient offices may be overwhelmed with patients 
seeking care. A “triage officer” may be useful for managing patient flow, including deferral of patients who do not 
require emergency care.  
• Designate separate waiting areas for patients with influenza-like symptoms. If this is not feasible, the waiting area 
should be set up to enable patients with respiratory symptoms to sit as far away as possible (at least 3 feet) from other 
patients.  
 
b) “Source control” measures to limit dissemination of influenza virus from respiratory secretions  
• Post signs that promote respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette in common areas (e.g., elevators, waiting areas, cafeterias, 
lavatories) where they can serve as reminders to all persons in the health 
care facility. Signs should instruct persons to:  
o Cover the nose/mouth when coughing or sneezing.  
o Use tissues to contain respiratory secretions.  
o Dispose of tissues in the nearest waste receptacle after use.  
o Perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions. 
Samples of visual alerts are available at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/covercough.htm 
• Facilitate adherence to respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette by ensuring the availability of materials in waiting areas 
for patients and visitors.  
o Provide tissues and no-touch receptacles (e.g., waste containers with pedal-operated lid or uncovered waste 
container) for used tissue disposal.  
o Provide conveniently located dispensers of alcohol-based hand rub.  
o Provide soap and disposable towels for hand washing where sinks are available.  
• Promote the use of masks and spatial separation by persons with symptoms of influenza.  
o Offer and encourage the use of either procedure masks (i.e., with ear loops) or surgical masks (i.e., with ties 
or elastic) by symptomatic persons to limit dispersal of respiratory droplets.  
o Encourage coughing persons to sit as far away as possible (at least 3 feet) from other persons in common 
waiting areas.  
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c) Hospitalization of pandemic influenza patients  
Patient placement  
• Limit admission of influenza patients to those with severe 
complications of influenza who cannot be cared for outside the 
hospital setting.  
o Admit patients to either a single-patient room or an area 
designated for cohorting of patients with influenza.  
• Cohorting  
o Designated units or areas of a facility should be used for 
cohorting patients with pandemic influenza.5
  
During a 
pandemic, other respiratory viruses (e.g., non-pandemic 
influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, parainfluenza virus) may be circulating concurrently in a community. 
Therefore, to prevent cross-transmission of respiratory viruses, whenever possible assign only patients with 
confirmed pandemic influenza to the same room. At the height of a pandemic, laboratory testing to confirm 
pandemic influenza is likely to be limited, in which case cohorting should be based on having symptoms 
consistent with pandemic influenza.  
o Personnel (clinical and non-clinical) assigned to cohorted patient care units for pandemic influenza patients 
should not “float” or otherwise be assigned to other patient care areas. The number of personnel entering the 
cohorted area should be limited to those necessary for patient care and support.  
o Personnel assigned to cohorted patient care units should be aware that patients with pandemic influenza may 
be concurrently infected or colonized with other pathogenic organisms (e.g., Staphylococcus aureus, 
Clostridium difficile) and should adhere to infection control practices (e.g., hand hygiene, changing gloves 
between patient contact) used routinely, and as part of standard precautions, to prevent nosocomial 
transmission  
o Because of the high patient volume anticipated during a pandemic, cohorting should be implemented early in 
the course of a local outbreak.  
Patient transport  
• Limit patient movement and transport outside the isolation area to medically necessary purposes. 
• Consider having portable x-ray equipment available in areas designated for cohorting influenza patients.  
• If transport or movement is necessary, ensure that the patient wears a surgical or procedure mask. If a mask cannot be 
tolerated (e.g., due to the patient’s age or deteriorating respiratory status), apply the most practical measures to contain 
respiratory secretions. Patients should perform hand hygiene before leaving the room.  
Visitors  
• Screen visitors for signs and symptoms of influenza before entry into the facility and exclude persons who are 
symptomatic.  
• Family members who accompany patients with influenza-like illness to the hospital are assumed to have been exposed 
to influenza and should wear masks.  
• Limit visitors to persons who are necessary for the patient’s emotional well-being and care.  
• Instruct visitors to wear surgical or procedure masks while in the patient’s room.  
• Instruct visitors on hand-hygiene practices.  
Pediatrics 
• Place pediatric patients in droplet precautions for the duration of illness 
• Consider gowns for health care workers caring for infants in their arms.  Aprons would not provide sufficient 
protection 
 
5 
During the early stages of a pandemic, laboratory-confirmation of influenza infection is recommended when possible before cohorting patients.  
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d) Control of nosocomial pandemic influenza transmission  
• Once patients with pandemic influenza are admitted to the hospital, nosocomial surveillance should be heightened for 
evidence of transmission to other patients and health care personnel. (Once pandemic influenza is firmly established in 
a community this may not be feasible or necessary.)  
• If limited nosocomial transmission is detected (e.g., has occurred on one or two patient care units), appropriate control 
measures should be implemented. These may include:  
o Cohorting of patients and staff on affected units  
o Restriction of new admissions (except for other pandemic influenza patients) to the affected unit(s)  
o Restriction of visitors to the affected unit(s) to those who are essential for patient care and support  
• If widespread nosocomial transmission occurs, controls may need to be implemented hospital wide and might include:  
o Restricting all nonessential persons  
o Stopping admissions not related to pandemic influenza and stopping elective surgeries  
 
2. Nursing homes and other residential facilities  
Residents of nursing homes and other residential facilities will be at particular risk for transmission of pandemic influenza and 
disease complications. Pandemic influenza can be introduced through facility personnel and visitors; once a pandemic 
influenza virus enters such facilities, controlling its spread is problematic. Therefore, as soon as pandemic influenza has been 
detected in the region, nursing homes and other residential facilities should implement aggressive measures to prevent 
introduction of the virus.  
 
a) Prevention or delay of pandemic influenza virus entry into the facility  
Control of visitors  
• Post visual alerts (in appropriate languages) at the entrance to the facility 
restricting entry by persons who have been exposed to or have symptoms of 
pandemic influenza.  
• Enforce visitor restrictions by assigning personnel to verbally and visually screen 
visitors for respiratory symptoms at points of entry to the facility.  
• Provide a telephone number where persons can call for information on measures 
used to prevent the introduction of pandemic influenza.  
• Control of personnel  
• Implement a system to screen all personnel for influenza-like symptoms before 
they come on duty. 
• Symptomatic personnel should be sent home until they are physically able to 
return to duty.  
 
b) Monitoring patients for pandemic influenza and instituting appropriate control measures  
Despite aggressive efforts to prevent the introduction of pandemic influenza virus, persons in the early stages of pandemic 
influenza could introduce it to the facility. Residents returning from a hospital stay, outpatient visit, or family visit could also 
introduce the virus. Early detection of the presence of pandemic influenza in a facility is critical for ensuring timely 
implementation of infection control measures.  
• Early in the progress of a pandemic in the region, increase resident surveillance for influenza-like symptoms. Notify 
state or local health department officials if a case(s) is suspected.  
• If symptoms of pandemic influenza are apparent, implement droplet precautions for the resident and roommates, 
pending confirmation of pandemic influenza virus infection. Patients and roommates should not be separated or 
moved out of their rooms unless medically necessary. Once a patient has been diagnosed with pandemic influenza, 
roommates should be treated as exposed cohorts.  
• Cohort residents and staff on units with known or suspected cases of pandemic influenza.  
• Limit movement within the facility (e.g., temporarily close the dining room and serve meals on nursing units, cancel 
social and recreational activities).  
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3. Pre-hospital care (emergency medical services)  
Patients with severe pandemic influenza or disease complications are likely to require emergency transport to the hospital. The 
following information is designed to protect EMS personnel during transport.  
• Screen patients requiring emergency transport for symptoms of influenza.  
• Follow standard and droplet precautions when transporting symptomatic patients.  
• Consider routine use of surgical or procedure masks for all patient transport when pandemic influenza is in the 
community.  
• If possible, place a procedure or surgical mask on the patient to contain droplets expelled during coughing. If this is 
not possible (i.e., would further compromise respiratory status, difficult for the patient to wear), have the patient cover 
the mouth/nose with tissue when coughing, or use the most practical alternative to contain respiratory secretions.  
• Oxygen delivery with a non-rebreather face mask can be used to provide oxygen support during transport. If needed, 
positive-pressure ventilation should be performed using a resuscitation bag-valve mask.  
• Unless medically necessary to support life, aerosol-generating procedures (e.g., mechanical ventilation) should be 
avoided during prehospital care.  
• Optimize the vehicle’s ventilation to increase the volume of air exchange during transport. When possible, use 
vehicles that have separate driver and patient compartments that can provide separate ventilation to each area.  
• Notify the receiving facility that a patient with possible pandemic influenza is being transported.  
• Follow standard operating procedures for routine cleaning of the emergency vehicle and reusable patient care 
equipment.  
 
4. Home health care services  
Home health care includes health and rehabilitative services performed in the home by providers including home health 
agencies, hospices, durable medical equipment providers, home infusion therapy services, and personal care and support 
services staff. The scope of services ranges from assistance with activities of daily living and physical and occupational therapy 
to wound care, infusion therapy, and chronic ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD). Communication between home health 
care providers and patients or their family members is essential for ensuring that these personnel are appropriately protected.  
When pandemic influenza is in the community, home health agencies should consider contacting patients before the home visit 
to determine whether persons in the household have an influenza-like illness.  
• If patients with pandemic influenza are in the home, consider:  
o Postponing nonessential services  
o Assigning providers who are not at increased risk for complications of pandemic influenza to care for these 
patients  
o Home health care providers who enter homes where there is a person with an influenza-like illness should 
follow the recommendations for standard and droplet precautions described above. Professional judgment 
should be used in determining whether to don a surgical or procedure mask upon entry into the home or only 
for patient interactions. Factors to consider include the possibility that others in the household may be 
infectious and the extent to which the patient is ambulating within the home.  
 
5. Outpatient medical offices  
Patients with non-emergency symptoms of an influenza-like illness may seek care from their medical provider. Implementation 
of infection control measures when these patients present for care will help prevent exposure among other patients and clinical 
and non-clinical office staff.  
a) Detection of patients with possible pandemic influenza  
• Post visual alerts (in appropriate languages) at the entrance to outpatient offices instructing persons with respiratory 
symptoms (e.g., patients, persons who accompany them) to:  
o Inform reception and health care personnel when they first register for care  
o Practice respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (see 
ww.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/resphygiene.htm) Sample visual alerts may be found on 
CDC’s SARS website: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/covercough.htm   
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• Triage patients calling for medical appointments for influenza symptoms:  
o Discourage unnecessary visits to medical facilities.  
o Instruct symptomatic patients on infection control measures to limit transmission in the home and when 
traveling to necessary medical appointments.  
 
b) “Source control” measures 
• Post signs that promote cough etiquette in common areas (e.g., elevators, waiting areas, cafeterias, lavatories) where 
they can serve as reminders to all persons in the health care facility. Signs should instruct persons to:  
o Cover the nose/mouth when coughing or sneezing.  
o Use tissues to contain respiratory secretions.  
o Dispose of tissues in the nearest waste receptacle after use.  
o Perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions.  
• Facilitate adherence to respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette. Ensure the availability of materials in waiting areas 
 for patients and visitors.  
o Provide tissues and no-touch receptacles (e.g., waste containers with pedal-operated lid or uncovered waste 
container) for used tissue disposal.  
o Provide conveniently located dispensers of alcohol-based hand rub.  
o Provide soap and disposable towels for hand washing where sinks are available.  
• Promote the use of procedure or surgical masks and spatial separation by persons with symptoms of influenza.  
o Offer and encourage the use of either procedure masks (i.e., with ear loops) or surgical masks (i.e., with ties 
or elastic) by symptomatic persons to limit dispersal of respiratory droplets.  
o Encourage coughing persons to sit at least 3 feet away from other persons in common waiting areas.  
 
c) Patient placement 
• Where possible, designate separate waiting areas for patients with 
symptoms of pandemic influenza. Place signs indicating the 
separate waiting areas.  
• Place symptomatic patients in an evaluation room as soon as 
possible to limit their time in common waiting areas.  
6. Other ambulatory settings 
A wide variety of ambulatory settings provide chronic (e.g., hemodialysis 
units) and episodic (e.g., freestanding surgery centers, dental offices) 
health care services. When pandemic influenza is in the region, these 
facilities should implement control measures similar to those 
recommended for outpatient physician offices. Other infection control 
strategies that may be utilized include:  
• Screening patients for influenza-like illness by phone or before 
coming into the facility and rescheduling appointments for those whose care is non-emergency  
• Canceling all non-emergency services when there is pandemic influenza in the community  
 
G. Care of pandemic influenza patients in the home 
 
Most patients with pandemic influenza will be able to remain at home during the course of their illness and can be cared for by 
other family members or others who live in the household. Anyone residing in a household with an influenza patient during the 
incubation period and illness is at risk for developing influenza. A key objective in this setting is to limit transmission of 
pandemic influenza within and outside the home. When care is provided by a household member, basic infection control 
precautions should be emphasized (e.g., segregating the ill patient, hand hygiene). Infection within the household may be 
minimized if a primary caregiver is designated, ideally someone who does not have an underlying condition that places them at 
increased risk of severe influenza disease. Although no studies have assessed the use of masks at home to decrease the spread 
of infection, use of surgical or procedure masks by the patient and/or caregiver during interactions may be of benefit. 
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1. Management of influenza patients  
• Physically separate the patient with influenza from non-ill persons living in the home as much as possible.  
• Patients should not leave the home during the period when they are most likely to be infectious to others (i.e., 5 days 
after onset of symptoms). When movement outside the home is necessary (e.g., for medical care), the patient should 
follow cough etiquette (i.e., cover the mouth and nose when coughing and sneezing) and wear procedure or surgical 
masks if available. 
  
2. Management of other persons in the home  
• Persons who have not been exposed to pandemic influenza and who are not essential for patient care or support should 
not enter the home while persons are actively ill with pandemic influenza.  
• If unexposed persons must enter the home, they should avoid close contact with the patient.  
• Persons living in the home with the pandemic influenza patient should limit contact with the patient to the extent 
possible; consider designating one person as the primary care provider.  
• Household members should monitor closely for the development of influenza symptoms and contact a telephone 
hotline or medical care provider if symptoms occur. 
  
3. Infection control measures in the home  
• All persons in the household should carefully follow recommendations for hand hygiene (i.e., handwashing with soap 
and water or use of an alcohol-based hand rub) after contact with an influenza patient or the environment in which 
care is provided.  
• Although no studies have assessed the use of masks at home to decrease the spread of infection, use of surgical or 
procedure masks by the patient and/or caregiver during interactions may be of benefit. The wearing of gloves and 
gowns is not recommended for household members providing care in the home. 
• Soiled dishes and eating utensils should be washed either in a dishwasher or by hand with warm water and soap.  
Separation of eating utensils for use by a patient with influenza is not necessary.  
• Laundry can be washed in a standard washing machine with warm or cold water and detergent. It is not necessary to 
separate soiled linen and laundry used by a patient with influenza from other household laundry.  Care should be used 
when handling soiled laundry (i.e., avoid “hugging” the laundry) to avoid contamination.  Hand hygiene should be 
performed after handling soiled laundry.  
• Tissues used by the ill patient should be placed in a bag and disposed with other household waste. Consider placing a 
bag for this purpose at the bedside.  
• Normal cleaning of environmental surfaces in the home should be followed.  
 
 
H. Care of pandemic influenza patients at alternative sites 
 
If an influenza pandemic results in severe illness that overwhelms the capacity of existing health care resources, it may become 
necessary to provide care at alternative sites (e.g., schools, auditoriums, conference centers, hotels). Existing “all-hazard” plans 
have likely identified designated sites for this purpose. The same principles of infection control apply in these settings as in 
other health care settings. Careful planning is necessary to ensure that resources are available and procedures are in place to 
adhere to the key principles of infection control.  
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IV.  Recommendations for Infection Control in Schools and Workplaces 
• In schools and workplaces, infection control for pandemic influenza should focus on:  
o Keeping sick students, faculty, and workers away while they are infectious.  
o Promoting respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette and hand hygiene as for any respiratory infection.  
• The benefit of wearing masks in these settings has not been established. 
• School administrators and employers should ensure that materials for respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (i.e., tissues 
and receptacles for their disposal) and hand hygiene are available. Educational messages and infection control 
guidance for pandemic influenza are available for distribution.  
 
 
V.  Recommendations for Infection Control in Community 
Settings 
Infection control in the community should focus on “social distancing” and 
promoting respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette and hand hygiene to decrease 
exposure to others. This could include the use of masks by persons with 
respiratory symptoms, if feasible. Although the use of masks in community 
settings has not been demonstrated to be a public health measure to decrease 
infections during a community outbreak, persons may choose to wear a mask as 
part of individual protection strategies that include cough etiquette, hand hygiene, 
and avoiding public gatherings. Mask use may also be important for persons who 
are at high risk for complications of influenza. Public education should be 
provided on how to use masks appropriately. Persons at high risk for 
complications of influenza should try to avoid public gatherings (e.g., movies, 
religious services, public meetings) when pandemic influenza is in the community. 
They should also avoid going to other public areas (e.g., food stores, pharmacies); 
the use of other persons for shopping or home delivery service is encouraged.  
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Box 1.  Summary of infection control recommendations for care of patients with  
  pandemic influenza 
COMPONENT  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Standard Precautions 
 
See http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_isolation_standard.html 
Hand Hygiene Perform hand hygiene after touching blood, body fluids, secretions, 
excretions, and contaminated items; after removing gloves; and between 
patient contacts.  Hand hygiene includes both handwashing with either 
plain or antimicrobial soap and water or use of alcohol-based products 
(gels, rinse, foams) that contain an emollient and do not require the use of 
water.  If hands are visibly soiled or contaminated with respiratory 
secretions, they should be washed with soap (either non-antimicrobial or 
antimicrobial) and water.  In the absence of visible soiling of hands, 
approved alcohol-based products for hand disinfection are preferred over 
antimicrobial or plain soap and water because of their superior 
microbicidal activity, reduced drying of the skin, and convenience. 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
 Gloves 
 
 
 Gown 
 
 
 Face/eye protection (e.g., 
surgical or procedure mask and 
goggles or a face shield) 
 
For touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, and contaminated 
items; for touching mucous membranes and nonintact skin 
During procedures and patient-care activities when contact of 
clothing/exposed skin with blood/body fluids, secretions, and excretions 
is anticipated 
During procedures and patient care activities likely to generate splash or 
spray of blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions 
Safe Work Practices Avoid touching eyes, nose, mouth, or exposed skin with contaminated 
hands (gloved or ungloved), avoid touching surfaces with contaminated 
gloves and other PPE that are not directly related to patient care (e.g., 
door knobs, keys, light switches). 
Patient Resuscitation Avoid unnecessary mouth-to-mouth contact, use mouthpiece, 
resuscitation bag, or other ventilation devices to prevent contact with 
mouth and oral secretions. 
Soiled Patient Care Equipment Handle in a manner that prevents transfer of microorganisms to oneself, 
other and environmental surfaces, wear gloves if visibly contaminated: 
perform hand hygiene after handling equipment. 
Soiled Linen and Laundry Handle in a manner that prevents transfer of microorganisms to oneself, 
others, and to environmental surfaces; wear gloves (gown if necessary) 
when handling and transporting soiled linen and laundry; and perform 
hand hygiene. 
Needles and other Sharps Use devices with safety features when available; do not recap, bend, 
break or hand–manipulate used needles; if recapping is necessary, use a 
one-handed scoop technique, place used sharps in a puncture-resistant 
container. 
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Box 1.  Summary of infection control recommendations for care of patients with  
  pandemic influenza (cont.) 
COMPONENT  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Standard Precautions (cont’d) 
 
See http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_isolation_standard.html 
Environmental Cleaning & Disinfection Use EPA-registered hospital detergent-disinfectant: follow 
standard facility procedures for cleaning and disinfection of 
environmental surfaces, emphasize cleaning/disinfection of frequently 
touched surfaces (e.g., bed rail, phones, lavatory surfaces). 
Disposal of Solid Waste Contain and dispose of solid waste (medical and non-medical) in 
accordance with facility procedures and/or local or state regulations, wear 
gloves when handling waste, wear gloves when handling containers, 
perform hand hygiene. 
Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette 
Source control measures for persons 
with symptoms of a respiratory 
infection; implement at first point of 
encounter (e.g., triage/reception areas) 
within a health care setting 
Cover the mouth/nose when sneezing/coughing; use tissues and dispose 
in no-touch receptacles; perform hand hygiene after contact with 
respiratory secretions; wear a  mask (procedure or surgical) if tolerated; 
sit or stand as far away as possible (more than 3 feet) from persons who 
are not ill. 
Droplet Precautions See http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_isolation_droplet.html 
Patient Placement Place patients with influenza in a private room or cohort with other 
patients with influenza.*  Keep door closed or slightly ajar; maintain 
room assignments of patients in nursing homes and other residential 
settings; and apply droplet precautions to all persons in the room. 
 
*During the early stages of a pandemic, infection with influenza should 
be laboratory-confirmed, if possible. 
Personal Protective Equipment Wear a surgical or procedure mask for entry into patient room, wear 
other PPE as recommended for standard precautions. 
Patient Transport Limit patient movement outside of room to medically necessary 
purposes, have patient wear a procedure or surgical mask when outside 
the room. 
Other Follow standard precautions and facility procedures for handling linen, 
laundry, dishes and eating utensils, and for cleaning/disinfection of 
environmental surfaces and patient care equipment, disposal of solid 
waste, and postmortem care. 
Aerosol-Generating Procedures During procedures that may generate small particles of respiratory 
secretions (e.g., endotracheal intubation, bronchoscopy, nebulizer 
treatment, suctioning), health care personnel should wear gloves, gown, 
face/eye protection, and a fit-tested N95 respirator or other appropriate 
particulate respirator. 
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Box 2. Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette  
 
To contain respiratory secretions, all persons with signs and symptoms of a respiratory infection, regardless 
of presumed cause, should be instructed to:  
. • Cover the nose/mouth when coughing or sneezing.  
. • Use tissues to contain respiratory secretions.  
. • Dispose of tissues in the nearest waste receptacle after use.  
. • Perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions and contaminated objects/materials.  
 
Health care facilities should ensure the availability of materials for adhering to respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette 
in waiting areas for patients and visitors:  
. • Provide tissues and no-touch receptacles for used tissue disposal.  
. • Provide conveniently located dispensers of alcohol-based hand rub.  
 • Provide soap and disposable towels for handwashing where sinks are available.  
Masking and separation of persons with symptoms of respiratory infection  
During periods of increased respiratory infection in the community, persons who are coughing should be offered 
either a procedure mask (i.e., with ear loops) or a surgical mask (i.e., with ties) to contain respiratory secretions. 
Coughing persons should be encouraged to sit as far away as possible (at least 3 feet) from others in common 
waiting areas. Some facilities may wish to institute this recommendation year-round. 
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 Summary of Public Health Roles and Responsibilities for Clinical Guidelines 
Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
Health care providers: 
• Be aware of case definitions 
• Know procedures for influenza screening and laboratory testing 
• Know appropriate infection control measures 
• Know appropriate antiviral regimens for influenza A (H5N1) and other novel viruses 
• Notify health departments about suspected or confirmed novel influenza cases and fatalities 
• Collect and forward specimens to designated state and federal laboratories for the diagnosis of novel influenza strains 
 
ADHS and local health department: 
• Help educate health care providers about interpandemic (i.e. “normal” influenza) as well as novel and pandemic 
influenza 
• Provide or facilitate testing and investigation of suspected novel influenza cases 
• Conduct follow-up of suspected novel influenza cases 
 
HHS agencies: 
• Develop and disseminate recommendations on the use of influenza 
diagnostic tests, antiviral drugs, and vaccines during an influenza 
pandemic  
• Develop a national stockpile of antiviral drugs for use during a pandemic 
• Work with state and local health departments to investigate and manage 
suspected cases of human infection with avian influenza A (H5N1) or 
other novel strains of influenza 
• Establish case definition and reporting mechanisms.  
 
Pandemic Period  
Health care providers: 
• Regularly review updates on case definitions, screening, laboratory 
testing, and treatment algorithms for pandemic influenza 
• Follow recommendations on antiviral use from federal, state, and local health agencies 
• Choose antiviral treatment appropriate for circulating influenza strains 
• When antiviral supplies are limited, prescribe antivirals for persons in priority groups where the need and benefit are 
the greatest 
• Report pandemic influenza cases or fatalities as requested by health departments 
• Collect and forward specimens for ongoing pandemic influenza surveillance as requested to designated state and 
federal laboratories  
• Report atypical cases, breakthrough infections while on prophylaxis, or any other abnormal cases throughout the 
duration of the pandemic to public health agencies 
 
ADHS and local health departments:  
• Update providers regularly as the influenza pandemic unfolds as to clinical management and treatment issues 
• Provide or facilitate testing and investigation of pandemic influenza cases 
• Accelerate training on the appropriate use of antivirals among public health staff and health care partners 
• Work with health care partners to activate state-based plans for distributing and administering antivirals to persons in 
priority groups 
• Review and modify as needed recommendations for prioritization of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis 
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 • Work with CDC to investigate and report special pandemic situations 
• Work with other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to ensure effective public health 
communications 
 
HHS responsibilities: 
• Update and disseminate national guidelines on influenza diagnostic testing and use of antiviral drugs and vaccines 
during the pandemic 
• Develop a pandemic influenza vaccine 
• Work with health care partners to refine clinical management guidelines and issue regular updates on treatment issues 
• Conduct studies to investigate pandemic influenza pathogenesis 
• Monitor pandemic influenza cases for antiviral resistance 
• Monitor antiviral drug use and inventories 
• Collect information on clinical features, outcomes, and treatments 
 
 
I.  Rationale 
Health care providers play an essential role in the detection of an initial case of novel or pandemic influenza in a community. 
Early identification and isolation of cases may help slow the spread of influenza. Clinical awareness of novel or pandemic 
influenza disease can also benefit the individual patient, as rapid initiation of treatment can avert potentially severe 
complications.    
 
Currently there is a lack of specific clinical findings and commercially available laboratory tests to rapidly distinguish novel or 
pandemic influenza from seasonal influenza. In addition, it is difficult ahead of time to fully predict the clinical characteristics 
of a novel or pandemic influenza virus strain or the groups at highest risk for complications. 
 
However, clinical management of patients during pandemic influenza will follow many of the same principles of patient care in 
cases of interpandemic (i.e. “normal”) seasonal strains of influenza.  Health care workers will need to know 1) the symptoms of 
an influenza-like illness, 2) the strains that are circulating in the community,  3) the appropriate tests to diagnose influenza, 4) 
the appropriate infection control precautions, 5) how to select the correct antiviral medicine, 6) the side effects of the antiviral 
medicines, and 7) how to prescribe antivirals for prophylaxis (see Supplement 7). 
 
Additional difficulties in managing pandemic influenza include 1) differentiating seasonal strains of influenza from pandemic 
strains, 2) deciding which antiviral medicine would be most appropriate to use, and 3) selecting the populations that would 
benefit most from antivirals in the face of great demands for a limited supply of antivirals. 
The management of influenza is based primarily on sound clinical judgment regarding the individual patient as well as the 
availability of local resources, such as rapid diagnostic tests, antiviral drugs, and hospital beds.   Health care providers who are 
well trained in managing seasonal influenza will be better able to effectively diagnose and care for patients with pandemic 
influenza. 
 
II. Overview 
Supplement 5 focuses on the initial screening, assessment, and management of patients who present from the community with 
fever and/or respiratory symptoms during the Interpandemic, Pandemic Alert, and Pandemic Periods (Box 1 defines these 
periods).   Boxes, figures, tables, and appendices are incorporated from the November 2005 HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan 
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf ). 
 
The Appendices add additional information on the clinical presentation and complications of influenza, the clinical features of 
human infection with avian influenza A (H5N1), and management of secondary bacterial pneumonia during a pandemic.   The 
appendices also contain Clinician Fact Sheets from the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) about Influenza and 
Antivirals, as well as a respiratory etiquette poster. 
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 During the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods, 
early recognition of illness caused by a novel influenza A 
virus strain will rely on a combination of clinical and 
epidemiologic features. 
 
During periods in which no human infections with a 
novel influenza A virus strain have occurred anywhere in 
the world (Interpandemic Period, phases 1 or 2), or when 
sporadic cases of animal-to-human transmission or rare 
instances of limited human-to-human transmission of a 
novel influenza A virus strain have occurred in the world 
(Pandemic Alert Period, phases 3 or 4), the risk to 
travelers is low.  
 
Therefore, when a traveler who is returning from an 
affected area and develops severe respiratory disease or 
an influenza-like illness, the likelihood of novel influenza 
A virus infection is very low.  In this situation, the possibility of infection with human influenza viruses in returning travelers 
is much higher and should be considered, since human influenza A and B viruses circulate worldwide among humans year-
round. 
 
However, once local person-to-person transmission of a novel influenza A virus strain has been confirmed (Pandemic Alert 
Period: Phase 5), the potential for novel influenza A virus infection will be higher in an ill person who has a strong 
epidemiologic link to the affected area. 
 
During the Pandemic Period (in a setting of high community prevalence), diagnosis will be more clinically oriented because 
the likelihood will be high that any severe febrile respiratory illness is pandemic influenza. 
 
This Clinical Guidance supplement is current as of January 2006, and is subject to change as experience is gained. Updates will 
be provided, as needed, on the Arizona Department of Health Services website (www.azdhs.gov) and the CDC website 
(www.cdc.gov/flu/). 
 
Other supplements in the pandemic plan that cover topics of potential interest to clinicians are: 
Supplement 1:  Surveillance and Epidemiology 
Supplement 2:  Laboratory Diagnostics 
Supplement 3:  health Care Coordination and Surge Capacity 
Supplement 4:  Infection Control 
Supplement 6:  Vaccine Distribution and Use 
Supplement 7:  Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use 
 
 
III. Clinical guidelines for the interpandemic and pandemic alert periods 
During Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods, the primary goal is to quickly identify and contain cases of novel influenza. 
To limit evaluating an overwhelming number of patients, screening criteria should rely on a combination of clinical and 
epidemiologic features.  
 
Febrile respiratory illnesses are one of the most common reasons for medical evaluation during the winter.  Therefore, during 
the interpandemic and pandemic alert period, febrile illnesses caused by novel influenza strains are expected to be rare.  
Laboratory testing should be done for those with severe respiratory illness, such as pneumonia. The main features of case 
detection and clinical management during the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods are outlined in Figure 1. 
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 A.  Criteria for evaluation of patients with possible novel influenza 
During the Pandemic Alert Period, human infections with novel influenza A 
viruses will be uncommon.   Therefore, both clinical and epidemiologic 
criteria should be met. The criteria will be updated as needed and posted at 
www.cdc.gov/flu. 
 
1.  Clinical criteria 
Any suspected cases of human infection with a novel influenza virus must meet 
the criteria for influenza-like illness (ILI):  temperature of >38°C plus one of 
the following:  sore throat, cough, or dyspnea.  
 
Because of the large number of influenza-like during a typical influenza season, 
during the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods laboratory evaluation for 
novel influenza A viruses is recommended only for: 
a) Hospitalized patients with severe ILI, including pneumonia, who meet 
the epidemiologic criteria (see below), or  
b) Non-hospitalized patients with ILI and with strong epidemiologic suspicion of novel influenza virus exposure (e.g., 
direct contact with ill poultry in an affected area, or close contact with a known or suspected human case of novel 
influenza.).  
 
Recommendations for the evaluation of patients with respiratory illnesses are provided in Box 2.  Exceptions to the current 
clinical criteria are provided in Box 3.  
 
2.  Epidemiologic criteria 
Epidemiologic criteria for evaluation of patients with possible novel influenza focus on the risk of exposure to a novel 
influenza virus with pandemic potential. Although the incubation period for seasonal influenza ranges from 1 to 4 days, the 
incubation periods for novel types of influenza are currently unknown and might be longer. Therefore, the maximum interval 
between potential exposure and symptom onset is set conservatively at 10 days.  
 
Exposure risks — Exposure risks fall into two categories: a) travel and b) occupational. 
a)  Travel risks:  Persons have a travel risk if they have:  
1) recently visited or lived in an area affected by highly pathogenic avian influenza A outbreaks in domestic poultry or 
where a human case of novel influenza has been confirmed, and  
2) either had direct contact with poultry, or  
3) had close contact with a person with confirmed or suspected novel influenza. Updated listings of areas affected by 
avian influenza A (H5N1) and other current/recent novel strains are provided on the websites of the OIE ( 
http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm), WHO (www.who.int/en/), and CDC (www.cdc.gov/flu/). 
 
Direct contact with poultry is defined as: 1) touching birds (well-appearing, sick, or dead), or 2) touching poultry feces or 
surfaces contaminated with feces, or 3) consuming uncooked poultry products (including blood) in an affected area. Close 
contact with a person from an infected area with confirmed or suspected novel influenza is defined as being within 3 feet (1 
meter) of that person during their illness.  Because specific testing for human infection with avian influenza A (H5N1) might 
not be locally available in an affected area, persons reporting close contact in an affected area with a person suffering from a 
severe, yet unexplained, respiratory illness should also be evaluated. 
 
Human influenza viruses circulate worldwide and year-round, including in countries with outbreaks of avian influenza A 
(H5N1) among poultry.  Therefore, during the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods, human influenza virus infection can 
be a cause of ILI among returned travelers at any time of the year, including during the summer in the United States. This 
includes travelers returning from areas affected by poultry outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) in Asia. 
As of December 2005, such persons are currently more likely to have infection with human influenza viruses than with avian 
influenza A (H5N1) viruses. 
 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 5 Supplement 5:  Clinical Guidelines 
 
 b)  Occupational risks 
Persons at occupational risk for infection with a novel strain of influenza include: 
1) persons who work on farms or live poultry markets 
2) persons who process or handle poultry infected with known or suspected 
avian influenza viruses 
3) workers in laboratories that contain live animal or novel influenza viruses 
4) health care workers in direct contact with a suspected or confirmed novel 
influenza case. 
 
Information on limiting occupational risk is provided on the Occupational Health 
and Safety Administration (OSHA) website at: www.osha.gov/dsg/guidance/avian-
flu.html. 
 
During the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods, when there is no sustained 
human-to-human transmission of any novel influenza viruses, direct contact with 
animals such as poultry in an affected area or close contact with a case of suspected 
or confirmed human novel influenza is required for further evaluation.  
 
During the Pandemic Alert Period, Phases 3 and 4, the majority of human cases of novel influenza will result from avian-to-
human transmission (see Box 1). Therefore, a history of direct contact with poultry (well-appearing, sick, or dead), 
consumption of uncooked poultry or poultry products, or direct exposure to environmental contamination with poultry feces in 
an affected area will be important to ascertain.  
 
During the Pandemic Alert Period, Phase 5, a history of close contact with an ill person suspected or confirmed to have novel 
influenza in an affected area will be even more important. 
 
Other avian influenza A viruses  
Although the epidemiologic criteria for novel influenza are based on recent human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1), they are 
intended for use in the evaluation of suspected cases of infection with any novel influenza A virus strain, including other avian 
influenza viruses.  
 
Other avian influenza A viruses that have caused human disease include the highly pathogenic viruses H7N7 and H7N3 and 
the low pathogenic viruses H9N2 and H7N2.   Some of these human cases have occurred in Europe (Netherlands) and North 
America (Canada and the United States). Therefore, the same high-risk exposures defined above for avian influenza A (H5N1) 
also apply to other avian influenza A viruses.  
 
A strong epidemiologic link to an avian influenza outbreak in poultry, even in areas that have not experienced poultry 
outbreaks of avian influenza A (H5N1), may raise the index of suspicion for human infection with avian influenza A viruses.   
 
In the future, other animal hosts (in addition to poultry) or novel influenza A virus subtypes (in addition to H5N1) might 
become significantly associated with human disease. If such events occur, this guidance will be updated. 
B.  Initial management of patients who meet the criteria for novel influenza  
When a patient meets both the clinical and epidemiologic criteria for a suspected case of novel influenza, health care personnel 
should initiate the following activities: 
1. Implement infection control precautions for novel influenza, including Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette. Patients 
should be placed on Droplet Precautions for a minimum of 14 days, unless there is full resolution of illness or 
another etiology has been identified before that period has elapsed. Health care personnel should wear surgical or 
procedure masks on entering a patient’s room, as per Droplet Precautions.  They should also wear gloves and gowns 
when indicated for Standard Precautions (Table 1). Patients should be admitted to a single-patient room, and patient 
movement and transport within the hospital should be limited to medically necessary purposes (see also Supplement 4, 
Infection Control). 
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 2. Notify the local health department or ADHS. Report each patient who meets the clinical and epidemiologic criteria 
for a suspected case of novel influenza to the state or local health department as quickly as possible to facilitate 
initiation of public health measures (see Supplement 1, Surveillance).   Designate one person as a point of contact to 
update public health authorities on the patient’s clinical status.  
 
3. Obtain clinical specimens for novel influenza A virus testing and notify the 
local and state health departments to arrange testing.  Testing of suspected 
novel or pandemic influenza will be directed by public health authorities (see 
Supplement 2, Laboratory Diagnostics for more detailed guidelines).  
a. Where feasible, collect of the following respiratory specimens for 
novel influenza A virus testing:  1) nasopharyngeal swab; 2) throat 
swab; 3) tracheal aspirate (for intubated patients); and 4) nasal swab, 
aspirate or wash.  
b. Store specimens at 4°C in viral transport media until transported or 
shipped for testing. Acute (within 7 days of illness onset) and 
convalescent serum specimens (2–3 weeks after the acute specimen 
and at least 3 weeks after illness onset) should be obtained and 
refrigerated at 4°C or frozen at minus 20–80°C. Serological testing 
for novel influenza virus infection can be performed only at CDC.  
c. Immediately notify their local health departments of their intention 
to ship clinical specimens from suspected cases of human infectio
with avian influenza, to ensure that the specimens are handled under 
proper biocontainment conditions. 
n 
d. Novel influenza can be confirmed by RT-PCR or virus isolation from tissue cell culture with subtyping.  
However, RT-PCR for testing of novel influenza viruses cannot be performed by a hospital laboratory and is 
available only at state public health laboratories and CDC. Viral culture of specimens from suspected novel 
influenza cases should be attempted only in laboratories that meet the biocontainment conditions for BSL-3 
with enhancements or higher. 
e. Rapid influenza diagnostic tests and immunofluorescence (indirect fluorescent antibody staining [IFA] or 
direct fluorescent antibody staining [DFA]) may be used to detect seasonal influenza, but should not be used 
to confirm or exclude novel influenza during the Pandemic Alert Period. Rapid influenza tests have 
relatively low sensitivity for detecting seasonal influenza, and their ability to detect novel influenza subtypes 
is unknown. Such tests can identify influenza A viruses but cannot distinguish between human infection with 
seasonal and novel influenza A viruses. A negative rapid influenza test result does not necessarily exclude 
human infection with either seasonal or novel influenza A viruses. A positive rapid influenza test result could 
be a false positive or represent infection with either seasonal or novel influenza A viruses. Therefore, both 
negative and positive rapid influenza test and immunofluoresence results should be interpreted with caution, 
and RT-PCR testing for influenza viruses should be performed.  (See Supplement 2, Laboratory Diagnostics 
for further information on rapid diagnostic testing).  
f. Acute and convalescent serum samples and other available clinical specimens (respiratory, blood, and stool) 
should be saved and refrigerated or frozen for additional testing until a specific diagnosis is made.  
 
4. Evaluate alternative diagnoses. An alternative diagnosis should be based only on laboratory tests with high positive-
predictive value (e.g., blood culture, viral culture, PCR, Legionella urinary antigen, pleural fluid culture, transthoracic 
aspirate culture). If an alternate etiology is identified, the possibility of co-infection with a novel influenza virus may 
still be considered if there is a strong epidemiologic link to exposure to novel influenza. 
 
5. Decide on inpatient or outpatient management. The decision to hospitalize a suspected novel influenza case will be 
based on the physician’s clinical assessment and assessment of risk and whether adequate precautions can be taken at 
home to prevent the potential spread of infection.  
a. Patients cared for at home should be separated from other household members as much as possible.  
b. All household members should carefully follow recommendations for hand hygiene, and tissues used by the 
ill patient should be placed in a bag and disposed with other household waste (Box 4).              
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 c. Although no studies have assessed the use of masks at home to decrease the spread of infection, use of 
surgical or procedure masks by the patient and/or caregiver during interactions may be of benefit.   
d. Separation of eating utensils for use by a patient with influenza is not necessary, as long as they are washed 
with warm water and soap (Box 4).  
 
6. Initiate antiviral treatment as soon as possible, even if laboratory results are not yet available. Clinical trials have 
shown that these drugs can decrease the illness due to seasonal influenza duration by several days when they are 
initiated within 48 hours of illness onset. The clinical effectiveness of antiviral drugs for treatment of novel influenza 
is unknown, but it is likely that the earlier treatment is initiated, the greater the likelihood of benefit. During the 
Pandemic Alert Period, available virus isolates from any case of novel influenza will be tested for resistance to the 
currently licensed antiviral medications.  (See Supplement 7 for antiviral information). 
 
7. Assist public health officials with identifying exposed contacts. After consulting with ADHS or local public health 
officials, clinicians might be asked to help identify persons exposed to the suspected novel influenza case-patient 
(particularly health care workers). In general, persons in close contact with the case-patient at any time beginning one 
day before the onset of illness are considered at risk. Close contacts might include household and social contacts, 
family members, workplace or school contacts, fellow travelers, and/or health care providers (see Supplement 8 and 
Supplement 9). 
 
C.  Management of patients who test positive for novel influenza 
If a patient is confirmed to have an infection with a novel influenza virus: 
1. Continue antiviral treatment 
2. Continue all isolation and infection control precautions  
3. Isolate patients with novel influenza from seasonal influenza patients.  
In addition to prior vaccination against seasonal influenza, such measures may 
decrease the risk of co-infection and viral genetic reassortment.  
 
D.  Management of patients who test positive for seasonal influenza 
Many people who are suspected to have a novel influenza will be found to have 
seasonal human influenza, particularly during the winter season. It should be 
recognized that human influenza viruses circulate among people worldwide throughout the year, including in affected areas 
with poultry outbreaks of avian influenza A viruses. 
 
For patients with confirmed seasonal influenza, maintain Standard and Droplet Precautions, and continue appropriate antiviral 
treatment for a full treatment course   (e.g., 5 days).  
 
E.  Management of patients who test negative for novel influenza 
The sensitivity of the currently available tests for detecting novel influenza viruses in clinical specimens has not been 
thoroughly evaluated, so false-negative test results may occur.   Therefore, if test results are negative but the clinical and 
epidemiologic suspicion for a novel influenza virus remains high, continue antiviral treatment and isolation procedures.  Test 
results could be negative for influenza viruses for several reasons: 
1. Some patients may have an alternate etiology to explain their illness. The general work-up for febrile respiratory 
illnesses described below should evaluate the most common alternate causes.  
2. A certain number of truly infected cases might also test falsely negative, due to specimen collection conditions, to 
viral shedding that is not detectable, or to sensitivity of the test. 
 
Interpretation of negative testing results should be tailored to the individual patient in consultation with hospital infection 
control and infectious disease specialists, as well as the state or local health department and CDC. In hospitalized patients who 
test negative for novel influenza but have no alternate diagnosis established, novel-influenza-directed management should be 
continued if clinical suspicion is high and there is a strong epidemiologic link to exposure to novel influenza.  
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 When influenza tests are negative and an alternative diagnosis is established, isolation precautions and antiviral drug therapy 
for novel influenza may be discontinued based on clinician’s assessment if: 
1. There is no strong epidemiologic link 
2. An alternative diagnosis is made using a test with a high positive-predictive value 
3. The clinical manifestations are explained by the alternative diagnosis. 
 
IV. Clinical guidelines for the pandemic period 
During the Pandemic Period, the primary goal of rapid detection is to appropriately identify and triage cases of pandemic 
influenza. During this period, outpatient clinics and emergency departments might be overwhelmed with suspected cases, 
restricting the time and laboratory resources available for evaluation. In addition, if the pandemic influenza virus exhibits 
transmission characteristics similar to those of seasonal 
influenza viruses, illnesses will likely spread throughout the 
community too rapidly to allow the identification of obvious 
exposures or contacts.  
 
Evaluation will therefore focus predominantly on clinical and 
basic laboratory findings, with less emphasis on laboratory 
diagnostic testing (which may be in short supply) and 
epidemiologic criteria. Nevertheless, clinicians in 
communities without pandemic influenza activity might 
consider asking patients about recent travel from a 
community with pandemic influenza activity or close contact 
with a suspected or confirmed pandemic influenza case. The 
main features of clinical management during the Pandemic 
Period are outlined in Figure 2.  
 
A. Criteria for evaluation of patients with possible pandemic influenza 
 
1.  Clinical criteria 
Suspected cases of pandemic influenza virus infection should meet the criteria for an influenza-like illness (ILI): temperature 
of >38°C plus one of the following:  sore throat, cough, or dyspnea.  
 
Although past influenza pandemics have most frequently resulted in respiratory illness, the next pandemic influenza virus 
strain might present with a different clinical syndrome (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). During a pandemic, updates on other 
clinical presentations will be provided at: www.pandemicflu.gov and www.cdc.gov/flu/. 
 
Recommendations for general evaluation of patients with ILI are provided in Box 2. Exceptions to the clinical criteria are 
provided in Box 3. 
 
2.  Epidemiologic criteria 
During the Pandemic Period, an exposure history will be marginally useful for clinical management when disease is 
widespread in a community. In addition, there will be a relatively high likelihood that any case of ILI during that time period 
will be pandemic influenza. Once pandemic influenza has arrived in a particular locality, clinical criteria will be sufficient for 
classifying the patient as a suspected pandemic influenza case. 
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 B. Initial management of patients who meet the criteria for pandemic influenza 
When a patient meets the criteria for a suspected case of pandemic influenza, health care personnel should initiate the 
following activities: 
1. Report according to local and state health department recommendations for patients who meet the criteria for 
pandemic influenza. See Supplement 1 for guidance on case reporting during the Pandemic Period. 
2. If the patient is hospitalized, implement infection control precautions for pandemic influenza, including Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette (see Supplement 4, Box 2).  
a. Place the patient on Droplet Precautions for a minimum of 5 days from the onset of symptoms. 
b. Health care personnel should wear surgical or procedure masks on entering a patient’s room, as per Droplet 
Precautions 
c. Health care personnel should wear gloves and gowns, when indicated, as per Standard Precautions (Table 1, 
Infection Control).  
d. Patients should be admitted to either a single-patient room or an area designated for cohorting of patients 
with influenza.  
e. Patient movement and transport outside the isolation area should be limited to medically necessary purposes 
(see Table 1, Infection Control).  
 
3. Limit hospital admission of patients should be limited to those with severe complications who cannot be cared for 
outside the hospital setting, especially once a pandemic is underway. 
 
4. Obtain clinical specimens, as clinically indicated (see Box 2).  
a. Once pandemic influenza has arrived in a community, influenza testing will likely not be needed for most 
patients.  
b. Work in conjunction with health departments to perform laboratory testing in a subset of pandemic influenza 
cases, as part of ongoing virologic surveillance (see Supplement 1).  
c. Influenza diagnostic testing should be considered before initiating treatment with antivirals (see Supplement 
7).  
d. See Supplement 2, Laboratory Diagnostics for guidelines for pandemic influenza virus testing.  
e. As with seasonal influenza, RT-PCR and virus isolation from tissue culture will be the most accurate 
methods for diagnosing pandemic influenza.  
f. Specimens should generally include combined nasopharyngeal aspirates or nasal swabs, and throat swabs, 
stored at 4°C in viral transport media.  
g. BSL-2 conditions should be sufficient for viral culture of clinical specimens from suspected pandemic 
influenza patients during the Pandemic Period.   
 
5. Know how to properly use rapid diagnostic tests for influenza 
a. Rapid tests and immunofluoresence may be helpful for initial clinical management, including cohorting and 
treatment, but have relatively low sensitivity for detecting seasonal influenza, and their ability to detect 
pandemic influenza viruses is unknown. 
b.  The sensitivity of rapid diagnostic tests will likely be higher in specimens collected within two days of 
illness onset, in children, and when tested at clinical laboratories that perform a high volume of testing.  
c. During a pandemic a negative rapid test may be a false negative.  Therefore test results need to be interpreted 
within the overall clinical context. For example, it may not be optimal to withhold antiviral treatment from a 
seriously ill high-risk patient on the basis of a negative test; however, in a setting of limited antiviral drug 
availability, treatment decisions in less high-risk situations could be based on test results.  
d. The risk of a false-negative test also must be taken into account in making cohorting decisions.  
e. Rapid diagnostic testing should not preclude more reliable testing, if available.  
f. See Supplement 2, Laboratory Diagnostics for further information on rapid diagnostic testing. 
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 6. Decide on inpatient or outpatient management. 
The decision to hospitalize a suspected pandemic influenza case will be based on the physician’s clinical assessment of the 
patient as well as the availability of hospital beds and personnel. Guidelines on cohorting and infection control for 
admitted patients can be found in Supplement 3, health Care Planning, and Supplement 4, Infection Control. 
a. High priority for admission 
i. An unstable patient 
ii. Patients with high-risk conditions (see Appendix 1) might also warrant special attention, such as 
observation or close follow-up, even if disease is mild.  
b. Appropriate for home management with follow up 
i. Well-appearing young children with fever alone.  
c. See Supplement 7, Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use for inpatient and outpatient antiviral treatment 
strategies.  
 
7. Infection control for home care 
a. Patients cared for at home should be separated 
from other household members as much as 
possible. 
b. All household members should carefully follow 
recommendations for hand hygiene, and tissues 
used by the ill patient should be placed in a bag 
and disposed with other household waste  
(Box 4).  
c. Infection within the household may be 
minimized if a primary caregiver is designated.  
The primary caregiver would ideally be someone 
who does not have an underlying condition that places them at increased risk of severe influenza disease.  
d. Using a surgical or procedure mask by the patient or caregiver during interactions may be of benefit.  
e. Separation of eating utensils for use by a patient with influenza is not necessary, as long as they are washed 
with warm water and soap (Box 4). 
 
C.  Clinical management of pandemic influenza patients 
See Supplement 7, Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use for current antiviral information and treatment strategies.  In addition 
to the use of antivirals, clinical management of severe influenza should address supportive care and the rapid identification and 
treatment of secondary complications.*  
1. Provide CDC with virus isolates from persons who fail treatment or antiviral prophylaxis, as these strains may more 
likely be drug resistant.  
2. Do not give aspirin or other salicylate-containing product to children aged < 18 years with suspected or confirmed 
pandemic influenza because of an increased risk of Reye syndrome in this age group (characterized by acute 
encephalopathy and liver failure).  
3. Monitor for complications.  Complications related to seasonal human influenza occur more commonly in persons with 
certain underlying medical conditions, such as chronic respiratory or cardiovascular disease and extremes of age, and 
are described in Appendix 1. Limited data are available on risk factors and complications related to infection with 
novel influenza viruses, and these may change as individual strains evolve.  
4. Review the summary of the clinical presentations and complications associated with recent influenza A (H5N1) 
viruses in Appendix 2.  
5. Be aware that post-influenza community-acquired pneumonia will likely be a commonly encountered complication, 
and be aware of recommended methods for diagnosis and treatment. Guidance on the management of influenza-
related pneumonia is in Appendix 3.  
 
* Ribavirin and immunomodulatory therapies, such as steroids, are not approved by the FDA for treatment of severe influenza of any type and are purely 
investigational at this time.  These agents frequently have severe adverse effects, such as bone marrow and hepatic toxicity, while the benefits of these 
therapies are unknown. 
 
Box 1. Risk of Novel Influenza in Persons with Severe Respiratory Disease or Influenza-like Illness during the 
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 Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
Clinicians should recognize that human influenza A and B viruses and other respiratory viruses circulate year-round among 
people throughout the world, including in countries affected by outbreaks of avian influenza A viruses in poultry. Seasonal 
human influenza A and B community outbreaks occur in temperate climates of the northern and southern hemisphere, and 
human influenza activity may occur year-round in subtropical and tropical regions. Outbreaks of human influenza can occur 
among travelers during any time of the year, including periods of low influenza activity in the United States (e.g., summer) 
. 
Phases 1, 2: Interpandemic Period 
A novel influenza A virus has been detected in animals but not in humans. During these phases, the risk of human infection 
with a novel influenza A virus strain is extremely low. The risk of human infection with human influenza viruses or other 
viruses is much higher in persons living in or traveling to affected areas. 
  
Phases 3, 4: Pandemic Alert Period  
A novel influenza A virus has been detected in humans through sporadic animal-to-human transmission in an affected area 
(e.g., direct contact with infected poultry), and few cases of limited, local human-to-human transmission have occurred (small 
clusters of cases). During these phases, the risk of human infection with a novel influenza A virus strain is very low. The risk 
of human infection with human influenza viruses or other viruses is much higher in persons living in or traveling to affected 
areas. 
  
Phase 5: Pandemic Alert Period  
A novel influenza A virus has been detected in humans in larger clusters in an affected area, suggesting that the virus is 
becoming better adapted to spread among people. During this period, the risk of human infection with a novel influenza A 
virus strain is higher, depending on specific exposures, in persons living in or traveling to affected areas. Human infection with 
human influenza viruses or other viruses will occur and should still be considered.  
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Box 2. Clinical Evaluation of Patients with Influenza-like Illness during the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
• Patients who require hospitalization for an influenza-like illness for which a definitive alternative diagnosis is not 
immediately apparent* should be questioned about: 1) travel to an area affected by avian influenza A virus outbreaks in 
poultry, 2) direct contact with poultry, 3) close contact with persons with suspected or confirmed novel influenza, or 4) 
occupational exposure to novel influenza viruses (such as through agricultural, health care, or laboratory activities).  
• Patients may be screened on admission for recent seasonal influenza vaccination and pneumococcal vaccination. Those 
without a history of immunization should receive these vaccines before discharge, if indicated.  
• Patients meeting the epidemiologic criteria for possible infection with a novel strain of influenza should undergo a routine 
diagnostic work-up, guided by clinical indications. Appropriate personal protective equipment should be used when 
evaluating patients with suspected novel influenza, including during collection of specimens.**  
• Diagnostic testing for a novel influenza A virus should be initiated as follows:  
o Collect all of the following specimens: nasopharyngeal swab, nasal swab, wash, or aspirate, throat swab, and tracheal 
aspirate (if intubated), and place into viral transport media and refrigerate at 4OC until specimens can be transported 
for testing.  
o Immediately contact the local and state health departments to report the suspected case and to arrange novel influenza 
testing by RT-PCR. 
RT-PCR testing is not available in hospital laboratories and must be performed at a qualified laboratory such as a state health 
department laboratory or the CDC Influenza Laboratory. Viral culture should be performed only at biosafety level 3 [BSL-3] 
with enhancements (see Supplement 2).  
• Depending on the clinical presentation and the patient’s underlying health status, other initial diagnostic testing might 
include:  
o Pulse oximetry  
o Chest radiograph  
o Complete blood count (CBC) with differential  
o Blood cultures  
o Sputum (in adults), tracheal aspirate, and pleural effusion aspirate (if an effusion is present) Gram stain and culture  
o Antibiotic susceptibility testing (encouraged for all bacterial isolates)  
o Multivalent immunofluorescent antibody testing or PCR of nasopharyngeal aspirates or swabs for common viral 
respiratory pathogens, such as influenza A and B, adenovirus, parainfluenza viruses, and respiratory syncytial virus, 
particularly in children  
o In adults with radiographic evidence of pneumonia, Legionella and pneumococcal urinary antigen testing  
o If clinicians have access to rapid and reliable testing (e.g., PCR) for M. pneumoniae and C. pneumoniae, adults and 
children <5 yrs with radiographic pneumonia should be tested. 
o Comprehensive serum chemistry panel, if metabolic derangement or other end-organ involvement such as liver or renal 
failure is suspected. 
 
*Further evaluation and diagnostic testing should also be considered for outpatients with strong epidemiologic risk factors and mild or moderate illness (see 
Box 3). 
 
**Health care personnel should wear surgical or procedure masks on entering a patient’s room (Droplet Precautions), as well as gloves and gowns, when 
indicated (Standard Precautions) (see Table and Supplement 4). 
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Box 3. Special Situations and Exceptions to the Clinical Criteria 
Persons with a high risk of exposure—For persons with a high risk of exposure to a novel influenza virus (e.g., poultry worker 
from an affected area,* caregiver of a patient with laboratory-confirmed novel influenza, employee in a laboratory that works 
with live novel influenza viruses), epidemiologic evidence might be enough to initiate further measures, even if clinical criteria 
are not fully met. In these persons, early signs and symptoms—such as rhinorrhea, conjunctivitis, chills, rigors, myalgia, 
headache, and diarrhea—in addition to cough or sore throat, may be used to fulfill the clinical criteria for evaluation.  
High-risk groups with atypical symptoms—Young children, elderly patients, patients in long-term care facilities, and persons 
with underlying chronic illnesses might not have typical influenza-like symptoms, such as fever. When such patients have a 
strong epidemiologic risk factor, novel influenza should be considered with almost any change in health status, even in the 
absence of typical clinical features. Conjunctivitis has been reported in patients with influenza A (H7N7) and (H7N3) infections. 
In young children, gastrointestinal manifestations such as vomiting and diarrhea might be present. Infants may present with 
fever or apnea alone, without other respiratory symptoms, and should be evaluated if there is an otherwise increased suspicion of 
novel influenza.  
*Updated lists of affected areas are provided at the websites of the OIE (http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm), WHO 
(www.who.int/en/), and CDC (www.cdc.gov/flu/).  
 
Box 4. Home Care Infection Control Guidance for Pandemic Influenza Patients and  Household Members 
Most patients with pandemic influenza will be able to remain at home during the course of their illness and can be cared for by 
family members or others who live in the household. Anyone who has been in the household with an influenza patient during 
the incubation period is at risk for developing influenza. A key objective in this setting is to limit transmission of pandemic 
influenza within and outside the home.  
 
Management of influenza patients in the home 
•     Physically separate the patient with influenza from non-ill persons living in the home as much as possible.  
•     Patients should not leave the home during the period when they are most likely to be infectious to others (i.e., 5 days after 
onset of symptoms). When movement outside the home is necessary (e.g., for medical care), the patient should follow 
respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (i.e., cover the mouth and nose when coughing and sneezing) and should wear a mask. 
 
Management of other persons in the home 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Persons who have not been exposed to pandemic influenza and who are not essential for patient care or support should not 
enter the home while persons are still having a fever due to pandemic influenza.  
If unexposed persons must enter the home, they should avoid close contact with the patient.  
Persons living in the home with the patient with pandemic influenza should limit contact with the patient to the extent 
possible; consider designating one person as the primary care provider.  
Household members should be vigilant for the development of influenza symptoms. Consult with health care providers to 
determine whether a pandemic influenza vaccine, if available, or antiviral prophylaxis should be considered.  
 
Infection control measures in the home  
• All persons in the household should carefully follow recommendations for hand hygiene (i.e., hand washing with soap and 
water or use of an alcohol-based hand rub) after contact with an influenza patient or the environment in which they are 
receiving care.  
• Although no studies have assessed the use of masks at home to decrease the spread of infection, using a surgical or 
procedure mask by the patient or caregiver during interactions may be beneficial.  
• Soiled dishes and eating utensils should be washed either in a dishwasher or by hand with warm water and soap. Separation 
of eating utensils for use by a patient with influenza is not necessary. 
• Laundry may be washed in a standard washing machine with warm or cold water and detergent. It is not necessary to 
separate soiled linen and laundry used by a patient with influenza from other household laundry. Care should be used when 
handling soiled laundry (i.e., avoid “hugging” the laundry) to avoid self-contamination. Hand hygiene should be performed 
after handling soiled laundry.  
• Tissues used by the ill patient should be placed in a bag and disposed of with other household waste. Consider placing a bag 
for this purpose at the bedside. 
• Environmental surfaces in the home should be cleaned using normal procedures 
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 Figure 1. Case Detection and Clinical Management during the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
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 Footnotes to Figure 1: 
1. Further evaluation and diagnostic testing should also be considered for outpatients with strong epidemiologic risk factors and mild 
or moderate illness. (See Box 2).  
2. Updated information on areas where novel influenza virus transmission is suspected or documented is available on the CDC 
website at www.cdc.gov/travel/other/avian_flu_ah5n1_031605.htm and on the WHO website at www.who.int/en/.  
3. For persons who live in or visit affected areas, close contact includes touching live poultry (well-appearing, sick or dead) or 
touching or consuming uncooked poultry products, including blood. For animal or market workers, it includes touching surfaces 
contaminated with bird feces. In recent years, most instances of human infection with a novel influenza A virus having pandemic 
potential, including influenza A (H5N1), are thought to have occurred through direct transmission from domestic poultry. A small 
number of cases are also thought to have occurred through limited person-to-person transmission or consumption of uncooked 
poultry products. Transmission of novel influenza viruses from other infected animal populations or by contact with fecally 
contaminated surfaces remains a possibility. These guidelines will be updated as needed if alternate sources of novel influenza 
viruses are suspected or confirmed.  
4. Close contact includes direct physical contact, or approach within 3 feet (1 meter) of a person with suspected or confirmed novel 
influenza.  
5. Standard and Droplet Precautions should be used when caring for patients with novel influenza or seasonal influenza (Table and 
Supplement 4). Information on infection precautions that should be implemented for all respiratory illnesses (i.e., Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette) is provided at: www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/resphygiene.htm  
6. Hospitalization should be based on all clinical factors, including the potential for infectiousness and the ability to practice adequate 
infection control. If hospitalization is not clinically warranted, and treatment and infection control is feasible in the home, the 
patient may be managed as an outpatient. The patient and his or her household should be provided with information on infection 
control procedures to follow at home (Box 3). The patient and close contacts should be monitored for illness by local public health 
department staff.  
7. Guidance on how to report suspected cases of novel influenza is provided in Supplement 1.  
8. The general work-up should be guided by clinical indications. Depending on the clinical presentation and the patient’s underlying 
health status, initial diagnostic testing might include:  
o Pulse oximetry  
o Chest radiograph  
o Complete blood count (CBC) with differential  
o Blood cultures  
o Sputum (in adults), tracheal aspirate, pleural effusion aspirate (if pleural effusion is present) Gram stain and culture  
o Antibiotic susceptibility testing (encouraged for all bacterial isolates)  
o Multivalent immunofluorescent antibody testing or PCR of nasopharyngeal aspirates or swabs for common viral 
respiratory pathogens, such as influenza A and B, adenovirus, parainfluenza viruses, and respiratory syncytial virus, 
particularly in children  
o In adults with radiographic evidence of pneumonia, Legionella and pneumococcal urinary antigen testing  
o If clinicians have access to rapid and reliable testing (e.g., PCR) for M. pneumoniae and C. pneumoniae, adults and 
children <5 yrs with radiographic pneumonia should be tested.  
o Comprehensive serum chemistry panel, if metabolic derangement or other end-organ involvement, such as liver or 
renal failure, is suspected See Box 2 for additional details.  
9. Guidelines for novel influenza virus testing can be found in Supplement 2. All of the following respiratory specimens should be 
collected for novel influenza A virus testing: nasopharyngeal swab; nasal swab, wash, or aspirate; throat swab; and tracheal aspirate 
(for intubated patients), stored at 4° C in viral transport media; and acute and convalescent serum samples.  
10. Strategies for the use of antiviral drugs are provided in Supplement 7.  
11. Guidelines for the management of contacts in a health care setting are provided in Supplement 3.  
12. Given the unknown sensitivity of tests for novel influenza viruses, interpretation of negative results should be tailored to the 
individual patient in consultation with the local health department. Novel influenza directed management may need to be 
continued, depending on the strength of clinical and epidemiologic suspicion. Antiviral therapy and isolation precautions for novel 
influenza may be discontinued on the basis of an alternative diagnosis. The following criteria may be considered for this 
evaluation:  
o Absence of strong epidemiologic link to known cases of novel influenza  
o Alternative diagnosis confirmed using a test with a high positive-predictive value  
o Clinical manifestations explained by the alternative diagnosis  
13. Guidance on the evaluation and treatment of suspected post-influenza community-associated pneumonia is provided in Appendix 3. 
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 Figure 2. Case Detection and Clinical Management during the Pandemic Period 
 
 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 18 Supplement 5:  Clinical Guidelines 
 
 Footnotes to Figure 2: 
1. Antiviral therapy and isolation precautions for pandemic influenza should be discontinued on the basis of an alternative diagnosis 
only when both the following criteria are met:  
o Alternative diagnosis confirmed using a test with a high positive-predictive value, and  
o Clinical manifestations entirely explained by the alternative diagnosis  
2. Standard and Droplet Precautions should be used when caring for patients with novel influenza or seasonal influenza (Table and 
Supplement 4). Information on infection precautions that should be implemented for all respiratory illnesses (i.e., Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette) is provided at: www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/resphygiene.htm  
3. Guidance on laboratory testing during the Pandemic Period can be found in Supplement 2. Generally, specimens should include 
respiratory samples (e.g., nasopharyngeal wash/aspirate; nasopharyngeal, nasal or oropharyngeal swabs, or tracheal aspirates) 
stored at 4°C in viral transport media. Routine laboratory confirmation of clinical diagnoses will be unnecessary as pandemic 
activity becomes widespread in a community. CDC will continue to work with state health laboratories to conduct virologic 
surveillance to monitor antigenic changes and antiviral resistance in the pandemic virus strains throughout the Pandemic Period.  
4. The decision to hospitalize should be based on a clinical assessment of the patient and the availability of hospital beds and 
personnel.  
5. Guidelines on cohorting can be found in Supplement 4. Laboratory confirmation of influenza infection is recommended when 
possible before cohorting patients.  
6. The general work-up should be guided by clinical indications. Depending on the clinical presentation and the patient’s underlying 
health status, initial diagnostic testing might include:  
o Pulse oximetry  
o Chest radiograph  
o Complete blood count (CBC) with differential  
o Blood cultures  
o Sputum (in adults) or tracheal aspirate Gram stain and culture  
o Antibiotic susceptibility testing (encouraged for all bacterial isolates)  
o Multivalent immunofluorescent antibody testing of nasopharyngeal aspirates or swabs for common viral respiratory 
pathogens, such as influenza A and B,  adenovirus, parainfluenza viruses, and respiratory syncytial virus, particularly in 
children  
o In adults with radiographic evidence of pneumonia, Legionella and pneumococcal urinary antigen testing  
o If clinicians have access to rapid and reliable testing (e.g., PCR) for M. pneumoniae and C. pneumoniae, adults and 
children <5 yrs with radiographic pneumonia should be tested.  
o Comprehensive serum chemistry panel, if metabolic derangement or other end- organ involvement, such as liver or renal 
failure, is suspected See Box 2 for additional details.  
7. Guidance on the evaluation and treatment of community acquired pneumonia and suspected post-influenza community-acquired 
bacterial pneumonia are provided in Appendix 3.  
8. Strategies for the use of antiviral drugs are provided in Supplement 7.  
9. Guidance on the reporting of pandemic influenza cases is found in Supplement 1.  
10. Patients with mild disease should be provided with standardized instructions on home management of fever and dehydration, pain 
relief, and recognition of deterioration in status. Patients should also receive information on infection control measures to follow at 
home (Box 4). Patients cared for at home should be separated from other household members as much as possible. All household 
members should carefully follow recommendations for hand hygiene, and tissues used by the ill patient should be placed in a bag 
and disposed of with other household waste. Infection within the household may be minimized if a primary caregiver is designated; 
ideally, someone who does not have an underlying condition that places them at increased risk of severe influenza disease. 
Although no studies have assessed the use of masks at home to decrease the spread of infection, using a surgical or procedure mask 
by the patient or caregiver during interactions may be beneficial. Separation of eating utensils for use by a patient with influenza is 
not necessary, as long as they are washed with warm water and soap. Additional information on measures to limit the spread of 
pandemic influenza in the home and community can be found in Supplement 4 and Supplement 8.  
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 Figure 3. Management of Community-Acquired Pneumonia during an Influenza Pandemic: Adults 
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 Figure 4:  Management of Community Acquired Pneumonia during an Influenza Pandemic:  Children 
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 Table 1. Pandemic Influenza Infection Control Guidance For health Care Providers 
 
Component Recommendations 
Standard 
Precautions 
As per  www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/ISOLAT/std_prec_excerpt.htm  
Hand hygiene 
Perform hand hygiene after touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, and contaminated 
items; after removing gloves; between patient contacts. Hand hygiene includes both handwashing with 
either plain or antimicrobial soap and water and use of alcohol-based products (gels, rinses, foams) 
that contain an emollient and do not require the use of water. If hands are visibly soiled or 
contaminated with respiratory secretions, they should be washed with soap (either non-antimicrobial or 
antimicrobial) and water. In the absence of visible soiling of hands, approved alcohol-based products 
for hand disinfection are preferred over antimicrobial or plain soap and water because of their superior 
microbiocidal activity, reduced drying of the skin, and convenience.  
Personal protective 
equipment (PPE)  
Gloves  
Gown  
Face/eye protection 
(e.g., surgical or 
procedure mask and 
goggles or a face 
shield)  
• For touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, and contaminated items; for touching 
mucous membranes and nonintact skin  
• During procedures and patient-care activities when contact of clothing/exposed skin with 
blood/body fluids, secretions, and excretions is anticipated 
• During procedures and patient care activities likely to generate splash or spray of blood, body 
fluids, secretions, excretions  
Safe work practices 
Avoid touching eyes, nose, mouth, or exposed skin with contaminated hands (gloved or ungloved); 
avoid touching surfaces with contaminated gloves and other PPE that are not directly related to patient 
care (e.g., door knobs, keys, light switches).  
Patient resuscitation 
Avoid unnecessary mouth-to-mouth contact; use mouthpiece, resuscitation bag, other ventilation 
devices to prevent contact with mouth and oral secretions. Soiled patient care equipment Handle in a 
manner that prevents transfer of microorganisms to oneself, others and to environmental surfaces; wear 
gloves if visibly contaminated; perform hand hygiene after handling equipment.  
Soiled linen and 
laundry 
Handle in a manner that prevents transfer of microorganisms to oneself, others, and to environmental 
surfaces; wear gloves (gown if necessary) when handling and transporting soiled linen and laundry and 
perform hand hygiene  
Needles and other 
sharps 
Use devices with safety features when available; do not recap, bend break or hand-manipulate used 
needles; if recapping is necessary, use a one-handed scoop technique; place used sharps in a puncture-
resistant container.  
Environmental 
cleaning and 
disinfection 
Use EPA-registered hospital detergent-disinfectant; follow standard facility procedures for cleaning 
and disinfection of environmental surfaces; emphasize cleaning/disinfection of frequently touched 
surfaces (e.g., bed rails, phones, lavatory surfaces).  
Disposal of solid 
waste 
Contain and dispose of solid waste (medical and non-medical) in accordance with facility procedures 
and/or local or state regulations; wear gloves when handling waste; wear gloves when handling waste 
containers and perform hand hygiene  
Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough 
Etiquette 
Source control measures for persons with symptoms of a respiratory infection; implement at first point 
of encounter (e.g., triage/reception areas) within a health care setting. Have the patient cover the 
mouth/nose when sneezing/coughing; use tissues and dispose in no-touch receptacle; perform hand 
hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions; wear a mask (procedure or surgical) if tolerated; sit 
or stand as far away as possible (more than 3 feet) away from persons who are not ill.  
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 Droplet Precautions As per www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/ISOLAT/droplet_prec_excerpt.htm  
Patient placement 
Place patients with influenza in a private room or cohort with other patients with influenza.* Keep 
door closed or slightly ajar; maintain room assignments of patients in nursing homes and other 
residential settings, and apply droplet precautions to all persons in the room. 
*During the early stages of a pandemic, infection with influenza should be laboratory-confirmed, if 
possible. Personal protective equipment Wear a surgical or procedure mask for entry into patient room; 
wear other PPE as recommended for standard precautions.  
Patient transport 
Limit patient movement outside of room to medically necessary purposes; have patient wear a 
procedure or surgical mask when outside the room. 
Other 
Follow standard precautions and facility procedures for handling linen and laundry and dishes and 
eating utensils, and for cleaning/disinfection of environmental surfaces and patient care equipment, 
disposal of solid waste, and postmortem care. 
Aerosol-Generating 
Medical Procedures 
During procedures that may generate small particles of respiratory secretions (e.g., endotracheal 
intubation, bronchoscopy, nebulizer treatment, suctioning), health care personnel should wear gloves, 
gown, face/eye protection, and a fit-tested N-95 respirator or other appropriate particulate respirator.  
 
 
Standard Precautions for home health care 
Health care providers who enter homes where there is a person with an influenza-like illness should follow the 
recommendations for Standard and Droplet Precautions. Standard Precautions include performing hand hygiene and respiratory 
hygiene/cough etiquette, wearing gloves and gowns, using face/eye protection when needed; and following safe work practices. 
 
Droplet Precautions for home health care 
Health care providers who enter homes where there is a person with an influenza-like illness should follow the 
recommendations for Standard and Droplet Precautions. Droplet Precautions include all Standard Precautions plus separating 
the patient from others in the household as much as possible and wearing a surgical or procedure mask for patient interactions. 
Professional judgment should be used in determining whether to don a mask upon entry into the home or only on entering the 
patient’s room. Factors to consider in this decision include the possibility that others in the household may be infectious and 
the extent to which the patient is ambulating within the home. 
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 Appendix 1 
Clinical Presentation and Complications of Seasonal Influenza 
 
Although often quite characteristic, the clinical picture of seasonal influenza can be indistinguishable from illness caused by 
other respiratory infections. The frequent use of non-specific terms such as "flu" and "influenza-like illness" makes the clinical 
diagnosis of influenza even more indefinite. Even when the diagnosis of influenza is confirmed, management can be 
challenging, as influenza virus infection can result in subclinical infection, mild illness, uncomplicated influenza, or 
exacerbation of underlying chronic conditions to fulminant deterioration, and can result in a wide variety of complications. 
 
This appendix provides a brief description of the common presentations and complications of seasonal human influenza. Novel 
and pandemic influenza viruses might, however, cause quite different clinical syndromes than seasonal influenza. For instance, 
seasonal influenza-related complications more commonly affect those at the extremes of age, whereas previous pandemics 
resulted in disproportionate morbidity and mortality in young and previously healthy adults. It will be essential to describe and 
disseminate the clinical features of novel or pandemic influenza cases as soon as they are identified.  
 
Presentation of Seasonal Influenza 
• A typical case of uncomplicated seasonal influenza begins abruptly and is manifested by systemic symptoms such as fever, 
chills, myalgias, anorexia, headache, and extreme fatigue. Fever typically lasts 2–3 days and usually reaches 38–40°C, but 
can be higher (particularly in children).  
• Respiratory tract symptoms such as nonproductive cough, sore throat, and upper respiratory congestion occur at the same 
time, although these may be overshadowed by systemic complaints.  
• Physical examination typically reveals fever, weakness, mild inflammation of the upper respiratory tract, and rare crackles 
on lung examination, but none of these findings is specific for influenza.  
• In uncomplicated illness, major symptoms typically resolve after a limited number of days, but cough, weakness, and 
malaise can persist for up to 2 weeks. 
• In the elderly and in infants, the presenting signs can include respiratory symptoms with or without fever, fever only, 
anorexia only, lassitude, or altered mental status. In children, fevers are often higher than in adults and can lead to febrile 
seizures. Gastrointestinal manifestations (e.g., vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea) occur more frequently in children. 
Fever or apnea without other respiratory symptoms might be the only manifestations in young children, particularly in 
neonates.  
 
At times, influenza can be difficult to distinguish from illnesses caused by other respiratory pathogens on the basis of 
symptoms alone. Fever and cough, particularly in combination, are modestly predictive of influenza in unvaccinated adults, as 
is the combination of fever, cough, headache, and pharyngitis in children.   
  
Other constitutional signs and symptoms, such as chills, rigors, diaphoresis, and myalgias, are also suggestive. The positive 
predictive value of any clinical definition is strongly dependent on the level of influenza activity and the presence of other 
respiratory pathogens in the community.  
 
Routine laboratory findings for seasonal influenza 
No routine laboratory test results are specific for influenza. Leukocyte counts are variable.  Severe leukopenia and 
thrombocytopenia have been described in fulminant cases. Leukocytosis of >15,000 cells/ml should raise suspicion for a 
secondary bacterial process. Comprehensive laboratory testing might reveal other influenza-related complications (see 
Complications below). 
 
Differential diagnosis 
The fever and respiratory manifestations of seasonal influenza are not specific and can occur with several other pathogens, such 
as respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), parainfluenza viruses, adenoviruses, human metapneumovirus, rhinoviruses, 
coronaviruses, and Mycoplasma pneumoniae. 
 
In contrast to influenza, most of these pathogens do not usually cause severe disease, particularly in previously healthy adults.  
However, RSV and parainfluenza viruses can lead to severe respiratory illness in young children and the elderly and should be 
considered in the differential diagnosis if circulating in the community. Even if an alternate etiology is determined, viral or 
bacterial co-infections can still be a possibility.   
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Often the clinician can diagnose seasonal influenza with reasonable certainty in the absence of laboratory testing due to the 
tendency for influenza to occur in community epidemics and to affect persons of all ages.  Nevertheless, a definitive diagnosis 
requires laboratory testing.  
 
Rapid influenza diagnostic tests and immunofluorescence testing using a panel of respiratory pathogens aid in the clinical 
management of patients with suspected influenza. Further information on diagnostic testing for influenza can be found at 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/labdiagnosis.htm. 
 
Complications 
Groups at risk for complications of influenza 
 
The following groups are currently recognized to be at higher risk for complications of seasonal influenza (e.g., hospitalization; 
death) compared to healthy older children and younger adults (see Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).  MMWR 2005; 54: 1-40 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5408a1.htm). 
• Persons aged = 65 years  
• Residents of nursing homes and other chronic-care facilities that house persons of any age who have chronic medical 
conditions  
• Adults and children who have chronic disorders of the pulmonary or cardiovascular systems, including asthma  
• Adults and children who required regular medical follow-up or hospitalization during the previous year because of 
chronic metabolic diseases (including diabetes mellitus), renal dysfunction, hemoglobinopathies, or 
immunosuppression (including immunosuppression caused by medications or by infection with human 
immunodeficiency virus [HIV])  
• Children and adolescents (aged 6 months–18 years) who are receiving long-term aspirin therapy (and are therefore at 
risk for Reye syndrome)  
• Pregnant women  
• All children aged <2 years  
• All persons with conditions that can compromise respiratory function or the handling of respiratory secretions, or that 
can increase the risk of aspiration  
 
Excluding the last group, in 2003 approximately 85 million persons in the United States belonged to one or more of these target 
groups.  
 
Types of influenza complications 
1. Respiratory exacerbations.  Worsening of underlying chronic diseases are the most common serious complications of 
influenza. Complications are frequently related to underlying respiratory disease, such as chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD). In some cases, typical influenza symptoms might be brief or minimal compared to the 
exacerbation of the underlying disease, particularly in the elderly. 
2. Secondary bacterial pneumonia.  This common complication is characterized by an initial improvement in influenza 
symptoms over the first few days followed by a return of fever, along with a productive cough and pleuritic chest 
pain. Findings include lobar consolidation on chest x-ray and, in adults, sputum smears positive for leukocytes and 
bacteria. The most commonly isolated pathogens are Streptococcus pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus, group A 
Streptococcus, and Haemophilus influenzae. 
3. Primary influenza viral pneumonia. A prominent feature of previous influenza pandemics, primary influenza viral 
pneumonia is currently a relatively rare outcome of seasonal influenza in adults. In contrast, children with pneumonia 
are more likely to have a viral etiology, including influenza than a bacterial cause. Primary influenza pneumonia 
usually begins abruptly, with rapid progression to severe pulmonary disease within 1–4 days. Physical and radiologic 
findings are consistent with diffuse interstitial and/or alveolar disease, including bilateral inspiratory crackles on 
auscultation and diffuse pulmonary infiltrates on chest radiographs. Hypoxia and hemoptysis indicate a poor 
prognosis, and recovery can take up to 1–2 weeks.  
 
4. Mixed viral-bacterial pneumonia.  This is slightly more common than primary viral pneumonia, and, although mixed 
pneumonia may have a slower progression, the two are often indistinguishable. Bacterial pathogens in mixed 
infections are similar to those found in secondary bacterial pneumonias. 
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 5. Bronchiolitis due to influenza.  This occurs more commonly in children, with a clinical picture similar to that of RSV 
or parainfluenza virus infections.  
6. Croup.  Influenza can cause croup (laryngotracheobronchitis) in children, and, although influenza viruses are a less 
common etiology than other respiratory viruses, the illness can be more severe.  
7. Otitis media & sinusitis.  Children with influenza can also develop otitis media, due to either direct viral infection or 
secondary bacterial involvement. Similarly, bacterial sinusitis can develop in older children and adults with influenza. 
8. Cardiovascular complications.  A range of cardiovascular problems can occur, most commonly as an exacerbation of 
an underlying condition such as congestive heart failure. Pregnant women and children with congenital heart defects 
can also experience worsening cardiac function during an influenza illness.              Cardiac inflammation, such as 
myocarditis and pericarditis, can be found occasionally, although clinical manifestations are rare. Available reports 
suggest that myocarditis might have occurred more frequently during pandemic years. Influenza virus is not typically 
identified in heart tissue, suggesting that the host inflammatory response might play a role.                                                   
Although influenza has been associated in rare instances with sudden death possibly due to cardiac arrhythmia, this 
outcome has been difficult to investigate. 
9. Gastrointestinal symptoms.  Gastrointestinal involvement is uncommon with seasonal influenza, although more 
commonly reported in children. Manifestations can include vomiting and diarrhea, sometimes leading to significant 
dehydration. Transient hepatic inflammation can occur in rare circumstances.  
10. Myositis related to influenza.  This is another complication more commonly found in children.  It is also more 
frequently associated with influenza B than with influenza A. Involvement may be limited to pain and weakness of the 
lower extremities but sometimes can progress to rhabdomyolysis and renal failure. 
11. Encephalopathy.  Influenza-associated encephalopathy, characterized by an acute alteration in mental status within the 
first few days of fever onset, is a recently recognized complication of influenza in children. Most reports of influenza-
associated encephalopathy have been in Japanese children, but the condition has been reported sporadically in other 
countries, including the United States. The syndrome can include seizures, neurologic deficits, obtundation, and coma. 
While most children recover completely, some cases can result in permanent sequelae or death. This condition might 
be due to an abnormal host inflammatory response without viral infection of the central nervous system.  
12. Other neurologic complications.  Uncomplicated self-limited febrile seizures can occur with high fever, usually 
occurring in younger children.  Guillain-Barré syndrome and transverse myelitis have been reported to occur in very 
rare instances after influenza, but no definite etiologic relationship has been established. 
13. Reye syndrome.  This characterized by an acute encephalopathy combined with hepatic failure in the absence of 
inflammation in either the brain or the liver. Hepatic involvement includes fatty infiltration, hypoglycemia, and 
hyperammonemia, whereas neurologic manifestations include cerebral edema, delirium, coma, and respiratory arrest. 
Reye syndrome was found to be associated with the use of aspirin in children; its incidence has decreased dramatically 
since the 1980s after aspirin use was discouraged in children. 
14. Systemic complications.  Seasonal influenza can be associated with systemic symptoms, such as sepsis and shock. 
Sepsis caused by invasive co-infection with Staphylococcus aureus, including methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA), 
or other bacteria, such as Neisseria meningitidis.  Toxic shock syndrome without bacterial co-infection has also been 
reported.   
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 Appendix 2 
Clinical Presentation and Complications of Illnesses Associated With Avian Influenza A (H5N1) and Previous 
Pandemic Influenza Viruses 
 
Human infections with different avian influenza A viruses have emerged and caused mild to severe illness in recent years, 
including H9N2, H7N7, H7N3, and H7N2. One novel subtype, influenza A (H5N1), has repeatedly caused limited outbreaks of 
severe and fatal human disease in recent years and therefore has been of particular concern. 
 
Human infection with avian influenza A (H5N1) 
The H5N1 subtype first came to widespread public attention in 1997, when a poultry outbreak of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza A (H5N1) in Hong Kong caused illness in 18 humans. These cases were the first identified instances of direct avian-
to-human transmission of an avian influenza A virus that led to severe disease. 
 
Clinical features ranged from asymptomatic infection or mild upper respiratory symptoms to severe pneumonia and death. 
Most cases presented with fever, headache, malaise, myalgia, sore throat, cough, and rhinorrhea; a few persons also had 
conjunctivitis or gastrointestinal distress. Seven persons, mostly children, developed only mild upper respiratory infections, 
whereas 11 developed severe primary viral pneumonia with rapid deterioration. Most patients in this latter group developed 
lymphopenia; six developed acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), and five developed multi-organ system failure. Other 
abnormalities included pulmonary hemorrhage, renal dysfunction, liver failure, pancytopenia, hemophagocytosis, and Reye 
syndrome (with aspirin ingestion). Notably, none of the patients had secondary bacterial pneumonia. Six of the 18 infected 
persons eventually died. 
 
Avian influenza A (H5N1) resurfaced in Hong Kong in February 2003, in a father and son returning from Fujian Province, 
China. Both presented with influenza-like symptoms, chest radiograph abnormalities, and lymphopenia. The father's status 
rapidly deteriorated, and he developed severe lung involvement and hemophagocytosis; the 8-year-old son recovered. Of note, 
the father's 7-year-old daughter had also died of a pneumonia-like illness while in China, but the cause of her illness was not 
determined. The boy reported close contact with live chickens during his visit to China, but no definite source for H5N1 was 
found. 
 
The most recent human outbreak of avian influenza A (H5N1) has been ongoing since December 2003. This outbreak has been 
associated with an extensive H5N1 epizootic among poultry in Asia. Transmission continues to be predominantly from birds to 
humans, although a few instances of limited human-to-human transmission have been suspected. 
 
Reports published from Vietnam and Thailand describe the early confirmed H5N1 cases from this outbreak. These reports 
characterize human illness with avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection as a primarily respiratory febrile illness that 
progresses to severe disease in a high proportion of cases. Among 10 Vietnamese patients,1 all were previously healthy 
children or young adults (mean age, 13.7 years) who presented to medical attention with fever, cough, and dyspnea. None of 
the patients had other respiratory symptoms, such as sore throat or rhinorrhea, but seven developed diarrhea. Significant 
lymphopenia was observed in all 10 cases, and moderate thrombocytopenia occurred. All 10 had marked abnormalities on 
chest radiograph, and eight patients—all of whom eventually died—required mechanical ventilation for respiratory failure. 
Respiratory cultures suggested bacterial pneumonia in two patients.  
 
Of 12 cases described from Thailand,2 seven were aged <14 years, and all but one were previously healthy. All of the patients 
developed fever, cough, and dyspnea, and six patients were reported with myalgia and diarrhea. Decreased leukocyte counts 
were reported in seven cases, thrombocytopenia occurred in four cases, and increased serum liver enzymes were found in eight. 
All patients had negative blood cultures. They all had abnormal chest radiographs; nine developed respiratory failure with 
ARDS, whereas five developed cardiac failure, four had renal failure, and eight ultimately died. In the Vietnamese and Thai 
cases, respiratory deterioration oc3curred a median of 5 days after symptom onset, but the range was quite wide.
                                                 
1 Tran TH, Nguyen TL, Nguyen TD, Luong TS, Pham PM, Nguyen VC, et al. Avian influenza A (H5N1) in 10 patients in Vietnam. N Engl J Med. 2004;350:1179-88. 
2 Chotpitayasunondh T, Ungchusak K, Hanshaoworakul W, Chunsuthiwat S, Sawanpanyalert P, Kijphati R, et al. Human disease from influenza A (H5N1), Thailand, 2004. Emerg Infect Dis. 2005;11:201-9. 
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 Whereas all patients described above presented with pulmonary symptoms, subsequently published case reports suggest that 
other clinical syndromes can occur with H5N1 infection.3,4,5 In one report, a 39-year-old female with confirmed H5N1 from 
Thailand was initially admitted with symptoms of fever, vomiting, and diarrhea, and was found to have significant 
lymphopenia. She developed shortness of breath approximately 12 days after illness onset and soon progressed to ARDS and 
death.  
 
A 4-year-old male from Vietnam presented for medical attention with severe diarrhea, developed acute encephalitis with coma, 
and died soon thereafter. Although avian influenza A (H5N1) was later detected in throat, stool, serum, and cerebrospinal fluid 
specimens, the patient had no respiratory symptoms at presentation. This patient's 9-year-old sister died of a similar illness a 
few days before his illness began, but no H5N1 testing was performed. Asymptomatic H5N1 infection, detected by 
seroconversion, has been reported. Updated information on avian influenza can be found at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/. 
 
Illnesses associated with previous pandemic viruses 
Since most people do not have previous immunity to novel influenza A viruses, an influenza pandemic results in an increased 
rate of severe disease in a majority of age groups. Nevertheless, the three pandemics of the past century demonstrated 
significant variability in terms of morbidity.  
 
The 1918–19 pandemic was particularly notable in affecting young, healthy adults with severe illness. A significant proportion 
of patients developed fulminant disease, accompanied by a striking perioral cyanosis, leading to death within a few days. 
Postmortem examinations in these patients frequently revealed denuding tracheobronchitis, pulmonary hemorrhage, or 
pulmonary edema. Others survived the initial illness, only to die of a secondary bacterial pneumonia, usually due to 
Streptococcum pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus, group A Streptococcus, or Haemophilus influenzae.  
 
The clinical features of the subsequent pandemics of 1957–58 and 1968–69 were also typical of influenza-like illness, 
including fever, chills, headache, sore throat, malaise, cough, and coryza, but were milder compared to the 1918–19 pandemic. 
On a population level, the impact of influenza in 1957–58 was only one-tenth that observed in 1918–19, and the excess death 
rate in 1968–69 was only half that observed during 1957–58. However, death rates were elevated among the chronically ill and 
the elderly, and the occurrence of severe complications, such as primary viral pneumonia, was notably increased in healthy 
young adults during the 1957–58 pandemic, particularly in pregnant women.  
 
Implications for the next pandemic 
The characteristic clinical features of the next influenza pandemic cannot be predicted. It is reasonable to assume that most 
affected persons will have the typical features of influenza (e.g., fever, respiratory symptoms, myalgia, malaise). However, past 
pandemics have varied considerably with regard to severity and associated complications. 
 
 Illnesses caused by novel influenza viruses such as avian influenza A (H5N1) might predict the potential characteristics of 
pandemic influenza, but H5N1 has not adapted to spread easily among humans, and its presentation and severity might change 
as the virus evolves. Even as the next pandemic begins and spreads, the characteristic features might change, particularly if 
successive waves occur over several months.  
 
Given this potential for a dynamic clinical picture, it will be important for clinicians and public health partners to work together 
to disseminate updated and authoritative information to the health care community on a regular basis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3,4,5 de Jong MD, Bach VC, Phan TQ, Vo MH, Tran TT, Nguyen BH, et al. Fatal avian influenza A (H5N1) in a child presenting with diarrhea followed by coma. N Engl J Med. 2005;352:686-91. 
      Apisarnthanarak A, Kitphati R, Thongphubeth K, Patoomanunt P, Anthanont P, Auwanit W, et al. Atypical avian influenza (H5N1). Emerg Infect Dis 2004;10:1321-4 
      Beigel JH, Farrar J, Hayden FG, Hyer R, de Jong MD, Lochindrat S, et al. Avian influenza A (H5N1) infection in humans. N Eng J Med. 2005 Sep 29;353(13):1374-85. 
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 Appendix 3 
Guidelines For Management of Community-Acquired Pneumonia,  
Including Post-Influenza Community-Acquired Pneumonia 
 
Rationale 
Post-influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia will likely be a common complication during the next pandemic and 
might affect approximately 10% of persons with pandemic influenza, based on data from previous influenza pandemics. 
Assuming that pandemic influenza will affect about 15%–35% of the U.S. population, approximately 4.4 to 10.2 million cases 
of post-influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia could occur. 
 
Post-influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia often presents as a return of fever, along with a productive cough and 
pleuritic chest pain, after an initial improvement in influenza symptoms over the first few days. Findings include lobar 
consolidation on chest x-ray and, in adults, sputum smear positive for leukocytes and bacteria. As with other bacterial 
infections, leukocytosis with increased immature forms may be present, but this finding is neither sensitive nor specific.   
 
The most common etiologies of post-influenza bacterial pneumonia are Streptococcus pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus, 
group A Streptococcus, and Haemophilus influenzae.  
 
Primary viral pneumonia, with abrupt onset and rapid progression, is more common than bacterial pneumonia in children, yet 
rare in adults. Physical and radiologic findings in viral pneumonia are consistent with interstitial and/or alveolar disease and 
include bilateral inspiratory crackles and diffuse infiltrates.  
 
Mixed viral-bacterial pneumonia is slightly more common than primary viral pneumonia, but they are often indistinguishable. 
Bacterial pathogens in mixed infections are similar to those found in secondary bacterial pneumonias.  
 
Droplet and Standard Precautions are currently recommended for community-acquired pneumonia of bacterial etiology.1 
  
Treatment of community-acquired pneumonia, including post-influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia will pose 
challenges for clinicians during a pandemic. Secondary bacterial pneumonia following influenza virus infection will be 
difficult to distinguish from community-acquired pneumonia that is not preceded by influenza.  
 
Current guidelines for the treatment of adult community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) during the Interpandemic Period de-
emphasize the use of diagnostic testing for pathogen-directed treatment and favor empiric therapy with safe and effective 
broad-spectrum antibacterials, especially extended-spectrum macrolides and fluoroquinolones. However, these antibacterials 
will likely be in short supply during a pandemic. 
 
The guidelines in this appendix are therefore designed to assist clinicians in managing patients with community-acquired 
pneumonia, including post-influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia, in a setting of high patient volume and limited 
clinical resources, where the pressure to treat empirically will likely be even greater than during the Interpandemic Period.    
 
These recommendations are from the November 2005 HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan 
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf ).   
For adults, the guidance draws heavily from the current draft guidelines for the management of CAP developed jointly by the 
Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA)2 and the American Thoracic Society (ATS).3   For children, the guidance 
incorporates recommendations from the British Thoracic Society (BTS),4 a published review5 and expert opinions 
. 
                                                 
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Guidelines for preventing health-care-associated pneumonia, 2003 recommendations of CDC and the Health care Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee. 
Respir Care. 2004;49(8):926-39. 
2 Mandell LA, Bartlett JG, Dowell SF, File TM Jr, Musher DM, Whitney C; Infectious Diseases Society of America. Update of practice guidelines for the management of community-acquired pneumonia in 
immunocompetent adults. Clin Infect Dis. 2003; 37(11):1405-33. 
3 Niederman MS, Mandell LA, Anzueto A, Bass JB, Broughton WA, Campbell GD, et al. American Thoracic Society. Guidelines for the management of adults with community-acquired pneumonia. Diagnosis, 
assessment of severity, antimicrobial therapy, and prevention. Am J Respir Crit Care Med. 2001;163(7):1730-54. 
4 British Thoracic Society Standards of Care Committee. British Thoracic Society guidelines for the management of community acquired pneumonia in childhood. Thorax. 2002;57(suppl 1):i1-24. 
5 McIntosh, K. Community-acquired pneumonia in children. N Engl J Med. 2002;346:429-37. 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 29 Supplement 5:  Clinical Guidelines 
 
 Prevention 
Efforts to maximize vaccination coverage against Streptococcus pneumoniae are an important component of post-influenza 
bacterial community-acquired pneumonia prevention during the Interpandemic, Pandemic Alert, and Pandemic Periods. 
Current guidelines on the use of the 23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine among adults6 and the 7-valent 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine among children7 are available.  
 
Site of care: inpatient versus outpatient 
Adults 
IDSA-ATS draft guidelines recommend the use of severity scores, such as the Pneumonia PORT Severity Index (PSI) and the 
CURB-65 system, to determine which patients can be safely treated as outpatients (Tables 2–5). The use of these or other 
similar systems could be extremely important during the next pandemic, as hospital beds will be in short supply. However, 
these ystems should be used to supplement rather than replace the judgment of the individual clinician. 
 
Children 
Current guidelines provide indicators for hospitalization of children with CAP. For infants, the indications include temperature 
>38.5 C, respiratory rate (RR) >70 breaths per minute, chest retractions (indrawing), nasal flaring, hypoxia, cyanosis, 
intermittent apnea, grunting, and poor feeding. Indications for hospitalization among older children include temperature >38.5 
C, RR >50, chest retractions, nasal flaring, hypoxia, cyanosis, grunting, and signs of dehydration.  
 
As with pandemic influenza, the decision to hospitalize for post-influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia during the 
Pandemic Period will rely on the physician’s clinical assessment of the patient as well as availability of personnel and hospital 
resources. Although an unstable patient will be considered a high priority for admission, patients with certain high-risk 
conditions (see Appendix 1) might also warrant special attention. Home management with follow-up might be appropriate for 
well-appearing young children with fever alone. 
 
Diagnostic testing 
Adults 
Generally, the etiologies associated with CAP during the Interpandemic Periods will continue to occur during a pandemic. 
Familiarity with the appropriate use of available diagnostic tests is therefore a key feature of clinical preparedness. 
 
1. Look for S. pneumoniae and S. aureus.  Draft IDSA-ATS guidelines recommend obtaining appropriate specimens for 
etiologic diagnosis whenever such an etiology would alter clinical care. Since the most common etiologies of post-
influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia [S. pneumoniae and S. aureus, including community-acquired 
methicillin-resistant S. aureus (CA-MRSA)] are treated differently, diagnostic testing should be performed to the 
extent feasible to distinguish among these pathogens.  
 
2. Do additional tests for hospitalized patients.   
a. Blood cultures, pneumococcal urine antigen testing, and pleural fluid aspiration with Gram stain and culture 
should be considered.  
b. Since sputum Gram stain and culture is highly dependent on patient and technical conditions, these are 
considered optional for hospitalized but non-severe patients.  
c. For patients admitted to an ICU, consider aspiration of endotracheal secretions for Gram stain and bacterial 
culture.  
 
Children 
Diagnostic studies for identifying bacterial pneumonia in young children are severely limited. 
1. Blood cultures should be obtained from all children suspected of having post-influenza bacterial community-acquired 
pneumonia.  
2. Sputum samples are rarely useful in children.  However, if tracheal or pleural fluid aspirates are available, they should 
be submitted for Gram stain and bacterial culture.  
3. If pleural effusions are present, they should be aspirated and submitted for Gram stain and culture.  
4. Test antibiotic susceptibility testing of any bacterial isolates to direct treatment, where feasible. 
 
 
                                                 
6 CDC. Prevention of pneumococcal disease: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 1997;46(RR-8). 
7 Prevention of pneumococcal disease among infants and young children: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2000;49(RR-9). 
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 Antibiotic treatment 
Adults and children 
Antibiotics will likely be in short supply during the Pandemic Period, particularly those needed to treat CAP.  Therefore, use of 
empiric therapy for all persons with post-influenza bacterial community-acquired pneumonia may not be feasible.   
 
1. Antimicrobial therapy is best managed by culture and susceptibility testing of appropriate clinical specimens, and by 
awareness of local antibiotic susceptibility patterns. (See Figures 1 and 2 for additional clinical management 
algorithms and information.) 
2. A history of a preceding influenza-like illness, especially when pandemic influenza is circulating in the community, 
might help to select those patients more likely to have viral rather than bacterial respiratory infection.  
3. Empiric therapy should be directed toward the most likely etiologies of post-influenza bacterial community-acquired 
pneumonia.  
4. Concurrent antiviral treatment should also be considered, depending on the timing and presentation of illness, the 
clinical status of the patient, and the availability of antivirals (see Supplement 7, Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 31 Supplement 5:  Clinical Guidelines 
 
 Supplement 5.  Appendix 3.  Table 2. 
Pneumonia PORT Severity Index (PSI) Calculation 
 
Patient Characteristic  Points Assigned  
Demographic Factor   
     Age 
          Male           Female  
Number of years 
Number of years–10  
     Nursing home resident  +10  
Comorbid illnesses   
     Neoplastic disease  +30  
     Liver disease  +20  
     Congestive heart failure  +10  
     Cerebrovascular disease  +10  
     Renal disease  +10  
Physical examination finding   
     Altered mental status  +20  
     Respiratory rate >30 breaths/minute  +20  
     Systolic blood pressure <90 mm Hg  +20  
     Temperature <35 C or >40 C  +15  
     Pulse >125 beats/minute  +10  
Laboratory and /or radiographic finding   
     Arterial pH <7.35  +30  
     Blood urea nitrogen >30 mg/dl  +20  
     Sodium <130mmol/l  +20  
     Glucose >250 mg/dl  +10  
     Hematocrit <30%  +10  
     Hypoxemia: 
    <90% by pulse oximetry OR 
     <60mm Hg by arterial blood gas 
+10  
     Pleural effusion on baseline radiograph  +10  
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 Supplement 5.  Appendix 3.  Table 3. 
Pneumonia Severity Index Risk Classification 
 
PSI Risk 
Class  
Characteristics and Points  
Recommended Site of 
Care  
I  
Age >50 years + no comorbid conditions, normal range vital signs, normal mental 
status  
Outpatient  
II  <70  Outpatient  
III  71–90  Outpatient / Brief inpatient 
IV  91–130  Inpatient  
V  130  Inpatient  
 
Supplement 5.  Appendix 3.  Table 4. 
CURB-65 Scoring System 
 
Characteristic  Points  
Confusion1  +1  
Urea >7mmol/l (20mg/dl)  +1  
Respiratory rate >30 breaths per minute  +1  
Blood pressure (Systolic <90 or diastolic <60 mm Hg)  +1  
Age >65 years  +1  
1 Based on a specific mental test or disorientation to person, place, or time. 
 
Supplement 5.  Appendix 3.   Table 5. 
Recommended site of care based on CURB-65 system 
 
Number of Points  Recommended Site of Care  
0–1  Outpatient  
2  Admit to medical ward  
3–5  Admit to medical ward or ICU  
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Updated 19 Jan 2006 
Appendix 4.   ADHS Clinician Fact Sheet:  Influenza
     Clinician Fact Sheet:  Influenza 2005-2006 
Epidemiology 
• Human disease is caused by influenza A or influenza B 
• Ongoing minor antigenic changes require yearly vaccination in the fall 
• Knowing the currently circulating strain aids in decisions regarding antiviral treatment and prophylaxis 
Clinical Presentation 
• High fever, chills, prostration, muscle aches, sore throat, coryza, cough; at times, also vomiting and diarrhea 
Differential Diagnosis 
• Febrile respiratory illnesses such as bacterial pneumonia, mycoplasma, adenovirus, avian influenza (e.g. influenza A 
H5N1), and SARS 
Laboratory 
• Rapid testing of nasopharyngeal swabs for influenza 
• Consider NP swab for respiratory viral culture (if positive, allows for further typing of isolate) 
• Do not order routine viral culture if avian influenza is suspected 
Infection control 
• Droplet precautions (mask within 3-6 feet) 
• Routine standard precautions and good handwashing before & after patient contact 
Treatment & Prophylaxis 
• Antivirals shorten the course of illness when given within the first 1-2 days of influenza symptoms  
• CDC recommends against the use of amantadine & rimantadine for the 2005-2006 season 
 Amantadine 
(Symmetrel®) 
Rimantadine 
(Flumadine®) 
Oseltamivir  
(Tamiflu®) 
Zanamivir  
(Relenza®) 
Effective for 
Influenza A  
Not recommended for  
2005-2006 season 
Yes Yes 
Effective for  
Influenza B 
No No Yes Yes 
Mode Oral Oral Oral Inhaled 
Treatment > 1 y.o. > 13 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 7 y.o. 
Prophylaxis > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. Not licensed 
Follow CDC’s recommendations for ages and contraindications 
• Don’t use smaller doses than recommended 
• Only use LAIV (Flumist™) in healthy people ages 5 years-49 years 
• Persons receiving LAIV should avoid close contact with severely immunosuppresed people for 7 days 
• Contraindications to inactivated influenza vaccine or LAIV  
o Anaphylactic allergy to eggs 
o Previous Guillain-Barré syndrome during the 6 weeks following a previous influenza vaccine 
 
Remember Pneumovax® or Prevnar® pneumococcal vaccine for high-risk individuals. 
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 Influenza Vaccine Recommendations for 2005-2006 season 
Inactivated intramuscular shot [Multiple manufacturers]:   
1) Ages > 50 y.o.  
2) All children ages 6 mo.-23 mo.                 
3) Household contacts and out-of-home caretakers of infants < age 6 mo.  
4) Ages 2 y.o.-64 y.o. with a chronic medical conditions (e.g. heart disease, lung disease, asthma, diabetes, kidney 
disease, immunosuppression, etc.)  
5) Pregnant during influenza season. 
6) Children age 6 mo.-18 y.o. on chronic aspirin therapy. 
7) Health care workers (HCW) with direct patient care. 
8) Residents in nursing home or long-term care facility. 
9) Anyone wishing to reduce their risk of influenza. 
Live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) [Flumist™]:  
• Healthy, nonpregnant people ages 5 y.o. through 49 y.o., including close contacts of infants and many health care 
workers  
Pediatric pointers 
• Children ages 5 years-8 years old receiving any influenza vaccine for the first time need two doses of vaccine.   
o Two inactivated shots should be spaced > 4 weeks apart 
o Two LAIV doses should be separated by 6-10 weeks  
• Notify local or county health department for pediatric influenza deaths. 
Staphylococcal and MRSA disease associated with influenza 
• MRSA is becoming a community-acquired infection 
• Coagulase positive staphylococcus secondary respiratory infections are more likely with influenza 
• During the 2003-2004 season, CDC reported severe illness and death associated with influenza and MRSA 
¾ Physicians caring for patients who have influenza and worsening respiratory status requiring IV antibiotics should 
consider using vancomycin for staphylococcal coverage until culture results are available and/or clinical improvement 
occurs 
• Many oral antibiotics do not cover MRSA 
• Oral antibiotics that may be effective against MRSA 
o Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole  
 Poor against Streptococcus pneumoniae 
 Avoid in pregnancy 
o Clindamycin (Good against Streptococcus pneumoniae) 
For More Information 
• ADHS website at  http://www.azdhs.gov/phs/immun/providersflu.htm  
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website at www.cdc.gov/flu  
• MMWR July 29, 2005 “Treatment and Control of Influenza” at  
• http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5408a1.htm 
• Recorded ADHS Hotline for the Public: 
   
Metro Phoenix 602-364-4500  Statewide 1-800-314-9243 
Arizona Department of Health Services 
Division of Public Health Services 
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Updated 19 Jan 2006 
Appendix 5.   ADHS Clinician Fact Sheet:  Antivirals 
    Clinician Fact Sheet:  Antivirals for Influenza 2005-2006 
Four antiviral drugs are licensed for treatment and chemoprophylaxis  
• Antivirals shorten the course of illness when given within the first 1-2 days of influenza symptoms  
• Avoid antivirals in pregnant women unless benefit outweighs risk 
• Though usually effective for influenza A, this season amantadine and rimantadine are not recommended in the U.S. due to 
high levels of resistance 
 Amantadine 
(Symmetrel®) 
Rimantadine 
(Flumadine®) 
Oseltamivir 
(Tamiflu®) 
Zanamivir 
(Relenza®) 
Effective for Flu A Not recommended for 2005-2006 
season 
Yes Yes 
Effective for Flu B No No Yes Yes 
Mode Oral Oral Oral Inhaled 
Treatment > 1 y.o. > 13 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 7 y.o. 
Prophylaxis > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. N/A 
Priority groups for treatment with antiviral medicines 
• Any person with a potentially life-threatening influenza-related illness   
• Any person at high risk for serious complications of influenza and who is within the first 2 days of illness onset 
Priority groups for chemoprophylaxis with antiviral medicines 
• All residents and workers during an institutional outbreak   
• All persons at high risk of serious influenza complications if they are exposed to a known or suspected case of 
influenza 
Consider antiviral use in these patients if local supplies are adequate: 
Chemoprophylaxis 
• Persons in communities where influenza viruses are circulating (influenza outbreak usually lasts 6-8 weeks) 
• Persons at high risk of serious complications who cannot get vaccinated.  
Persons at high risk of serious complications who have been vaccinated but have not had time to mount an immune 
response to the vaccine.  In adults, chemoprophylaxis should occur for 2 weeks after vaccination.  
• Persons with immunosuppressive conditions who are not expected to mount an adequate antibody response to 
influenza vaccine. 
• Heath-care workers with direct patient care responsibilities who have not been vaccinated 
Treatment  
• Infected adults and children aged >1 year who do not have conditions placing them at high risk for serious 
complications secondary to influenza infection. 
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 Length of Antiviral Treatment and Chemoprophylaxis 
Chemoprophylaxis Length  Treatment 
Length  After 
exposure 
Institutional outbreak After vaccine** 
Amantadine 
Rimantadine 
3-5 days* 7 days Until outbreak over 2 weeks 
Oseltamivir 7 days Until outbreak over 2 weeks 
Zanamivir 
5 days 
N/A N/A N/A 
*Until afebrile 1-2 days  ** If antiviral prophylaxis is desired for high-risk individuals during the time immunity is developing 
 
Pediatric Pointers 
• Children < 9 years old who have never had an influenza vaccine need 2 doses of influenza vaccine, > 1 month apart to be 
optimally protected.  Therefore, if a high-risk child is vaccinated when there is influenza in the community, antiviral 
prophylaxis may need to be continued for 6 weeks for optimal protection. 
• For pediatric antiviral use where no liquid formulation is available, open the capsule or crush the tablet, and give the 
appropriate dose in cherry syrup.    
 
ANTIVIRAL MEDICINES 
Amantadine  [100 mg capsule; 50 mg/5 ml syrup] 
• Treatment and prophylaxis (T&P) of influenza A in > 12 months of age.   
• Standard dose in adults for both T&P: 100 mg PO twice a day. 
• Standard dose in children for T&P: 5 mg/kg/day PO in two divided doses (max of 150 mg/day). 
• Side effects:  CNS effects (e.g. trouble concentrating, insomnia & lowered seizure threshold, dry mouth, urinary retention). 
• Decrease dose to 100 mg Q day 
o CrCl < 50 ml/min 
o Age > 65 years 
o When side effects occur on 100 mg BID 
 
Rimantadine [100 mg tablet; 50 mg/5 ml syrup] 
• Treatment of influenza A in > 13 y.o.   
• Prophylaxis of influenza A in > 1 y.o. 
• Standard dose in adults: 100 mg PO twice a day (see above table for length) 
• Standard dose in children: 5 mg/kg/day PO in two divided doses (max of 150 mg/day). 
• Similar but fewer side effects than amantadine  
• Decrease dose to 100 mg Q day 
o Nursing home residents 
o Age > 65 years 
o Severe hepatic dysfunction 
o CrCl < 10 ml/min 
o When side effects occur on 100 mg BID 
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 Oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) [75 mg tablet; 60 mg/5 ml suspension] 
• Treatment and prophylaxis of influenza A & B in > 12 months old.   
• Treatment: 75 mg PO twice daily for 5 days.    
• Lower dose in children based on weight: 
< 15 kg, 30 mg BID;  
>15-23 kg, 45 mg BID; 
>23-40 kg, 60 mg BID;  
>40 kg, 75 mg PO BID. 
• Prophylaxis:  75 mg PO once daily  
• Side effects:  nausea & vomiting 
• Reduce dose to 75 mg every other day when CrCl 10-30 ml/min 
Zanamivir (Relenza®) [Inhaler] 
• Treatment of influenza A & B in > 7 years of age.   
• Inhalation (10 mg) twice daily for 5 days. 
• Side effects:  Bronchospasm  
For more detailed information about each antiviral medication 
See http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/treatment  
 
        
 Arizona Department of Health Services 
Division of Public Health Services 
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Summary of Public Health Roles and Responsibilities for Vaccine Distribution and Use 
 
(The following actions for  HHS, ADHS, and county and tribal health departments are described in further detail, later in this 
Supplement.  The roles and responsibilities of health care partners in vaccine distribution and use are described in Supplement 3.) 
 
Interpandemic and pandemic alert periods 
 
ADHS  
• Work with local health departments, health care providers and other stakeholders to develop state-based plans for monitoring 
vaccine effectiveness and safety, and coordinating vaccine distribution and use. 
 
County and tribal health departments 
• Develop and implement plans, systems and capacities to receive, distribute, and administer vaccine to population of 
jurisdiction  
 
HHS agencies: 
• Work with manufacturers to expedite public-sector vaccine purchasing contracts during a pandemic and establish mechanisms 
for vaccine procurement and distribution. 
• Develop guidance on priority groups for vaccination. 
• Develop and stockpile vaccine for influenza strains with pandemic potential. 
• Expedite the rapid development, licensure, and production of new influenza vaccines, as well as evaluate dose optimization 
strategies to maximize use of limited vaccine stocks. 
• Estimate rates of reports of mild and severe adverse events following immunization (AEFIs) 
• Identify mechanisms and define protocols fro conducting vaccine-effectiveness studies. 
• Develop reporting specifications for tracking data on vaccine administration  
• Develop and distribute communication and education materials for use by states and other stakeholders. 
 
Pandemic period 
 
After the first reports of pandemic influenza are confirmed and before a vaccine becomes available: 
 
ADHS  
• If stockpiled vaccine of the pandemic subtype is available, ensure delivery to county and tribal health departments and health 
care partners, as determined by priority status. 
• Keep the health care and public health workforce up-to-date on projected timelines for availability of vaccines against 
pandemic influenza. 
• Provide updated information to public on vaccine status and prioritization (see Supplement 10). 
 
County and tribal health departments 
• Mobilize response partners, and prepare to activate plans for receiving, distributing, and administering vaccines. 
• Activate plans and systems to receive, distribute, and administer pre-pandemic stockpiled vaccines to designated groups, upon 
delivery by ADHS 
• Review modifications, if any, to recommendations on vaccinating priority groups. 
• Accelerate training in vaccination and vaccine monitoring for public health staff and for partners responsible for vaccinating 
priority groups. 
• Be prepared to administer unlicensed vaccines (if needed) under FDA's Investigational New Drug (IND) provisions 
• Work with other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to ensure effective public health 
communications. 
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HHS agencies: 
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• Facilitate vaccine procurement, distribution, and tracking, working 
with private partners. 
• Revise recommendations on vaccination of priority groups, guided by 
epidemiologic information about the pandemic virus  
• Provide guidance on reporting specifications for tracking 
administration of vaccine  
• Provide guidance on Investigational New Drug (IND) and Emergency 
Use Authorization (EUA)  
• Provide guidance on which adverse event reports are highest priority 
for investigation. 
• Provide regulatory guidance to vaccine manufacturers  
 
After a vaccine becomes available: 
 
ADHS  
• Submit requests to HHS for appropriate number of vaccine doses 
• Work with emergency management to ensure the safe delivery of 
pandemic vaccines to county and tribal health departments and to 
health care agencies, for prioritized vaccinations 
• Monitor vaccine supplies, distribution, and use. 
• Monitor and investigate adverse events. 
• Provide updated information to the public via the news media. 
• Ensure that vaccine requests to HHS and distribution to clinics and other facilities accounts for the need for second doses 
• Work with HHS to evaluate vaccine-related response activities when the pandemic is over. 
 
County and tribal health departments 
• Activate plans and systems to receive, distribute and administer vaccines to designated groups, upon delivery from ADHS. 
• Phase in vaccination of the rest of the population after priority groups have been vaccinated. 
 
HHS agencies: 
• Provide forecasts of pandemic vaccine availability from the manufacturers 
• Continue to provide input into appropriate strain selection for seasonal influenza vaccine. 
• Distribute public stocks of vaccines to state and large city health departments and to federal agencies with direct patient care 
responsibility, as needed. 
• Implement protocols for assessing vaccine effectiveness. 
• Monitor vaccine coverage rates. 
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I.  Rationale  
The initial response to an influenza pandemic will include medical care, community containment and personal protective 
measures, and targeted use of antiviral drugs. Before a vaccine containing the circulating pandemic virus strain becomes 
available, pre-pandemic vaccine from stockpiles (if available for the pandemic subtype or partially cross-protective to the 
circulating virus) may be considered for persons in designated priority groups. Once a vaccine against the circulating pandemic 
virus strain becomes available, its distribution and delivery will be a major focus of pandemic response efforts.  Public health 
goals for vaccination during an influenza pandemic include: 
• Developing pre-pandemic strategies for vaccine manufacturing and stockpiling that will maximize manufacturing 
capability 
• Stockpiling influenza vaccine for strains and subtypes with pandemic potential 
• Expediting development of a pandemic virus reference strain and distribution of the strain to vaccine manufacturers 
• Accelerating production of a pandemic vaccine 
• Maximizing the immune response to the vaccine 
• Ensuring efficient and equitable distribution of pandemic vaccine, according to priority lists 
• Rapidly determining vaccine effectiveness 
• Providing ongoing and timely monitoring of vaccine coverage 
• Providing ongoing and timely monitoring of vaccine safety 
 
 
ADHS goals for vaccination, once vaccine becomes available, are: 
• Securing sufficient quantities of vaccine for priority groups 
• Ensuring equitable distribution of vaccine to providers serving priority groups 
• Distributing and delivery of vaccine to pre-identified public providers 
• Facilitating special immunizations clinics for easy access by the priority groups, the vulnerable, and hard to read 
population 
• Monitoring vaccine usage and effectiveness according to set protocols 
• Communicating the benefits of vaccine for priority groups 
• Collecting data and reporting any adverse events following vaccination 
 
 
II.  Overview  
Supplement 6 provides recommendations to state and local partners and other stakeholders on planning for the different 
elements of a pandemic vaccination program. The recommendations for the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods focus 
on planning for vaccine distribution, vaccination of 
priority groups, monitoring of adverse events, tracking 
of vaccine supply and administration, vaccine coverage 
and effectiveness studies, communications, legal 
preparedness, and training. The recommendations for 
the Pandemic Period focus on working with health care 
partners to implement plans for vaccination against 
pandemic influenza and initiate monitoring activities. 
 
The activities described below are primarily the 
responsibility of government health authorities at the 
state, federal, local, and tribal levels.  Additional issues 
that night be of interest to health partners that 
administer vaccine are addressed in Supplement 3. 
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III.  Actions for the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods  
 
ADHS  
• Work with local health departments, health care providers and other stakeholders to develop state-based plans for monitoring 
vaccine effectiveness and safety, and coordinating vaccine distribution and use. 
 
County and tribal health departments 
• Develop and implement plans, systems and capacities to receive, distribute, and adminster vaccine to population of jurisdiction  
 
A.  Vaccination against seasonal influenza virus strains 
 
During the Interpandemic Period, the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) and county health departments will 
continue to work with tribes, IHS, community partners, mass immunizers, health care partners, targeted populations, and 
immunization coalitions to promote and enhance levels of: 
 
1) Seasonal influenza vaccination in groups at risk for severe influenza 
a. persons aged ≥65 years with co-morbid conditions 
b. residents of long-term care facilities 
c. persons aged 2-64 years with co-morbid conditions 
d. persons aged ≥65 years without co-morbid conditions 
e. children aged 6-23 months 
f. pregnant women 
g. health care personnel 
h. household contacts and out-of-home caregivers of children aged <6 months 
i. household contacts of children and adults at increased risk for influenza-related complications 
 
2) Pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccination among those for whom it is recommended: 
a. persons aged ≥65 years 
b. persons aged 2-64 years with co-morbid conditions or who are living in special environments or social settings  
c. persons aged 50-64 years  
d. immunocompromised persons 
 
The success of the pandemic influenza vaccination program will be determined in large part by the strength of the ADHS and 
local vaccination programs during the Interpandemic Period.  ADHS, county health departments, and mass immunizers work 
collaboratively each year, to increase public confidence and to provide flu vaccine to high-risk populations and to the general 
public.  ADHS participates in the Adult Immunization coalition with representatives from health plans, vaccine manufacturers, 
mass immunizers to address annual flu vaccine concerns/issues and to get information to the pubic regarding these issues.  The 
ADHS Immunization Program Office supports the Community Information and Referral (CIR) hotline and website, the 
statewide “flu and pneumococal immunization clinic locator” each year by publicizing the hotline number and web address in 
print materials and media messages.  During an influenza pandemic, the CIR Hotline will play a critical role providing 
information to the general public.      
 
Higher annual vaccination rates will foster increased familiarity with and public confidence in influenza vaccines, increased 
manufacturing capacity for influenza vaccines, and strengthened distribution channels. HHS is working with industry partners 
to ensure influenza vaccine can be produced on an emergency basis at any time throughout the year (see Box 1). 
In past years, approximately 80%-90% of flu vaccine administered in Arizona has been administered by the private sector.  
Although geographical, provider, and demographic information on this segment has not been readily available, ADHS and 
county health departments have improved communications the past 2 years prompted by the flu vaccine shortage in 2004-2005, 
and delayed shipments in 2005-2006.     
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Increased use of pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine may decrease rates of secondary bacterial infections during a pandemic.  
Because large-scale pneumococcal vaccination might not be feasible once a pandemic occurs, the Interpandemic Period and 
Pandemic Alert is the ideal time to deliver this preventive measure.  Pneumococcal vaccine is indicated for most persons for 
whom influenza vaccine is recommended.  Specific guidelines on the prevention of pneumococcal disease can be found at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr4608.pdf, Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP).   
 
With funding from the Governor’s Health Crisis Fund, ADHS began a campaign promoting pneumococcal immunization on 
December 26, 2005.  The campaign will be conducted through March and again from October – December, 2006.  Media 
messages with be broadcast  in English and Spanish on cable and radio channels, and educational materials will be developed, 
printed and distributed to provider offices serving targeted populations.   
 
The state has recognized the increased need to vaccinate the high risk population with pneumococcal vaccine.  Each year, 
pneumococcal vaccination will be promoted in advance of an influenza pandemic. These efforts have begun in December 2005 
to vaccinate those individuals 65 and older as well as other individuals with a high-risk medical conditions for which this 
vaccine is recommended. 
 
B. Preparedness for vaccination against a pandemic influenza virus 
 
A limited amount of avian influenza A (H5N1) vaccine is being stockpiled 
and will be considered for early use in the event of an H5N1 pandemic. 
Development of vaccines against other strains with pandemic potential is also 
being considered. A monovalent vaccine directed against the circulating 
pandemic virus strain of influenza should begin to be available within 4-6 
months after identification of the new pandemic virus strain (Box 1). The 
number of persons who may be protected by vaccination depends on the 
manufacturing capacity, the amount of antigen per dose needed for a 
protective immune response, and the number of doses required. Although 
annual influenza vaccine is immunogenic in older children and adults with a 
single 15 microgram (µg) dose, a higher antigen concentration and/or two 
doses may be needed for pandemic vaccine where persons have no previous 
exposure to the influenza subtype and lack any immunity. Preliminary results 
from a recent clinical trial of an H5N1 vaccine in healthy adults suggested 
that two doses of 90 µg were required. Additional clinical trials are ongoing 
to evaluate possible ways to improve the immune response to lower the 
amounts of vaccine antigen needed for protection. 
 plans). 
 
Initial pandemic vaccine stocks will be used to vaccinate designated priority 
groups (Part 1, Appendix D). After vaccination of these priority groups, 
vaccination of all those who desire it will be phased in depending on available 
supplies.  In working with health care partners to develop state-based plans 
for distributing vaccines, ADHS and county health departments might use 
existing state-based plans for emergency mass distribution of medical 
supplies as the basis for developing local pandemic vaccination plans (e.g., 
smallpox and bioterrorism response
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Preparation Steps by ADHS to protect Arizona’s population 
  Review CDC’s priority groups and recommendations; accept or modify groups for Arizona 
  Update “Arizona’s Influenza Vaccine Estimate Worksheet” with the numbers of individuals in targeted 
priority groups established by CDC 
  Prompt CHD’s to compile list of potential clinic sites for vaccine administration 
  Compile list of qualified ADHS staff who can assist or administer vaccine in the clinics and/or provide 
support functions (e.g., set-up, crowd control, data entry) 
  Compile list of volunteers from other agencies/organizations, who can assist. 
  Prompt CHD’s to compile list of physicians in community who are/ would likely be giving vaccine. 
  Conduct inventory of vaccine distribution related supplies (e.g. styrofoam coolers, ice packs) and 
establish written procedures/ names of vendors to order additional supplies. 
  Identify additional storage facilities (refrigerators) for vaccine. 
  Review written SOPs for mass vaccination clinics and update if needed.  
  Educate and train clinic staff on importance of proper storage and handling protocols  
  Establish financial/logistical mechanisms for obtaining and distributing necessary vaccine and 
distribution supplies 
  Recommend appropriate security measures during vaccine storage and transportation 
   Review SNS protocol in the event state supplies become exhausted 
  Anticipate adverse reactions to vaccine, possible vaccine failures, and potential liability issues 
  Establish a continuity of operations plan in the event of increased workload, staff absenteeism, or staff 
losses 
 
 
1.  Vaccination of priority groups  
 
A list of priority groups for receiving vaccination and the rationale for prioritization is provided in Part 1, Appendix D, as 
interim recommendations. In addition, during a pandemic, changes may be made based on the characteristics of the causative 
virus (e.g., transmissibility, virulence, initial geographic distribution, age-specific attack rates, complication rates) and on 
vaccine effectiveness. 
 
In the pandemic alert periods, ADHS will establish a Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization Policy Committee (VAPPC) 
composed of 
o Representative(s) from the Governor’s office 
o State Epidemiologist 
o State physician(s) 
o ADHS influenza epidemiologist 
o Office of Infectious Disease Services office chief 
o ADHS administrator(s) 
o Arizona Immunization Program Office (AIPO) 
representative 
o Arizona Local Health Officers Association  
representative 
o Arizona Medical Association representative 
o Hospital Association representative 
o Arizona Emergency Medical Service 
representative 
o Arizona Pharmacy Alliance representative 
o Long-term care representative  
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The VAPPC will define how these priority groups will apply on a local level, and will define who should be included in the 
groups of public safety workers, essential service providers, and key governmental decision makers.   
 
During an influenza pandemic, the VAPPC will modify these priority groups as needed based on the availability of antiviral 
medicines and vaccine, the characteristics of the causative virus (e.g., drug susceptibilities, initial geographic distribution, 
fatality rate, age-specific morbidity and mortality rates) and the effectiveness of implemented strategies. 
 
The VAPPC will provide the rationale for establishing the 
priority groups so that the reasons for prioritization can be 
communicated to the community. 
 
A listing of the priority groups identified by the federal 
pandemic plan has been inserted into the Arizona’s Influenza 
Vaccine Estimate Worksheet (Table 1).   The worksheet also 
acts as a tool for a County Health Department to estimate the 
County’s population in each group.  The definition of each 
prioritization group and the rationales for each groups are 
found in the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, Appendix D, Part 
1. Some priority groups require further discussion (ie: key 
government leaders, telecommunications, utility service 
workers, etc) for better estimation of numbers. 
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Table 1.  Arizona’s Influenza Vaccine Estimate Worksheet 
Resource: 2005 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Appendix D: Table D-1 
Assumptions: 2004 Census data and AZ/US ratio ~2% 
Estimates include Federal health care providers to Indian Nations and Tribes  
 
Estimated Population  # of doses 
(2 doses per person) Tiers Pandemic Priority Groups U.S.  
 Arizona Pop. 
Arizona Winter Pop and 
migrant seasonal workers
 
County 
 
ALL     Total Population 312,000,000 5,832,150 600,000  11,664,300
       
1A  Vaccine & antiviral
manufacturers 
~ 40,000 ~ 800    
1A Medical workers and public 
health workers w/direct patient 
care 
~ 8 – 9 
million 
~160,000 – 
180,000 
   
1B Persons > 65 years w/ 1 or 
more high-risk conditions 
~ 18.2 million ~364,000 250,000    
1B Persons 6 months to 64 w/ 2 or 
more high-risk conditions 
~ 6.9 million ~138,000    
1B Persons 6 months or older w/ 
history of hospitalization for 
pneumonia or influenza in past 
year 
~ 740,000 ~14,800    
1C Pregnant women ~ 30 million ~ 600,000    
1C Household contacts of severely 
immunocompromised persons 
who could not receive vaccine 
~  2.7 million ~ 54,000    
1C Household contact of children 
< 6 months olds 
~ 5.0 million ~100,000    
1D Public health emergency 
response workers critical to 
pandemic response 
~  150,000 ~ 3,000    
1D Key government leaders TBD TBD    
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2A Healthy persons 65 years and 
older 
~ 17.7 million ~ 354,000 300,000   
2A Persons 6 months to 64 years 
of age w/1 high-risk condition 
~ 35.8 million ~716,000 50,000   
2A Healthy children 6 – 23 
months olds 
~ 5.6 million ~112,000    
2B Other public health emergency 
responders 
~ 300,000 
 
~6,000    
2B Public safety workers 
including police, fire, 911 
dispatchers, and correctional 
facility staff  
2.99 million 59,800    
2B Utility workers essential for 
maintenance of power, water, 
and sewage 
364,000     7,280
2B      Transportation workers
transporting fuel, water, food, 
and medical supplies 
3.8 million 
 
72,000
2B  Telecommunications/IT for
essential network operations 
and maintenance 
1.08 million 21,600    
3 Other key government health 
decision-makers 
TBD     TBD
3       Funeral directors/embalmers 62,000 1,240
4 Healthy persons 2-64 years not 
included in other categories 
~179.3 
million 
~3,026,630    
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Table 2 below represents the total populations by tier/groups needed for Arizona: 
 
Tiers/Groups Arizona 
population 
Migratory/ 
Seasonal 
1 1,455,600 250,000 
2 1,348,680 350,000 
3 1,240 0 
4 ~ 3,026,630 ? 
Total 
Population 
 
5,832,150 600,000 
 
 
2. Vaccine production, procurement and distribution 
 
HHS is working to expand pandemic influenza vaccine production capacity and will signal to manufacturers when to shift from 
annual to pandemic vaccine production and assure that pandemic vaccine is produced at full capacity. 
 
At the onset of an influenza pandemic, HHS, in concert with the Congress in collaboration with the states, will work with the 
pharmaceutical industry to acquire vaccine directed against the pandemic strain. Distribution of pandemic vaccine to ADHS 
and providers will occur via private-sector vaccine distributors or directly via manufacturer. (Only stockpiled pre-pandemic 
vaccine would be distributed by the federal government, if used.) 
 
ADHS will receive available vaccine in proportion to the size of its population in defined priority groups. The following 
concepts are used to formulate the event-specific vaccination response plan, specific to the amount of vaccine that available to 
the state: 
• Use of the Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization Policy 
Committee (VAPPC) to determine and estimate the size of the 
priority groups that will be vaccinated  
• Identify organizations that will provide vaccination to persons in 
priority groups  
• Identify locations for vaccination clinics to achieve vaccination 
of those populations 
• Determine whether vaccine will be shipped from the 
manufacturer to ADHS further distribution or directly  to 
immunization providers  
• Ensure event-specific plan includes strategies for vaccinating 
medically underserved, hard to reach populations, seasonal 
visitors, and migrant populations to improve equity in access 
within priority groups and, later, the general population. 
• If vaccinations are provided by private-sector organizations or 
providers at offices, clinics, or other sites, ADHS and county 
health departments will: 
o Allocate vaccine based on projected need. 
o Collect unused vaccine (if any) from health care providers who have met their priority vaccination goals and 
distribute the vaccine to those who have not. 
o Monitor that vaccine administration follows existing plans on priority groups. 
 
ADHS, in conjunction with the county health departments, will the authorized vaccine providers pre-authorized to receive 
influenza vaccine.  ADHS will procure the influenza vaccine through CDC and/or the vaccine manufacturers.  It is anticipated 
the CDC will determine the number of doses each state is allotted on monthly basis. 
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Arizona Influenza Vaccine Distribution: 
• Submit the quantity of desired or monthly allotment of influenza vaccine to CDC and/or vaccine manufacturer 
• Request direct shipments of vaccine from the manufacturer to the vaccine providers. It is highly unlikely the vaccine 
manufacturers could accommodate nationwide direct shipments.  Arizona has 500-1000 potential influenza vaccine 
providers. 
• Utilize a two-prong approach to vaccine distribution, dependent upon doses in inventory and scheduled shipments 
allotted from manufacturer. Current vaccine storage capacity at ADHS is 100,000 doses at any time.  ADHS will 
utilize the existing 3rd party distributor, to handle the storage and distribution of this vaccine if ADHS storage capacity 
is exceeded. 
• Transport vaccine from ADHS to predetermined locations on a weekly basis to control distribution and adjustments to 
geographical areas, minimize storage problems at the vaccine providers.  
• Review the adequacy of the current security measures at ADHS and CHD offices and enhance security, if needed. 
ADHS may request assistance from law enforcement agencies. The AIPO would remain responsible for management 
of vaccine, including coordination of distribution. Enhanced security for vaccine at the local distribution sites will be 
the responsibility of the local authorities.  
 
a)  Second-dose vaccination 
A vaccine against pandemic influenza will likely require two doses, administered at least a month apart, to provide a level of 
immunity comparable to that obtained with seasonal influenza vaccines. Recommendations on the number of required doses 
and the timing of the second dose will be issued once immunogenicity trials have been completed.  If two doses are required to 
achieve immunity, it will be necessary to ensure that vaccinated persons return for the second dose.  
 
b)  Contingency planning for Investigational New Drug use 
ADHS and county and tribal health departments need to be prepared to distribute unlicensed vaccines (if needed) under FDA's 
Investigational New Drug (IND) provisions. Unlicensed vaccines might be needed, for example, if pandemic spread is rapid 
and standard vaccine efficacy and safety tests are not completed in time to play a role in the response. 
 
IND provisions require strict inventory control and record-keeping, completion of a signed consent form from each vaccinee, 
and mandatory reporting of specified types of adverse events.  
 
IND provisions also require approval from Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in hospitals, health departments, and other 
vaccine-distribution venues. The FDA regulations permit the use of a national or "central" IRB. A treatment IND is one IND 
mechanism that FDA has available for use and is especially suited for large scale use of investigational products 
(http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_99/21cfr_99.html). 
 
As an alternative to IND use of an unapproved antiviral drug, HHS may utilize the drug roduct under Emergency Use 
Authorization procedures as described in the FDA draft Guidance "Emergency Use Authorization of Medical Products" 
(http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/emeruse.pdf). 
 
3.  Vaccine monitoring and data collection 
 
i. Vaccine effectiveness 
To ensure optimal use of a new pandemic influenza vaccine, state and county and tribal health departments and 
participating immunization providers should be prepared to collect data on vaccine effectiveness, vaccine supply and 
distribution, vaccine coverage, and vaccine safety. 
 
ADHS has the capability and capacity to collect data and store vaccine/immunization data in the Arizona State 
Immunization Information System (ASIIS), the state immunization registry.  Vaccine supply can be tracked and data 
collected on coverage.  Vaccine effectiveness and safety will be monitored through ASIIS, VAERS reports, and disease 
surveillance.   ASIIS is continually upgraded and enhanced to collect additional information and expand data collection on 
all ages (currently, Arizona providers are only required to report immunizations administered to individuals birth through 
18 years of age only).  ASIIS is a web-based system which will allow any health care professional licensed under title 32 
to provide immunizations, to enroll and submit immunization data on any age person to ASIIS  
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ii.  Vaccine supply and distribution 
Vaccine effectiveness will be assessed by comparing rates of influenza-related illness, hospitalization, and/or death among 
vaccinated and unvaccinated persons. These studies will be implemented by CDC in collaboration with health care and 
university partners and with state and local health departments that participate in influenza surveillance systems (see 
Supplement 1)  
• Vaccine tracking and coverage information may be used by federal, state, and local decision-makers to estimate 
adverse event rates based on the number of doses administered and to determine if vaccine is being administered 
according to established priority groups for pandemic vaccine (especially in the early phases of vaccination).  
Data will be collected from individual providers, collated at the local and state levels, and reported to federal 
authorities on a scheduled routine basis. 
• ADHS will be able to utilize the state immunization registry, ASIIS, to track coverage with pandemic influenza 
vaccine. Health professionals administering vaccines to individuals birth through 18 years of age have been 
required (ARS §36-135) to report those immunizations to ASIIS since 1998.  ASIIS is a web-based system and 
can be expanded to allow any health professional administering pandemic flu vaccine to any age person to report 
those doses and other needed information.  Data currently collected includes name, address, social security 
number if known, gender, and date of birth.  Fields can be added to collect, at a minimum, tracking data such as: 
o Number of doses administered, by date and age, priority group, and state or county (or zip code) 
o ASIIS includes a reminder/recall program that could be utilized to recall patients for a second dose, 
if necessary. 
o ADHS and county and tribal health departments may consider additional data requirements for their 
own needs. 
 
iii.  Vaccine coverage 
CDC will work with ADHS to develop a system for monitoring vaccination rates at regular intervals, using a pre-existing 
population-based survey tool (e.g., Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System) that provides national and state-level 
estimates and complements the vaccine tracking systems described above. 
 
iv.  Vaccine safety 
ADHS and county health departments will use VAERS to report and investigate adverse events following immunization 
(AEFI) with a pandemic influenza vaccine.  
 
•  Currently, the Immunization Services Manager in 
the ADHS Immunization Program Office, serves 
as the point of contact for adverse events occurring 
in and reported by facilities using publicly 
purchased vaccine.  Currently, AEFI occurring in private provider offices are reported directly to VAERS by the 
provider site.   
•  ADHS will review existing policies for AEFI reporting and follow-up to ensure timeliness of reporting and will 
work with private provider organizations and mass immunizers to report all AEFI to the state coordinator to 
minimize duplicate reporting of AEFI to VAERS. 
 • ADHS will develop a plan to ensure timely reporting of and communication about large numbers of AEFI reports. 
•  ADHS will review procedures for and familiarize program staff with the strengths, imitations, and objectives of 
VAERS.  VAERS typically involves direct reporting by individual health care providers, with periodic feedback 
to the states.  AEFI reporting in Arizona will build on the infrastructure and experience developed during the 
2003 smallpox vaccination program.  Adverse events related to use of IND vaccines may be reported through 
other mechanisms in addition to or in place of VAERS, in accordance with specific regulatory or policy 
requirements. Adverse events will also be monitored through the Vaccine Safety Datalink 
(www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe/default.htm#VSD), a network of seven geographically diverse health maintenance 
organizations through which active surveillance vaccine safety studies are conducted. Another potential resource 
for vaccine safety research is CDC's Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment (CISA) network 
(www.vaccinesafety.org/CISA/index.htm). 
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4.  Public health communications 
The provision of vaccine information will be an important component of ongoing public health communication during a 
pandemic (see Supplement 10). 
•  ADHS and county and tribal health departments need to work with federal partners to disseminate accurate, 
useful, and consistent public health messages and should tailor information to local needs as indicated. 
•  ADHS and county health departments need to provide information to health care providers, state and local 
government officials, and the news media on: 
o Rationale for prioritization and list of priority groups 
o Phasing of vaccination, if any, after priority groups have been vaccinated 
o When and where vaccination is available 
o Importance of vaccination given likelihood of subsequent pandemic waves, particularly if public interest in 
vaccination has decreased 
•  ADHS will disseminate information on vaccine use to health care providers who purchase private stocks of 
pandemic influenza vaccine. In addition, all vaccine providers will need vaccine information sheets that describe 
the risks and benefits of, and contraindications to, vaccination. 
 
5.  Coordination with bordering jurisdictions 
ADHS and county and tribal health departments will vaccine distribution plans with health authorities in bordering 
jurisdictions, including neighboring states, Sonora, Mexico, and other unique populations. 
 
6.  Legal preparedness 
ADHS and county and tribal departments need to ensure that appropriate legal authorities are in place to facilitate 
implementation of plans for distributing pandemic influenza vaccines.  
• ARS 36-787 provides authority to ADHS to coordinate a mass immunization campaign during a public 
health emergency 
• Arizona Revised Statues delineate who is allowed to provide immunizations in the state of Arizona (see 
below). 
• ARS also allows for  licensed volunteers or health care workers from other jurisdictions to administer 
influenza vaccines. 
• During a declared public health emergency under ARS 36-787, licensing requirements can be suspended to 
allow others to perform these tasks 
• ARS 36-788 provides for mandatory vaccination during a public health emergency, with an exception for 
those who refuse on religious grounds, who in turn can be quarantined during the period of risk for exposure.  
It is not felt that this would be an appropriate action for a pandemic response in Arizona. 
 
7.  Training 
ADHS and county health departments will assist health care partners in conducting training exercises to facilitate rapid and 
effective delivery and use of vaccines (see Supplement 
3). Exercises and drills are essential to ensure that 
emergency procedures are in place and roles and 
responsibilities are well understood.  By 2006, most 
Arizona CHDs have exercised their own county-wide 
mass vaccination clinic plans, or have participated in such 
exercises with ADHS.  Such exercises have included 
practice in receiving large quantities of vaccine; storing 
and handling vaccine from distributor and from the 
Strategic National Stockpile; setting up and staffing 
clinics; administering vaccine; testing information 
management systems; educating the public, media, and 
medical providers; targeting specific priority groups).  
Ongoing exercising of rapid response activities will be 
undertak . 
 
en
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Administration of vaccine to the general population will most likely take place at large vaccination “clinics”. CHDs will 
continually evaluate existing emergency response plans and supplement them as needed to ensure that lists of appropriate sites, 
properly licensed professionals who can be called on to staff clinics, and partner organizations (e.g., voluntary organizations, 
health care facilities) are up-to date. 
 
Presently in Arizona, physicians, registered nurses and registered nurse practitioners have authority to administer vaccines in 
accordance with their respective “scopes of practice.” Additionally, physician’s assistants may do so under protocols 
established with a supervisory physician. Medical assistants and personal care assistants may administer vaccinations under 
appropriate physician supervision. Certain military personnel may have training as well to administer vaccinations.  The 
potential emergency need for additional non-professional personnel to administer vaccinations will be assessed and necessary 
mechanisms (e.g., emergency orders from the Governor), appropriate training, supervisory guidelines, etc. of such staff will be 
developed. 
 
IV.  Actions for the Pandemic Period 
 
A. Before a vaccine is available 
 
ADHS  
• If stockpiled vaccine of the pandemic subtype is available, ensure delivery to county and tribal health departments and health 
care partners, as determined by priority status. 
• Keep the health care and public health workforce up-to-date on projected timelines for availability of vaccines against 
pandemic influenza. 
• Provide updated information to public on vaccine status and prioritization (see Supplement 10). 
 
County and tribal health departments 
• Mobilize response partners, and prepare to activate plans for receiving, distributing, and administering vaccines. 
• Activate plans and systems to receive, distribute, and administer pre-pandemic stockpiled vaccines to designated groups, upon 
delivery by ADHS 
• Review modifications, if any, to recommendations on vaccinating priority groups. 
• Accelerate training in vaccination and vaccine monitoring for public health staff and for partners responsible for vaccinating 
priority groups. 
• Be prepared to administer unlicensed vaccines (if needed) under FDA's Investigational New Drug (IND) provisions 
• Work with other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to ensure effective public health 
communications. 
 
B. When a vaccine becomes available 
• Submit requests to HHS for appropriate number of vaccine doses 
• Work with emergency management to ensure the safe delivery of pandemic vaccines to county and tribal health departments 
and to health care agencies, for prioritized vaccinations 
• Monitor vaccine supplies, distribution, and use. 
• Monitor and investigate adverse events. 
• Provide updated information to the public via the news media. 
• Ensure that vaccine requests to HHS and distribution to clinics and other facilities accounts for the need for second doses 
• Work with HHS to evaluate vaccine-related response activities when the pandemic is over. 
 
County and tribal health departments 
• Activate plans and systems to receive, distribute and administer vaccines to designated groups, upon delivery from ADHS. 
• Phase in vaccination of the rest of the population after priority groups have been vaccinated, based on age or other criteria that 
will ensure fair, equitable, and orderly distribution  
• After the pandemic has ended, ADHS and county health departments will evaluate all response activities, including 
vaccine tracking and delivery, adverse event monitoring, and communications.  Written reports of all such activities 
will be available to HHS and CDC. 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 15 Supplement 6:  Vaccine Distribution & Use 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.  Development of vaccines against pandemic strains of influenza 
 
HHS is working with industry partners to ensure that influenza vaccine can be produced on an emergency basis at any time 
throughout the year (http://www.HHS.gov/nvpo/pandemicplan/) and to facilitate the development of cell- and recombinant-
based interpandemic and pandemic influenza vaccines towards FDA licensure in U.S.-based manufacturing 
facilities. Activities in support of these goals include: 
• Stimulating expanded manufacturing capacity by increasing annual demand for influenza vaccines by the CMS and 
CDC 
• Securing a year-round egg supply for production of inactivated egg-based influenza vaccines 
• Promoting the development of new technologies that: 
• Shorten the time required to develop a vaccine against a new strain of influenza. 
• Facilitate rapid expansion of vaccine production during a pandemic. 
• Optimize the use of limited vaccine supplies (e.g., antigen-sparing strategies). 
 
HHS is also spearheading the development of human vaccines against avian influenza A (H5N1) and against other influenza 
A viruses with pandemic potential. HHS is providing funding to develop and manufacture pilot investigational lots of these 
vaccines at licensed influenza vaccine manufacturers and to evaluate their safety and immunogenicity in NIH-sponsored 
clinical trials in healthy adult, elderly, and pediatric populations. 
 
HHS is acquiring commercial scale lots of influenza A (H5N1) vaccine to provide vaccine manufacturers with experience 
initially and then to establish and maintain stockpiles of pre-pandemic H5N1 vaccine.   
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Appendix 1 
Time Table of Immunizations to Various Priority Groups 
 
Time table of immunizations to various priority groups 
  Dose 1   
  Dose 2 ( if needed) 
Vaccine 
Priority 
Groups 
Total doses 
per group 
Estimated 
doses in 
Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-8 
    
1A 180,800 135,600   
    
1B 514,800 463,320   
    
1C 754,000 377,000   
    
1D 3,100 2,790   
Subtotal 1,452,700 978,710  
    
1A = 180,800 doses     Assumption: 75% coverage rate = 135,600 
1B = 514,800 doses     Assumption: 90% coverage rate = 463,320 
1C = 754,000 doses     Assumption: 50% coverage rate = 377,000 
1D = 3,100    doses      Assumption: 90% coverage rate = 2,790 
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I.   Rationale 
Appropriate use of antiviral agents during an influenza pandemic may reduce morbidity and mortality and diminish the 
overwhelming demands that will be placed on the health care system.  Antivirals might also be used during the Pandemic Alert 
Period in limited attempts to contain small disease clusters and potentially slow the spread of novel influenza viruses.  
Drugs with activity against influenza viruses (“antivirals”) include the M2 ion channel inhibitors or amantadanes [amantadine  
(Symmetrel ®) and rimantadine (Flumadine®)] and the neuraminidase 
inhibitors [oseltamivir (Tamiflu ®) and zanamivir (Relenza®)].  These 
drugs have been useful for the management of interpandemic (i.e. seasonal) 
influenza.  
 
However, a large and uncoordinated demand for antivirals early in a 
pandemic could rapidly deplete national and local supplies.  Planning for 
optimal use of antiviral stocks is therefore essential.  During an influenza 
pandemic, the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) will need to 
play a central role in insuring that limited supplies of antivirals will be 
distributed efficiently to where there is the greatest need and benefit.    
 
 
II.  Overview 
Supplement 7 provides recommendations to state and local partners and to health care providers in Arizona on the distribution 
and use of antiviral drugs for treatment and prophylaxis during an influenza pandemic.  These recommendations are up to date 
as of January 2006, and will be revised as new information is available. 
 
In this document the term “novel strains of influenza” refers to avian or animal influenza strains that can infect humans (like 
avian influenza virus or swine influenza virus), or new or re-emergent human influenza viruses that cause cases or clusters of 
human disease.  A pandemic occurs when a novel influenza virus emerges that can infect humans and be efficiently transmitted 
from person to person. 
 
The Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Period recommendations focus on 1) preparedness planning for the rapid distribution 
and use of antiviral drugs, 2) the use of antiviral drugs in the management and containment of cases and clusters of infection 
with novel or pandemic strains of influenza, and 3) the education of health care providers about antiviral use in the 
management of both seasonal and pandemic influenza. 
 
The Pandemic Period recommendations focus on the local use of antiviral drugs in three situations: 1) when pandemic 
influenza is sporadically reported in the United States (without evidence of spread in the United States), 2) when there is 
limited transmission of pandemic influenza in the United States, and 3) when there is widespread transmission in the United 
States.    
 
Throughout the Pandemic Period, education of health care providers will continue.  ADHS recommendations for optimal use of 
limited stocks of antivirals will be updated throughout the course of an influenza pandemic to reflect new epidemiologic data, 
laboratory results, and the availability of an effective pandemic influenza vaccine. 
 
III.   Summary of Public Health Roles and Responsibilities for Antiviral Distribution and Use 
Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
 
1. Health care providers 
a. Learn how to identify influenza-like illnesses 
b. Know procedures for influenza screening and laboratory testing 
c. Know appropriate infection control measures for influenza 
d. Know appropriate antiviral regimens for influenza A and B 
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2. ADHS and county and tribal health departments  
a. Develop state-based plans for the distribution and use of antivirals during a pandemic (ADHS) 
b. Work with stakeholders to develop a system by which ADHS will assist in brokering antivirals 
during a pandemic where there is limited supply 
c. Develop state-based plans for requesting antivirals through the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) 
d. Work with stakeholders to develop a system to monitor interpandemic use of antivirals throughout 
the state (ADHS and county and tribal health) 
e. Procure a supply of antivirals under the control of ADHS for to use for special populations 
(ADHS) 
f. Help educate health care providers about clinical presentation and control of novel and pandemic 
influenza (ADHS and county and tribal health) 
g. Give guidance to health care providers about using antivirals in the medical management of cases 
of novel strains of influenza (ADHS and county and tribal health) 
h. Provide or facilitate testing and investigation of suspected novel influenza cases (ADHS and 
county and tribal health) 
i. Conduct follow-up of suspected novel influenza cases (County health departments) 
3. HHS 
a. Develop national guidance on the use of antivirals during both the pandemic alert and pandemic 
periods 
b. Develop a national stockpile of antiviral drugs for use during a pandemic  
c. Identify priority groups for antiviral drug treatment and prophylaxis 
d. Procure and maintain national supplies of antivirals in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) 
e. Maintain a program to test and extend dating of stockpiled antivirals 
f. Develop protocols for monitoring antiviral effectiveness, safety, and resistance during a pandemic 
g. Develop and distribute communication and education materials about antivirals for use by states 
and other stakeholders 
 
Pandemic Period  
 
o Health care providers 
1. Choose antivirals appropriate for circulating influenza strains 
2. Follow recommendations on antiviral use from federal, state, and local health agencies 
3. When antiviral supplies are limited, prescribe antivirals for persons in priority groups where the 
need and benefit are the greatest 
o ADHS and local health departments 
1. Work with health care partners to activate plans for distributing and administering antivirals to 
persons in priority groups (county health departments) 
2. Review and modify as needed recommendations for prioritization of antiviral treatment and 
prophylaxis (ADHS) 
3. Accelerate training on the appropriate use of antivirals among public health staff and health care 
partners (ADHS and county and tribal health) 
4. Work with CDC to monitor antiviral drug use and effectiveness, to monitor antiviral drug resistance, 
and to monitor and investigate adverse events associated with antivirals (ADHS) 
5. Work with other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to ensure effective 
public health communications (ADHS and county and tribal health) 
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o HHS responsibilities 
1. Revise recommendations for treatment and prophylaxis with antivirals for priority groups, if 
necessary 
2. Provide state, territorial and local health departments and health care partners with guidance on 
reporting specifications for tracking distribution, effectiveness, and safety of antivirals. 
3. Work with WHO and global partners to determine and monitor the drug susceptibilities of the 
pandemic strain  
4. Provide state, territorial and local health departments and health care partners with guidance on 
reporting specifications for tracking distribution, effectiveness, and safety of antivirals 
5. Provide information to health professionals and the public on issues related to availability and use of 
antiviral drugs during an influenza pandemic 
o Federal responsibilities 
1. Maintain stockpiles of influenza antiviral drugs at the SNS 
2. Distribute antiviral drugs from the SNS to states, cities, and federal agencies as appropriate 
3. Work with states to monitor antiviral drug use 
and effectiveness, to monitor antiviral drug 
resistance, and to monitor and investigate 
adverse events associated with antivirals 
4. Monitor the emergence of antiviral resistance 
5. Issue updated national guidelines for appropriate 
use of antivirals as the pandemic continues 
6. Continue to provide pertinent information to 
health professionals and the public on drug 
availability, distribution, administration, side 
effects, and the rationale for targeted drug use 
 
 
IV.  Recommendations for antiviral use in the interpandemic and pandemic alert periods 
A.  Use of antivirals in management of seasonal strains of influenza 
 
Influenza epidemics occur every winter in Arizona.  Antiviral medicines are a useful adjunct to influenza vaccine for 
controlling, treating, and preventing influenza (MMWR July 29, 2005 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5408a1.htm).  Current human influenza illness in the United States can be 
treated and prevented with antivirals.   
 
The M2 ion channel inhibitors (also known as amantadanes) are amantadine (Symmetrel®) and rimantadine (Flumadine®).  
They have historically been effective for most influenza A strains.  The neuraminadase inhibitors oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) or 
zanamivir (Relenza®) are effective for both influenza A and B.  Although many influenza A strains are sensitive to amantadine 
or rimantadine, the avian influenza A (H5N1) isolates are resistant.  At the present time, avian influenza A (H5N1) is usually 
sensitive to both oseltamivir and zanamivir. 
 
As long as pandemic influenza is not being reported abroad or in the United States, and there is no epidemiologic link to cases 
of avian influenza, seasonal influenza is unlikely to be caused by a novel influenza virus.  Epidemiologic links that should 
suggest the risk of a novel influenza virus would include: 
• A history of travel to areas where there are avian influenza outbreaks 
• A history of contact with a person with an unexplained respiratory disease in an area with avian influenza outbreaks 
• Contact with patients ill with a known or suspected novel virus 
• Contact with sick poultry 
  
See Clinical Guidelines Supplement 5 for more detailed information about epidemiologic criteria for suspecting a novel 
influenza virus. 
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Physicians can use antiviral medicines to treat and give prophylaxis against seasonal influenza.  Treatment is most effective in 
reducing the length of illness when given within the first 48 hours of symptoms.  Physicians should chose which antiviral 
medicine to use based on a variety of factors: 
• What strain is currently circulating in the community (influenza A or B or both) 
• The known sensitivities to antivirals of these circulating strains 
• Rapid influenza testing results 
• The age of the patient 
• Whether the antiviral medicine will be used for treatment or prophylaxis 
 
(See Appendix 3:  ADHS Clinician Fact Sheet:  Antivirals for Influenza 2005-2006; Appendix 4:  ADHS Clinician Fact Sheet:  
Influenza 2005-2006; and MMWR July 29, 2005 http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5408a1.htm) 
 
The educational components about antivirals of the ADHS’ Pandemic Influenza Plan will assist health care providers in the 
appropriate use of antivirals during seasonal influenza.  This will allow health care providers to be better prepared to use 
antivirals during pandemic influenza. 
 
B.  Use of antivirals in management of cases of novel influenza 
 
In this document the term “novel strains of influenza” is used to refer to avian or animal influenza strains that can infect 
humans (like avian influenza A [H5N1]) and new or re-emergent human influenza viruses that cause cases or clusters of human 
disease.  Criteria for early detection and identification of novel strains of influenza are discussed in Supplement 1.    
 
Sentinel laboratories throughout Arizona send influenza isolates to Arizona Public Health Laboratory.  Influenza A viral 
isolates are tested to detect hemagglutinins H1, H3, H5, or H7.  Recent circulating influenza strains have been H1 and H3.  If 
the isolate were H5 or H7, or if could not be identified, the isolate would be immediately sent to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) for further characterization to exclude a novel influenza virus.  
 
1.  Use of antivirals for TREATMENT of suspected avian influenza A (H5N1) or another novel strain of influenza. 
 
A patient with a suspected case of avian influenza A (H5N1) or another novel strain of influenza should be isolated as 
described in Supplement 4 and treated in accordance with the clinical algorithm for the Pandemic Alert Period provided in 
Supplement 5.   
 
As of December 2005, a patient with a suspected case of 
avian influenza A (H5N1) or another novel strain of 
influenza should be treated with oseltamivir or zanamivir.  
The antiviral should be administered as early as possible 
and ideally within 48 hours after onset of symptoms.   
 
Neuraminidase inhibitors are preferred because the majority 
of avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses currently affecting 
humans are resistant to amantadine and rimantadine.   
Cross-resistance between zanamivir- and oseltamivir-
resistant viruses is variable.  Current recommended doses 
for antiviral treatment are provided in Table 2 and in 
ADHS’ Clinician Fact Sheet on Antivirals for Influenza in 
Appendix 3.  This information will be updated as 
circumstances warrant. 
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2.  Use of antivirals for PROPHYLAXIS of contacts suspected avian influenza A (H5N1) or another novel strain of 
influenza. 
 
ADHS and local health departments, in consultation with CDC, will consider whether it is necessary and feasible to trace a 
patient’s close contacts and provide them with postexposure antiviral prophylaxis.   Close contacts may include family, 
schoolmates, workmates, health care providers, and fellow passengers if the patient has been traveling.  
If deemed necessary by public health authorities, these persons may receive post-exposure prophylaxis with oseltamivir, as 
zanamivir is not currently indicated for prophylaxis.   
 
If the exposure to the novel influenza virus strain occurs during the regular influenza season, the patient’s health care contacts 
(who may also care for persons with seasonal influenza) should be vaccinated against seasonal influenza to reduce the 
possible risk of co-infection and reassortment of seasonal and novel strains.   
 
3.  Use of antivirals for containment of disease clusters caused by suspected avian influenza A (H5N1) or another novel 
strain of influenza. 
 
In special circumstances, ADHS could recommend “targeted antiviral prophylaxis” as a community-based measure for 
containing small clusters of infection with novel strains of influenza (see Supplement 8).  This measure would be implemented 
in small, well-defined settings such as the initial introduction of a virus with pandemic potential into a small community or a 
military base.  However, once a pandemic is underway, such a strategy would not represent an efficient use of limited antiviral 
supplies. 
 
Because targeted antiviral prophylaxis would require rapid delivery and administration of substantial stocks of antiviral drugs, 
the feasibility to use antivirals to contain disease clusters caused by a novel strain of influenza will be evaluated at the time 
based on available antiviral supply and interim updated recommendations on antiviral drug use.  These decisions will involve 
the Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization Policy Committee (VAPPC) as described below in C-2-b:  “Establishing priority 
groups.” 
 
Targeted antiviral prophylaxis would involve investigation of disease clusters, administration of antiviral treatment to persons 
with confirmed or suspected cases of pandemic influenza, and provision of drug prophylaxis to all persons in the affected 
community. Targeted antiviral prophylaxis would also require intensive case finding in the affected area as well as effective 
communication with the affected community. 
 
C.  Preparedness planning for use of antivirals during a pandemic 
 
1.   National recommendations on use of antivirals during a pandemic 
During an influenza pandemic, demand is likely to far outstrip supplies available in stockpiles or through usual channels of 
distribution.  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, November 2005 Part 1, 
Appendix D, table D-2, page D-21 (http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf) provides a list of priority groups for 
receiving antiviral treatment or prophylaxis and the rationale for prioritization  
 
 During an actual pandemic, these recommendations will be modified, based on the characteristics of the causative virus (e.g., 
drug susceptibilities, initial geographic distribution, fatality rate, age-specific morbidity and mortality rates) and the 
effectiveness of implemented strategies.   
 
2.  Arizona planning 
ADHS is working with the federal government, local health departments, tribal governments, bordering states, and the 
government of Sonora, Mexico to develop and integrate state-based plans for antiviral needs assessment, procurement, 
distribution, and targeted use.  ADHS will use:  
• Interim recommendations developed by the National Vaccine Advisory Committee on priority groups for prophylaxis 
and treatment (http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf) to assist in calculations for Arizona priority 
groups 
• Strategies outlined in Box 1 for optimizing antiviral use in treatment and prophylaxis.   
• Clinical treatment algorithms provided in Clinical Guidance Supplement 5  
• Existing ADHS plans for emergency distribution of medical supplies  
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ADHS has, as part of its Influenza Pandemic Response Plan, procuring antiviral drugs for state and local stockpiles; 
distributing antivirals to priority groups by health care providers and through public health dispensing sites; data collection to 
monitor drug use, drug-related adverse events, and drug resistance; coordination with bordering jurisdictions; legal 
preparedness; training; and dissemination of public health information.    
 
This requires coordination and collaboration with health care providers who will administer antivirals during a pandemic.   
• ADHS will convene state-wide pandemic influenza strategy meetings on the use of antivirals to facilitate local 
planning and define public- and private-sector roles (e.g., related to rapid administration to priority groups and 
medical surge capacity)  
• ADHS continues to communicate with the medical community throughout the state about national guidelines for 
treatment and prophylaxis and the appropriate use of antivirals  
• ADHS is beginning to identify, and will maintain, contacts with federal agencies, local health departments, tribal 
governments, bordering states, and the government of Sonora, Mexico for coordinating distribution of antivirals. 
 
a.   Procurement 
 
The needs in Arizona for antiviral treatment and prophylaxis during an influenza 
pandemic will likely not be met by federally supplied antivirals from the SNS 
stockpile.  Therefore, state and local governments, and private institutions need to 
consider additional ways to obtain antivirals.   
 
Typically, human influenza outbreaks can be prevented and treated with four 
different antivirals.  Influenza A usually can be treated with amantadine 
(Symmetrel ®) or rimantadine (Flumadine®) or the neuraminadase inhibitors 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu ®) or zanamivir (Relenza®).  Influenza B is only sensitive to 
neuraminidase inhibitors.  Unfortunately, the currently circulating avian influenza 
strain H5N1 is not sensitive to amantadine or rimantadine.   Additionally, on 
January 16, 2006, CDC announced that the adamantanes were no longer 
recommended treatments against the human influenza strains circulating in the 2005-2006 influenza season, due to reportedly 
high rates of resistance (91%).  Zanamivir has only been approved for treatment of influenza. Therefore, oseltamivir is the only 
antiviral drug that would be available for both prophylaxis and treatment.     
 
ADHS has estimated the quantity of antiviral drugs that would be needed in Arizona (see Appendix 1) based on the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Pandemic Influenza Plan, November 2005 
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf ).  The cumulative amount to provide oseltamivir for all 11 of these 
priority groups would require 2,615,500 treatment courses, or 26,155,000 doses of oseltamivir. 
 
Procurement of State Stockpile 
Due to space constraints, management logistics, and challenges with rotating stock, ADHS will only be able to maintain a 
limited stockpile of antiviral medicines.  ADHS has identified $1,000,000 to procure oseltamivir.    Potential recipients of the 
ADHS stockpile of oseltamivir will include people who have an urgent and pressing need for antiviral therapy but are not 
covered by existing distribution processes, such as public health workers, hard to reach populations, and institutional outbreaks. 
 
Management of State Antiviral Stockpile 
ADHS is the responsible authority for coordinating and managing the Arizona antiviral stockpile.  Stockpiled antiviral 
inventory will be managed to prevent expiration of purchased antivirals.  The ADHS stockpile may be managed under: 
• Vendor-managed inventory (VMI),  
• Direct ADHS management, where the stockpile would be stored, rotated, and from where it would be 
distributed   
• Agreement with specific hospitals that they would rotate ADHS’ supply into their own pharmaceutical 
supply.    
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Arizona will increase the supply of antivirals for pandemic influenza in Arizona by 1) encouraging health care facilities to 
consider their own institutional stockpiles or vendor-managed inventories, 2) explore how to make arrangements with local 
private-sector distributors for emergency purchase of antiviral drugs, and 3) when needed, requesting antivirals from the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). 
 
ADHS’ office of HIV/AIDS Services has developed an infrastructure in order to provide HIV-related medicines for patients 
throughout the state who are participating in the Arizona Drug Assistance Program (ADAP).  As of April 1, 2006, all HIV 
medicines will be provided and distributed by a large outpatient pharmacy chain.  ADHS will explore ways to utilize this 
infrastructure to assist in distributing antivirals to community pharmacies. 
  
b.  Establishing priority groups 
 
In situations where there are limited supplies of antivirals for influenza, the medicine should go to people who have the greatest 
need and are most likely to benefit from it.   
The highest priority should be treatment of high-risk individuals who are hospitalized due to pandemic influenza illness. 
The next priorities would be 1) prophylaxis of health care workers (HCW) with direct patient contact and emergency medical 
service (EMS) providers, and 2) treatment of pandemic health responders (public health, vaccinators, vaccine and antiviral 
manufacturers), public safety (police, fire, corrections), and government decision-makers. 
Only when there is adequate antiviral medicine should there be able to be treatment of low-risk outpatients and prophylaxis 
of high-risk outpatients and other high-risk health care workers. 
  
In the interpandemic and pandemic alert periods, ADHS will establish a Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization Policy Committee 
(VAPPC) composed of 
• Representative(s) from the Governor’s office 
• State Epidemiologist 
• State physician(s) 
• ADHS influenza epidemiologist 
• Office of Infectious Disease Services office chief 
• ADHS administrator(s) 
• Arizona Immunization Program Office (AIPO) 
representative 
• Arizona Local Health Officers Association representative 
• Arizona Medical Association representative 
• Hospital Association representative 
• Emergency Medical Service representative 
• Arizona Pharmacy Alliance representative 
• Long-term care representative  
 
The VAPPC will define how these priority groups will apply on a local 
level, and will define who should be included in the groups of public safety workers, essential service providers, and key 
governmental decision makers.   
 
During an influenza pandemic, the VAPPC will modify these priority groups as needed based on the availability of antiviral 
medicines, the characteristics of the causative virus (e.g., drug susceptibilities, initial geographic distribution, fatality rate, age-
specific morbidity and mortality rates) and the effectiveness of implemented strategies. 
 
The VAPPC will provide the rationale for establishing the priority groups so that the reasons for prioritization can be 
communicated to the community. 
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Appendix 1 provides estimates for treatment and prophylaxis of priority groups based on the 11 priority groups in the HHS 
Pandemic Influenza Plan, November 2005 table D-2, page D-21, found at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf.  
One underlying assumption is that 25% of the U.S. population would become ill with influenza.  The cumulative amount to 
provide oseltamivir for all 11 of these priority groups in Arizona would require 2,615,500 treatment courses, or 26,155,000 
doses of oseltamivir.  These initial calculations can help the VAPPC to estimate the size of the various priority groups in 
Arizona. 
 
c.  Distributing and dispensing antivirals to priority groups 
  
Deciding how, where, and when to distribute 
Distribution of antivirals will depend on the amounts of antivirals available in the 
state, the priority groups that are to be targeted (as per the VAPPC), and the 
locations of greatest need.  In order to equitably and effectively distribute antivirals 
to priority groups during an influenza pandemic, ADHS will need to know the 
location and amount of antivirals throughout the state, and be able to rapidly direct 
their flow to the appropriate priority groups. 
 
During the interpandemic and pandemic alert periods, ADHS will: 
• Work with stakeholders to develop a system to assess and track antiviral 
stocks at the state and local level (both in inpatient and outpatient settings) 
to allow for tracking during a pandemic. 
• Constitute and exercise the VAPPC 
• Work with local health departments to plan for and to exercise the distribution of antiviral medicines based on 
priorities and needs. 
• Establish the legal authority to have standing orders for antivirals both at the state and local health department level 
• Explore how to implement standing orders if they are needed for treatment of certain priority groups (e.g. hospitalized 
patients and health care workers) 
• Review and update pre-existing plans for the transport, receipt, storage, security, tracking, and delivery of: 
o Antiviral stocks for use in treatment to hospitals, clinics, nursing homes, alternate care facilities, and other 
health care institutions.  
o Antiviral stocks for use in post-exposure prophylaxis (e.g., for direct contacts of infected patients)  
o Antiviral stocks for use in prophylaxis even when there is no known direct pandemic influenza exposure (e.g. 
pandemic health responders, public safety workers, government decision-makers, and pandemic societal 
responders) 
• Explore how to implement standing orders for antivirals for high priority groups (e.g. hospitalized patients, health care 
workers, etc.) 
• Develop a system to obtain antivirals for treatment of pandemic influenza, or prophylaxis of a close contact of 
someone with pandemic influenza, where lack of financial resources prevents the individual from purchasing available 
antivirals. 
 
During an influenza pandemic, ADHS will: 
• Handle requests for antivirals through an incident command system (ICS).   
o The providers would request antivirals through their local health department [or county Emergency 
Operating Center (EOC)] and these requests would be sent on to ADHS [or the Arizona state EOC]. 
• Be guided by the VAPPC’s recommendations about priority groups 
• Request and handle SNS antiviral supplies according to the ADHS SNS Plan for Receipt, Store, and Stage (RSS)  
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ADHS Brokering of Antiviral Supply 
According to Arizona Revised Statutes 36-787: 
[http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/36/00787.htm&Title=36&DocType=ARS], during a state of 
emergency in which there is a pandemic disease that poses a substantial risk of a significant number of human fatalities, the 
Governor, in consultation with the director of the Department of Health Services, may issue orders that ration medicine and 
vaccines, and provide for procurement of medicines and vaccines.   
Under these circumstances, ADHS will take the lead to direct the prioritization of limited antiviral supplies during an influenza 
pandemic. 
 
ADHS does not have the capacity to purchase, store, rotate, and distribute the estimated 2,615,500 treatment doses of 
oseltamivir that would be needed in Arizona if all 11 priority groups were to receive medication (see Appendix 1). 
 
Therefore, ADHS would need to use the current system of antiviral distribution in order to get antiviral medicines to patients 
during an influenza pandemic.  In the interpandemic and pandemic alert period, ADHS will assist providers in overcoming 
antiviral shortages by informing them of ways to obtain antivirals.  Hospitals will be encouraged and to prepare and maintain 
their own antiviral stockpile.   
 
During the pandemic period, if there are inadequate supplies of antivirals, ADHS will work directly with the manufacturer and 
the pharmaceutical distributors, in order to direct and broker the flow of medicines. Priority distribution will go to the sites of 
greatest need that service the highest priority groups according to the priorities outlined in C-2-b.   
 
The Arizona Immunization Program Office (AIPO) is experienced in the brokering of influenza vaccine during shortages.  
However, early in an influenza pandemic, vaccine will not be widely available, and antivirals will be the pharmaceutical most 
in need of brokering.  Therefore, the AIPO will take the lead at ADHS for brokering antivirals 
 
When the supply of antivirals in Arizona during an influenza outbreak is insufficient to provide for the needs of the citizens, 
the Director of Arizona Department of Health Services will make an emergency request for federal assets in the SNS.  HHS 
and CDC officials will make the decision whether to deploy federal assets to Arizona.  Federal supplies of antivirals will be 
delivered to Arizona’s Receipt, Storage and Staging (RSS) site.  ADHS SNS coordinators will provide logistical guidance on 
the receipt and distribution of federal assets to priority groups.   
  
Critical Stakeholder’s Committee 
In order for ADHS to effectively broker antiviral distribution in Arizona during pandemic influenza, there will need to be a 
broad consensus among stakeholders as to how this best can be accomplished.  ADHS will form a Critical Stakeholders’ 
Committee (CSC) to discuss prioritization and implementation of ADHS antiviral plan.  Potential stakeholders include: 
• Roche (oseltamivir manufacturer) 
• Glaxo Wellcome (Zanamivir manufacturer) 
• Pharmaceutical distributors  
• Arizona Board of Pharmacists 
• Arizona Medical Association 
• Arizona Osteopathic Medical Association 
• Arizona Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
• Arizona Hospital Association 
• Major local pharmacy chains 
• AHCCCS plans 
• Large insurance companies 
• IHS hospitals 
• Tribal health 
• ADHS Border Health Office 
• County health departments 
• Long-term care representative 
 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 10 Supp. 7:  Antiviral Drug Distribution & Use 
 
Topics for discussion with stakeholders will include 1) coordination between manufacturer, distributors, pharmacies, health 
care providers and ADHS; 2) proposed situations where ADHS would begin actual brokering and prioritization of antivirals; 3) 
plans on how and when to institute prioritization; 4) restrictions on when physicians can write prescriptions for oseltamivir; 
 
Distribution based on electronic monitoring of supply 
ADHS does not have information on the amount and type of antivirals currently used in Arizona.  Such information is regarded 
as proprietary.  However, in the United States in 2003-2004, there were 1,524,687 treatments of oseltamivir given 
(www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/21/608/0.pdf slide #9).  Since Arizona’s population is approximately 2% of the United 
States, a proportional number of oseltamivir treatments would be 30,500. 
 
In order for ADHS to effectively and equitably distribute a limited amount of 
antivirals, it will be essential to know where, when, by whom, and how much 
antiviral medicine is needed and/or is being used.  That information is not 
currently available in Arizona.  However, ADHS has established an electronic 
system with pharmacies for syndromic surveillance to watch sales of over the 
counter medicines.  A similar system could be established with antiviral 
medicines. 
 
ADHS will work with the Critical Stakeholder Committee (CSC) and meet with 
pharmacy and pharmaceutical representatives to develop a system by which 
ADHS is informed of the amount and location of antiviral medicines in the state.   
 
d.   Monitoring and data collection 
 
To ensure optimal use of antiviral drugs during an influenza pandemic, ADHS 
will work with federal officials and health care partners to collect data on 1) 
distribution of state or federal supplies of antiviral drugs, 2) occurrence of adverse 
events following administration of antiviral drugs, 3) effectiveness of treatment and prophylaxis, and 4) development of drug 
resistance. 
1) influenza specimens to CDC on a periodic basis, usually after testing them by RT-PCR, viral culture, or rapid 
diagnostic testing to confirm the presence of strains of influenza A.  CDC will test the drug susceptibilities of viruses 
isolated from different age groups and geographic groups over the course of the pandemic (see Antiviral Effectiveness 
above).  Changes in antiviral resistance patterns will influence changes in recommendations for treatment and 
prophylaxis 
 
e.   Coordination with bordering jurisdictions 
  
ADHS will review and coordinate antiviral drug distribution plans with health authorities in bordering jurisdictions, including: 
• Arizona Counties  
• Tribal governments  
• Mexico, specifically the state of Sonora 
• Surrounding states 
 
During an influenza pandemic, ADHS will share details regarding their distribution of antivirals with these jurisdictions to 
monitor antiviral needs and optimize targeting of antiviral use.   
 
Due to Arizona’s international border, additional planning will be needed with Mexico, since pandemic influenza will not stop 
at the border with Mexico.  If Sonora, Mexico does not have adequate amounts of vaccines and antivirals, people will be 
coming to the United States for further evaluation and treatment.  ADHS will meet with representatives of Sonora, Mexico to 
share information about pandemic influenza planning as it regards such things as diagnostic supplies, antiviral supplies, 
provider education, and coordination of pandemic planning.  In addition, ADHS will prepare Spanish versions of ADHS 
messages for the Spanish-speaking public. 
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f.  Legal preparedness 
 
According to Arizona Revised Statutes 36-787, during a state of emergency in which there is a pandemic disease that poses a 
substantial risk of a significant number of human fatalities, the Governor, in consultation with the director of the Department of 
Health Services, may issue orders that ration medicine and vaccines, and provide for procurement of medicines and vaccines.  
[http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/36/00787.htm&Title=36&DocType=ARS].  Under these 
circumstances, ADHS will take the lead to direct the prioritization of limited antiviral supplies during an influenza pandemic. 
 
During pandemic influenza, there may be a need for the ADHS medical director or local health departments to issue a blanket 
prescription for dispensing of antivirals.  The state medical director would need the authority to do so in a way that is 
consistent with Arizona’s prescription laws.  
 
A problem with blanket prescriptions is that as per ARS 32-1401, 27 (ss), it is unprofessional conduct for a physician to 
prescribe or dispense a prescription medication to a person without first conducting a physical examination of that person or 
having previously established a doctor-patient relationship.  
 
However, close contacts of patients with confirmed or suspected pandemic influenza should be able to receive appropriate 
prophylaxis without undue waiting.  Currently, in nonemergency situations, hospitals and treating physicians usually refer 
patients to local health departments or primary care physicians for prophylactic medications.  In a pandemic situation, this 
would cause undue delay in light of the short incubation period of influenza (1-3 days).   
 
Hospitals and physicians need to have the resources, the authority, and legal protection in order to rapidly provide antiviral 
prophylaxis to close contacts of confirmed or suspected cases of pandemic 
influenza.  
 
In addition, there needs to be clarification as to whether adverse side effects 
of antivirals when taken for prophylaxis by essential workers would be 
covered by worker’s compensation insurance. 
 
ADHS will investigate: 
• Ways to give health departments and physicians the authority to 
issue a blanket prescription for dispensing antivirals to contacts as a 
public health measure in a way that is consistent with state 
prescription laws. 
• How worker’s compensation laws apply to health care workers and 
other essential workers who take antivirals for prophylaxis. 
• Whether a state or county employee would be covered for 
malpractice or tort claims coverage under state law if they administer 
an antiviral medication in the course of his/her official duties.   
• What legal authority is in place, or needs to be put in place, to 
facilitate implementation of plans for the ADHS medical director or 
local health departments to issue a blanket prescription for dispensing of antivirals in a way that is consistent with 
Arizona’s prescription laws.  
 
g.   Training 
 
ADHS will work with local health departments, tribal governments, bordering states, and the government of Sonora, Mexico to 
enhance training and education efforts related to use of antiviral drugs during a pandemic.  
 
ADHS has developed concise information sheets for health care providers called Clinician Fact Sheets that give clinically 
pertinent information about use of antiviral medicines and influenza.  (See Appendices 3 & 4).  These Clinician Fact Sheets are 
available on ADHS’ influenza website.  ADHS will also develop Clinician Fact Sheets for health care providers for identifying, 
diagnosing, and managing pandemic influenza, and post it on the ADHS website.   
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ADHS physicians, nurses, and epidemiologists will participate in statewide lectures to inform health care providers about 
pandemic influenza and appropriate antiviral use. 
 
It is essential that those who will be involved in prioritizing and distributing antivirals understand their roles and 
responsibilities.   ADHS will conduct exercises with local health departments to plan for and to exercise the distribution of 
antiviral medicines based on priorities and needs.   ADHS will involve its Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization Policy 
Committee (VAPPC) and its Critical Stakeholders’ Committee (CSC) in these exercises. 
 
h.   Public health information 
 
ADHS will work with county health departments, tribal governments, bordering states, and the government of Sonora, Mexico 
to develop and implement plans to educate the public, the medical community, and other stakeholders about: 
• Role of antivirals in responding to pandemic influenza  
• Need to prioritize use of limited antiviral supplies for treatment and prophylaxis  
• Rationale for the priority groups identified in the interim recommendations  
• Importance of appropriate use (i.e., using the drugs as prescribed and for the full number of days recommended) to 
minimize the development of drug resistance  
 
Pandemic influenza information will also be provided in Spanish. 
 
i.  Contingency planning for Investigational New Drug (IND) use 
 
Unlicensed antiviral drugs may be available under FDA’s Investigational New Drug (IND) provisions during an influenza 
pandemic.  IND provisions require strict inventory control and record keeping, completion of a signed consent form from each 
person who receives the medication, and mandatory reporting of specified types of adverse events.  IND provisions also require 
approval of the protocol and consent form by an Institutional Review Board  (IRB).   These requirements are extremely time 
consuming. 
 
FDA regulations permit the use of a national or "central" IRB for IND medications, and would likely be used in such a 
situation.  A treatment IND is one IND mechanism that FDA has available for use and is especially suited for large-scale use of 
investigational products.  http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_99/21cfr_99.html 
 
As an alternative to IND use of an unapproved antiviral 
drug, HHS may utilize the drug product under Emergency 
Use Authorization procedures as described in the FDA 
draft Guidance "Emergency Use Authorization of 
Medical Products" 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/emeruse.pdf 
 
In order for state and local health departments to be able 
to help to distribute antiviral drugs under IND provisions, 
there needs to be funding for nurses, physicians, and 
pharmacists to provide the necessary services.  ADHS 
will investigate available funding sources and will decide 
on the feasibility of providing antivirals under IND 
provisions based on the availability of funding sources 
and personnel.   
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V.  Recommendations for Antiviral Use in the Pandemic Period 
 
ADHS will update interim recommendations for use of antivirals throughout the course of an influenza pandemic to reflect 
current epidemiologic and laboratory data.  Interim recommendations may also be updated as an effective influenza vaccine 
becomes available.  
  
A.   When pandemic influenza is reported abroad, or sporadic pandemic influenza cases are reported in the United 
States, without evidence of spread 
   
If an influenza pandemic has begun in other countries, ADHS will work with the federal government, county health 
departments, tribal governments, bordering states, and the government of Sonora, Mexico to: 
• Use antiviral drugs in the management of persons infected with novel strains of influenza and their contacts.  
• Work with health care partners to provide antiviral prophylaxis to persons at highest risk for pandemic influenza.  
Examples of such persons include:  
o Public health workers who investigate suspected cases of pandemic influenza  
o Health care workers in emergency departments, intensive care units, and, dialysis centers 
o Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians 
• Meet with local partners and stakeholders to review the state-based antiviral drug distribution plan.  As part of this 
effort, state and local partners will: 
o Modify the distribution plan to take into account  
 Updated federal recommendations on target groups 
 Updated information on projected supplies of antiviral drugs. 
o Notify the medical community about the status of the plan and the availability of antiviral drugs.  
o Disseminate public health guidelines that encourage drug-use practices to minimize the development of drug 
resistance.  
o Provide the public with information on interim recommendations and their rationale  
o Work with federal partners to monitor the safety and effectiveness of drugs and ensure that available 
antivirals are used in accordance with federal and local recommendations.  
 
B.   When there is limited transmission of pandemic influenza in the United States 
 
When there is limited transmission of pandemic influenza in the United States, ADHS will work with county health 
departments, tribal governments, bordering states, and the government of Sonora, Mexico to:  
• Activate state-based plans for targeting 
antiviral drugs to priority groups for 
prophylaxis and treatment. 
• Request antiviral drugs, as needed, from 
previously identified including the SNS.  
• Continue to educate health care partners to 
ensure appropriate use of antivirals in the 
medical management of early cases and 
contacts. 
• Assist hospitals in implementing procedures 
for early detection and treatment of influenza 
in health care workers (see Supplement 3).  
• Work with federal partners to begin 
monitoring the safety and effectiveness of 
drugs and ensure that available antivirals are 
used in accordance with federal and local 
recommendations.  
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C.  When there is widespread transmission of pandemic influenza in the United States 
• When pandemic influenza has become widespread, the goals of antiviral use will be to 1) treat those at highest risk of 
severe illness and death, and 2) to preserve the delivery of health care and other essential critical services through 
early treatment and limited prophylaxis.  
• After a vaccine becomes available, antiviral drugs will continue to be used to protect persons who have an inadequate 
vaccine response (e.g., the elderly and those with underlying immunosuppressive disease) as well as persons with 
contraindications to vaccination, such as anaphylactic hypersensitivity to eggs or other vaccine components. 
• Until the pandemic has waned, ADHS will continue to work with federal and health care partners to monitor the 
safety and effectiveness of antivirals and to encourage appropriate drug use practices that help minimize the 
development of drug resistance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1. Strategies for Antiviral Use in Pandemic Influenza Treatment and Prophylaxis  
The goals of vaccine and antiviral use during an influenza pandemic are to limit mortality and morbidity, minimize social 
disruption, and reduce economic impact.  Because a pandemic vaccine is unlikely to be available during the first 4 to 6 months 
of the pandemic, appropriate use of antivirals may play an important role in achieving these goals.  
 
A.  Treatment 
1.  Planning considerations  
• The effectiveness of antivirals against a new pandemic influenza virus cannot be predicted.  
• Early treatment may reduce the risk of hospitalization by ~50%, although there are no data on the effectiveness of 
neuraminidase inhibitors in preventing either serious morbidity or mortality (MMWR July 29, 2005 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5408.pdf ).  
• Antiviral agents used against seasonal influenza show efficacy in clinical trials when treatment is started within 48 
hours of the onset of symptoms. Assuming that antivirals have a similar level of effectiveness against pandemic 
influenza, it will be essential to have rapid diagnosis, distribution, and administration of antivirals during a 
pandemic. 
• Early treatment is a more efficient use of antivirals than widespread prophylaxis. Because prophylaxis for 
approximately 6 weeks would require at least four times the number of doses as a 5-day treatment course per 
individual, huge antiviral stockpiles would be required to permit prophylaxis of more than a small proportion of 
the U.S. population.  
• Most influenza A (H5N1) viruses currently in circulation in southeast Asia are resistant to the M2 ion channel 
inhibitors (amantadine and rimantadine).  Strains that may evolve from these viruses are likely to be resistant to 
this class of antivirals.  
• The emergence of drug resistant strains is less likely during treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir 
and zanamivir) than with M2 ion channel inhibitors (amantadine and rimantadine).  Neuraminidase inhibitors may 
also have a lower incidence of severe side (MMWR July 29, 2005 http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5408.pdf ). 
Reserve oseltamivir and zanamivir for treatment whenever possible. Because supplies of oseltamivir and zanamivir 
are expected to be limited, early depletion of oseltamivir and widespread use of M2 ion channel inhibitors could lead to 
increased rates of side effects and drug resistance. 
2.  Treatment Strategies  
Optimal use of limited stocks of antiviral drugs will vary depending on the phase of the pandemic.  The following is interim 
guidance that will be updated as more information becomes available.  
 
At all stages of a pandemic: 
• Target antiviral therapy to influenza patients admitted to a hospital who present within 48 hours of symptom onset.  
• Test to detect the emergence of drug-resistant variants of a pandemic influenza strain (e.g., obtaining specimens from 
persons who develop influenza while on prophylaxis or who progress to severe disease despite treatment).  
• Modify priority groups for treatment based on up-to-date information (e.g. drug supplies, drug susceptibilities, 
geographic distribution, fatality rate, age-specific morbidity and mortality rates, and the effectiveness of implemented 
strategies). AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 15 Supp. 7:  Antiviral Drug Distribution & Use 
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Box 1. Strategies for Antiviral Use in Pandemic Influenza Treatment and Prophylaxis –cont. 
 
• Monitor availability of antivirals.  When appropriate, recommend changes in priority groups for receiving antivirals 
• Purchase antivirals as needed as they become available if not provided by the federal government. 
• Distribute antivirals as they become available 
• Use an electronic management system for antiviral inventory tracking.  ADHS and the Division of Strategic National 
Stockpile are both working to develop such a management system. 
 
During the earliest stages of a pandemic in the United States: 
• Antiviral treatment decisions should be made on laboratory results.   A positive rapid antigen test for influenza A 
would be sufficient grounds for initiating treatment, with a confirmatory, definitive laboratory test required for 
continuation of treatment (e.g. viral isolate or RT-PCR).  
• Negative results of influenza testing would permit stopping antiviral treatment, given the overall low rate of infection 
in a particular community.  
• Target use of antivirals to contain small, well-defined pandemic disease clusters, to possibly delay or reduce the 
spread to other communities (see Supplement 8). 
 
When there is increasing disease activity in the United States:  
• Treatment decisions will be based on:  
o Laboratory-confirmed identification of the pandemic subtype (e.g. by viral isolation and subtyping, or RT-
PCR), or  
o Detection of influenza A by rapid antigen test, or  
o Epidemiologic and clinical characteristics.  
• Initiation of antiviral treatment should be on a clinical basis (i.e. before results from viral isolation, IFA, RT-PCR 
assays, or rapid antigen tests become available) since early treatment is more likely to be effective. 
  
Once infection becomes more common, negative rapid antigen test results are more likely to represent false negatives; 
therefore, treatment should continue while awaiting results from confirmatory testing. 
 
When the pandemic is widespread in the United States:   
• Antiviral treatment decisions will be made on clinical features and epidemiologic risk factors, taking into account 
updated knowledge of the epidemiology of the pandemic virus.   
 
As the pandemic progresses, recommendations for antiviral treatment will be revised as new information is obtained about the 
pandemic strain. 
 
B.   Prophylaxis 
1.  Planning considerations for prophylaxis  
• Primary constraints on the use of antivirals for prophylaxis will be:  
o Limited supplies  
o Increasing risk of side effects with prolonged use  
o Potential emergence of drug-resistant variants of the pandemic strain. 
• The need for antiviral prophylaxis may decrease once an effective pandemic influenza vaccine becomes available for 
use among healthcare workers and other groups.  
• Post-exposure prophylaxis might be useful in attempts to control small, well-defined disease clusters (institutional 
outbreaks or household introductions). The potential use of targeted prophylaxis to contain disease clusters is 
discussed in Supplement 8.   
• The number of persons who receive prophylaxis with oseltamivir should be minimized, primarily to extend supplies 
available to treat persons at highest risk of serious morbidity and mortality.  If sufficient antiviral supplies are 
available, prophylaxis should be used only during peak periods of viral circulation to protect small groups of front-
line healthcare workers and other providers of essential community services prior to availability of vaccine. 
• If a pandemic virus is susceptible to M2 ion channel inhibitors, amantadine and rimantadine can be used for 
prophylaxis, although drug resistance may emerge quickly.  
• Where supplies allow, rimantadine is preferred over amantadine, because it is associated with a lower incidence of 
A
 
 Box 1. Strategies for Antiviral Use in Pandemic Influenza Treatment and Prophylaxis – cont. 
 
• Prophylaxis with amantadine or rimandatine decreased the risk of influenza illness during the 1968 pandemic and 
the 1977 reappearance of H1N1 viruses.* 
• A study of post-exposure prophylaxis using amantadine—conducted during the 1968 pandemic—demonstrated 
little effectiveness, possibly due to rapid development of resistance.* 
• Oseltamivir has >70% efficacy as prophylaxis against laboratory-confirmed febrile influenza illness during 
interpandemic periods in unimmunized adults.* 
 
*See MMWR July 29, 2005 http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5408.pdf  
 
2.  Strategies for prophylaxis 
Strategies for effective use of antiviral prophylaxis during a pandemic include: 
• Targeting prophylaxis to priority groups throughout the first wave of the pandemic. . (See Appendix 1, and 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, November 2005, Appendix D:  
NVAC/ACIP recommendations for prioritization of pandemic influenza vaccine and NVAC recommendations on 
pandemic antiviral drug use, table D-2, page D-21, http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf.  Data 
from 20th century influenza pandemics suggest that the first wave of these pandemics lasted approximately 4 to 8 
weeks in a community 
• Using post-exposure prophylaxis (generally for 10 days) to:  
o Control small, well-defined disease clusters, such as outbreaks in nursing homes or other institutions, to 
delay or reduce transmission to other communities. 
o Protect individuals with a known recent exposure to a pandemic virus (e.g., household contacts of 
pandemic influenza patients).  
• Modify priority groups for prophylaxis based on up-to-date information (e.g. drug supplies, drug 
susceptibilities, geographic distribution, fatality rate, age-specific morbidity and mortality rates, the effectiveness 
of implemented strategies, and when a vaccine becomes available).   
• Consider post-exposure prophylaxis to protect key personnel (when a vaccine becomes available) during the 
period between vaccination and the development of immunity.  
 
C. Strategies for Combined Treatment and Prophylaxis 
During the Pandemic Alert Period, combined antiviral treatment for ill persons and targeted post-exposure prophylaxis of 
contacts would be considered in attempts to contain small disease clusters (e.g., institutional outbreaks or household 
introductions as described in Supplement 8.   
 
The administration of oseltamivir does not interfere with the development of antibodies to influenza viruses after 
administration of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine. Therefore, persons receiving prophylaxis can continue to receive 
oseltamivir during the period between vaccination and the development of immunity.  Whether oseltamivir can interfere 
with the immune response elicited by a live-attenuated pandemic vaccine is unknown. 
 
 
D. Pediatric Use 
None of the available influenza antivirals are currently FDA approved for use among children aged <1 year. In particular, 
the safety and efficacy of oseltamivir have not been studied in children aged <1 year for either treatment or prophylaxis of 
influenza (see oseltamivir package insert). The decision by an individual physician to treat children aged <1 year in an 
emergency setting on an off-label basis with an antiviral must be made on a case-by-case basis with full consideration of the
potential risks and benefits.   
 
Oseltamivir is available as an oral suspension for use in children.  However, this formulation of oseltamivir may not be 
available in sufficient supply during a pandemic to treat all pediatric patients. If physicians use 75 mg oseltamivir capsules 
to deliver a partial, pediatric dose to children, they should know that there are insufficient data on palatability, stability, and 
dosing consistency to predict the safety or effectiveness of such a use. 
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Box 2. Federal Supplies of Antiviral Drugs in the Strategic National Stockpile 
 
During an influenza pandemic, a decision to deploy federal assets from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) will be made 
by HHS.  As of October 2005, the SNS  (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/) contained 2.26 million treatment regimens of 
oseltamivir (capsules and suspension), 5 million treatment regimens of rimantadine (tablets and syrup), and 84,000 
treatment regimens of zanamivir.  Two million additional oseltamivir courses will be delivered to the SNS by November 
2005 and additional purchases of antivirals are pending.   
The details of the HHS approach for allocation and distribution of SNS assets during an influenza pandemic are currently 
under consideration.  ADHS will work with federal the federal government, local health departments, tribal governments, 
bordering states, and Sonora, Mexico to: 
 
• Develop plans to allot antivirals to health care facilities, assuming that distribution of limited supplies of antivirals 
will initially be targeted to patients hospitalized with pandemic influenza and for treatment or prophylaxis of 
essential health care workers.  
• Develop a system that would allow for standing orders for the prescription of antivirals, particularly for use in 
health care workers.  
• Work with occupational health clinics in hospitals and other health care organizations on plans for delivery of 
antivirals to health care workers.    
• Instruct health care providers not to prescribe oseltamivir to individuals for prophylaxis against pandemic 
influenza, and counsel individuals not to stockpile oseltamivir in homes. At the present time, antivirals are needed 
to treat and give prophylaxis to the highest priority groups for the current seasonal influenza.  Inappropriate use 
and stockpiling of oseltamivir will take away necessary resources from those who have the highest priority. 
 
 
Table 1.  Characteristics of Anti-Influenza Antiviral Drugs 
 
  Inhibits Acts on Administration Common Side Effects 
Amantadine M2 ion channel Influenza A Oral CNS, GI 
Rimantadine M2 ion channel Influenza A Oral 
CNS, GI (less often than 
amantadine) 
Oseltamivir Neuraminidase Influenza A and B Oral GI 
Zanamivir Neuraminidase Influenza A and B Inhaler Bronchospasm 
 
These agents differ in mechanisms of action, pharmokinetics, FDA-approved indications, dosages, cost, and potential for 
emergence of drug resistance (see July 2005 recommendations of the AHIC (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5408.pdf ).   
The neuraminidase inhibitors and rimantadine are superior to amantadine with regard to the frequency of serious side effects. 
The use of M2 ion channel inhibitor, particularly for treatment, is likely to lead to the emergence and spread of drug-resistant 
influenza viruses. 
 
Source of Table 1: http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/10 
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Table 2.  Recommended Daily Dosage of Antivirals for Treatment and Prophylaxis 
(From Prevention and Control of Influenza, Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP], 
MMWR July29, 2005) 
  
  Age Groups (years) 
Antiviral Agent 1–6 7–9 10–12 13–64 >65 
Amantadinea           
Treatment, 
influenza A  
5mg/kg body weight/day up to 
150 mg in two divided doses b
5mg/kg body weight /day 
up to 150 mg in two divided 
doses b 
100 mg  
twice daily c 
100 mg  
twice daily c
<100 
mg/day 
Prophylaxis, 
influenza A 
5mg/kg body weight /day up 
to 150 mg in two divided 
doses b 
5mg/kg body weight /day 
up to 150 mg in two divided 
doses b 
100 mg twice 
daily c 
100 mg 
twice daily c
<100 
mg/day 
Rimantadine d            
Treatment,e 
influenza A  NA
f NA NA 
100 mg 
twice daily 
c,g 
100 
mg/day 
Prophylaxis, 
influenza A 
5m/kg body weight /day up to 
150 mg in two divided doses b
5mg/kg body weight /day 
up to 150 mg in two divided 
doses b 
100 mg twice 
daily c 
100 mg 
twice daily c
100 
mg/day h 
Zanamiviri,j            
Treatment, 
influenza A and B NA 10 mg twice daily 
10 mg twice 
daily 
10 mg twice 
daily 
10 mg 
twice daily
Oseltamivir           
Treatment,k 
influenza A and B dose varies by child’s weight 
l dose varies by child’s 
weight l 
dose varies by 
child’s weight l 
75 mg twice 
daily 
75 mg 
twice daily
Prophylaxis, 
influenza A and B NA NA NA 75 mg/day 75 mg/day 
a The drug package insert should be consulted for dosage recommendations for administering amantadine to persons with creatinine clearance <50 
ml/min/1.73m2 .        
b 5 mg/kg body weight of amantadine or rimantadine syrup = 1 tsp/2.2 lbs. 
c Children aged >10 years who weigh <40 kg should be administered amantadine or rimantadine at a dosage of 5 mg/kg body weight /day. 
d A reduction in dosage to 100 mg/day of rimantadine is recommended for persons who have severe hepatic dysfunction or those with creatinine clearance <10 
mL/min. Other persons with less severe hepatic or renal dysfunction taking 100 mg/day of rimantadine should be observed closely, and the dosage should be 
reduced or the drug discontinued, if necessary.  
e Approved by FDA only  for treatment among adults. 
f Not applicable. 
g Rimantadine is approved by FDA for treatment among adults.  However, certain experts in the management of influenza consider it appropriate for treatment 
among children. (See American Academy of Pediatrics, 2003 Red Book.) 
h Older nursing-home residents should be administered only 100 mg/day of rimantadine. A reduction in dosage to 100 mg/day should be considered for all 
persons aged >65 years if they experience possible side effects when taking 200 mg/day. 
i Zanamivir administered via inhalation using a plastic device included in the medication package.  Patients will benefit from instruction and demonstration of 
the correct use of the device. 
j Zanamivir is not approved for prophylaxis. 
k A reduction in the dose of oseltamivir is recommended for persons with creatinine clearance <30 ml/min. 
l The dose recommendation for children who weigh <15 kg is 30 mg twice a day. For children who weigh >15 to 23 kg, the dose is 45 mg twice a day. For 
children who weigh >23 to 40 kg, the dose is 60 mg twice a day. And for children who weigh >40 kg, the dose is 75 mg twice a day. 
 
Source of table 2: http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/10 
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Appendix 1 
Arizona’s Priority Groups for Antiviral Use during an Influenza Pandemic 
Estimation of the Number of Treatment Courses Required in Arizona for Select Priority Groups 
 
 Priority Group Strategy Estimated Population  C.F. Number of  
Treatment Courses 
(10 pills/course) 
Rationale 
   US 
(millions) 
AZ  Target 
group 
Cumulative 
courses 
 
1 Patients admitted to 
hospital 
Treat 10.0  200,000 75% 150,000 150,000 Treat those seriously ill 
and most likely to die 
2 HCWs with direct 
patient care and 
EMS 
Treat 9.2 184,000 25% 46,000 196,000 HCWs needed for 
medical care 
3 Highest risk 
outpatients:  
Pregnant women; 
immuno-
compromised 
Treat 2.5 50,000 25% 12,500 208,500 Highest risk of 
hospitalization and 
death; hard to protect 
immuno-compromised 
by vaccine 
4 Pandemic health 
responders, Public 
Safety, Government 
decision-makers 
Treat 3.3 66,000 25% 16,500 225,000 Critical for effective 
public health response 
5 Increased risk 
patients:   
Ages 12-23 mos., 
>65 yrs.; underlying 
medical conditions 
Treat 85.5 1,710,000 25% 427,500 652,500 High risk for 
hospitalization and 
death 
6 Outbreak response  Post 
Exposure 
Prophy. 
~ 2 
million 
~ 40,000 2% 40,000 692,500 Treatment & 
prophylaxis to contacts 
stop outbreaks 
7 HCWs in 
emergency 
departments, ICU, 
EMS, dialysis 
centers 
Prophy. 1.2 240,000 x4 960,000 1,652,500 Most critical to prevent 
absenteeism and surge 
capacity response 
8 Pandemic societal 
responders & 
HCWs without 
direct patient 
contact 
Treat 10.2 204,000 25% 51,000 1,703,500 Impact on maintaining 
health, implementing 
pandemic response, 
maintaining societal 
functions 
9 Other outpatients Treat 180 3,600,000 25% 72,000 1,775,500 Those who develop 
influenza and do not fit 
in about groups 
10 Highest risk 
outpatients 
Prophy. 2.5 50,000 x4 200,000 1,975,500 Prevents illness in 
highest risk groups 
11 Other HCWs with 
direct patient 
contact 
Prophy. 8.0 160,000 x4 640,000 2,615,500 Reduce absenteeism 
and preserve optimal 
health care response 
Note:  This does not include calculations for family members of high priority or high-risk individuals 
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Appendix 1 
Assumptions, Definitions, and Abbreviations 
 
Assumptions:   
• US population as per estimated population in table = 314.4 million 
• AZ population in 2004 = 5,832,150 (2004) 
• Therefore, AZ/US Ratio ~ 2% 
 
C.F.=Conversion Factors:  Mirroring assumptions in HHS PIP 11-05 document for US  
• 75% of hospitalized patients would get treated.    
• 25% of select priority groups would get infected and need treatment.   
• Two million people in the US may need Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP); 2% of that = 40,000.   
• x4 derives from the average need for prophylaxis for select priority groups would be the equivalent of 4 treatment 
courses (20 days or forty 75 mg pills) 
 
HCWs=Health Care Workers 
EMS=Emergency Medical Service providers 
ICU= Intensive care units 
Prophy.=Prophylaxis 
NA=Not applicable 
Treatment Courses: 10 pills (i.e. Five days of  75 mg pills twice a day) 
Public Health Responders (PHR):  Public health, vaccinators, vaccine and antiviral manufacturers 
Public safety:  Police, fire, corrections 
Outbreak response: (Nursing homes and residential settings) 
 
Source of US population and suggested priority groups:  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ HHS Pandemic 
Influenza Plan, November 2005.   Appendix D:  NVAC/ACIP recommendations for prioritization of pandemic influenza 
vaccine and NVAC recommendations on pandemic antiviral drug use, table D-2, page D-21.  
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 21 Supp. 7:  Antiviral Drug Distribution & Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Projected use of Antivirals  
Arizonans who would receive Antivirals  
Based on Appendix 1’s priority Groups and E
Treatment  
Prophylaxis 
Treatment or Prophylaxis 
 
 
Supporting documents: 
1. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, November 200
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan 
2. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, Part 1--HHS S
Vaccines and NVAC Recommendations on Pa
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/Ap
3. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, Part 2—Public
Distribution and Use.  http://www.hhs.gov/pan
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in Arizona During an Influenza Pandemicstimates: 
# % of population 
775,500 13.2% 
490,000  8.5% 
1,265,500 21.7% 
5.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  
trategic Plan, Appendix D:  NVAC/ACIP Recommendations on Use of 
ndemic Antiviral Drug Use.   
pD.pdf 
 Health Guidance for State and Local Partners, Supplement 7:  Antiviral 
demicflu/plan/pdf/S07.pdf 
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Four antiviral drugs are licensed for treatment and chemoprophylaxis  
Updated 19 Jan 2006 
Appendix 3.   ADHS Clinician Fact Sheet: Antivirals 
     Clinician Fact Sheet:  Antivirals for Influenza 2005-2006 
• Antivirals shorten the course of illness when given within the first 1-2 days of influenza symptoms  
• Avoid antivirals in pregnant women unless benefit outweighs risk 
• Though usually effective for influenza A, this season amantadine and rimantadine are not recommended in the U.S. due to 
high levels of resistance 
 Amantadine 
(Symmetrel®) 
Rimantadine 
(Flumadine®) 
Oseltamivir 
(Tamiflu®) 
Zanamivir (Relenza®) 
Effective for Flu A Not recommended for 2005-2006 season Yes Yes 
Effective for Flu B No No Yes Yes 
Mode Oral Oral Oral Inhaled 
Treatment > 1 y.o. > 13 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 7 y.o. 
Prophylaxis > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. N/A 
Priority groups for treatment with antiviral medicines 
• Any person with a potentially life-threatening influenza-related illness   
• Any person at high risk for serious complications of influenza and who is within the first 2 days of illness onset 
Priority groups for chemoprophylaxis with antiviral medicines 
• All residents and workers during an institutional outbreak   
• All persons at high risk of serious influenza complications if they are exposed to a known or suspected case of 
influenza 
Consider antiviral use in these patients if local supplies are adequate: 
Chemoprophylaxis 
• Persons in communities where influenza viruses are circulating (influenza outbreak usually lasts 6-8 weeks) 
• Persons at high risk of serious complications who cannot get vaccinated.  
Persons at high risk of serious complications who have been vaccinated but have not had time to mount an immune 
response to the vaccine.  In adults, chemoprophylaxis should occur for 2 weeks after vaccination.  
• Persons with immunosuppressive conditions who are not expected to mount an adequate antibody response to 
influenza vaccine. 
• Heath-care workers with direct patient care responsibilities who have not been vaccinated 
Treatment  
• Infected adults and children aged >1 year who do not have conditions placing them at high risk for serious 
complications secondary to influenza infection. 
 
Length of Antiviral Treatment and Chemoprophylaxis 
Chemoprophylaxis Length  Treatment 
Length  After exposure Institutional outbreak After vaccine** 
Amantadine 
Rimantadine 
3-5 days* 7 days Until outbreak over 2 weeks 
Oseltamivir 7 days Until outbreak over 2 weeks 
Zanamivir 
5 days 
N/A N/A N/A 
*Until afebrile 1-2 days  ** If antiviral prophylaxis is desired for high-risk individuals during the time immunity is developing 
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Pediatric Points 
• Children < 9 years old who have never had an influenza vaccine need 2 doses of influenza vaccine, > 1 month apart to be 
optimally protected.  Therefore, if a high-risk child is vaccinated when there is influenza in the community, antiviral 
prophylaxis may need to be continued for 6 weeks for optimal protection. 
• For pediatric antiviral use where no liquid formulation is available, open the capsule or crush the tablet, and give the 
appropriate dose in cherry syrup.    
 
ANTIVIRAL MEDICINES 
Amantadine  [100 mg capsule; 50 mg/5 ml syrup] 
• Treatment and prophylaxis (T&P) of influenza A in > 12 months of age.   
• Standard dose in adults for both T&P: 100 mg PO twice a day. 
• Standard dose in children for T&P: 5 mg/kg/day PO in two divided doses (max of 150 mg/day). 
• Side effects:  CNS effects (e.g. trouble concentrating, insomnia & lowered seizure threshold, dry mouth, urinary retention). 
• Decrease dose to 100 mg Q day 
o CrCl < 50 ml/min 
o Age > 65 years 
o When side effects occur on 100 mg BID 
Rimantadine [100 mg tablet; 50 mg/5 ml syrup] 
• Treatment of influenza A in > 13 y.o.   
• Prophylaxis of influenza A in > 1 y.o. 
• Standard dose in adults: 100 mg PO twice a day (see above table for length) 
• Standard dose in children: 5 mg/kg/day PO in two divided doses (max of 150 mg/day). 
• Similar but fewer side effects than amantadine  
• Decrease dose to 100 mg Q day 
o Nursing home residents 
o Age > 65 years 
o Severe hepatic dysfunction 
o CrCl < 10 ml/min 
o When side effects occur on 100 mg BID 
Oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) [75 mg tablet; 60 mg/5 ml suspension] 
• Treatment and prophylaxis of influenza A & B in > 12 months old.   
• Treatment: 75 mg PO twice daily for 5 days.    
• Lower dose in children based on weight: 
< 15 kg, 30 mg BID;  
>15-23 kg, 45 mg BID; 
>23-40 kg, 60 mg BID;  
>40 kg, 75 mg PO BID. 
• Prophylaxis:  75 mg PO once daily  
• Side effects:  nausea & vomiting 
• Reduce dose to 75 mg every other day when CrCl 10-30 ml/min 
Zanamivir (Relenza®) [Inhaler] 
• Treatment of influenza A & B in > 7 years of age.   
• Inhalation (10 mg) twice daily for 5 days. 
• Side effects:  Bronchospasm  
 
For more detailed information about each antiviral medication 
See http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/treatment 
 
 
Arizona Department of Health Services 
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Appendix 4.   ADHS Clinician Fact Sheet:  Influenza 
     Clinician Fact Sheet:  Influenza 2005-2006 
 
       
Epidemiology 
• Human disease is caused by influenza A or influenza B 
• Ongoing minor antigenic changes require yearly vaccination in the fall 
• Knowing the currently circulating strain aids in decisions regarding antiviral treatment and prophylaxis 
Clinical Presentation 
• High fever, chills, prostration, muscle aches, sore throat, coryza, cough; at times, also vomiting and diarrhea 
Differential Diagnosis 
• Febrile respiratory illnesses such as bacterial pneumonia, mycoplasma, adenovirus, avian influenza (e.g. influenza A 
H5N1), and SARS 
Laboratory 
• Rapid testing of nasopharyngeal swabs for influenza 
• Consider NP swab for respiratory viral culture (if positive, allows for further typing of isolate) 
• Do not order routine viral culture if avian influenza is suspected 
Infection control 
• Droplet precautions (mask within 3-6 feet) 
• Routine standard precautions and good handwashing before & after patient contact 
Treatment & Prophylaxis 
• Antivirals shorten the course of illness when given within the first 1-2 days of influenza symptoms  
• CDC recommends against the use of amantadine & rimantadine for the 2005-2006 season 
 
 Amantadine 
(Symmetrel®) 
Rimantadine 
(Flumadine®) 
Oseltamivir  
(Tamiflu®) 
Zanamivir  
(Relenza®) 
Effective for 
Influenza A  
Not recommended for  2005-2006 season Yes Yes 
Effective for  
Influenza B 
No No Yes Yes 
Mode Oral Oral Oral Inhaled 
Treatment > 1 y.o. > 13 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 7 y.o. 
Prophylaxis > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. > 1 y.o. Not licensed 
 
Follow CDC’s recommendations for ages and contraindications 
• Don’t use smaller doses than recommended 
• Only use LAIV (Flumist™) in healthy people ages 5 years-49 years 
• Persons receiving LAIV should avoid close contact with severely immunosuppresed people for 7 days 
• Contraindications to inactivated influenza vaccine or LAIV  
o Anaphylactic allergy to eggs 
o Previous Guillain-Barré syndrome during the 6 weeks following a previous influenza vaccine 
Remember Pneumovax® or Prevnar® pneumococcal vaccine for high-risk individuals. 
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Influenza Vaccine Recommendations for 2005-2006 season  
Inactivated intramuscular shot [Multiple manufacturers]:   
• Ages > 50 y.o.  
• All children ages 6 mo.-23 mo.                 
• Household contacts and out-of-home caretakers of infants < age 6 mo.  
• Ages 2 y.o.-64 y.o. with a chronic medical conditions (e.g. heart disease, lung disease, asthma, diabetes, kidney 
disease, immunosuppression, etc.)  
• Pregnant during influenza season. 
• Children age 6 mo.-18 y.o. on chronic aspirin therapy. 
• Health care workers (HCW) with direct patient care. 
• Residents in nursing home or long-term care facility. 
• Anyone wishing to reduce their risk of influenza. 
Live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) [Flumist™]:  
• Healthy, nonpregnant people ages 5 y.o. through 49 y.o., including close contacts of infants and many health care 
workers  
Pediatric pointers 
• Children ages 5 years-8 years old receiving any influenza vaccine for the first time need two doses of vaccine.   
o Two inactivated shots should be spaced > 4 weeks apart 
o Two LAIV doses should be separated by 6-10 weeks  
• Notify local or county health department for pediatric influenza deaths. 
Staphylococcal and MRSA disease associated with influenza 
• MRSA is becoming a community-acquired infection 
• Coagulase positive staphylococcus secondary respiratory infections are more likely with influenza 
• During the 2003-2004 season, CDC reported severe illness and death associated with influenza and MRSA 
¾ Physicians caring for patients who have influenza and worsening respiratory status requiring IV antibiotics should 
consider using vancomycin for staphylococcal coverage until culture results are available and/or clinical improvement 
occurs 
• Many oral antibiotics do not cover MRSA 
• Oral antibiotics that may be effective against MRSA 
o Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole  
 Poor against Streptococcus pneumoniae 
 Avoid in pregnancy 
o Clindamycin (Good against Streptococcus pneumoniae) 
For More Information 
• ADHS website at  http://www.azdhs.gov/phs/immun/providersflu.htm  
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website at www.cdc.gov/flu  
• MMWR July 29, 2005 “Treatment and Control of Influenza” at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5408a1.htm 
• Recorded ADHS Hotline for the Public:  Metro Phoenix 602-364-4500, Statewide 1-800-314-9243 
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I.  Overview 
The initial response to the emergence of a novel influenza subtype that spreads between people will focus on containing the 
virus at its source, if feasible, and preventing a pandemic. Once spread beyond the initial focus occurs and with introduction of 
the virus into the United States, the foci of containment activities will be public health and individual measures that attempt to 
slow and limit viral transmission. Containment measures refer to measures that attempt to fully limit transmission as well as 
those that attempt to slow transmission. (Box 1)  Containment strategies aimed at controlling and slowing the spread of the 
virus might include measures that affect individuals (e.g., isolation of patients and monitoring their contacts) as well as 
measures that affect groups or entire communities (e.g., cancellation of public gatherings; implementation of community-wide 
“Stay Home Days”). (Appendix 1) Guided by epidemiologic data, ADHS 
and local health agencies will implement the most appropriate of these 
measures in efforts to maximize impact on disease transmission and 
minimize impact on individual freedom of movement.  
Although states and localities have primary responsibility for public 
health matters within their borders, including isolation and quarantine, 
under the authority of Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 
USC 264), the HHS Secretary may make and enforce regulations 
necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States or 
from one state or possession into another.  
Containment measures applied to individuals (e.g., isolation and 
quarantine) may have limited impact in preventing the transmission of 
pandemic influenza, due to the short incubation period of the illness, the ability of persons with asymptomatic infection to 
transmit virus, and the possibility that early symptoms among persons infected with a novel influenza strain may be non-
specific, delaying recognition and implementation of containment. Nevertheless, during the Pandemic Alert Period with a less 
efficiently transmitted virus, these measures may have great effectiveness, slowing disease spread and allowing time for 
targeted use of medical interventions.  In addition, implementing these measures early in a pandemic when disease is first 
introduced into the U.S. and when the scope of the outbreak is focal and limited may slow geographical spread and increase 
time for vaccine production and implementation of other pandemic response activities.  
Later, when disease transmission is occurring in communities around the U.S., individual quarantine is much less likely to have 
an impact and likely would not be feasible to implement. Thus, community-based containment measures (e.g., closing schools 
or restricting public gatherings) and emphasizing what individuals can do to reduce their risk of infection (e.g., hand hygiene 
and cough etiquette) may be more effective disease control tools.  
 
 
II.  Actions for Inter-pandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods 
A.  Community preparedness for implementation of pandemic influenza containment measures 
 
Both individual and community-based containment measures raise legal, logistic, and social challenges that should be 
addressed during the Interpandemic Period. This section provides information on planning for disease control and containment, 
legal preparedness, planning for potential use of influenza hotlines and the role of communications in preparing the public to 
accept the possible need for restrictive measures to reduce the spread of pandemic influenza. 
 
1. Planning for disease control and containment  
Although individual quarantine as a control measure is likely only to be used during the Pandemic Alert and very early during 
the Pandemic Period—for example, among communities where initial cases are introduced into the U.S.—all state and local 
health departments and tribal authorities should anticipate and prepare for the challenges of effectively implementing this 
measure by working with community partners to review the steps involved in establishing and maintaining quarantine facilities 
and procedures.  
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Key activities include (see Appendix 2):  
• Identifying and engaging traditional partners (e.g., public heath and health care workers) and non-traditional 
community partners (e.g., transportation workers) and inviting them to participate in preparedness planning 
and in pandemic influenza containment exercises and drills 
• Identifying potential isolation and quarantine facilities  
• Establishing procedures for medical evaluation and isolation of quarantined persons who exhibit signs of 
influenza-like illness (ILI)  
• Developing tools and mechanisms to prevent stigmatization and provide mental health services to persons in 
isolation or quarantine, as well as to family members of affected persons and other community members  
• Establishing procedures for delivering medical care, food, and services to persons in isolation or quarantine. 
These efforts should take into account the special needs of children and persons with disabilities.  
• Developing protocols for monitoring and enforcing quarantine measures  
• Ensuring legal authorities and procedures exist for various levels of movement restrictions  
• Establishing procedures for issues related to employment compensation and job security 
 
Planning checklists for businesses, individuals & families, and faith-based & community organizations are in Appendix 3. 
 
2. Legal preparedness  
ADHS, county health departments, and tribes (including Indian Health Services, as appropriate) have primary responsibility for 
public health matters within their borders, including isolation and quarantine. Specific statutory authorities for the government 
agencies are listed below: 
 
Isolation and Quarantine 
 
For purposes of this response plan, “Isolation” refers to the separation of an individual 
with influenza from non-infected individuals.  “Quarantine” refers to the separation of an 
individual, or individuals, exposed to influenza from non-infected and non-exposed 
individuals.  There are three sources of authority and direction for Isolation and 
Quarantine in Arizona: 
 
1.  ARS § 36-624 
Gives the counties the authority to conduct isolation and quarantine measures.  Must be consistent with the due process 
requirements that are specified under ARS § 36-788 and 36-789 (see below).  Some counties may have established their own 
procedures for isolation and quarantine under this authority, however many counties may not be prepared in this area. 
 
2.  ARS § 36-787 through 36-789 
Provides isolation and quarantine authority to the state during a state of emergency or state of war emergency.  Quarantine 
orders at the state level can only be given by the Governor, in consultation with the director of the Arizona Department of 
Health Services.  
 
3.  AAC R9-6-388 
These rules give the local health agency a process from which to issue isolation and/or quarantine orders that are congruent 
with ARS § 36-624, ARS § 36-788 and ARS §36-789 (see figures 8.1 and 8.2). 
 
Templates for documents needed to request isolation and quarantine orders are in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 8.1  During a Governor-declared state of war or state of emergency, the 
Department (ADHS) must follow the process below to issue an order for isolation 
or quarantine: 
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Figure 8.2  The local health agency must follow the process below to issue an 
order for isolation or quarantine: 
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3. Planning for influenza clinics and hotlines  
An influenza pandemic is likely to put great stress on Arizona’s health care delivery system, in particular emergency 
departments. A hospital and health care surge capacity plan has been designed to address the overwhelming demand on the 
health care system, especially emergency departments (see Supplement 3). 
 
Ill persons will be encouraged to call special influenza 
hotlines that provide advice on whether to stay home or to 
seek medical care. ADHS and the county health departments 
have hotline capacities that can act as triage and information 
systems to support this need. These “community triage” 
efforts may help prevent hospitals from being overwhelmed 
with patients who do not require hospital-level care. 
Moreover, community triage efforts may also reduce the 
number of uninfected persons who mingle with infected 
persons at clinics and hospitals. Activated influenza hotline 
systems will include:  
• Telephone hotline numbers that people can call to report specific symptoms (e.g., fever) that will be specified 
by ADHS  
• Protocols for hotline staff members that include training components and triage decision trees or algorithms  
• Communication systems with influenza clinics or alternative treatment facilities, if they are established  
 
4. Public understanding of disease containment measures  
Community preparedness for implementation of both individual and community control measures needs to be enhanced during 
the Interpandemic Period by improving public understanding of the dangers of pandemic influenza and the benefits of 
community-wide disease control practices, including social-distancing measures that can prevent illness and death.  Strategies 
for disease control will be facilitated by clear communication of the rationale for—and duration of—containment measures.  
Public health education campaigns that involve community partners will be designed to build public confidence in the ability to 
cope with an influenza pandemic. Partners will include schools, faith-based organizations, community-based organizations, and 
local government institutions that can help educate the public and provide support to families and persons who are 
incapacitated by illness.  
Local public health campaigns will explain how individual action (e.g., strict compliance with respiratory hygiene, staying 
home when ill) and community efforts (e.g., implementation of “Stay Home Days” and self-isolation, as described below) can 
help reduce disease transmission. Education campaigns will describe the criteria, justification, role, methodology, and duration 
of quarantine and the social, medical, and psychological ways in which persons will be supported during the quarantine period. 
They can also explain that quarantine—which temporarily restricts personal movement—is a collective action implemented for 
the common good. In addition, they can allay public concerns about privacy issues related to the provision of medical 
information to health care workers and public health officials. These key messages will be translated and modified as required 
to address the cultural and linguistic needs of local neighborhoods.  
 
5. Enforcement and support of community containment measures 
Experience from the 2003 SARS outbreak suggests that quarantine applied on a voluntary basis can be sufficient to reduce 
disease.  Nevertheless, ADHS and the county health are prepared to enact and enforce individual and community-based 
containment measures, if needed. 
  
B. Management of patients infected with novel strains of influenza and their contacts 
In this document, the term “novel strains of influenza” is used to refer to avian or animal influenza strains that can infect 
humans (like influenza A [H5N1]) and new or reemergent human viruses that cause cases or clusters of human disease.  The 
choice of measures to contain the spread of novel strains of influenza during the Pandemic Alert Period will vary depending on 
the assessment of risk, as reflected in the three Pandemic Alert Phases described by WHO (Box 2).  
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1. Patient isolation  
Infection control precautions and procedures for isolating influenza patients—in a residence, community facility, or hospital—
are described in Supplement 4. The patient will be admitted to a hospital if clinically indicated, if public health needs require it, 
or if isolation at home or in a community facility cannot be achieved safely and effectively. Information for evaluating the 
suitability of homes and facilities for patient isolation is provided in Appendix 6.  
ADHS or county health department personnel will advise the health care provider and health care facility on additional steps 
that may be taken, before and after laboratory test results become available, via the Arizona State Public Health Laboratory or 
CDC.  
2. Management of close contacts  
In most situations—even at the earliest stages of a pandemic—it will not likely be possible to trace and quarantine close 
contacts of suspected or confirmed cases within 48 hours (the average incubation period for human influenza). However, in 
certain situations, especially during the later phases of the WHO Pandemic Alert Period (Box 2), efforts to identify exposed 
individuals or groups might be recommended. Examples might include:  
• Suspected or confirmed cases of novel influenza. For example, a suspected or confirmed case of avian 
influenza A (H5N1) in persons who have traveled to an H5N1-affected country and have been exposed to 
sick poultry (either through handling or eating poultry products) or a laboratory-confirmed human case of 
H5N1 influenza  
• Suspected or confirmed cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) or another novel strain of influenza in travelers 
on internationally-originating airplanes about to arrive in Arizona (see Supplement 9)  
• Suspected or confirmed cases of avian influenza of any type in persons with known exposure to sick poultry 
or birds in the United States  
• Clusters of avian influenza A (H5N1) or another novel strain of influenza in small, well defined settings, 
such as a military base  
• Cases of laboratory exposure to avian influenza A (H5N1) or influenza viruses with the potential to cause a 
pandemic (e.g., influenza A [H2N2])  
 
Decisions on whether to trace a patient’s contacts and how to manage them will be made on a case-by-case basis by county 
health officers and/or ADHS officials, taking into consideration:  
• Likelihood that the suspected case is due to a novel influenza 
strain (based on symptoms and travel history, if laboratory 
results are not yet available)  
• Likelihood that the causative virus is transmitted from person-
to-person with a moderate or high efficiency (as reflected in the 
designated Pandemic Alert phase)  
• Feasibility of conducting contact-tracing given the short 
incubation period for influenza  
A patient’s close contacts may include family, friends, work colleagues, 
classmates, fellow passengers, and/or health care providers. Management of 
contacts might include passive or active monitoring without activity restrictions 
and/or quarantine at home or in a designated facility. In the Pandemic Alert 
Period, especially during Phase 3 or 4 when little or limited person-to-person 
transmission has been documented, quarantine of contacts should be implemented 
only when there is a high probability that the ill patient is infected with a 
novel influenza strain that may be transmitted to others.  
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A county, state, or tribal health department official will monitor contacts that are quarantined at least once a day—by phone or 
in person—to assess symptoms and address any needs. Frequent monitoring (e.g., twice a day) will facilitate early detection, 
reducing the interval between the onset of symptoms and the isolation of the sick person, but may not be feasible, depending on 
resource availability. Early signs of influenza include fever, respiratory symptoms, and chills, rigors, myalgia, headache, or 
diarrhea. Quarantine may be lifted as soon as the exposed contact has remained without signs or symptoms of disease for a 
complete incubation period for influenza disease. (Experience with seasonal influenza suggests the incubation period is 1-4 
days, with an average length of 2 days. However, the clinical behavior  
 
of a novel influenza virus may be different and could potentially be as long as 10 days. Pandemic influenza preparedness 
activities should plan for containment measures that may last between 1-10 days. For the purposes of this document, 10 days is 
referred to as the incubation period, following the HHS planning model; however, this time frame may be adjusted as more is 
known about the virus.)  
 
C. Containment of small clusters of infection with novel strains of influenza 
Community-based control measures that ADHS, county, or tribal health officials might use to contain small clusters of 
infection with novel strains of influenza (during the later Pandemic Alert phases or when cases are first introduced into the 
U.S.) include targeted chemoprophylaxis and early detection of new cases by use of influenza hotlines and clinics. These 
approaches may be implemented in small, well-defined settings. They are not likely to be useful once a pandemic is underway. 
 
1. Targeted chemoprophylaxis of disease clusters 
This intervention includes investigation of disease clusters, administration of antiviral treatment to persons with confirmed or 
suspected pandemic influenza, and provision of drug prophylaxis to all likely exposed persons in the affected community. CDC 
will assist ADHS and county health departments in these efforts, as needed. Targeted chemoprophylaxis also requires intensive 
disease surveillance to ensure coverage of the entire affected area, effective communication with the affected community, and 
rapid distribution and administration of antivirals because they are most effective when provided within 48 hours of symptom 
onset or when used as post-exposure prophylaxis before onset of illness.  This intervention may only be useful upon the 
recognition of the first cases or introduction in Arizona, especially in a closed community, such as an assisted living facility. 
 
2. Influenza hotlines and infectious disease referral centers  
During the later phases of a Pandemic Alert, in a community experiencing a disease cluster, a combination of self-assessment 
and establishment of influenza hotlines may be effective in detecting potential influenza disease and conducting “community 
triage” to direct persons with symptoms to the appropriate site and level of care. This intervention includes asking all members 
of the affected community to monitor their symptoms in accordance with instructions from ADHS. For example, all members 
of the community might be asked to take their temperature (and the temperature of their household members) once or twice 
daily. Persons with temperatures above a certain level may be asked to either stay home and phone a designated influenza 
hotline for a medical consult, or proceed to a designated infectious disease referral center, established by regional public health 
and health care authorities (see Supplement 3).  
 
 
III.  Actions for the Pandemic Period 
During the Pandemic Period, control measures such as contact tracing and quarantine applied to individuals may have limited 
impact in decreasing influenza transmission. In addition, individual-level measures may no longer be feasible. During this 
stage, ADHS and local health departments will consider measures that decrease social contact within groups or whole 
communities (e.g., self-isolation, cancellation of public events, “Stay Home Days”) and measures that individuals can take 
personally to decrease their risk of infection  
Box 2 outlines measures that may be employed at different stages of a pandemic, as disease becomes more widespread. These 
begin with containment activities for individuals and move on, as needed, to community-based measures  
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A. Containment measures for individuals  
1. Patient isolation  
As noted above, a patient with a suspected or confirmed case of pandemic influenza need to be separated from persons who are 
well, using infection control measures described in Supplement 4. If a surge in patients overwhelms health care capacity or if 
home isolation is not feasible, health departments may need to use alternative facilities for isolation of influenza patients. 
Guidance on use of alternative facilities for isolation of influenza patients is provided in Appendix 7 and in Supplement 3.  
2. Management of contacts  
Contact tracing, contact monitoring, and quarantine of close contacts may be effective only in special situations during the 
earliest stages of a pandemic. Because the usefulness and feasibility of these measures will be limited once the pandemic has 
started to spread, community-based measures that reduce disease transmission by increasing social distance will likely be the 
primary public health intervention. 
 
B. Community-based containment measures 
If disease transmission in the community is significant and sustained, ADHS and county and tribal health authorities may 
implement community-based containment measures. Community-based containment measures can be grouped into two broad 
categories: measures that affect groups of exposed or at-risk persons and measures that affect entire communities.  Table 1 lists 
quantifiable factors that may influence decisions on where and when to impose community-based containment measures. 
Social considerations—including levels of community cooperation and mobility—will also inform decision-making.  
 
1. Measures that affect groups of exposed or at-risk persons  
Measures that affect groups of exposed or at-risk persons include:  
• Quarantine of groups of exposed persons  
• Containment measures that apply to use of specific sites or buildings  
These measures should be considered when:  
• There is limited disease transmission in the area.  
• Most cases can be traced to contact with an earlier case or exposure to a known transmission setting (e.g., a 
school or workplace where a person has fallen ill).  
• The intervention is likely to either significantly slow the spread of infection or to decrease the overall 
magnitude of an outbreak in the community.  
 
a) Quarantine of groups of exposed persons  
The purpose of quarantine is to reduce influenza transmission by separating exposed persons from others, monitoring exposed 
persons for symptoms, and providing medical care and infection control precautions as soon as symptoms are detected. Groups 
that might be quarantined include:  
• Persons who might have been exposed to an influenza case  
o Via family members 
o At a public gathering 
o On an airplane or other closed conveyance (see 
also Supplement 9), or  
o At their school or workplace  
• Health care providers who work at a facility where 
influenza cases receive care  
 
Group quarantine (like patient isolation) is optimally performed on a 
voluntary basis, in accordance with instructions of health care providers and health officials. However, the Governor and the 
county health officer have the basic legal authority (A.R.S. 36-624, 36-787-9) to compel mandatory isolation and quarantine of 
individuals and groups when necessary to protect the public’s health. Recommendations for quarantine and monitoring of 
quarantined persons in different situations (home quarantine, quarantine in a designated facility, working quarantine) are 
provided in Appendix 6.  
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b) Measures that apply to use of specific sites or buildings  
Two ways of increasing social distance activity restrictions are to cancel events and close buildings or to restrict access to 
certain sites or buildings. These measures are sometimes called “focused measures to increase social distance.” Depending on 
the situation, examples of cancellations and building closures might include:  
• Cancellation of public events (concerts, sports events, movies, plays)  
• Closure of recreational facilities (community swimming pools, youth clubs, gymnasiums) or other public or 
private facilities 
 
2. Measures that affect communities  
Measures that affect entire communities (including both exposed and non-exposed persons), include:  
• Promotion of community-wide infection control measures (e.g., respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette)  
• “Stay Home Days” and self-isolation 
• Closure of office buildings, shopping malls, schools, and public transportation (e.g., buses; see  
Supplement 9)    
 
Measures that affect whole communities will be considered when:  
• There is moderate to extensive disease transmission in the area.  
• Many cases cannot be traced to contact with an earlier case or known exposure.  
• Cases are increasing among contacts of influenza patients.  
• There is a significant delay between the onset of symptoms and the isolation of cases because of the large 
number of ill persons.  
 
As community outbreaks of pandemic influenza occur, community-wide infection control measures may decrease the overall 
magnitude of the outbreak (see Box 2). Community-based measures may also include school closures, “Stay Home Days”, and 
self-isolation.  
a) Community-wide infection control measures  
Throughout a pandemic, public health authorities will encourage all persons with signs and symptoms of a respiratory 
infection, regardless of presumed cause, to:  
• Cover the nose/mouth when coughing or sneezing.  
• Use tissues to contain respiratory secretions. 
• Dispose of tissues in the nearest waste receptacle after use.  
• Perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions and contaminated 
objects or materials.  
 
Persons at high risk for complications of influenza will be advised to avoid public 
gatherings (e.g., movies, public meetings) when pandemic influenza is in the 
community. They should also avoid going to other public areas (e.g., food stores, 
pharmacies); the use of other persons for shopping or home delivery service is 
encouraged.  
Disposable surgical-type masks are used by health care workers taking care of ill 
patients to prevent splashes and droplets of potentially infectious material (e.g., from 
coughs and sneezes) from reaching the mucous membranes of the health care worker’s 
nose or mouth. The benefit of wearing masks by well persons in public settings has not 
been established and is not recommended as a public health control measure at this time. 
In contrast to health care workers who necessarily have close contact with ill patients, 
the general public should try to avoid close contact with ill individuals.  
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Nevertheless, persons may choose to wear a mask as part of individual protection strategies that include cough etiquette, hand 
hygiene, and avoiding public gatherings. Mask use may be most important for persons who are at high risk for complications of 
influenza and those who are unable to avoid close contact with others or must travel for essential reasons such as seeking 
medical care, or attending religious services. Public education should be provided on how to use and dispose of masks 
appropriately. In addition, this education should emphasize that mask use is not a substitute for social distance or other 
personal protection measures (see also Supplement 4). Supply issues should be considered so that mask use in communities 
does not limit availability for health care settings where the importance and effectiveness of this use has been documented.  
b) “Stay Home Days” and Self-isolation  
Implementation of “Stay Home Days”—asking everyone to stay home—involves the entire community in a positive way, is 
acceptable to most people, and is relatively easy to implement (note: “Stay Home Days” is the same as “Snow Days” in HHS 
and other state plans, but the title was changed for obvious reasons). “Stay Home Days” may be declared at a county or state 
level, by the respective health officer, for an initial 10-day period, with final decisions on duration based on an epidemiologic 
and social assessment of the situation. Such a declaration would be an official public health recommendation, but would not be 
legally enforceable.  States and local authorities need to consider recommendations to the public for acquisition and storage of 
necessary provisions including type and quantity of supplies needed during “Stay Home Days”. “Stay Home Days” can 
effectively reduce transmission without explicit activity restrictions (i.e., quarantine). Consideration will be given to personnel 
who maintain primary functions in the community (e.g., law enforcement personnel, transportation workers, utility workers 
[electricity, water, gas, telephone, sanitation]). Compliance with “Stay Home Days” might be enhanced by “self-isolation” 
behavior (i.e., many people may stay home even in the absence of an official “Stay Home Days” Declaration).  
c) Closure of office buildings, shopping malls, schools, and public transportation  
Closure of office buildings, stores, schools, and public transportation systems may be feasible community containment 
measures during a pandemic. All of these have significant impact on the community and workforce, however, and careful 
consideration will be focused on their potential effectiveness, how they can most effectively be implemented, and how to 
maintain critical supplies and infrastructure while limiting community interaction. For example, when public transportation is 
cancelled, other modes of transportation must be provided for emergency medical services and medical evaluation.  
Although data are limited, school closures may be effective in 
decreasing spread of influenza and reducing the overall magnitude of 
disease in a community. In addition, the risk of infection and illness 
among children is likely to be decreased, which would be particularly 
important if the pandemic strain causes significant morbidity and 
mortality among children. Children are known to be efficient 
transmitters of seasonal influenza and other respiratory illnesses. 
Anecdotal reports suggest that community influenza outbreaks may be 
limited by closing schools. Results of mathematical modeling also 
suggest a reduction of overall disease, especially when schools are 
closed early in the outbreak. During a Pandemic Period, parents will be 
encouraged to consider child care arrangements that do not result in 
large gatherings of children outside the school setting.  
d) Widespread community quarantine (cordon sanitaire)  
In extreme circumstances, state and county officials may implement widespread or community-wide quarantine, which is the 
most stringent and restrictive containment measure. It differs from “Stay Home Days” in two respects: 1) It may involve a 
legally enforceable action, and 2) it restricts travel into or out of an area circumscribed by a real or virtual “sanitary barrier” or 
“cordon sanitaire” except to authorized persons, such as public heath or health care workers.  While HHS includes this 
containment intervention in the Federal guidance, it is not included here as a viable option, due to a lack of legal authority in 
Arizona to enforce such an intervention, and the low-likelihood of success of physically maintaining such a containment. 
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3. Scaling back community containment measures  
The decision to discontinue community-level measures will balance the need to lift individual movement restrictions against 
community health and safety. Premature removal of containment strategies can increase the risk of additional transmission. 
Decisions will be based on evidence of improving local/regional control, such as:  
• Consistent decrease in the number of confirmed cases  
•  Reduction in the number of probable and known cases  
•  Effective protective countermeasures are in place (e.g., high coverage with a pandemic influenza 
vaccine)  
 
General recommendations are to withdraw the most stringent or disruptive measures first. 
 
Box 1.  Containment Measures:  Terms and Definitions 
 
  
Isolation is the separation and restriction and movement or activities of ill infected persons (patients) who have a contagious 
disease, for the purpose of preventing transmission to others.  
Quarantine is the separation and restriction of movement or activities of persons who are not ill but who are believed to 
have been exposed to infection, for the purpose of preventing transmission of disease. Individuals may be quarantined at 
home or in designated facilities; health care providers and other response workers may be subject to quarantine when they 
are off duty. Quarantine of close contacts refers to the quarantine of individuals exposed to patients with communicable 
diseases (e.g., family members, work or school mates, health care workers).  Quarantine of groups of exposed persons 
refers to quarantine of people who have been exposed to the same source of illness (e.g., a case of influenza at a public 
gathering, on an airline, train, or cruise ship, at a school or workplace or apartment complex, or at a recently visited store or 
office).  
Widespread or community-wide quarantine refers to the closing of community borders or the erection of a real or virtual 
barrier around a geographic area (a cordon sanitaire) with prohibition of travel into or out of the area.  
Self-isolation or Self-shielding refers to self-imposed exclusion from infected persons or those perceived to be infected 
(e.g., by staying home from work or school during an epidemic).  
Stay Home Days or Snow days are days on which offices, schools, transportation systems are closed or cancelled, as if 
there were a major snowstorm.  
Influenza clinics are special facilities that may be established during a pandemic to provide rapid medical assessment of 
potentially infected persons. Ill persons would be encouraged to call influenza hotlines that provide advice on whether to stay 
home or seek help at an influenza clinic. Persons who come to an influenza clinic will be advised on whether they may be 
best served by hospital care or home care.  
Individual-level containment measures include isolation of patients and management of their close contacts.  
Focused measures to increase social distance (or decrease social contact) includes measures applied to groups rather than 
individuals or whole communities (e.g., quarantine of groups of exposed persons and measures that apply to the use of 
specific sites or buildings).  
Containment measures that apply to use of specific sites or buildings include cancellation of public events (e.g., concerts, 
sports events, movies and plays), closure of office buildings, apartment complexes, or schools; and closure of subways or bus 
lines. These measures may also involve restricting entrance to buildings or other sites (e.g., requiring fever screening or use 
of face masks before entry to schools, worksites, or airplanes).  
Community-based measures to increase social distance include measures applied to whole neighborhoods, gown, or cities 
(e.g., “Stay Home Days”, establishment of fever clinics, and community-wide quarantine. 
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Appendix 1 
Interventions For Community Containment 
  
Contacts of pandemic influenza patients can be managed by use of a range of interventions, all of which are designed to 
facilitate early recognition of illness in persons at greatest risk of becoming infected and thereby prevent transmission to others. 
Whereas many of these interventions are applied individually to persons identified as contacts of a person with possible or 
known influenza disease, others are applied to larger groups of persons, or communities, that share a similar risk of exposure. 
Measures applied to individuals may not be feasible during the Pandemic Period, when quarantining individuals and tracing 
close contacts may not be possible. The range of interventions includes the following:  
Passive Monitoring  
Definition  • The contact is asked to perform self-assessment at least twice daily and to contact authorities immediately if respiratory symptoms and/or fever occur. 
Application  • Situations in which 1) the risk of exposure and subsequent development of disease is low, and 2) the risk to others if recognition of disease is delayed is also low 
Benefits  • Requires minimal resources  
 • Places few constraints on individual movement  
Challenges  • Relies on self-reporting  
 • Affected persons may not perform an adequate self-assessment  
Resources Required  • Supplies (thermometer; symptom log; written instructions)  
 • Hotline to notify authorities about symptoms or needs  
 • Staff to receive telephone reports and provide in-person evaluation and care  
 • Plans and procedures for rapid isolation of persons who develop symptoms  
Partners  • Household members  
Forms/Templates  • Symptom logs  
Under development 
 
• Instructions for patients and health care workers  
 
Active Monitoring without Explicit Activity Restrictions    
Definition • A health care or public health worker evaluates the contact on a regular (at least 
daily) basis by phone and/or in person for signs and symptoms suggestive of 
influenza 
Application • Situations in which 1) the risk of exposure to and subsequent development of 
disease is moderate to high, 2) resources permit close observation of individuals, and 
3) the risk of delayed recognition of symptoms is low to moderate 
Benefits • Places few constraints on individual liberties 
Challenges • Requires adequate staffing to track information and to verify monitoring and 
appropriate actions based on findings 
Resources Required • Trained staff to provide in-person and/or telephone evaluations Plans and procedures 
for rapid isolation of persons who develop symptoms Contingency plans for 
managing noncompliant persons Hotline to notify authorities about symptoms or 
needs 
Partners  • Professional and lay health care workers to perform evaluations on behalf of the 
health department 
 • Possible need for law enforcement to assist with management of noncompliant 
persons  
Forms/ 
Templates  • Checklist for assessment of active monitoring  
Under development 
 • Template for recording results of clinical evaluation  
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Working Quarantine  
Definition Employees are permitted to work but must observe activity restrictions while off duty.  Monitoring for 
influenza-like illness is usually required.  This may change based on the clinical  presentation of the 
pandemic strain.  Use of appropriate PPE while at work is required. 
 
Application  Persons for whom activity restrictions (home or facility quarantine) are indicated but who 
provide essential services (e.g., health care workers. 
Benefits Reduces risk of community spread from high-risk contacts while minimizing adverse impact of activity 
restrictions on provision of essential services. Clinical monitoring at work reduces the staff required for 
active monitoring at the quarantine site. 
 
Challenges  Need for close and consistent pre-shift monitoring at the work site to prevent inadvertent exposures 
May require means of transporting persons to and from work site to minimize interactions; persons in 
working quarantine should wear appropriate PPE during transport.  Must maintain close cooperation and 
communication between work site and local health authorities. Need to provide mental health services to 
address concerns about isolation from family and friends 
 
Resources  Appropriate facility for off-duty quarantine if home is unavailable or inadequate. 
Required Staff, funding, and goods for provision of essential services 
 Personal protective equipment 
 Hotline for notification of symptoms and personal needs 
 System to track results of work-site monitoring and location(s) of off-duty quarantine 
 Mental health, psychological, and behavioral support  services, especially if work includes care of influenza 
patients 
 
Partners  Work-site administrators and infection control personnel      
Community volunteers/workers  
 Staff/volunteers to assist with transportation to and from work  
 Mental health professionals  
 Potential need for law enforcement to assist with noncompliant person 
 
Forms/ 
Templates Under Development 
  Guidelines and instructions for persons in working quarantine 
Instructions for supervisors of persons in working quarantine  
 Checklist to evaluate homes for quarantine Guidelines for monitoring compliance  
  Checklist for active monitoring at work site  
  Template for recording results of clinical evaluation  
  Forms for recording compliance 
 
Active Monitoring with Activity Restrictions (Quarantine)  
Definition The contact remains separated from others for a specified period (up to 10 days after potential 
exposure), during which s/he is assessed on a regular basis (in person at least once daily) for signs and 
symptoms of influenza disease. Persons with fever, respiratory, or other early influenza symptoms 
require immediate evaluation by a trained health care provider. Restrictions may be voluntary or 
legally mandated; confinement may be at home or in an appropriate facility.  
No specific precautions are required for those sharing the household with a person in quarantine as 
long as the person remains asymptomatic. Because onset of symptoms may be insidious, it may be 
prudent to minimize interactions with household members during the period of quarantine, if feasible  
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Application Situations in which the risk of exposure and subsequent development of disease is high and the risk 
of delayed recognition of symptoms is moderate  
Benefits Reduces risk of spread from persons with subacute or subclinical presentations or from delayed 
recognition of symptoms  
Challenges May infringe on personal movement  
 May lead to a feeling of isolation from family and friends 
 May lead to loss of income or employment 
 Requires plans/protocols for provision of essential services  
 Requires plan for provision of mental health support  
 Risk of noncompliance, particularly as duration increases  
 May require enforcement for noncompliance  
 
Resources Required Staff for monitoring and evaluation  
 Appropriate facility if home setting is unavailable or inadequate  
 Staff, funding, and goods for provision of essential services  
 Hotline for notification of symptoms or personal needs  
 Mechanisms to communicate with family members outside the household or facility  
 Mental health and social support services  
 Delivery systems for food and other essential supplies  
Partners Professional and lay health care workers to perform assessments on behalf of the health department  
 Community volunteers/workers to assist with provision of essential services  
 Potential need for law enforcement to assist with noncompliant persons 
Forms/Templates  Under development 
 
 
Focused Measures to Increase Social Distance  
Definition Intervention applied to specific groups, designed to reduce interactions and thereby transmission risk 
within the group. When focused, the intervention is applied to groups or persons identified in 
specific sites or buildings, most but not necessarily all of whom are at risk of exposure to influenza.  
Examples Quarantine of groups of exposed persons Cancellation of public events Closure of office buildings, 
schools, and/or shopping malls; closure of public transportation such as subways or bus lines  
Application Groups or settings where transmission is believed to have occurred, where the linkages between cases 
is unclear at the time of evaluation, and where restrictions placed only on persons known to have been 
exposed is considered insufficient to prevent further transmission  
Benefits Applied broadly, reduces the requirement for urgent evaluation of large numbers of potential contacts 
to determine indications for activity restrictions May enable reductions in transmission among groups 
of persons without explicit activity restrictions (quarantine)  
Challenges May be difficult to solicit cooperation, particularly if popular buildings are closed or popular events 
are cancelled  
Requires excellent communication mechanisms to notify affected persons of details and rationale  
May need to provide replacement for affected activities  
Generally relies on passive monitoring  
Resources Required Systems to communicate relevant messages  
May require enforcement, particularly if closure of buildings or gathering places is necessary 
Requires resources for passive monitoring  
Hotlines to report symptoms and obtain follow-up instructions Transportation for medical evaluation, 
with appropriate infection control precautions  
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Partners News media and communication outlets  
 Law enforcement  
 Community groups 
  
Forms/Templates Messages for affected persons 
Under development Messages for employers of affected persons  
 Messages for persons supplying essential services  
 
Community-Wide Measures to Increase Social Distance  
Definition  Intervention applied to an entire community or region, designed to reduce personal interactions 
and thereby transmission risk.  The prototypical example is implementation of a “Stay Home 
Days” or “snow days” declaration, in which offices, schools, and transportation systems are 
cancelled as for a major snowstorm. 
Application  
All members of a community in which 1) extensive transmission of influenza is occurring, 2) a 
significant number of cases lack clearly identifiable epidemiologic links at the time of 
evaluation, and 3) restrictions on persons known to have been exposed are considered 
insufficient to prevent further spread. 
Benefits  Reduces need for urgent evaluation of large numbers of potential contacts to determine indications for activity restrictions.  
 May enable reductions in transmission among groups without explicit activity restrictions 
quarantine 
 “Snow days” may be familiar concepts and thus maybe easy to implement on short notice  
 
Challenges  May be difficult to solicit cooperation  
 Requires excellent communication mechanisms to notify affected persons of details and 
rationale  
 May need to provide replacement for affected activities  
 May need to address mental health and financial support issues  
 When an entire community is involved, requires cooperation with neighboring jurisdictions that 
 may not be using a similar intervention, particularly in situations where persons live in one city  
 and work in another and only one locale is affected by the intervention  
 Generally relies on passive monitoring  
 Social and economic impact of public transportation closures 
Resources Required  Communication outlets  
 Enforcement  
 Resources for passive monitoring  
 Hotlines and other communication systems to report symptoms and obtain follow-up 
instructions  
Partners  News media and other communication outlets  
 Law enforcement and transportation officials to enforce restrictions (e.g., closure of bridges, 
roads,  
 or mass transit systems) and plan for provision of critical supplies and infrastructure  
Forms/Templates  Messages for affected persons  
Under development Messages for employers of affected persons 
Messages for persons supplying essential services 
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Appendix 2 
Preparedness Checklist For Community Containment Measure 
 
General 
❑ Establish an incident command structure that can be used for influenza response.  
❑ Establish a legal preparedness plan.  
❑ Establish relationships with partners, such as law enforcement, first responders, health care facilities, mental health 
professionals, local businesses, and the legal community.  
❑ Plan to monitor and assess factors that will determine the types and levels of response, including the epidemiologic profile 
of the outbreak, available local resources, and level of public acceptance and participation.  
❑ Develop communication strategies for the public, government decision-makers, health care and emergency response 
workers, mental health professionals, and the law enforcement community.  
❑ Invite key partners to participate in pandemic influenza containment exercises and drills.  
 
Management of cases and contacts (including quarantine)  
❑ Develop protocols, tools, and databases for:  
 • Case surveillance  
 • Clinical evaluation and management  
 •  Contact tracing, monitoring, and management  
 •  Reporting criteria  
❑ Develop standards and tools for home and non-hospital isolation and quarantine.  
❑ Establish supplies for non-hospital management of cases and contacts.  
❑ Establish a telecommunications plan for “hotlines” or other services for:  
 •  Case and contact monitoring and response  
 •  Fever triage  
 •  Public information  
 •  Provider information  
❑ Plan to ensure provision of essential services and supplies to persons in isolation and quarantine, keeping in mind the 
special needs of children. Services and supplies include:  
 •  Food and water  
 •  Shelter  
 •  Medicines and medical consultations  
 •  Mental health and psychological support services  
 •  Other supportive services (e.g., day care or elder care)  
 •  Transportation to medical treatment, if required  
❑ Plan to address issues of financial support, job security, and prevention of stigmatization.  
❑ Establish procedures for medical evaluation and isolation of quarantined persons who exhibit signs of illness.  
❑ Develop protocols for monitoring and enforcing quarantine measures, such as:  
 • Protocols for follow-up of persons who cannot be reached by telephone.  
These may include a threshold period for nonresponsiveness that should trigger a home visit or other means to locate the person. 
Partnerships with law enforcement and other community-based resources will be helpful in tracing the whereabouts of persons who have 
violated restrictions. 
  
❑ Protocols for monitoring persons who cannot or will not comply with voluntary home quarantine. These may include:  
 • Issuing official, legally binding quarantine orders  
 • Posting a guard outside the home  
 • Using electronic forms of monitoring  
 • Using guarded facilities  
 • Protocols for using checkpoints to restrict travel between neighborhoods.  
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Temporary emergency facilities for patient isolation, quarantine, and assessment of patients with fever (see Appendix 7 
for a list of facility characteristics)  
❑ Identify appropriate community-based facilities for isolation of patients who have no substantial health care requirements.  
❑ Develop policies related to use of these facilities.  
❑ Identify facilities for persons for whom home isolation is indicated but who do not have access to an appropriate home 
setting, such as travelers and homeless populations.  
❑ Ensure that required procedures for assessment of potential isolation or quarantine sites are available and up to date.  
❑ Identify potential quarantine facilities and prepare contingency plans for staffing and equipping them.  
❑ Identify potential sites for fever clinics and prepare contingency plans for staffing and equipping them, including the 
ability to dispense antiviral drugs to identified cases in the priority groups 
 
Community containment measures  
❑ Ensure that legal authorities and procedures are in place to implement the various levels of movement restrictions as 
necessary.  
❑ Establish procedures for medical evaluation and isolation of quarantined persons who exhibit signs of illness. 
(Additional information on medical evaluation is provided in Supplement 5.)  
❑ Develop tools and mechanisms to prevent stigmatization and provide mental health services to persons in isolation 
or quarantine.  
❑ Identify key partners and personnel for the implementation of movement restrictions, including quarantine, and the 
provision of essential services and supplies:  
 • Law enforcement  
 • First responders  
 • Other government service workers  
 • Utilities  
 • Transportation industry  
 • Local businesses  
 • Schools and school boards  
 
Establish procedures for delivering medical care, food, and services to persons in isolation or quarantine. Examples of 
services that will require the help of non-traditional partners include:  
❑ Training for responders and health care workers, as necessary, in use of personal protective equipment  
❑ Plans for the mobilization and deployment of public health and other community-service personnel  
 
General  
❑ Establish an incident command structure that can be used for influenza response.  
❑ Establish a legal preparedness plan.  
❑ Establish relationships with partners, such as law enforcement, first responders, health care facilities, mental health 
professionals, and the legal community.  
❑ Plan to monitor and assess factors that will determine the types and levels of response, including the epidemiologic profile 
of the outbreak, available local resources, and level of public acceptance and participation.  
❑ Develop communication strategies for the public government decision-makers, health care and emergency response 
workers, mental health professionals, and the law enforcement community. These strategies should consider privacy 
concerns.  
❑ Invite key partners to participate in pandemic influenza containment exercises and drills.  
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Management of cases and contacts (including quarantine)  
❑ Develop protocols, tools, and databases for management of cases and contacts, considering account security and privacy 
concerns. These may include protocols for:  
 • Case surveillance  
 •  Clinical evaluation and management  
 •  Contact tracing, monitoring, and management  
 •  Reporting criteria  
❑ Develop standards and tools for home and non-hospital isolation and quarantine.  
❑ Establish supplies for non-hospital management of cases and contacts.  
❑ Establish a telecommunications plan for “hotlines” or other services for case and contact monitoring and response  
 •  Fever triage  
 •  Public information  
 •  Provider information  
❑ Plan to ensure provision of essential services and supplies to persons in isolation and quarantine, including:  
 •  Food and water  
 •  Shelter  
 •  Medicines and medical consultations  
 •  Mental health and psychological support services  
 •  Other supportive services (e.g., day care or elder care).  
 •  Transportation to medical treatment, if required  
❑ Plan to address issues of financial support, job security, privacy concerns and prevention of stigmatization.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Planning Checklists (http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/checklists.html) 
 
3.1  Business 
 http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/pdf/businesschecklist.pdf 
3.2  Individuals and Families 
 http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/pdf/individuals.pdf 
 
  
3.3  Faith-Based and Community Organizations 
 http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/pdf/faithbasedcommunitychecklist.pdf 
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Appendix 3.1 
Business Checklist 
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Appendix 3.2 
Individuals and Families Checklist 
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3. Items to have on hand for an extended stay at home during an influenza pandemic:  
 
Examples of food and non-perishables  
❑ Ready-to-eat canned meats, fruits, and vegetables 
❑ 5 days of broth-based soups  
❑ Protein or fruit bars  
❑ Dry cereal or granola  
❑ Peanut butter or nuts  
❑ Dried fruit  
❑ Crackers  
❑ Canned juices  
❑ Bottled water  
❑ Canned or jarred baby food and formula  
❑ Pet food  
 
Examples of medical, health, and emergency supplies  
❑ Prescribed medical supplies such as glucose and blood-pressure monitoring equipment  
❑ Soap and water 
❑ 60 % alcohol-based hand sanitizer 
❑ Medicines for fever, such as acetaminophen or ibuprofen  
❑ Over the counter flu medicines 
❑ Thermometer  
❑ 70% Isopropyl alcohol for disinfecting thermometer 
❑ Anti-diarrheal medication  
❑ Throat lozenges 
❑ Vitamins  
❑ Fluids with electrolytes  
❑ Flashlight  
❑ Batteries  
❑ Portable radio  
❑ Manual can opener  
❑ Garbage bags  
❑ Tissues, toilet paper, disposable diapers  
❑ Disinfectant  
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Appendix 3.3 –  Faith-Based & Community Organizations Checklist
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Appendix 4 
Legal Preparedness:  Isolation and Quarantine Templates 
 
 4.1 Quarantine Directive for Public Health Emergencies: A.R.S. § 36-788 and 789 
 
 4.2  Isolation Directive for Public Health Emergencies: A.R.S. § 36-788 and 789 
 
 4.3  Petition for Compulsory Isolation or Quarantine: A.R.S. § 36-789 (B) 
 
 4.4 Affidavit in Support of Compulsory Isolation or Quarantine: A.R.S. § 36-789 (C) 
 
 4.5  Order for Isolation or Quarantine: A.R.S. § 36-789 (B), (F), (G) 
 
 4.6 Verification of Petition for Compulsory Isolation or Quarantine:  A.R.S. § 36-789(B) 
AZ Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (6.06) 29 Supp. 8:  Comm Disease Control & Prevention  
 
 
Appendix 4.1 – Quarantine Directive for Public Health Emergencies   
A.R.S. § 36-788 and 789 
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Appendix 4.1 – Quarantine Directive for Public Health Emergencies 
A.R.S. § 36-788 and 789
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Appendix 4.2:  – Isolation Directive for Public Health Emergencies: 
A.R.S.§ 36-788 and 789 
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Appendix 4.3  – Petition for Compulsory Isolation or Quarantine:  A.R.S. § 36-789 (B)
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Appendix 4.4  – Affidavit in Support of Compulsory Isolation or Quarantine:  A.R.S. § 36-789 (C) 
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Appendix 4.5 – Order for Isolation or Quarantine:  A.R.S. § 36-789 (B), (F), (G) 
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Appendix 4.6  – Verification of Petition for Compulsory Isolation or Quarantine: A.R.S.§ 36-789 (B) 
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APPENDIX 5 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT QUARANTINE 
  
If an influenza pandemic occurs, will my community be quarantined?  
Community-wide quarantine is only one of a spectrum of actions that may be considered during an influenza pandemic in the 
United States. Although rapid control is likely to require bold and swift action, measures that are less drastic than legally 
enforced quarantine may suffice, depending on the epidemiologic characteristics of the pandemic. For example, active 
monitoring without activity restrictions may be adequate when most cases are either imported or have clear epidemiologic 
linkages at the time of initial evaluation. When the epidemiology of the outbreak indicates a need for stronger measures, 
jurisdictions can adopt a voluntary quarantine approach and reserve compulsory measures for only extreme situations. When an 
outbreak progresses to include large numbers of cases for which no epidemiologic linkages can be identified, community-level 
interventions may become necessary. Even at this stage, however, measures designed to increase social distance, such as “Stay 
Home Days”, may be preferred alternatives to quarantine. Wider use of quarantine is generally reserved for situations in which 
all other control measures are believed to be ineffective.  
The choice of containment measures requires frequent and ongoing assessment of an outbreak and evaluation of the 
effectiveness of existing control measures. Officials must be prepared to make decisions based on limited information and then 
modify those decisions as additional information becomes available.  
Does the effectiveness of containment measures require 100% compliance?  
No. Containment measures, including quarantine, are effective even if compliance is less than 100%. Although health officials 
should strive for high compliance, even partial or “leaky” quarantine can reduce transmission. Therefore, strict enforcement is 
not always needed; in most cases, jurisdictions can rely on voluntary cooperation. The incremental benefit of quarantine 
approaches a maximum at a compliance rate of approximately 90%, with little additional benefit from higher rates of 
compliance. Therefore, containment measures can be important components of the response to a communicable disease 
outbreak even when compliance is not 100%.  
Does “quarantine” always mean using a legal order to restrict someone’s activity?  
No. The term “quarantine” is often defined narrowly to refer to the legally mandated separation of well persons who have been 
exposed to a communicable disease from those who have not been exposed. Although the precise legal definition of quarantine 
may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, when used clinically or programmatically, quarantine may be defined more broadly 
to include all interventions, both mandatory and voluntary, that restrict the activities of persons exposed to a communicable 
disease. Therefore, whenever an exposed person is placed under a regimen of monitoring that includes an activity restriction, 
even when those restrictions are voluntary, the person is said to be under quarantine. 
Must quarantine be mandatory to be effective?  
Although the federal government and nearly all states have the basic legal authority to place persons exposed to certain 
communicable diseases under quarantine and enforce the required restrictions on activity, use of this authority may not always 
be necessary or practical. Previous experiences with the use of quarantine, including those during the 2003 SARS outbreak, 
suggest that the majority of persons comply voluntarily with requests from health authorities to remain in quarantine and 
observe the recommended activity restrictions. In the event voluntary measures are not successful, it may be necessary to 
implement mandatory containment measures. 
Does being placed in quarantine increase a person’s risk for acquiring disease?  
One of the fundamental principles of modern quarantine is that persons in quarantine are to be closely monitored so that those 
who become ill are efficiently separated from those who are well. A second principle is that persons in quarantine should be 
among the very first to receive any available disease-prevention interventions. Adherence to these two principles of modern 
quarantine should prevent an increase in risk for acquiring disease while in quarantine.  
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Is quarantine really necessary if everyone who develops symptoms is rapidly placed in isolation?  
Although theoretically true, it would be unrealistic to believe that even the most efficient system for initiation of isolation will 
minimize delays to the extent required to prevent transmission. Among the factors contributing to delays in recognition of 
symptoms are the insidious nature of disease onset and denial that symptoms have developed.  
Quarantine helps to reduce transmission associated with delays in isolation in two ways. First, quarantine enables health 
officials to quickly locate symptomatic persons who should be placed in isolation. Second, although quarantine locations may 
not be as efficient as isolation facilities in preventing transmission, quarantine reduces the number of persons who might be 
exposed while awaiting transfer to an isolation facility. If quarantine was not used, symptomatic and infectious persons could 
move about freely in public places, potentially exposing large numbers of additional persons and thereby fueling the outbreak.  
Is quarantine useful only for diseases that are spread by the airborne route?  
No. Quarantine simply refers to the separation and restriction of activity of persons exposed to a communicable disease who 
are not ill. It is designed to minimize interactions between those exposed to a disease and those not yet exposed. As such, 
quarantine can be used for any disease that is spread from person to person. In practice, however, because of the activity 
restrictions associated with quarantine, the intervention is generally reserved for diseases like SARS or pandemic influenza that 
are easily and rapidly spread from person to person. However, this tool can also be useful where transmission can occur 
through close personal contact with secretions or objects contaminated by an ill person. Smallpox is an excellent example of a 
disease where quarantine can be effective in controlling spread although transmission may occur by means other than the 
airborne route.  
Will the public accept the use of quarantine?  
Yes. The negative connotations associated with quarantine likely stem from its misuse or abuse in the past. Although 
inappropriate use of quarantine, either voluntary or mandatory, would not and should not be accepted by the public, efforts 
should be made to gain public acceptance when use of this measure is indicated. Experiences with the use of quarantine during 
the SARS outbreaks of 2003 suggest that public acceptance of quarantine may be greater than previously thought. For example, 
during the 2003 SARS outbreak in Canada, almost all persons asked to observe quarantine restrictions did so willingly, with 
only a small number requiring a legal order to gain cooperation. In all cases, cooperation and acceptance was achieved through 
clear and comprehensive communication with the public about the rationale for use of quarantine.  
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APPENDIX 6 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR QUARANTINE 
(Note: Recommendations on patient isolation are provided in Supplement 3.) 
General considerations  
• Monitor each quarantined person daily, or more frequently if feasible, for fever, respiratory symptoms, and other 
symptoms of early influenza disease.  
• Monitor compliance with quarantine through daily visits or telephone calls.  
• Provide a hotline number for quarantined persons to call if they develop symptoms or have other immediate needs.  
• If a quarantined person develops symptoms suggestive of influenza, arrangements should be in place for separating that 
person from others in quarantine and ensuring immediate medical evaluation.  
• Provide persons in quarantine with all needed support services, including 1) psychological support, 2) food and water, 3) 
household and medical supplies, and 4) care for family members who are not in quarantine. Financial issues, such as 
medical leave, may also need to be considered.  
• Collect data related to quarantine activities to guide ongoing decision-making including information on each person 
quarantined:  
 • Relationship to the case-patient  
 • Nature and time of exposure  
 • Whether the contact was vaccinated, on antiviral prophylaxis or using PPE  
 • Underlying medical conditions  
 • Number of days in quarantine  
 • Symptom log  
 • Basic demographics  
 • Compliance with quarantine  
 
Based on current available data, the recommended duration of quarantine for influenza is generally 10 days from the time of 
exposure. (This period may be adjusted based on available information during a pandemic.) At the end of the designated 
quarantine period, contacts should have a final assessment for fever and respiratory symptoms. Persons without fever or 
respiratory symptoms may return to normal activities.  
Home quarantine  
Whenever possible, contacts should be quarantined at home. Home quarantine requires the fewest additional resources, 
although arrangements must still be made for monitoring patients, reporting symptoms, transporting patients for medical 
evaluation if necessary, and providing essential supplies and services. Home quarantine is most suitable for contacts with a 
home environment that can meet their basic needs and in which unexposed household members can be protected from 
exposure. Other considerations include:  
• Persons in home quarantine must be able to monitor their own symptoms (or have them monitored by a caregiver).  
• The person’s home should be evaluated for suitability before being used for quarantine, using a questionnaire 
administered to the quarantined person or the caregiver. Additional guidance on use of a residence for quarantine is 
provided in Appendix 7.  
• Quarantined persons should minimize interactions with other household members to prevent exposure during the 
interval between the development and recognition of symptoms. Precautions may include 1) sleeping and eating  
in a separate room, 2) using a separate bathroom, and 3) appropriate use of personal protective equipment (see 
Supplement 4).  
• Persons in quarantine may be assessed for symptoms by either active or passive monitoring. Active monitoring of 
contacts in quarantine may overcome delays resulting from the insidious onset of symptoms or denial among those in 
quarantine.  
• Household members may go to school, work, etc., without restrictions unless the quarantined person develops 
symptoms. If the quarantined person develops symptoms, household members should remain at home in a room  
separate from the symptomatic person and await additional instructions from health authorities.  
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• Household members can provide valuable support to quarantined persons by helping them feel less isolated and 
ensuring that essential needs are met.  
• Immediate and ongoing psychological support services should be provided to minimize psychological distress.  
• Quarantined persons should be able to maintain regular communication with their loved ones and health care 
providers.  
 
Quarantine in designated facilities  
In some cases, affected persons may not have access to an appropriate home environment for quarantine. Examples include 
travelers; persons living in dormitories, homeless shelters, or other group facilities; and persons whose homes do not meet the 
minimum requirements for quarantine. In other instances, contacts may have an appropriate home environment but may not 
wish to put family members at risk. In these situations, health officials should identify an appropriate community-based 
quarantine facility. Monitoring of quarantined persons may be either passive or active, although active monitoring may be 
more appropriate in a facility setting. Facilities designated for quarantine of persons who cannot or choose not to be 
quarantined at home should meet the same criteria listed for home quarantine. Evaluation of potential sites for facility-based 
quarantine is an important part of preparedness planning (see Appendix 7).  
Working quarantine  
This type of quarantine applies to health care workers or other essential personnel who are at occupational risk of influenza 
infection. These groups may be subject to quarantine either at home or in a designated facility during off-duty hours. When off 
duty, contacts on working quarantine should be managed in the same way as persons in quarantine at home or in a designated 
facility. Local officials should:  
 • Monitor persons in working quarantine for symptoms during work shifts  
 • Promptly evaluate anyone who develops symptoms  
 • Provide transportation to and from work, if needed  
 • Develop mechanisms for immediate and ongoing psychological support  
 
At the end of the designated quarantine period, contacts should receive physical (fever and respiratory symptoms) and 
psychological health assessments. Persons without fever or respiratory symptoms may return to normal activities. Persons who 
exhibit psychological distress should be referred to mental health professionals for additional support services. 
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APPENDIX 7 
Evaluation Of Homes And Facilities For Isolation  
And Quarantine Isolation Facilities 
 
Home isolation  
Ideally, persons who meet the criteria for a case of pandemic influenza and who do not require hospitalization for medical 
reasons should be isolated in their homes. The home environment is less disruptive to the patient’s routine than isolation in a 
hospital or other community setting.  
If feasible—especially during the earliest stages of a pandemic—a home being considered as an isolation setting should be 
evaluated by an appropriate authority, which could be the patient’s physician, health department official, or other appropriate 
person to verify its suitability. The assessment should center on the following minimum standards for home isolation of an 
influenza patient:  
Infrastructure  
 • Functioning telephone  
 • Electricity  
 • Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)  
 • Potable water  
 • Bathroom with commode and sink  
• Waste and sewage disposal (septic tank, community sewage line)  
 
Accommodations  
• Ability to provide a separate bedroom for the influenza patient  
• Accessible bathroom in the residence; if multiple bathrooms are available, one bathroom designated for use by the 
influenza patient  
 
Resources for patient care and support  
• Primary caregiver who will remain in the residence and who is not at high risk for complications from influenza 
disease  
• Meal preparation  
• Laundry  
• Banking  
• Essential shopping  
• Social diversion (e.g., television, radio, Internet access, reading materials)  
• Masks, tissues, hand hygiene products, and information on infection  control procedures  
• Educational material on proper waste disposal  
 
Isolation in a community-based facility  
When persons requiring isolation cannot be accommodated either at home or in a health care facility, a community-
based isolation facility will be required. The availability of a community-based facility will be particularly important 
during a large outbreak (See also http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altsites.htm).  
Much of the work in identifying and evaluating potential sites for isolation should be conducted in advance of an 
outbreak as part of preparedness planning. Each jurisdiction should assemble a team (including infection control 
specialists, public health authorities, engineers, sanitation experts, and mental health specialists) to identify appropriate 
locations and resources for community influenza isolation facilities, establish procedures for activating them, and 
coordinate activities related to patient management. The team should consider the use of both existing and temporary 
structures. Options for existing structures include community health centers, nursing homes, apartments, schools, 
dormitories, and hotels. Options for temporary structures include trailers, barracks, and tents.  
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Considerations include:  
Basic infrastructure requirements  
•  Meets all local code requirements for a public facility  
•  Functioning telephone system  
•  Electricity  
•  Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC)  
•  Potable water  
•  Bathroom with commode and sink  
•  Waste and sewage disposal (septic tank, community sewage line)  
•  Multiple rooms for housing ill patients (individual rooms are preferred)  
 
Access considerations  
•  Proximity to hospital  
•  Parking space  
•  Ease of access for delivery of food and medical and other supplies  
•  Handicap accessibility  
•  Basic security  
 
Space requirements  
•  Administrative offices  
•  Offices/areas for clinical staff  
•  Holding area for contaminated waste and laundry  
•  Laundry facilities (on- or off-site)  
•  Meal preparation (on- or off-site)  
 
Social support resources  
•  Television and radio  
•  Reading materials  
 
To determine priorities among available facilities, consider these features:  
•  Separate rooms for patients or areas amenable to isolation of patients with minimal construction  
•  Feasibility of controlling access to the facility and to each room  
•  Availability of potable water, bathroom, and shower facilities  
•  Facilities for patient evaluation, treatment, and monitoring  
•  Capacity for providing basic needs to patients  
•  Rooms and corridors that are amenable to disinfection  
•  Facilities for accommodating staff 
•  Facilities for collecting, disinfecting, and disposing of infectious waste  
•  Facilities for collecting and laundering infectious linens and clothing  
•  Ease of access for delivery of patients and supplies  
•  Legal/property considerations  
 
Additional considerations include:  
•  Staffing and administrative support  
•  Training  
•  Ventilation and other engineering controls  
•  Ability to support appropriate infection control measures  
•  Availability of food services and supplies  
•  Ability to provide an environment that supports the social and psychological well-being  of patients  
•  Security and access control  
•  Ability to support appropriate medical care, including emergency procedures  
•  Access to communication systems that allow for dependable communication within and outside the facility  
•  Ability to adequately monitor the health status of facility staff  
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QUARANTINE FACILITIES  
Home quarantine  
A person’s residence is generally the preferred setting for quarantine. As with isolation, home quarantine is often least 
disruptive to a person’s routine. Because persons who have been exposed to influenza may need to stay in quarantine for as 
long as 10 days (may be modified based on information about the virus), it is important to ensure that the home environment 
meets the individual’s ongoing physical, mental, and medical needs. An evaluation of the home for its suitability for quarantine 
should be performed, ideally before the person is placed in quarantine. This evaluation may be performed on site by a health 
official or designee. However, from a practical standpoint, it may be more convenient to evaluate the residence through the 
administration of a questionnaire to the individual and/or the caregiver. Factors to be considered in the evaluation include:  
•  Basic utilities (water, electricity, garbage collection, and heating or air-conditioning as appropriate)  
• Basic supplies (clothing, food, hand-hygiene supplies, laundry services)  
•  Mechanism for addressing special needs (e.g., filling prescriptions)  
•  Mechanism for communication, including telephone (for monitoring by health staff, reporting of symptoms, gaining 
access to support services, and communicating with family)  
•  Accessibility to health care workers or ambulance personnel  
•  Access to food and food preparation  
•  Access to supplies such as thermometers, fever logs, phone numbers for reporting symptoms or accessing services, 
and emergency numbers (these can be supplied by health authorities if necessary)  
•  Access to mental health and other psychological support services.  
 
Quarantine in a community-based facility  
Although the home is generally the preferred setting for quarantine, alternative sites for quarantine may be necessary in 
certain situations. For example, persons who do not have a home situation suitable for this purpose or those who require 
quarantine away from home (e.g., during travel) will need to be housed in an alternative location. Because persons who 
have been exposed to influenza may require quarantine for as long as 10 days, it is important to ensure that the 
environment is conducive to meeting the individual’s ongoing physical, mental, and medical needs. Ideally, one or more 
community-based facilities that could be used for quarantine should be identified and evaluated as part of influenza 
preparedness planning. The evaluation should be performed on site by a public health official or designee. Additional 
considerations, beyond those listed above for home quarantine, include:  
• Adequate rooms and bathrooms for each contact  
• Delivery systems for food and other needs  
• Staff to monitor contacts at least daily for fever and respiratory symptoms  
• Transportation for medical evaluation for persons who develop symptoms  
• Mechanisms for communication, including telephone (for monitoring by health staff, reporting symptoms, gaining 
access to support services, and communicating with family)  
• Adequate security for those in the facility  
 
Services for removal of waste. No special precautions for removal of waste are required as long as persons remain 
asymptomatic.  
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PRIMARY RESPONSE AGENCIES 
 
• Arizona Department of Health Services 
• Arizona Office of Homeland Security 
• Arizona Department of Emergency Management 
• County Health Departments 
• Tribal Health Agencies 
• City Police and Fire Departments 
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
• U. S. Border Patrol 
 
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
Arizona Department of Health Services Responsibilities: 
• Coordinate w/ HHS and CDC on activities related to travel-related risk 
• Provide guidance to county healthy departments on implementing travel-related containment  measures 
• Provide public health information to residents that may travel to countries of concern for exposure 
 
County Health Department and Tribal Health Agencies Responsibilities: 
• Ensure readiness to implement travel-related disease containment measures. 
• Provide public health information to travelers who visit countries where avian or animal influenza strains that can infect 
humans (e.g., avian influenza A [H5N1]) or human strains with pandemic potential have been reported. 
• Evaluate and manage arriving ill passengers who might be infected with avian or animal influenza strains or human strains 
with pandemic potential. 
• Evaluate and implement quarantine, as necessary, on exposed passengers or other individuals  related to travel 
• Evaluate the need to implement or terminate travel-related containment measures as the pandemic evolves. 
 
City Police and Fire Departments 
• Provide Incident Command and Security related to travel disease control and risk containment strategies 
 
Federal responsibilities (as outlined in the HHS Pandemic Response Plan): 
• Work with local points of entry to prevent the importation of influenza-infected birds and animals into the United States. 
• Provide state and local health departments with legal preparedness templates for use in implementing quarantine and 
patient isolation measures. 
• Work with travel industry partners to ensure that airplane captains and crew are familiar with  procedures for identifying 
and managing arriving ill passengers. 
• Coordinate with other countries and WHO to prevent the spread of novel influenza via international travel. 
• Work with state and local health departments and CDC quarantine stations to prevent the importation and exportation of 
cases of pandemic influenza. 
• Develop and maintain procedures for isolating sick and quarantining exposed border crossers on the Arizona-Sonora 
international border 
• Coordinate with other countries and WHO to prevent the spread of pandemic influenza via international travel. 
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I.  Rationale 
 
The 2003 pandemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) demonstrated how quickly human respiratory viruses can 
spread, especially in a world of modern air travel. Disease spread will likely be even faster during an influenza pandemic 
because a typical influenza virus has a shorter average incubation period (typically 2 days vs. 7-10 days for SARS associated 
coronavirus [SARS-CoV]) and is more efficiently transmitted from person to person.  If an influenza pandemic begins outside 
the United States, public health authorities might screen inbound travelers from affected areas to decrease disease importation 
into the United States. If a pandemic begins in or spreads to the United States, health authorities might screen outbound 
passengers to decrease exportation of disease or implement domestic travel-related measures to slow disease spread within the 
United States.   
 
Because some persons infected with 
influenza will still be in the incubation 
period, be shedding virus asymptomatically, 
or have mild symptoms, it will not be 
possible to identify and isolate all arriving 
infected or ill passengers and quarantine 
their fellow passengers. Moreover, if an ill 
passenger is identified after leaving the 
airport, it might not be possible to identify 
all travel contacts within the incubation 
period for influenza. Nevertheless—
depending on the situation—these activities 
might slow spread early in a pandemic, 
allowing additional time for implementation 
of other response measures such as 
vaccination.   
 
Once a pandemic is underway, exit 
screening of travelers from affected areas is 
likely to be more efficient than entry screening to identify ill travelers. Early in a pandemic, this intervention may decrease 
disease introductions into the U.S.  Later, however, as pandemic disease spreads in communities, ongoing indigenous 
transmission will likely exceed new introductions and, therefore, federal authorities might modify or discontinue this strategy. 
Voluntary limitations on travel during a pandemic alert and pandemic, as persons decide to limit their own personal risk by 
canceling nonessential trips, will also decrease the amount of disease spread. Limiting or canceling travel of U.S. residents and 
others from affected countries will depend on the properties of the pandemic virus that emerges, and will be informed by the 
facts on the ground at the time of emergence. 
 
 
II.  Overview 
 
Supplement 9 details travel-related containment strategies that can be used during different phases of an influenza pandemic. 
These strategies range from distribution of travel health alert notices, to isolation and quarantine of new arrivals, to restriction 
or cancellation of nonessential travel. ADHS and county health departments will implement these strategies in coordination 
with CDC quarantine stations located at 18 U.S. ports of entry (currently no CDC quarantine station exists in Arizona; the 
nearest station is the Los Angeles station). The actions for the Interpandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods focus on 
preparedness planning and on management of arriving ill passengers on international flights, primarily at Sky Harbor 
International Airport, in Phoenix, and on cross-border travel associated with the Arizona-Sonora border. The actions for the 
Pandemic Period focus on travel-related measures to decrease disease spread into, out of, and within the United States. 
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III.  Interpandemic And Pandemic Alert Periods 
A. Preparedness for implementation of travel-related containment measures 
 
If a pandemic begins outside the United States, early application of travel-related control measures (i.e., identification and 
isolation of ill travelers, quarantine of close contacts) might slow the introduction of the virus into Arizona, allowing more time 
for healthcare preparedness efforts.  
 
The effectiveness of these measures might be limited because asymptomatic travelers can transmit disease, travelers in the 
incubation phase might not become symptomatic until after arrival at their destinations, and it might not be possible to trace 
contacts within the incubation period for influenza. Results of mathematical models suggest that even with international flights, 
if persons are asymptomatic but incubating influenza when they board, they may remain asymptomatic when they arrive and, 
therefore, may not be detected by either exit or entry screening.  Nevertheless, the ability to detect some cases early in the 
pandemic may slow disease spread even for a short time.  
  
Actions 
 
1. Engaging community partners 
While primary planning and response activities occur at the local level (county health and city emergency response), ADHS is 
working closely with Maricopa County, and other affected counties, to engage appropriate community partners and develop 
and exercise appropriate plans.  Community partners currently or soon-to-be engaged include: 
 
• City emergency responders (firefighters, police officers) 
• Local members of the legal community 
• Emergency medical services and other emergency 
responders 
• Referral hospital personnel 
• Representatives of Sky Harbor International  
and Tucson International Airports,  
• CDC Quarantine officers 
• U. S. Border Patrol 
• Political leaders 
• American Red Cross and other  
non-governmental organizations 
• Business services 
 
 
2. Protocols for managing ill travelers at ports of entry 
County health officials are responsible, in conjunction with ADHS, for developing protocols for managing ill travelers at 
airports.  These protocols include provisions for: 
• Meeting flights with a reported ill passenger 
• Establishing notification procedures and communication links among organizations involved in the response 
• Reporting potential cases to ADHS (ADHS will ensure reporting to CDC) 
• Providing a medical assessment of the ill traveler and referral for evaluation and care 
• Separating the ill traveler from other passengers during the initial medical assessment 
• Transporting the ill traveler to a designated healthcare facility (see also Supplement 3) 
• Identifying other ill passengers and separating them from passengers who are not sick 
• Transporting and quarantining contacts, if necessary (see #3 below) 
• Enforcing isolation and quarantine, if necessary, when ill travelers or their contacts are uncooperative 
A copy of the final version of the Maricopa County/Sky Harbor Airport Quarantine Plan will be included as an Appendix to 
Supplement 9, when it is completed. 
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Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport is currently being considered as a future site of a CDC Division of Quarantine Station.  This 
Station would be the lead response entity for managing ill travelers at Sky Harbor, as well as the lead point of contact for 
federal quarantine actions in Arizona.  If this site becomes a Quarantine Station, Supplement 9 will be updated, to reflect any 
necessary changes in protocols. 
 
U. S. Border patrol is the primary agency responsible for identifying potential cases of pandemic influenza crossing the 
international border into Arizona.  Border Patrol has developed a Standard Operating Guideline detailing the procedures for:  
• Detaining and isolating suspect cases  
• Transporting such cases to referral hospitals  
• Specimen collection and transport to the Arizona State Health Laboratory  
• Quarantining contacts  
Border Patrol is working with the Arizona Department of Health Services, and the border counties and tribes on this 
Guideline.  A copy of the final version of the guideline will be included as an appendix in future versions of this Supplement.  
 
3. Quarantine preparedness at ports of entry 
County health officials, in collaboration with the ADHS, need to identify quarantine facilities for housing passengers, crew, 
and emergency workers who may have been exposed to an ill traveler. These plans need to account for: 
• Temporary quarantine (a few hours to a few days), until the results of diagnostic tests become available  
• Longer-term quarantine (up to 10 days) if a diagnosis of pandemic influenza is confirmed 
• The provision of goods and services to persons in quarantine (see Supplement 8). 
 
4. Legal preparedness 
The primary legal remedies for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases related to 
travel are the county and state legal authorities prescribed in the Arizona Revised Statutes (36-264, 36-787-9) (see Supplement 
8 for a better explanation of quarantine authorities).   The Federal government has primary responsibility for preventing 
international importation of diseases.  The U.S. Public Health Service authority for quarantine relates to international travel, as 
well as travel between states, to help prevent domestic disease spread.  These authorities are used at the state and local level 
when such authorities don’t exist at the local level or there is no capacity to enact local level authorities.   
 
State and local authorities are primarily responsible for restricting travel within their borders, although there is no statutory 
authority in Arizona for large scale travel restrictions, especially related to cordon sanitaire, and these measures, therefore, are 
not currently part of the Arizona Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (see Supplement 8). 
 
B. Health information for travelers 
 
Arizona, through the ADHS website (www.azdhs.gov) and www.az211.gov (see Supplement 10)  will link to the CDC’s 
Travelers’ Health website (www.cdc.gov/travel/) to provide up-to-date travel notices for international travelers to countries 
affected by novel influenza viruses during the Pandemic Alert Period and Pandemic Period. These notices are issued depending 
on the scope, risk for travelers, and recommended preventive measures.  
 
C. Evaluation of travel-related cases of infection with novel strains of influenza 
 
During the Pandemic Alert Period, travel-related cases of infection might be detected after entry into the United States, 
specifically Arizona, or reported during transit by airline personnel before arrival of an ill passenger. Information on the 
detection and identification of novel strains of influenza is provided in Supplement 1. Guidance on the clinical management of 
suspected cases of novel influenza is provided in Supplement 5. 
 
County health departments are required to ensure the completion and implementation of protocols for the management of 
arriving ill passengers, arriving in their county, who meet the clinical and epidemiologic criteria for infection with a novel 
strain of influenza, and for the management of contacts of such passengers.  ADHS is responsible for assisting counties in the 
development and implementation of these protocols.  Additionally, ADHS is responsible for ensuring all state and local 
protocols are coordinated with federal protocols and systems. 
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D. Preventing the importation of infected birds and animals 
 
While there are no legal authorities for ADHS to impose interventions to prevent the importation of infected birds or animals 
into the state, ADHS works closely with Department of Agriculture and the Arizona Game and Fish Department on all animal 
issues that relate to human health.  For more information on surveillance related to infected birds and animals please see 
Supplement 1. 
 
 
IV.  The Pandemic Period 
Over the course of an influenza pandemic, ADHS and county health authorities might consider a range of travel-related control 
measures to decrease the spread of disease into or within Arizona. The following factors will be considered in developing 
policy: 
• The relative magnitude, duration, and stage of indigenous transmission versus the risk associated with further 
introduced cases. When pandemic disease is widespread in the U.S., the additional contribution of introduced cases to 
the magnitude or spread of the pandemic will be minimal depending on the state of the epidemic in the specific 
location of introduction. 
• The value of compulsory restrictions in a setting of voluntary changes in travel patterns. Voluntary changes in travel 
will occur during a pandemic as persons choose to cancel nonessential travel to decrease their potential exposure and 
risk of acquiring influenza infection. In this context, the added value of compulsory restrictions should be considered 
relative to the societal disruptions that limitations on movement would cause. 
 
A. Travel-related containment measures 
 
1. Travel into Arizona 
Early during an influenza pandemic that begins outside the 
United States, affected county health departments will heighten 
disease surveillance at airports and maintain close 
communication with ADHS.  ADHS will maintain close 
communication with U.S. Border Patrol and CDC regarding 
disease surveillance and containment at the Arizona-Sonora 
border.  Travel-related disease control measures will include 
management of ill travelers arriving at ports of entry and 
provision of travel health alert notices to incoming travelers. 
 
a) Managing arriving ill passengers 
Identification and management of incoming ill travelers may delay and decrease the introduction of novel influenza strains into 
the United States during the Pandemic Alert Period. These efforts will continue during the early stages of the Pandemic Period, 
especially if a pandemic strain emerges in another country but has not yet entered the United States. 
 
Once the pandemic has spread outside and within the United States, screening for arriving ill passengers will become less 
useful and feasible. Although exit-screening of travelers from affected areas is likely to be a more effective disease control 
measure, its effectiveness too will be limited.   
 
To manage arriving ill passengers, public health authorities or quarantine officers will need to do the following: 
• If a suspected case of pandemic influenza is reported aboard an arriving airplane during the early stages of a 
pandemic, obtain preliminary information about the ill passenger, and advise the captain and crew on patient isolation 
and infection control. 
• If the likelihood of pandemic influenza infection appears high, established airline quarantine response plans (see 
Interpandemic And Pandemic Alert Periods-3.A.2 above) The major objective activities of these plans are to : 
o Notify the airport to mobilize its first responders, and arrange for patient transport and preparation of 
quarantine facilities. 
o Meet the airplane, perform a medical evaluation of the ill traveler, and assess the risk to public health. 
o Inform the passengers and crew of the situation, and do not allow them to disembark until the evaluation is 
complete.  
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b) Travel health precautions and warnings 
As the pandemic spreads from country to country, CDC will update country-specific travel notices and post them on the CDC 
Travelers’ Health website (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/). ADHS and county health officials will assist in providing this 
information to the public through websites (e.g., www.azdhs.gov, www.az211.gov), information lines, and the local media (see 
Supplement 10). 
 
c) Travel-related measures at early stages of a pandemic 
When there is limited transmission in other countries and potential for importation 
of cases into the United States, specifically Arizona, ADHS and county health 
departments, in conjunction with federal partners, may conduct the following 
actions, depending on status of statewide disease spread, and the established 
epidemiology of the pandemic: 
• Initiate enhanced disease surveillance at ports of entry. 
• Provide guidance on infection control procedures that can be 
implemented, if needed, on airplanes (e.g., separate the ill passenger from 
other passengers; provide the ill passenger with a mask or  
tissues to prevent viral spread via coughing). 
• Isolate arriving ill passengers or border crossers, and quarantine their 
contacts as necessary. 
• Collect information on all arriving passengers if notification is warranted 
(e.g., for antiviral administration, vaccination, or health monitoring). 
• Ensure appropriate containment of exposed border-crossers, as feasible 
 
d) Travel-related measures at later stages of a pandemic 
If the situation worsens overseas and there is extensive and sustained transmission in other countries, CDC and ADHS and 
county health departments may conduct these actions: 
• Distribute travel health alert notices to passengers arriving from affected countries (i.e., countries for which health 
warnings have been issued). 
• Post travel health alert notices in airports (e.g., on posters). 
• Recommend canceling or limiting nonessential travel to affected countries. 
• Further collection of information on all arriving passengers will likely not be feasible due to resource needs 
 
2. Travel out of the United States 
If the level of influenza transmission in the United States presents a high risk for exportation of disease, CDC and ADHS and 
county health authorities will likely conduct the following actions: 
• Distribute travel health warnings to outbound passengers who live in or have visited affected parts of the United 
States. 
• Recommend the cancellation of nonessential travel to other countries from ports of entry in affected parts of the 
United States. 
• Recommend the implementation of pre-departure screening (e.g., temperature screening or visual screening) of 
outbound travelers. 
 
3. Travel within the United States and Arizona 
If the level of influenza transmission in a U.S. area is high and if most other areas have not yet been affected, CDC and state 
authorities will consider recommending the limiting or canceling of nonessential travel to that area or to implement increased 
disease surveillance measures.  If the area of high disease transmission includes Arizona, community infection control 
measures will be used to slow the spread of illness within the state (see Supplement 8). 
 
B. De-escalation of travel-related control measures 
 
Decisions to de-escalate control measures related to international travel will be made in consultation with CDC. 
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